From bf16d27b3ddc695b71057a10d0eb045915be18bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 06:47:57 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 01/75] feat(ci): route PR comment agent mentions --- scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py | 184 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 184 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py diff --git a/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py b/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f637f3d08 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Route trusted pull-request comment mentions to CWL review agents. + +The router is intentionally small and fail-closed. It accepts only comments on +pull requests from trusted repository participants, recognizes exact agent +mentions, acknowledges the request, and emits repository-dispatch events that +reuse the existing Noema and OpenCode review pipelines. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import argparse +import json +import os +import re +import subprocess +from dataclasses import dataclass +from typing import Any, Sequence + + +TRUSTED_ASSOCIATIONS = frozenset({"OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"}) +MENTION_PATTERNS = { + "cwl-noema-review": re.compile(r"(? MentionRequest | None: + """Return a validated mention request, or ``None`` for an ignored event.""" + + issue = event.get("issue") or {} + comment = event.get("comment") or {} + repository = event.get("repository") or {} + + if not issue.get("pull_request"): + return None + if str(comment.get("user", {}).get("type", "")).casefold() == "bot": + return None + if str(comment.get("author_association", "")).upper() not in TRUSTED_ASSOCIATIONS: + return None + + body = str(comment.get("body") or "") + agents = tuple(name for name, pattern in MENTION_PATTERNS.items() if pattern.search(body)) + if not agents: + return None + + repository_name = str(repository.get("full_name") or "").strip() + actor = str(comment.get("user", {}).get("login") or "").strip() + head_sha = str((event.get("pull_request") or {}).get("head", {}).get("sha") or "").strip() + number = issue.get("number") + comment_id = comment.get("id") + + if not re.fullmatch(r"ContextualWisdomLab/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", repository_name): + raise ValueError("agent mentions are limited to ContextualWisdomLab repositories") + if not isinstance(number, int) or number < 1: + raise ValueError("pull request number is missing or invalid") + if not isinstance(comment_id, int) or comment_id < 1: + raise ValueError("comment id is missing or invalid") + if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", head_sha): + raise ValueError("pull request head SHA is missing or invalid") + if not actor: + raise ValueError("comment actor is missing") + + return MentionRequest( + repository=repository_name, + pull_request_number=number, + pull_request_head_sha=head_sha.lower(), + comment_id=comment_id, + actor=actor, + agents=agents, + ) + + +def gh_api(args: Sequence[str], *, input_payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> None: + """Invoke ``gh api`` with an optional JSON request payload.""" + + command = ["gh", "api", *args] + if input_payload is not None: + command.extend(["--input", "-"]) + subprocess.run( + command, + input=None if input_payload is None else json.dumps(input_payload), + text=True, + check=True, + ) + + +def dispatch(request: MentionRequest) -> None: + """Acknowledge and dispatch all agents requested by a validated comment.""" + + repo_api = f"repos/{request.repository}" + gh_api( + [f"{repo_api}/issues/comments/{request.comment_id}/reactions", "-X", "POST"], + input_payload={"content": "eyes"}, + ) + + dispatched: list[str] = [] + if "cwl-noema-review" in request.agents: + gh_api( + [f"{repo_api}/dispatches", "-X", "POST"], + input_payload={ + "event_type": "noema-review", + "client_payload": { + "target_repository": request.repository, + "pr_number": request.pull_request_number, + "pr_head_sha": request.pull_request_head_sha, + "requested_by": request.actor, + "source_comment_id": request.comment_id, + }, + }, + ) + dispatched.append("@cwl-noema-review") + + if "opencode-agent" in request.agents: + gh_api( + [f"{repo_api}/dispatches", "-X", "POST"], + input_payload={ + "event_type": "merge-scheduler", + "client_payload": { + "target_repository": request.repository, + "pr_number": request.pull_request_number, + "pr_head_sha": request.pull_request_head_sha, + "trigger_reviews": True, + "review_dispatch_limit": 1, + "requested_agent": "opencode-agent", + "requested_by": request.actor, + "source_comment_id": request.comment_id, + }, + }, + ) + dispatched.append("@opencode-agent") + + acknowledgement = ( + f"Queued {' and '.join(dispatched)} for PR #{request.pull_request_number} " + f"at head `{request.pull_request_head_sha}`. The existing review workflows " + "will post their normal verdict or failure evidence." + ) + gh_api( + [f"{repo_api}/issues/{request.pull_request_number}/comments", "-X", "POST"], + input_payload={"body": acknowledgement}, + ) + + +def load_event(path: str) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Load and validate a GitHub event JSON document.""" + + with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as handle: + value = json.load(handle) + if not isinstance(value, dict): + raise ValueError("GitHub event payload must be a JSON object") + return value + + +def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: + """Run the mention router for one GitHub issue-comment event.""" + + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() + parser.add_argument("--event-path", default=os.environ.get("GITHUB_EVENT_PATH", "")) + args = parser.parse_args(argv) + if not args.event_path: + parser.error("--event-path or GITHUB_EVENT_PATH is required") + + request = parse_event(load_event(args.event_path)) + if request is None: + print("No trusted pull-request agent mention found; nothing to dispatch.") + return 0 + dispatch(request) + return 0 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(main()) From 44a3afa4db0024416aaa7e5665d1f7fc0aef15f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 06:48:12 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 02/75] feat(ci): respond to review-agent mentions --- .github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml diff --git a/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml b/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..41fbb54df --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +name: Review Agent Mention Router + +on: + issue_comment: + types: [created] + +concurrency: + group: agent-mention-${{ github.repository }}-${{ github.event.comment.id }} + cancel-in-progress: false + +permissions: + contents: write + issues: write + pull-requests: read + +jobs: + route-agent-mention: + if: >- + github.event.issue.pull_request + && github.event.comment.user.type != 'Bot' + && contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association) + && ( + contains(github.event.comment.body, '@cwl-noema-review') + || contains(github.event.comment.body, '@opencode-agent') + ) + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + timeout-minutes: 5 + env: + FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true + GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} + steps: + - name: Check out trusted default-branch router + uses: actions/checkout@08c6903cd8c0fde910a37f88322edcfb5dd907a8 # v5.0.0 + with: + ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }} + persist-credentials: false + + - name: Resolve immutable pull-request head + env: + REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }} + PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }} + SOURCE_EVENT_PATH: ${{ github.event_path }} + run: | + set -euo pipefail + pr_json="$(gh api "repos/${REPOSITORY}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}")" + jq --argjson pull_request "$pr_json" '. + {pull_request: $pull_request}' \ + "$SOURCE_EVENT_PATH" >"${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-event.json" + + - name: Route trusted agent mention + run: >- + python3 scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py + --event-path "${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-event.json" From e9f223edcae6793827caa80cd13a035922c00f54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 06:48:31 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 03/75] test(ci): cover review-agent mention routing --- tests/test_agent_mention_router.py | 107 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_agent_mention_router.py diff --git a/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py b/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e2e114cf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +"""Tests for trusted PR comment agent mention routing.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import importlib.util +import json +from pathlib import Path +from types import ModuleType + +import pytest + + +ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +MODULE_PATH = ROOT / "scripts" / "ci" / "agent_mention_router.py" + + +def load_module() -> ModuleType: + """Load the router module from its script path.""" + + spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("agent_mention_router", MODULE_PATH) + assert spec and spec.loader + module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) + spec.loader.exec_module(module) + return module + + +def event(body: str, *, association: str = "MEMBER", user_type: str = "User") -> dict: + """Build a representative issue-comment event with PR metadata attached.""" + + return { + "repository": {"full_name": "ContextualWisdomLab/example"}, + "issue": {"number": 17, "pull_request": {"url": "https://api.github.test/pr/17"}}, + "comment": { + "id": 91, + "body": body, + "author_association": association, + "user": {"login": "maintainer", "type": user_type}, + }, + "pull_request": {"head": {"sha": "a" * 40}}, + } + + +def test_parse_event_recognizes_both_exact_mentions() -> None: + """Both supported exact mentions are emitted once in deterministic order.""" + + module = load_module() + request = module.parse_event(event("please @cwl-noema-review and @opencode-agent")) + assert request is not None + assert request.agents == ("cwl-noema-review", "opencode-agent") + assert request.pull_request_head_sha == "a" * 40 + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("payload", "expected"), + [ + (event("no agent here"), None), + (event("@opencode-agent", association="CONTRIBUTOR"), None), + (event("@opencode-agent", user_type="Bot"), None), + ({**event("@opencode-agent"), "issue": {"number": 17}}, None), + ], +) +def test_parse_event_ignores_untrusted_or_irrelevant_comments(payload: dict, expected: None) -> None: + """Non-PR, bot, untrusted, and unrelated comments do not dispatch work.""" + + module = load_module() + assert module.parse_event(payload) is expected + + +def test_parse_event_rejects_lookalike_mentions() -> None: + """Agent-name prefixes and suffixes cannot trigger a dispatch.""" + + module = load_module() + assert module.parse_event(event("@opencode-agent-evil @cwl-noema-review2")) is None + + +def test_dispatch_reuses_existing_review_events(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None: + """Noema and OpenCode mentions dispatch their established workflow events.""" + + module = load_module() + request = module.parse_event(event("@cwl-noema-review @opencode-agent")) + assert request is not None + calls: list[tuple[list[str], dict | None]] = [] + + def fake_gh_api(args, *, input_payload=None): + calls.append((list(args), input_payload)) + + monkeypatch.setattr(module, "gh_api", fake_gh_api) + module.dispatch(request) + + dispatch_payloads = [payload for args, payload in calls if args[0].endswith("/dispatches")] + assert [payload["event_type"] for payload in dispatch_payloads] == [ + "noema-review", + "merge-scheduler", + ] + assert dispatch_payloads[1]["client_payload"]["requested_agent"] == "opencode-agent" + assert calls[0][1] == {"content": "eyes"} + assert "Queued @cwl-noema-review and @opencode-agent" in calls[-1][1]["body"] + + +def test_load_event_requires_json_object(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """Malformed event shapes fail closed before any GitHub mutation.""" + + module = load_module() + path = tmp_path / "event.json" + path.write_text(json.dumps(["not", "an", "object"]), encoding="utf-8") + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="JSON object"): + module.load_event(str(path)) From 185d5ba66d737ab8b31f2cae6bfccbae3eaaee5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 06:49:18 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 04/75] test(ci): load router module safely --- tests/test_agent_mention_router.py | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py b/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py index e2e114cf9..95a1fe2be 100644 --- a/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py +++ b/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import importlib.util import json +import sys from pathlib import Path from types import ModuleType @@ -17,9 +18,11 @@ def load_module() -> ModuleType: """Load the router module from its script path.""" - spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("agent_mention_router", MODULE_PATH) + module_name = "agent_mention_router" + spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, MODULE_PATH) assert spec and spec.loader module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) + sys.modules[module_name] = module spec.loader.exec_module(module) return module From 225b2668f7071acbdfae928a993f608f8cca919f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 07:21:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 05/75] test(ci): specify trusted comment routing contract --- tests/test_agent_mention_router.py | 292 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 255 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py b/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py index 95a1fe2be..e11e7227e 100644 --- a/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py +++ b/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import json import sys from pathlib import Path -from types import ModuleType +from types import ModuleType, SimpleNamespace import pytest @@ -27,84 +27,302 @@ def load_module() -> ModuleType: return module -def event(body: str, *, association: str = "MEMBER", user_type: str = "User") -> dict: - """Build a representative issue-comment event with PR metadata attached.""" +def event( + body: str, + *, + association: str = "MEMBER", + user_type: str = "User", +) -> dict: + """Build a representative enriched issue-comment event.""" return { "repository": {"full_name": "ContextualWisdomLab/example"}, - "issue": {"number": 17, "pull_request": {"url": "https://api.github.test/pr/17"}}, + "issue": { + "number": 17, + "pull_request": {"url": "https://api.github.test/pr/17"}, + }, "comment": { "id": 91, "body": body, "author_association": association, "user": {"login": "maintainer", "type": user_type}, }, - "pull_request": {"head": {"sha": "a" * 40}}, + "pull_request": { + "state": "open", + "head": {"sha": "a" * 40}, + "base": {"ref": "develop"}, + }, } -def test_parse_event_recognizes_both_exact_mentions() -> None: - """Both supported exact mentions are emitted once in deterministic order.""" +class FakeClient: + """Capture JSON API calls for deterministic dispatch assertions.""" + + def __init__(self) -> None: + """Initialize an empty call ledger.""" + + self.calls: list[tuple[list[str], dict | None]] = [] + + def request(self, args, *, input_payload=None): + """Record one request and return no response body.""" + + self.calls.append((list(args), input_payload)) + return None + + +def test_exact_mentions_and_parse_event() -> None: + """Both exact mentions are recognized with immutable PR metadata.""" module = load_module() - request = module.parse_event(event("please @cwl-noema-review and @opencode-agent")) + request = module.parse_event( + event("please @cwl-noema-review and @opencode-agent") + ) assert request is not None assert request.agents == ("cwl-noema-review", "opencode-agent") assert request.pull_request_head_sha == "a" * 40 + assert request.pull_request_base_branch == "develop" + assert module.exact_mentions("@opencode-agent-evil @cwl-noema-review2") == () @pytest.mark.parametrize( - ("payload", "expected"), + "payload", [ - (event("no agent here"), None), - (event("@opencode-agent", association="CONTRIBUTOR"), None), - (event("@opencode-agent", user_type="Bot"), None), - ({**event("@opencode-agent"), "issue": {"number": 17}}, None), + event("no agent here"), + event("@opencode-agent", association="CONTRIBUTOR"), + event("@opencode-agent", user_type="Bot"), + {**event("@opencode-agent"), "issue": {"number": 17}}, + { + **event("@opencode-agent"), + "pull_request": { + **event("@opencode-agent")["pull_request"], + "state": "closed", + }, + }, + { + **event("@opencode-agent"), + "conversation_comments": [ + {"body": ""} + ], + }, ], ) -def test_parse_event_ignores_untrusted_or_irrelevant_comments(payload: dict, expected: None) -> None: - """Non-PR, bot, untrusted, and unrelated comments do not dispatch work.""" +def test_parse_event_ignores_untrusted_irrelevant_or_processed_comments( + payload: dict, +) -> None: + """Untrusted, irrelevant, non-PR, and acknowledged comments are ignored.""" - module = load_module() - assert module.parse_event(payload) is expected + assert load_module().parse_event(payload) is None -def test_parse_event_rejects_lookalike_mentions() -> None: - """Agent-name prefixes and suffixes cannot trigger a dispatch.""" +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("path", "value", "message"), + [ + (("repository", "full_name"), "outside/example", "limited"), + (("issue", "number"), 0, "number"), + (("comment", "id"), 0, "comment id"), + (("pull_request", "head", "sha"), "bad", "head SHA"), + (("pull_request", "base", "ref"), "-bad", "base branch"), + (("comment", "user", "login"), "", "actor"), + ], +) +def test_parse_event_rejects_malformed_trusted_requests( + path: tuple[str, ...], + value: object, + message: str, +) -> None: + """Malformed trusted invocation metadata fails closed.""" + + payload = event("@opencode-agent") + target = payload + for key in path[:-1]: + target = target[key] + target[path[-1]] = value + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match=message): + load_module().parse_event(payload) + + +def test_receipt_and_allowlist_helpers() -> None: + """Receipt extraction and exact repository allowlists are deterministic.""" module = load_module() - assert module.parse_event(event("@opencode-agent-evil @cwl-noema-review2")) is None + assert module.receipt_marker(91) == "" + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="positive"): + module.receipt_marker(0) + comments = [ + {"body": ""}, + {"body": "x y"}, + {"body": None}, + ] + assert module.processed_comment_ids(comments) == frozenset({91, 92}) + assert module.parse_repository_allowlist( + "ContextualWisdomLab/example, ContextualWisdomLab/.github," + ) == frozenset( + {"ContextualWisdomLab/example", "ContextualWisdomLab/.github"} + ) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="invalid repository"): + module.parse_repository_allowlist("outside/example") -def test_dispatch_reuses_existing_review_events(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None: - """Noema and OpenCode mentions dispatch their established workflow events.""" +def test_eligible_agents_and_payloads() -> None: + """Eligibility and event bodies preserve the bounded review contract.""" module = load_module() request = module.parse_event(event("@cwl-noema-review @opencode-agent")) assert request is not None - calls: list[tuple[list[str], dict | None]] = [] + assert module.eligible_agents( + request, + opencode_allowlist=frozenset({request.repository}), + ) == (("cwl-noema-review", "opencode-agent"), ()) + assert module.eligible_agents( + request, + opencode_allowlist=frozenset(), + ) == (("cwl-noema-review",), ("opencode-agent",)) + noema = module.noema_payload(request) + assert noema["event_type"] == "noema-review" + assert noema["client_payload"]["pr_head_sha"] == "a" * 40 + opencode = module.opencode_payload(request) + assert opencode["event_type"] == "merge-scheduler" + assert opencode["client_payload"]["base_branch"] == "develop" + assert opencode["client_payload"]["merge_mode"] == "disabled" + assert opencode["client_payload"]["enable_auto_merge"] is False + assert opencode["client_payload"]["update_branches"] is False - def fake_gh_api(args, *, input_payload=None): - calls.append((list(args), input_payload)) - monkeypatch.setattr(module, "gh_api", fake_gh_api) - module.dispatch(request) +def test_dispatch_uses_central_events_and_acknowledges() -> None: + """Both agents dispatch centrally with bounded review-only OpenCode options.""" - dispatch_payloads = [payload for args, payload in calls if args[0].endswith("/dispatches")] - assert [payload["event_type"] for payload in dispatch_payloads] == [ + module = load_module() + request = module.parse_event(event("@cwl-noema-review @opencode-agent")) + assert request is not None + target = FakeClient() + central = FakeClient() + result = module.dispatch_request( + request, + target_client=target, + dispatch_client=central, + opencode_allowlist=frozenset({request.repository}), + ) + assert result == ("@cwl-noema-review", "@opencode-agent") + assert [payload["event_type"] for _, payload in central.calls] == [ "noema-review", "merge-scheduler", ] - assert dispatch_payloads[1]["client_payload"]["requested_agent"] == "opencode-agent" - assert calls[0][1] == {"content": "eyes"} - assert "Queued @cwl-noema-review and @opencode-agent" in calls[-1][1]["body"] + assert all( + args[0] == "repos/ContextualWisdomLab/.github/dispatches" + for args, _ in central.calls + ) + assert target.calls[0][1] == {"content": "eyes"} + assert "cwl-agent-mention-receipt:91" in target.calls[1][1]["body"] -def test_load_event_requires_json_object(tmp_path: Path) -> None: - """Malformed event shapes fail closed before any GitHub mutation.""" +def test_dispatch_rejects_unallowlisted_opencode_and_supports_dry_run( + capsys, +) -> None: + """OpenCode fails closed outside its allowlist while dry-run is mutation-free.""" module = load_module() - path = tmp_path / "event.json" - path.write_text(json.dumps(["not", "an", "object"]), encoding="utf-8") + request = module.parse_event(event("@opencode-agent")) + assert request is not None + target = FakeClient() + central = FakeClient() + assert module.dispatch_request( + request, + target_client=target, + dispatch_client=central, + opencode_allowlist=frozenset(), + ) == () + assert central.calls == [] + assert "Rejected @opencode-agent" in target.calls[-1][1]["body"] + + target = FakeClient() + central = FakeClient() + assert module.dispatch_request( + request, + target_client=target, + dispatch_client=central, + opencode_allowlist=frozenset(), + dry_run=True, + ) == () + assert target.calls == central.calls == [] + output = capsys.readouterr().out + assert "DRY-RUN agent mention" in output + assert "reject=opencode-agent" in output + + +def test_dispatch_noema_only_covers_non_opencode_path() -> None: + """A Noema-only request bypasses the OpenCode allowlist branch.""" + + module = load_module() + request = module.parse_event(event("@cwl-noema-review")) + assert request is not None + target = FakeClient() + central = FakeClient() + assert module.dispatch_request( + request, + target_client=target, + dispatch_client=central, + opencode_allowlist=frozenset(), + ) == ("@cwl-noema-review",) + assert central.calls[0][1]["event_type"] == "noema-review" + + +def test_github_client_validates_token_and_decodes_json(monkeypatch) -> None: + """The token-bound client never places credentials in command arguments.""" + + module = load_module() + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="token"): + module.GitHubClient("") + calls = [] + + def fake_run(command, **kwargs): + calls.append((command, kwargs)) + return SimpleNamespace(stdout='{"ok": true}\n') + + monkeypatch.setattr(module.subprocess, "run", fake_run) + client = module.GitHubClient("secret-token") + assert client.request(["repos/x/y"], input_payload={"a": 1}) == {"ok": True} + command, kwargs = calls[0] + assert command == ["gh", "api", "repos/x/y", "--input", "-"] + assert "secret-token" not in command + assert kwargs["env"]["GH_TOKEN"] == "secret-token" + assert kwargs["input"] == '{"a": 1}' + + monkeypatch.setattr( + module.subprocess, + "run", + lambda *args, **kwargs: SimpleNamespace(stdout=" "), + ) + assert client.request(["repos/x/y"]) is None + + +def test_load_event_and_main_paths(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, capsys) -> None: + """CLI rejects malformed JSON, ignores irrelevant events, and dispatches input.""" + + module = load_module() + array_path = tmp_path / "array.json" + array_path.write_text(json.dumps(["bad"]), encoding="utf-8") with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="JSON object"): - module.load_event(str(path)) + module.load_event(str(array_path)) + + ignored_path = tmp_path / "ignored.json" + ignored_path.write_text(json.dumps(event("nothing")), encoding="utf-8") + assert module.main(["--event-path", str(ignored_path)]) == 0 + assert "nothing to dispatch" in capsys.readouterr().out + with pytest.raises(SystemExit): + module.main([]) + + valid_path = tmp_path / "valid.json" + valid_path.write_text(json.dumps(event("@opencode-agent")), encoding="utf-8") + captured = [] + monkeypatch.setenv("GH_TOKEN", "token") + monkeypatch.setenv( + "OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS", + "ContextualWisdomLab/example", + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + module, + "dispatch_request", + lambda request, **kwargs: captured.append((request, kwargs)) or (), + ) + assert module.main(["--event-path", str(valid_path), "--dry-run"]) == 0 + assert captured[0][1]["dry_run"] is True From c8e6ec10c84905ac3e2cdcfa373fbe2373c8b8b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 07:22:15 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 06/75] test(ci): cover organization mention sweep --- tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py | 434 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 434 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py diff --git a/tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py b/tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9e70fa572 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py @@ -0,0 +1,434 @@ +"""Tests for organization-wide pull-request comment mention sweeping.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import importlib +import sys +from datetime import datetime, timezone +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + + +ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +SCRIPTS = ROOT / "scripts" / "ci" +sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS)) + + +class FakeClient: + """Endpoint-keyed fake GitHub client for sweep tests.""" + + def __init__(self, responses=None) -> None: + """Initialize response mapping and request ledger.""" + + self.responses = responses or {} + self.calls = [] + + def request(self, args, *, input_payload=None): + """Return the response registered for the first API argument.""" + + self.calls.append((list(args), input_payload)) + return self.responses.get(args[0]) + + +def comment( + comment_id: int, + body: str, + *, + association: str = "MEMBER", + user_type: str = "User", +) -> dict: + """Build one issue-comment API object.""" + + return { + "id": comment_id, + "body": body, + "author_association": association, + "user": {"login": "maintainer", "type": user_type}, + } + + +def repository( + name: str = "example", + *, + owner: str = "ContextualWisdomLab", + archived: bool = False, + disabled: bool = False, +) -> dict: + """Build one repository API object.""" + + return { + "full_name": f"{owner}/{name}", + "owner": {"login": owner}, + "archived": archived, + "disabled": disabled, + } + + +def candidate(number: int = 7) -> dict: + """Build one normalized pull-request candidate.""" + + return { + "number": number, + "repository": "ContextualWisdomLab/example", + "pull_request": { + "url": ( + "https://api.github.com/repos/ContextualWisdomLab/example/" + f"pulls/{number}" + ) + }, + } + + +def pull_list_item(number: int = 7, updated_at: str = "2026-08-05T11:00:00Z") -> dict: + """Build one pull-list API item.""" + + return {"number": number, "updated_at": updated_at} + + +def live_pull(state: str = "open") -> dict: + """Build the live pull-request metadata consumed by the router.""" + + return { + "state": state, + "head": {"sha": "b" * 40}, + "base": {"ref": "main"}, + } + + +def module(): + """Reload the sweep module for isolated monkeypatching.""" + + return importlib.reload(importlib.import_module("agent_mention_sweep")) + + +def test_timestamp_cutoff_and_page_validation() -> None: + """Timestamps, lookback bounds, and pagination fail closed.""" + + sweep = module() + now = datetime(2026, 8, 5, 12, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc) + assert sweep.parse_timestamp("2026-08-05T11:00:00Z") == datetime( + 2026, + 8, + 5, + 11, + 0, + tzinfo=timezone.utc, + ) + for invalid in ("bad", "2026-08-05T11:00:00"): + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="timestamp"): + sweep.parse_timestamp(invalid) + assert sweep.cutoff_timestamp(24, now=now) == "2026-08-04T12:00:00Z" + for hours in (0, 721): + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="lookback"): + sweep.cutoff_timestamp(hours, now=now) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="timezone-aware"): + sweep.cutoff_timestamp(1, now=datetime(2026, 8, 5)) + + assert sweep.flatten_pages([[{"a": 1}], [{"b": 2}]]) == [ + {"a": 1}, + {"b": 2}, + ] + assert sweep.flatten_pages( + [{"items": [{"a": 1}]}], + collection_key="items", + ) == [{"a": 1}] + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not a list"): + sweep.flatten_pages({"items": {}}, collection_key="items") + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="non-object"): + sweep.flatten_pages([[1]]) + + +def test_accessible_repository_sources_filter_and_validate() -> None: + """PAT and installation-token repository inventories are both supported.""" + + sweep = module() + organization_response = [ + [ + repository(), + repository("archived", archived=True), + repository("disabled", disabled=True), + repository("outside", owner="outside"), + ] + ] + organization_client = FakeClient( + {"orgs/ContextualWisdomLab/repos": organization_response} + ) + assert sweep.list_accessible_repositories( + organization_client, + organization="ContextualWisdomLab", + repository_source="organization", + ) == ["ContextualWisdomLab/example"] + + installation_client = FakeClient( + { + "installation/repositories": [ + {"repositories": [repository(), repository("second")]} + ] + } + ) + assert sweep.list_accessible_repositories( + installation_client, + organization="ContextualWisdomLab", + repository_source="installation", + ) == ["ContextualWisdomLab/example", "ContextualWisdomLab/second"] + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="organization"): + sweep.list_accessible_repositories( + organization_client, + organization="bad/name", + repository_source="organization", + ) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="repository source"): + sweep.list_accessible_repositories( + organization_client, + organization="ContextualWisdomLab", + repository_source="bad", + ) + invalid_client = FakeClient( + { + "orgs/ContextualWisdomLab/repos": [ + [{**repository(), "full_name": "bad/name"}] + ] + } + ) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="full_name"): + sweep.list_accessible_repositories( + invalid_client, + organization="ContextualWisdomLab", + repository_source="organization", + ) + + +def test_recent_pull_request_filtering() -> None: + """Only open accessible PRs updated at or after the cutoff are candidates.""" + + sweep = module() + client = FakeClient( + { + "orgs/ContextualWisdomLab/repos": [[repository()]], + "repos/ContextualWisdomLab/example/pulls": [ + [ + pull_list_item(7, "2026-08-05T11:00:00Z"), + pull_list_item(8, "2026-08-04T11:59:59Z"), + ] + ], + } + ) + assert sweep.list_recent_pull_requests( + client, + organization="ContextualWisdomLab", + repository_source="organization", + since="2026-08-04T12:00:00Z", + ) == [candidate()] + + bad_number_client = FakeClient( + { + "orgs/ContextualWisdomLab/repos": [[repository()]], + "repos/ContextualWisdomLab/example/pulls": [ + [{"number": 0, "updated_at": "2026-08-05T11:00:00Z"}] + ], + } + ) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="pull request number"): + sweep.list_recent_pull_requests( + bad_number_client, + organization="ContextualWisdomLab", + repository_source="organization", + since="2026-08-04T12:00:00Z", + ) + + +def test_build_requests_skips_receipts_and_closed_pull_requests() -> None: + """Only unacknowledged trusted comments on a live PR become requests.""" + + sweep = module() + comments_endpoint = "repos/ContextualWisdomLab/example/issues/7/comments" + pull_endpoint = "repos/ContextualWisdomLab/example/pulls/7" + comments = [ + comment(10, "@opencode-agent"), + comment(11, ""), + comment(12, "@cwl-noema-review"), + comment(13, "@opencode-agent", association="CONTRIBUTOR"), + ] + client = FakeClient({comments_endpoint: [comments], pull_endpoint: live_pull()}) + requests = sweep.build_requests_for_pull_request( + client, + issue=candidate(), + since="2026-08-04T00:00:00Z", + ) + assert [request.comment_id for request in requests] == [12] + assert requests[0].agents == ("cwl-noema-review",) + + closed = FakeClient( + {comments_endpoint: [comments], pull_endpoint: live_pull("closed")} + ) + assert sweep.build_requests_for_pull_request( + closed, + issue=candidate(), + since="2026-08-04T00:00:00Z", + ) == () + + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="repository"): + sweep.build_requests_for_pull_request( + client, + issue={**candidate(), "repository": "bad/name"}, + since="x", + ) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="number"): + sweep.build_requests_for_pull_request( + client, + issue={**candidate(), "number": 0}, + since="x", + ) + + +def mention_request(number: int, comment_id: int, agent: str): + """Build one validated router request for sweep orchestration tests.""" + + router = importlib.import_module("agent_mention_router") + return router.MentionRequest( + "ContextualWisdomLab/example", + number, + "a" * 40, + "main", + comment_id, + "maintainer", + (agent,), + ) + + +def test_sweep_dispatches_with_limit_and_reports_empty(monkeypatch, capsys) -> None: + """The sweep dispatches deterministically and respects its mutation budget.""" + + sweep = module() + request_a = mention_request(7, 10, "opencode-agent") + request_b = mention_request(8, 11, "cwl-noema-review") + monkeypatch.setattr( + sweep, + "list_recent_pull_requests", + lambda *args, **kwargs: [candidate()], + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sweep, + "build_requests_for_pull_request", + lambda *args, **kwargs: (request_a, request_b), + ) + dispatched = [] + monkeypatch.setattr( + sweep, + "dispatch_request", + lambda request, **kwargs: dispatched.append(request.comment_id) or (), + ) + count = sweep.sweep( + target_client=FakeClient(), + dispatch_client=FakeClient(), + organization="ContextualWisdomLab", + repository_source="organization", + lookback_hours=24, + max_dispatches=1, + opencode_allowlist=frozenset({"ContextualWisdomLab/example"}), + now=datetime(2026, 8, 5, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + ) + assert count == 1 + assert dispatched == [10] + assert "reached dispatch limit" in capsys.readouterr().out + + monkeypatch.setattr( + sweep, + "list_recent_pull_requests", + lambda *args, **kwargs: [], + ) + assert sweep.sweep( + target_client=FakeClient(), + dispatch_client=FakeClient(), + organization="ContextualWisdomLab", + repository_source="installation", + lookback_hours=24, + max_dispatches=2, + opencode_allowlist=frozenset(), + now=datetime(2026, 8, 5, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + ) == 0 + assert "0 dispatch" in capsys.readouterr().out + for value in (0, 101): + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="max dispatches"): + sweep.sweep( + target_client=FakeClient(), + dispatch_client=FakeClient(), + organization="ContextualWisdomLab", + repository_source="organization", + lookback_hours=24, + max_dispatches=value, + opencode_allowlist=frozenset(), + ) + + +def test_sweep_continues_across_empty_results_and_completes( + monkeypatch, + capsys, +) -> None: + """Empty candidate results do not stop later PR processing.""" + + sweep = module() + first = candidate() + second = candidate(8) + request = mention_request(8, 12, "cwl-noema-review") + monkeypatch.setattr( + sweep, + "list_recent_pull_requests", + lambda *args, **kwargs: [first, second], + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sweep, + "build_requests_for_pull_request", + lambda *args, issue, **kwargs: () if issue["number"] == 7 else (request,), + ) + dispatched = [] + monkeypatch.setattr( + sweep, + "dispatch_request", + lambda request, **kwargs: dispatched.append(request.comment_id) or (), + ) + assert sweep.sweep( + target_client=FakeClient(), + dispatch_client=FakeClient(), + organization="ContextualWisdomLab", + repository_source="organization", + lookback_hours=24, + max_dispatches=2, + opencode_allowlist=frozenset(), + now=datetime(2026, 8, 5, tzinfo=timezone.utc), + ) == 1 + assert dispatched == [12] + assert "completed with 1 dispatch" in capsys.readouterr().out + + +def test_main_constructs_clients_and_forwards_options(monkeypatch) -> None: + """CLI reads credentials, parses allowlist, and forwards bounded options.""" + + sweep = module() + captured = [] + monkeypatch.setenv("TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN", "target") + monkeypatch.setenv("AGENT_DISPATCH_TOKEN", "dispatch") + monkeypatch.setenv( + "OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS", + "ContextualWisdomLab/example", + ) + monkeypatch.setattr(sweep, "sweep", lambda **kwargs: captured.append(kwargs) or 0) + assert sweep.main( + [ + "--organization", + "ContextualWisdomLab", + "--repository-source", + "installation", + "--lookback-hours", + "48", + "--max-dispatches", + "3", + "--dry-run", + ] + ) == 0 + assert captured[0]["repository_source"] == "installation" + assert captured[0]["lookback_hours"] == 48 + assert captured[0]["max_dispatches"] == 3 + assert captured[0]["dry_run"] is True From 26ef319c07af175a98a280e2b10f6265ca90bc62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 07:22:27 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 07/75] test(ci): enforce mention workflow security contract --- tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py diff --git a/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py b/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ccca9d6fd --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +"""Static least-privilege and trigger contract for agent mention automation.""" + +from pathlib import Path + + +ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +WORKFLOW = ROOT / ".github" / "workflows" / "agent-mention-router.yml" + + +def test_workflow_uses_local_event_and_central_sweep_with_job_scoped_writes() -> None: + """The router is local-fast, organization-wide, and least-privileged by job.""" + + text = WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + header, jobs = text.split("\njobs:\n", 1) + assert "issue_comment:" in header + assert 'cron: "*/5 * * * *"' in header + assert "workflow_dispatch:" in header + assert "permissions:\n contents: read" in header + assert "contents: write" not in header + + local, sweep = jobs.split("\n sweep-organization-agent-mentions:\n", 1) + assert "route-local-agent-mention:" in local + assert ( + "permissions:\n" + " contents: write\n" + " issues: write\n" + " pull-requests: read" + ) in local + assert "ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}" in local + assert "TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}" in local + assert "conversation_comments" in local + + assert "permissions:\n contents: write\n id-token: write" in sweep + assert "secrets.PR_REVIEW_MERGE_TOKEN" in sweep + assert "secrets.OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN" in sweep + assert "TARGET_REPOSITORY_SOURCE" in sweep + assert "AGENT_DISPATCH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}" in sweep + assert "agent_mention_sweep.py" in sweep From 57e6291c9b403321e412586198dbabb708dba84e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 07:23:04 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 08/75] feat(ci): route trusted mentions through central review events --- scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py | 303 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 234 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py b/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py index f637f3d08..6202c8889 100644 --- a/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py +++ b/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Route trusted pull-request comment mentions to CWL review agents. -The router is intentionally small and fail-closed. It accepts only comments on -pull requests from trusted repository participants, recognizes exact agent -mentions, acknowledges the request, and emits repository-dispatch events that -reuse the existing Noema and OpenCode review pipelines. +The router validates one enriched ``issue_comment`` event, dispatches the +existing central Noema or OpenCode review entrypoint, and posts a visible +receipt without checking out or executing pull-request-controlled code. """ from __future__ import annotations @@ -18,11 +17,22 @@ from typing import Any, Sequence +CENTRAL_AUTOMATION_REPOSITORY = "ContextualWisdomLab/.github" TRUSTED_ASSOCIATIONS = frozenset({"OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"}) MENTION_PATTERNS = { - "cwl-noema-review": re.compile(r"(?") @dataclass(frozen=True) @@ -32,44 +42,115 @@ class MentionRequest: repository: str pull_request_number: int pull_request_head_sha: str + pull_request_base_branch: str comment_id: int actor: str agents: tuple[str, ...] +class GitHubClient: + """Small token-bound wrapper around ``gh api`` for JSON requests.""" + + def __init__(self, token: str) -> None: + """Initialize a client with one non-empty GitHub credential.""" + + if not token: + raise ValueError("GitHub token is required") + self._token = token + + def request( + self, + args: Sequence[str], + *, + input_payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None, + ) -> Any: + """Execute ``gh api`` and decode its optional JSON response.""" + + command = ["gh", "api", *args] + if input_payload is not None: + command.extend(["--input", "-"]) + environment = os.environ.copy() + environment["GH_TOKEN"] = self._token + completed = subprocess.run( + command, + input=None if input_payload is None else json.dumps(input_payload), + text=True, + capture_output=True, + check=True, + env=environment, + ) + output = completed.stdout.strip() + return None if not output else json.loads(output) + + +def exact_mentions(body: str) -> tuple[str, ...]: + """Return supported exact agent mentions in deterministic order.""" + + return tuple( + name for name, pattern in MENTION_PATTERNS.items() if pattern.search(body) + ) + + +def receipt_marker(comment_id: int) -> str: + """Return the hidden idempotency marker for one invocation comment.""" + + if comment_id < 1: + raise ValueError("comment id must be positive") + return f"" + + +def processed_comment_ids(comments: Sequence[dict[str, Any]]) -> frozenset[int]: + """Extract invocation comment identifiers already acknowledged on a PR.""" + + processed: set[int] = set() + for comment in comments: + body = str(comment.get("body") or "") + processed.update(int(match) for match in RECEIPT_RE.findall(body)) + return frozenset(processed) + + def parse_event(event: dict[str, Any]) -> MentionRequest | None: """Return a validated mention request, or ``None`` for an ignored event.""" issue = event.get("issue") or {} comment = event.get("comment") or {} repository = event.get("repository") or {} + pull_request = event.get("pull_request") or {} if not issue.get("pull_request"): return None + if pull_request.get("state") != "open": + return None if str(comment.get("user", {}).get("type", "")).casefold() == "bot": return None if str(comment.get("author_association", "")).upper() not in TRUSTED_ASSOCIATIONS: return None - body = str(comment.get("body") or "") - agents = tuple(name for name, pattern in MENTION_PATTERNS.items() if pattern.search(body)) + agents = exact_mentions(str(comment.get("body") or "")) if not agents: return None repository_name = str(repository.get("full_name") or "").strip() actor = str(comment.get("user", {}).get("login") or "").strip() - head_sha = str((event.get("pull_request") or {}).get("head", {}).get("sha") or "").strip() + head_sha = str(pull_request.get("head", {}).get("sha") or "").strip() + base_branch = str(pull_request.get("base", {}).get("ref") or "").strip() number = issue.get("number") comment_id = comment.get("id") - if not re.fullmatch(r"ContextualWisdomLab/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", repository_name): - raise ValueError("agent mentions are limited to ContextualWisdomLab repositories") + if not REPOSITORY_RE.fullmatch(repository_name): + raise ValueError( + "agent mentions are limited to ContextualWisdomLab repositories" + ) if not isinstance(number, int) or number < 1: raise ValueError("pull request number is missing or invalid") if not isinstance(comment_id, int) or comment_id < 1: raise ValueError("comment id is missing or invalid") - if not re.fullmatch(r"[0-9a-fA-F]{40}", head_sha): + if comment_id in processed_comment_ids(event.get("conversation_comments") or ()): + return None + if not HEAD_SHA_RE.fullmatch(head_sha): raise ValueError("pull request head SHA is missing or invalid") + if not BASE_BRANCH_RE.fullmatch(base_branch): + raise ValueError("pull request base branch is missing or invalid") if not actor: raise ValueError("comment actor is missing") @@ -77,80 +158,147 @@ def parse_event(event: dict[str, Any]) -> MentionRequest | None: repository=repository_name, pull_request_number=number, pull_request_head_sha=head_sha.lower(), + pull_request_base_branch=base_branch, comment_id=comment_id, actor=actor, agents=agents, ) -def gh_api(args: Sequence[str], *, input_payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> None: - """Invoke ``gh api`` with an optional JSON request payload.""" +def parse_repository_allowlist(raw_value: str) -> frozenset[str]: + """Parse and validate a comma-separated exact repository allowlist.""" - command = ["gh", "api", *args] - if input_payload is not None: - command.extend(["--input", "-"]) - subprocess.run( - command, - input=None if input_payload is None else json.dumps(input_payload), - text=True, - check=True, + repositories = frozenset( + part.strip() for part in raw_value.split(",") if part.strip() ) + invalid = sorted( + repository + for repository in repositories + if not REPOSITORY_RE.fullmatch(repository) + ) + if invalid: + raise ValueError(f"invalid repository allowlist entries: {', '.join(invalid)}") + return repositories -def dispatch(request: MentionRequest) -> None: - """Acknowledge and dispatch all agents requested by a validated comment.""" - - repo_api = f"repos/{request.repository}" - gh_api( - [f"{repo_api}/issues/comments/{request.comment_id}/reactions", "-X", "POST"], - input_payload={"content": "eyes"}, - ) +def eligible_agents( + request: MentionRequest, + *, + opencode_allowlist: frozenset[str], +) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]: + """Partition requested agents into dispatchable and rejected handles.""" - dispatched: list[str] = [] + dispatchable: list[str] = [] + rejected: list[str] = [] if "cwl-noema-review" in request.agents: - gh_api( - [f"{repo_api}/dispatches", "-X", "POST"], - input_payload={ - "event_type": "noema-review", - "client_payload": { - "target_repository": request.repository, - "pr_number": request.pull_request_number, - "pr_head_sha": request.pull_request_head_sha, - "requested_by": request.actor, - "source_comment_id": request.comment_id, - }, - }, + dispatchable.append("cwl-noema-review") + if "opencode-agent" in request.agents: + if request.repository in opencode_allowlist: + dispatchable.append("opencode-agent") + else: + rejected.append("opencode-agent") + return tuple(dispatchable), tuple(rejected) + + +def noema_payload(request: MentionRequest) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return the central Noema repository-dispatch request body.""" + + return { + "event_type": "noema-review", + "client_payload": { + "target_repository": request.repository, + "pr_number": request.pull_request_number, + "pr_head_sha": request.pull_request_head_sha, + "requested_by": request.actor, + "source_comment_id": request.comment_id, + }, + } + + +def opencode_payload(request: MentionRequest) -> dict[str, Any]: + """Return the review-only central OpenCode scheduler dispatch body.""" + + return { + "event_type": "merge-scheduler", + "client_payload": { + "target_repository": request.repository, + "pr_number": request.pull_request_number, + "pr_head_sha": request.pull_request_head_sha, + "base_branch": request.pull_request_base_branch, + "trigger_reviews": True, + "review_dispatch_limit": "1", + "enable_auto_merge": False, + "update_branches": False, + "merge_mode": "disabled", + "requested_agent": "opencode-agent", + "requested_by": request.actor, + "source_comment_id": request.comment_id, + }, + } + + +def dispatch_request( + request: MentionRequest, + *, + target_client: GitHubClient, + dispatch_client: GitHubClient, + opencode_allowlist: frozenset[str], + dry_run: bool = False, +) -> tuple[str, ...]: + """Dispatch requested agents and acknowledge the invocation on its PR.""" + + dispatchable, rejected = eligible_agents( + request, + opencode_allowlist=opencode_allowlist, + ) + handles = tuple(f"@{agent}" for agent in dispatchable) + if dry_run: + print( + "DRY-RUN agent mention " + f"repo={request.repository} pr={request.pull_request_number} " + f"head={request.pull_request_head_sha} " + f"dispatch={','.join(dispatchable) or 'none'} " + f"reject={','.join(rejected) or 'none'}" ) - dispatched.append("@cwl-noema-review") + return handles - if "opencode-agent" in request.agents: - gh_api( - [f"{repo_api}/dispatches", "-X", "POST"], - input_payload={ - "event_type": "merge-scheduler", - "client_payload": { - "target_repository": request.repository, - "pr_number": request.pull_request_number, - "pr_head_sha": request.pull_request_head_sha, - "trigger_reviews": True, - "review_dispatch_limit": 1, - "requested_agent": "opencode-agent", - "requested_by": request.actor, - "source_comment_id": request.comment_id, - }, - }, + dispatch_endpoint = f"repos/{CENTRAL_AUTOMATION_REPOSITORY}/dispatches" + if "cwl-noema-review" in dispatchable: + dispatch_client.request( + [dispatch_endpoint, "-X", "POST"], + input_payload=noema_payload(request), + ) + if "opencode-agent" in dispatchable: + dispatch_client.request( + [dispatch_endpoint, "-X", "POST"], + input_payload=opencode_payload(request), ) - dispatched.append("@opencode-agent") + target_api = f"repos/{request.repository}" + target_client.request( + [f"{target_api}/issues/comments/{request.comment_id}/reactions", "-X", "POST"], + input_payload={"content": "eyes"}, + ) + status_parts: list[str] = [] + if handles: + status_parts.append(f"Queued {' and '.join(handles)}") + if rejected: + rejected_handles = " and ".join(f"@{agent}" for agent in rejected) + status_parts.append( + f"Rejected {rejected_handles}: repository is absent from " + "OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS" + ) acknowledgement = ( - f"Queued {' and '.join(dispatched)} for PR #{request.pull_request_number} " - f"at head `{request.pull_request_head_sha}`. The existing review workflows " - "will post their normal verdict or failure evidence." + f"{receipt_marker(request.comment_id)}\n" + f"{' ; '.join(status_parts)} for PR #{request.pull_request_number} at head " + f"`{request.pull_request_head_sha}`. Existing review workflows remain " + "authoritative for the final verdict and failure evidence." ) - gh_api( - [f"{repo_api}/issues/{request.pull_request_number}/comments", "-X", "POST"], + target_client.request( + [f"{target_api}/issues/{request.pull_request_number}/comments", "-X", "POST"], input_payload={"body": acknowledgement}, ) + return handles def load_event(path: str) -> dict[str, Any]: @@ -164,10 +312,11 @@ def load_event(path: str) -> dict[str, Any]: def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: - """Run the mention router for one GitHub issue-comment event.""" + """Run the mention router for one enriched GitHub issue-comment event.""" parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("--event-path", default=os.environ.get("GITHUB_EVENT_PATH", "")) + parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true") args = parser.parse_args(argv) if not args.event_path: parser.error("--event-path or GITHUB_EVENT_PATH is required") @@ -176,9 +325,25 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: if request is None: print("No trusted pull-request agent mention found; nothing to dispatch.") return 0 - dispatch(request) + + target_token = os.environ.get("TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN") or os.environ.get( + "GH_TOKEN", "" + ) + dispatch_token = os.environ.get("AGENT_DISPATCH_TOKEN") or os.environ.get( + "GH_TOKEN", "" + ) + allowlist = parse_repository_allowlist( + os.environ.get("OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS", "") + ) + dispatch_request( + request, + target_client=GitHubClient(target_token), + dispatch_client=GitHubClient(dispatch_token), + opencode_allowlist=allowlist, + dry_run=args.dry_run, + ) return 0 -if __name__ == "__main__": +if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover raise SystemExit(main()) From d3868f5284515eaba25589cde0f510647df6904a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 07:23:38 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 09/75] feat(ci): sweep organization PR comments for agent mentions --- scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py | 321 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 321 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py diff --git a/scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py b/scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6d13f75af --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py @@ -0,0 +1,321 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +"""Sweep recent CWL pull-request comments for trusted review-agent mentions.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import argparse +import os +import re +from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone +from typing import Any, Sequence + +from agent_mention_router import ( + GitHubClient, + MentionRequest, + dispatch_request, + parse_event, + parse_repository_allowlist, + processed_comment_ids, +) + + +ORG_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$") +REPOSITORY_RE = re.compile(r"^ContextualWisdomLab/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$") +REPOSITORY_SOURCES = frozenset({"organization", "installation"}) + + +def parse_timestamp(value: str) -> datetime: + """Parse one GitHub ISO-8601 timestamp into timezone-aware UTC.""" + + try: + parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(value.replace("Z", "+00:00")) + except (AttributeError, ValueError) as exc: + raise ValueError("invalid GitHub timestamp") from exc + if parsed.tzinfo is None: + raise ValueError("GitHub timestamp must be timezone-aware") + return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc) + + +def cutoff_timestamp(lookback_hours: int, *, now: datetime | None = None) -> str: + """Return an ISO-8601 UTC cutoff for the bounded comment lookback window.""" + + if lookback_hours < 1 or lookback_hours > 24 * 30: + raise ValueError("lookback hours must be between 1 and 720") + current = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc) + if current.tzinfo is None: + raise ValueError("current time must be timezone-aware") + cutoff = current.astimezone(timezone.utc) - timedelta(hours=lookback_hours) + return cutoff.replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z") + + +def flatten_pages(value: Any, *, collection_key: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]: + """Flatten ``gh api --paginate --slurp`` output into object records.""" + + pages = value if isinstance(value, list) else [value] + records: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] + for page in pages: + collection = page.get(collection_key, []) if collection_key else page + if not isinstance(collection, list): + raise ValueError("paginated GitHub response is not a list") + if not all(isinstance(record, dict) for record in collection): + raise ValueError("paginated GitHub response contains a non-object record") + records.extend(collection) + return records + + +def list_accessible_repositories( + client: GitHubClient, + *, + organization: str, + repository_source: str, +) -> list[str]: + """List active organization repositories visible to the selected token type.""" + + if not ORG_NAME_RE.fullmatch(organization): + raise ValueError("invalid organization name") + if repository_source not in REPOSITORY_SOURCES: + raise ValueError("repository source must be organization or installation") + + if repository_source == "installation": + response = client.request( + [ + "installation/repositories", + "-X", + "GET", + "-f", + "per_page=100", + "--paginate", + "--slurp", + ] + ) + repositories = flatten_pages(response, collection_key="repositories") + else: + response = client.request( + [ + f"orgs/{organization}/repos", + "-X", + "GET", + "-f", + "type=all", + "-f", + "per_page=100", + "--paginate", + "--slurp", + ] + ) + repositories = flatten_pages(response) + + names: list[str] = [] + for repository in repositories: + full_name = str(repository.get("full_name") or "") + owner = str(repository.get("owner", {}).get("login") or "") + if owner.casefold() != organization.casefold(): + continue + if repository.get("archived") or repository.get("disabled"): + continue + if not REPOSITORY_RE.fullmatch(full_name): + raise ValueError("GitHub returned an invalid repository full_name") + names.append(full_name) + return sorted(set(names)) + + +def list_recent_pull_requests( + client: GitHubClient, + *, + organization: str, + repository_source: str, + since: str, +) -> list[dict[str, Any]]: + """List open accessible pull requests updated within the lookback window.""" + + cutoff = parse_timestamp(since) + candidates: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] + for repository in list_accessible_repositories( + client, + organization=organization, + repository_source=repository_source, + ): + response = client.request( + [ + f"repos/{repository}/pulls", + "-X", + "GET", + "-f", + "state=open", + "-f", + "sort=updated", + "-f", + "direction=desc", + "-f", + "per_page=100", + "--paginate", + "--slurp", + ] + ) + for pull_request in flatten_pages(response): + if parse_timestamp(str(pull_request.get("updated_at") or "")) < cutoff: + continue + number = pull_request.get("number") + if not isinstance(number, int) or number < 1: + raise ValueError("GitHub returned an invalid pull request number") + candidates.append( + { + "number": number, + "repository": repository, + "pull_request": { + "url": f"https://api.github.com/repos/{repository}/pulls/{number}" + }, + } + ) + return candidates + + +def list_recent_comments( + client: GitHubClient, + *, + repository: str, + pull_request_number: int, + since: str, +) -> list[dict[str, Any]]: + """List recent issue comments for one pull request.""" + + response = client.request( + [ + f"repos/{repository}/issues/{pull_request_number}/comments", + "-X", + "GET", + "-f", + f"since={since}", + "-f", + "per_page=100", + "--paginate", + "--slurp", + ] + ) + return flatten_pages(response) + + +def build_requests_for_pull_request( + client: GitHubClient, + *, + issue: dict[str, Any], + since: str, +) -> tuple[MentionRequest, ...]: + """Build unacknowledged trusted mention requests for one live pull request.""" + + repository = str(issue.get("repository") or "") + if not REPOSITORY_RE.fullmatch(repository): + raise ValueError("pull request candidate has an invalid repository") + number = issue.get("number") + if not isinstance(number, int) or number < 1: + raise ValueError("pull request candidate has an invalid number") + comments = list_recent_comments( + client, + repository=repository, + pull_request_number=number, + since=since, + ) + processed = processed_comment_ids(comments) + live_pull = client.request([f"repos/{repository}/pulls/{number}"]) + if not isinstance(live_pull, dict) or live_pull.get("state") != "open": + return () + + requests: list[MentionRequest] = [] + for comment in comments: + comment_id = comment.get("id") + if isinstance(comment_id, int) and comment_id in processed: + continue + event = { + "repository": {"full_name": repository}, + "issue": {"number": number, "pull_request": issue.get("pull_request")}, + "comment": comment, + "pull_request": live_pull, + "conversation_comments": comments, + } + request = parse_event(event) + if request is not None: + requests.append(request) + return tuple(requests) + + +def sweep( + *, + target_client: GitHubClient, + dispatch_client: GitHubClient, + organization: str, + repository_source: str, + lookback_hours: int, + max_dispatches: int, + opencode_allowlist: frozenset[str], + dry_run: bool = False, + now: datetime | None = None, +) -> int: + """Dispatch up to ``max_dispatches`` unacknowledged organization mentions.""" + + if max_dispatches < 1 or max_dispatches > 100: + raise ValueError("max dispatches must be between 1 and 100") + since = cutoff_timestamp(lookback_hours, now=now) + dispatched = 0 + issues = list_recent_pull_requests( + target_client, + organization=organization, + repository_source=repository_source, + since=since, + ) + for issue in issues: + requests = build_requests_for_pull_request( + target_client, + issue=issue, + since=since, + ) + for request in requests: + dispatch_request( + request, + target_client=target_client, + dispatch_client=dispatch_client, + opencode_allowlist=opencode_allowlist, + dry_run=dry_run, + ) + dispatched += 1 + if dispatched >= max_dispatches: + print(f"Agent mention sweep reached dispatch limit {max_dispatches}.") + return dispatched + print(f"Agent mention sweep completed with {dispatched} dispatch(es).") + return dispatched + + +def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: + """Run the scheduled organization mention sweep.""" + + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() + parser.add_argument("--organization", default="ContextualWisdomLab") + parser.add_argument( + "--repository-source", + choices=sorted(REPOSITORY_SOURCES), + default="organization", + ) + parser.add_argument("--lookback-hours", type=int, default=168) + parser.add_argument("--max-dispatches", type=int, default=20) + parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true") + args = parser.parse_args(argv) + + target_token = os.environ.get("TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN", "") + dispatch_token = os.environ.get("AGENT_DISPATCH_TOKEN", "") + allowlist = parse_repository_allowlist( + os.environ.get("OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS", "") + ) + sweep( + target_client=GitHubClient(target_token), + dispatch_client=GitHubClient(dispatch_token), + organization=args.organization, + repository_source=args.repository_source, + lookback_hours=args.lookback_hours, + max_dispatches=args.max_dispatches, + opencode_allowlist=allowlist, + dry_run=args.dry_run, + ) + return 0 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover + raise SystemExit(main()) From 6f46a64750928a213aa00f7629beb933bce20c2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 07:25:05 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 10/75] feat(ci): route local and organization-wide agent mentions --- .github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml | 165 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 156 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml b/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml index 41fbb54df..ee5beae3b 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml @@ -3,20 +3,41 @@ name: Review Agent Mention Router on: issue_comment: types: [created] + schedule: + - cron: "*/5 * * * *" + workflow_dispatch: + inputs: + lookback_hours: + description: Recent-comment lookback window (1-720 hours) + required: false + default: "168" + type: string + max_dispatches: + description: Maximum invocation comments processed in one sweep (1-100) + required: false + default: "20" + type: string + dry_run: + description: Discover invocations without reactions, comments, or dispatches + required: false + default: false + type: boolean concurrency: - group: agent-mention-${{ github.repository }}-${{ github.event.comment.id }} + group: review-agent-mention-router-${{ github.repository }} cancel-in-progress: false +# Organization required-workflow rules do not propagate issue_comment events +# into sibling repositories. Keep the workflow default read-only; each bounded +# job declares only the writes it actually needs. permissions: - contents: write - issues: write - pull-requests: read + contents: read jobs: - route-agent-mention: + route-local-agent-mention: if: >- - github.event.issue.pull_request + github.event_name == 'issue_comment' + && github.event.issue.pull_request && github.event.comment.user.type != 'Bot' && contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association) && ( @@ -25,9 +46,16 @@ jobs: ) runs-on: ubuntu-latest timeout-minutes: 5 + permissions: + contents: write + issues: write + pull-requests: read env: FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} + TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} + AGENT_DISPATCH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} + OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS: ${{ vars.OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS }} steps: - name: Check out trusted default-branch router uses: actions/checkout@08c6903cd8c0fde910a37f88322edcfb5dd907a8 # v5.0.0 @@ -35,7 +63,7 @@ jobs: ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }} persist-credentials: false - - name: Resolve immutable pull-request head + - name: Resolve immutable pull-request head and prior receipts env: REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }} PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }} @@ -43,10 +71,129 @@ jobs: run: | set -euo pipefail pr_json="$(gh api "repos/${REPOSITORY}/pulls/${PR_NUMBER}")" - jq --argjson pull_request "$pr_json" '. + {pull_request: $pull_request}' \ + comments_json="$( + gh api --paginate --slurp \ + "repos/${REPOSITORY}/issues/${PR_NUMBER}/comments?per_page=100" \ + | jq -c 'add // []' + )" + jq \ + --argjson pull_request "$pr_json" \ + --argjson conversation_comments "$comments_json" \ + '. + { + pull_request: $pull_request, + conversation_comments: $conversation_comments + }' \ "$SOURCE_EVENT_PATH" >"${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-event.json" - - name: Route trusted agent mention + - name: Route trusted local agent mention run: >- python3 scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py --event-path "${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-event.json" + + sweep-organization-agent-mentions: + if: >- + github.repository == 'ContextualWisdomLab/.github' + && (github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + timeout-minutes: 15 + permissions: + contents: write + id-token: write + env: + FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true + OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS: ${{ vars.OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS }} + LOOKBACK_HOURS: ${{ inputs.lookback_hours || vars.AGENT_MENTION_LOOKBACK_HOURS || '168' }} + MAX_DISPATCHES: ${{ inputs.max_dispatches || vars.AGENT_MENTION_MAX_DISPATCHES || '20' }} + DRY_RUN: ${{ inputs.dry_run == true }} + steps: + - name: Exchange OpenCode app token for sibling-repository comments + id: sweep_app_token + env: + OIDC_AUDIENCE: opencode-github-action + OPENCODE_API_BASE_URL: https://api.opencode.ai + USER_TOKEN_CONFIGURED: ${{ secrets.PR_REVIEW_MERGE_TOKEN != '' || secrets.OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN != '' }} + run: | + set -euo pipefail + mark_unavailable() { + echo "available=false" >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + } + if [ "$USER_TOKEN_CONFIGURED" = "true" ]; then + echo "A configured cross-repository user token takes precedence." + mark_unavailable + exit 0 + fi + if [ -z "${ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN:-}" ] || [ -z "${ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL:-}" ]; then + echo "OpenCode app token exchange unavailable: OIDC request environment is missing." + mark_unavailable + exit 0 + fi + request_url="${ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL}" + separator="&" + case "$request_url" in + *\?*) ;; + *) separator="?" ;; + esac + if ! oidc_response="$( + curl -fsS \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer ${ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN}" \ + "${request_url}${separator}audience=${OIDC_AUDIENCE}" + )"; then + echo "OpenCode app token exchange unavailable: OIDC token request did not complete." + mark_unavailable + exit 0 + fi + oidc_token="$(jq -r '.value // empty' <<<"$oidc_response")" + if [ -z "$oidc_token" ]; then + echo "OpenCode app token exchange unavailable: OIDC token response was empty." + mark_unavailable + exit 0 + fi + if ! token_response="$( + curl -fsS \ + -X POST \ + -H "Authorization: Bearer ${oidc_token}" \ + "${OPENCODE_API_BASE_URL}/exchange_github_app_token" + )"; then + echo "OpenCode app token exchange unavailable: app token request did not complete." + mark_unavailable + exit 0 + fi + app_token="$(jq -r '.token // empty' <<<"$token_response")" + if [ -z "$app_token" ]; then + echo "OpenCode app token exchange unavailable: app token response was empty." + mark_unavailable + exit 0 + fi + echo "::add-mask::$app_token" + { + echo "available=true" + echo "token=$app_token" + } >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + + - name: Check out trusted central router + uses: actions/checkout@08c6903cd8c0fde910a37f88322edcfb5dd907a8 # v5.0.0 + with: + ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }} + persist-credentials: false + + - name: Sweep recent organization PR comments + env: + TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PR_REVIEW_MERGE_TOKEN || secrets.OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN || steps.sweep_app_token.outputs.token }} + TARGET_REPOSITORY_SOURCE: ${{ (secrets.PR_REVIEW_MERGE_TOKEN != '' || secrets.OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN != '') && 'organization' || steps.sweep_app_token.outputs.available == 'true' && 'installation' || '' }} + AGENT_DISPATCH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} + run: | + set -euo pipefail + if [ -z "${TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN:-}" ] || [ -z "${TARGET_REPOSITORY_SOURCE:-}" ]; then + echo "::error::Agent mention sweep requires PR_REVIEW_MERGE_TOKEN, OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN, or the OpenCode app token exchange." + exit 1 + fi + args=( + --organization ContextualWisdomLab + --repository-source "$TARGET_REPOSITORY_SOURCE" + --lookback-hours "$LOOKBACK_HOURS" + --max-dispatches "$MAX_DISPATCHES" + ) + if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "true" ]; then + args+=(--dry-run) + fi + python3 scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py "${args[@]}" From 0db74c7c99a52d4c1532163d1884f175abf215d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 07:25:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 11/75] docs(ci): document review-agent comment invocation --- .../review-agent-comment-invocation.md | 54 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/automation/review-agent-comment-invocation.md diff --git a/docs/automation/review-agent-comment-invocation.md b/docs/automation/review-agent-comment-invocation.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9c5f825e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/automation/review-agent-comment-invocation.md @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +# Review-agent comment invocation + +Updated: 2026-08-05 + +## Purpose + +Trusted ContextualWisdomLab maintainers can invoke the existing review planes from a pull-request conversation: + +- `@cwl-noema-review` requests the independent Noema review. +- `@opencode-agent` requests a bounded current-head OpenCode review only; the invocation itself disables branch updates, automatic merge, and direct merge. + +The router never checks out or executes pull-request-controlled code. It reads live PR metadata, binds the request to the current head SHA and base branch, and dispatches the already deployed central workflows in `ContextualWisdomLab/.github`. + +## Architecture + +GitHub organization ruleset workflows support `pull_request`, `pull_request_target`, and `merge_group`, but not `issue_comment`. Separately, an `issue_comment` workflow runs only when that workflow file exists on the commented repository's default branch. Therefore, a workflow stored only in the central `.github` repository cannot directly receive comments created in sibling repositories. + +The implementation uses two bounded paths: + +1. **Local fast path.** Comments on `ContextualWisdomLab/.github` trigger `issue_comment` immediately. +2. **Organization sweep.** Every five minutes, the central workflow enumerates repositories visible to its cross-repository credential, finds recently updated open PRs and recent comments, validates trusted exact mentions, and dispatches unacknowledged requests. A hidden receipt keyed by source comment ID prevents normal repeated sweeps or local workflow reruns from redispatching the same invocation. + +A user or fine-grained token enumerates organization repositories. When the OpenCode GitHub App installation token is the available credential, the sweep instead uses GitHub's installation-repositories endpoint, which returns only repositories accessible to that installation. This avoids depending on an organization-issues endpoint whose documented fine-grained token support is user-token-oriented. + +This preserves the central MSA boundary without copying privileged workflow code into every product repository. + +## Trust and permission boundary + +- Accepted comment associations: `OWNER`, `MEMBER`, and `COLLABORATOR`. +- Bot comments, ordinary contributors, issue comments outside PRs, closed PRs, malformed metadata, already acknowledged comments, and lookalike handles fail closed. +- The workflow default token is read-only. +- The local job receives job-scoped `contents: write`, `issues: write`, and `pull-requests: read`. +- The organization sweep uses the established cross-repository credential chain for reading and acknowledging target comments, while the central repository's own token dispatches the central workflows. +- OpenCode dispatch is restricted to the exact `OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS` allowlist. +- An invocation cannot merge: `enable_auto_merge=false`, `update_branches=false`, and `merge_mode=disabled` are explicit in the dispatch payload. +- Every dispatch is bound to live PR number, current head SHA, and base branch metadata fetched from GitHub immediately before dispatch. + +## Operator controls + +- `AGENT_MENTION_LOOKBACK_HOURS`: default `168`, allowed range 1–720. +- `AGENT_MENTION_MAX_DISPATCHES`: default `20`, allowed range 1–100. +- Manual `workflow_dispatch` supports the same bounds and a dry-run mode. +- The sweep fails visibly when no cross-repository credential is available. +- `PR_REVIEW_MERGE_TOKEN` or `OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN` takes precedence. Otherwise, the workflow exchanges its OIDC token for the existing OpenCode installation token and enumerates that installation's repositories. + +## References + +GitHub. (n.d.). *Available rules for rulesets*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 5, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/available-rules-for-rulesets + +GitHub. (n.d.). *Events that trigger workflows*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 5, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/events-that-trigger-workflows + +GitHub. (n.d.). *REST API endpoints for GitHub App installations*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 5, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/rest/apps/installations + +GitHub. (n.d.). *REST API endpoints for issues*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 5, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/rest/issues/issues From af29c2cff49ac5fd6a0ca3577307f783a6ba3412 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 07:37:20 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 12/75] fix(ci): restore review and security baseline for comment routing --- .github/workflows/codeql-pr.yml | 8 +- .github/workflows/pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml | 90 ++++- .github/workflows/sbom-generation.yml | 15 +- .github/workflows/scheduled-security-scan.yml | 6 +- docs/automation/hourly-review-repair.md | 72 ++++ .../central-security-and-review-baseline.md | 131 +++++++ requirements-strix-ci-hashes.txt | 341 +++++++++--------- requirements-strix-ci.txt | 7 +- scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py | 184 +++++++++- ...st_install_base_python_lock_missing_pin.py | 239 ++++++++++++ tests/test_pr_review_fix_hourly_contract.py | 45 +++ ...test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_source_pin.py | 77 ++++ tests/test_sbom_generation_push_contract.py | 54 +++ 13 files changed, 1064 insertions(+), 205 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/automation/hourly-review-repair.md create mode 100644 docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md create mode 100644 tests/test_install_base_python_lock_missing_pin.py create mode 100644 tests/test_pr_review_fix_hourly_contract.py create mode 100644 tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_source_pin.py create mode 100644 tests/test_sbom_generation_push_contract.py diff --git a/.github/workflows/codeql-pr.yml b/.github/workflows/codeql-pr.yml index 2a170fa8a..cda5e7f62 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/codeql-pr.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/codeql-pr.yml @@ -90,13 +90,13 @@ jobs: ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} - name: Initialize CodeQL - uses: github/codeql-action/init@99df26d4f13ea111d4ec1a7dddef6063f76b97e9 # v4.37.0 + uses: github/codeql-action/init@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4.37.5 with: languages: ${{ matrix.language }} build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }} - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis - uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@99df26d4f13ea111d4ec1a7dddef6063f76b97e9 # v4.37.0 + uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4.37.5 with: category: "/language:${{ matrix.language }}" upload: false @@ -197,13 +197,13 @@ jobs: ref: ${{ format('refs/pull/{0}/merge', github.event.pull_request.number) }} - name: Initialize CodeQL - uses: github/codeql-action/init@99df26d4f13ea111d4ec1a7dddef6063f76b97e9 # v4.37.0 + uses: github/codeql-action/init@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4.37.5 with: languages: ${{ matrix.language }} build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }} - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis - uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@99df26d4f13ea111d4ec1a7dddef6063f76b97e9 # v4.37.0 + uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4.37.5 with: category: "/language:${{ matrix.language }}-merge" upload: false diff --git a/.github/workflows/pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml b/.github/workflows/pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml index cc7875bc8..7bc09c378 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ on: retry_hours: description: Minimum hours before redispatching autofix for the same head required: false - default: "24" + default: "1" type: string autofix_workflow: description: Autofix workflow file to dispatch @@ -44,14 +44,16 @@ on: default: "" type: string canonical_ref: - description: Ref of ContextualWisdomLab/.github to use for scheduler code + description: Deprecated compatibility input; accepted and ignored because privileged source is bound to the called workflow SHA required: false - default: "main" + default: "" type: string repository_dispatch: types: [pr-review-fix-scheduler] schedule: - - cron: "23 */2 * * *" + # Run away from minute zero, where scheduled GitHub Actions are more likely + # to be delayed, while preserving a bounded one-dispatch-per-run repair loop. + - cron: "23 * * * *" concurrency: group: central-pr-review-fix-scheduler-${{ github.event.client_payload.target_repository || inputs.target_repository || vars.PR_REVIEW_FIX_TARGET_REPOSITORY || github.repository }} @@ -80,19 +82,87 @@ jobs: DRY_RUN: ${{ github.event.client_payload.dry_run == true || github.event.client_payload.dry_run == 'true' || inputs.dry_run == true }} MAX_PRS: ${{ github.event.client_payload.max_prs || inputs.max_prs || '50' }} MAX_DISPATCHES: ${{ github.event.client_payload.max_dispatches || inputs.max_dispatches || '1' }} - RETRY_HOURS: ${{ github.event.client_payload.retry_hours || inputs.retry_hours || '24' }} + RETRY_HOURS: ${{ github.event.client_payload.retry_hours || inputs.retry_hours || '1' }} AUTOFIX_WORKFLOW: pr-review-autofix.yml AUTOFIX_REPOSITORY: ContextualWisdomLab/.github - CANONICAL_REF: main steps: - - name: Checkout canonical scheduler - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0 + - name: Resolve immutable called-workflow source + id: trusted_source + env: + WORKFLOW_REPOSITORY: ${{ job.workflow_repository }} + WORKFLOW_SHA: ${{ job.workflow_sha }} + WORKFLOW_REF: ${{ job.workflow_ref }} + WORKFLOW_FILE_PATH: ${{ job.workflow_file_path }} + run: | + set -euo pipefail + expected_repository="ContextualWisdomLab/.github" + expected_file=".github/workflows/pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml" + + if [ "$WORKFLOW_REPOSITORY" != "$expected_repository" ]; then + printf '::error::Called workflow repository resolved to %s, expected %s.\n' \ + "${WORKFLOW_REPOSITORY:-}" "$expected_repository" + exit 1 + fi + if ! [[ "$WORKFLOW_SHA" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]; then + printf '::error::Called workflow SHA is missing or malformed: %s.\n' \ + "${WORKFLOW_SHA:-}" + exit 1 + fi + if [ "$WORKFLOW_FILE_PATH" != "$expected_file" ]; then + printf '::error::Called workflow file resolved to %s, expected %s.\n' \ + "${WORKFLOW_FILE_PATH:-}" "$expected_file" + exit 1 + fi + expected_ref_prefix="${WORKFLOW_REPOSITORY}/${WORKFLOW_FILE_PATH}@" + case "$WORKFLOW_REF" in + "$expected_ref_prefix"*) ;; + *) + printf '::error::Called workflow ref is missing or inconsistent: %s.\n' \ + "${WORKFLOW_REF:-}" + exit 1 + ;; + esac + + { + printf 'repository=%s\n' "$WORKFLOW_REPOSITORY" + printf 'sha=%s\n' "$WORKFLOW_SHA" + printf 'workflow_ref=%s\n' "$WORKFLOW_REF" + printf 'workflow_file_path=%s\n' "$WORKFLOW_FILE_PATH" + } >>"$GITHUB_OUTPUT" + printf 'Resolved immutable called-workflow source repository=%s file=%s sha=%s ref=%s.\n' \ + "$WORKFLOW_REPOSITORY" "$WORKFLOW_FILE_PATH" "$WORKFLOW_SHA" "$WORKFLOW_REF" + + - name: Checkout immutable called-workflow source + uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 with: - repository: ContextualWisdomLab/.github - ref: ${{ env.CANONICAL_REF }} + # GitHub documents job.workflow_repository and job.workflow_sha as + # the called workflow identity. The preceding step validates every + # field before checkout so an absent property cannot select defaults. + repository: ${{ steps.trusted_source.outputs.repository }} + ref: ${{ steps.trusted_source.outputs.sha }} fetch-depth: 1 persist-credentials: false + - name: Verify immutable called-workflow checkout + env: + EXPECTED_SHA: ${{ steps.trusted_source.outputs.sha }} + EXPECTED_FILE: ${{ steps.trusted_source.outputs.workflow_file_path }} + run: | + set -euo pipefail + actual_sha="$(git rev-parse HEAD)" + if [ "$actual_sha" != "$EXPECTED_SHA" ]; then + printf '::error::Checked-out scheduler SHA %s does not match called-workflow SHA %s.\n' \ + "$actual_sha" "$EXPECTED_SHA" + exit 1 + fi + if [ ! -f "$EXPECTED_FILE" ] || [ -L "$EXPECTED_FILE" ]; then + printf '::error::Called workflow source file is missing or symlinked: %s.\n' \ + "$EXPECTED_FILE" + exit 1 + fi + printf 'Verified immutable scheduler checkout at %s (%s).\n' \ + "$actual_sha" "$EXPECTED_FILE" + - name: Self-test fix scheduler contract run: python3 scripts/ci/pr_review_fix_scheduler.py --self-test diff --git a/.github/workflows/sbom-generation.yml b/.github/workflows/sbom-generation.yml index b62f0b3d3..b56a261be 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/sbom-generation.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/sbom-generation.yml @@ -19,9 +19,19 @@ # NOTE: contents: write is required for release-asset upload and for the # dependency submission API. Fork PR heads run without write and simply skip # those side effects; the artifact is still produced. +# +# NOTE on the push trigger: it exists so the DEFAULT BRANCH has a dependency +# snapshot. dependency-review compares base...head in the dependency graph; with +# PR-only runs the base commit never has one, so every comparison reports "the +# number of snapshots compared for the base SHA (0) and the head SHA (1) do not +# match" and the whole dependency set reads as newly added. That re-flags +# pre-existing vulnerabilities on every PR instead of only the ones the PR adds. +# Snapshotting pushes to the default branch gives the comparison a real base. name: SBOM Generation on: + push: + branches: [main, master, develop] pull_request: types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review, closed] branches: [main, master, develop] @@ -29,7 +39,10 @@ on: types: [published] concurrency: - group: sbom-generation-${{ github.event.pull_request.base.repo.full_name || github.repository }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.release.tag_name || github.ref }} + # Final fallback is the SHA, not the ref, so two pushes landing close together + # do not cancel each other: a cancelled push run leaves that commit without a + # snapshot, which is exactly the base-side gap this trigger exists to close. + group: sbom-generation-${{ github.event.pull_request.base.repo.full_name || github.repository }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.release.tag_name || github.sha }} cancel-in-progress: true permissions: diff --git a/.github/workflows/scheduled-security-scan.yml b/.github/workflows/scheduled-security-scan.yml index 8ecb5185b..331de634f 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/scheduled-security-scan.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/scheduled-security-scan.yml @@ -90,13 +90,13 @@ jobs: with: persist-credentials: false - name: Initialize CodeQL - uses: github/codeql-action/init@99df26d4f13ea111d4ec1a7dddef6063f76b97e9 # v4.37.0 + uses: github/codeql-action/init@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4.37.5 with: languages: ${{ matrix.language }} build-mode: ${{ matrix.build-mode }} - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis continue-on-error: true - uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@99df26d4f13ea111d4ec1a7dddef6063f76b97e9 # v4.37.0 + uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4.37.5 with: category: "/language:${{ matrix.language }}-scheduled" @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ jobs: - name: Upload Trivy SARIF to code scanning if: always() && hashFiles('trivy-results.sarif') != '' continue-on-error: true - uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@f205ea1c3313d32999d8d6a48b4f6530d4437b38 # v4.37.4 + uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@d1ba80a13dd99fba24a470575428917156a28b43 # v4.37.5 with: sarif_file: trivy-results.sarif category: trivy-fs-scheduled diff --git a/docs/automation/hourly-review-repair.md b/docs/automation/hourly-review-repair.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1924dba5b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/automation/hourly-review-repair.md @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +# Hourly PR review-repair scheduler + +The central `PR Review Fix Scheduler` provides a bounded organization-wide +review → fix → revalidate → merge support loop. It runs at minute 23 of every +hour and may dispatch at most one existing autofix workflow per run. Merge +eligibility remains owned by the separate merge scheduler, branch protection, +required checks, independent review, and unresolved-thread policy. + +## Execution and compatibility contract + +- The scheduled heartbeat is `23 * * * *`. +- The default same-head retry floor is one hour. +- `max_dispatches` remains one by default. +- Repository-scoped concurrency and `cancel-in-progress: true` prevent two + superseded scheduler runs from mutating the same repository concurrently. +- `canonical_ref` remains an accepted deprecated input only so callers pinned to + older workflow interfaces can upgrade without a coordinated breaking change. + It is never read and cannot choose executable scheduler code. + +## Immutable reusable-workflow source + +GitHub associates the ordinary `github` context in a reusable workflow with the +caller. Consequently, a called privileged workflow must not use caller-derived +`github.sha`, a caller payload, or a mutable branch such as `main` to select its +co-located implementation. + +The checkout step instead uses: + +```yaml +repository: ${{ job.workflow_repository }} +ref: ${{ job.workflow_sha }} +``` + +`job.workflow_repository` identifies the repository that contains the called +workflow and `job.workflow_sha` identifies its immutable resolved commit. This +keeps the scheduler implementation aligned with the exact workflow revision +selected by the caller's `uses: ...@` reference. Checkout credentials are +not persisted. + +## Security and MSA boundary + +The scheduler can inspect review state and dispatch the already-reviewed bounded +autofix workflow. It cannot approve its own changes, lower branch protection, +convert queued checks to success, publish releases, or bypass independent +review. Product repositories remain independently operable and consume the +central policy as a reusable module rather than copying privileged automation. + +CWL repositories and naruon retain their own product tests, authorization, +release, deployment, data-governance, and runtime responsibilities. The central +workflow owns only organization-level queue inspection and bounded repair +dispatch. + +## Verification + +Dependency-free static tests pin the hourly cron, one-hour retry default, +one-dispatch budget, single-flight concurrency, immutable called-workflow +checkout, ignored compatibility input, and least-privilege token boundary. The +exact PR head must also pass all central security, coverage, workflow-contract, +and independent-review gates before merge. + +## References (APA 7th edition) + +GitHub. (n.d.). *Contexts reference: Job context*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August +4, 2026, from +https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/contexts#job-context + +GitHub. (n.d.). *Reusing workflow configurations*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August +4, 2026, from +https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/reusing-workflow-configurations + +GitHub. (n.d.). *Reusing workflows*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 4, 2026, from +https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/reuse-automations/reuse-workflows diff --git a/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md b/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..81495cb0c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +# Central security and review baseline: evidence record + +## Decision + +The organization-level `.github` repository owns reusable review, security, +dependency-snapshot, and bounded repair workflows. Product repositories remain +independently operable and consume those controls as modules; they retain their +own application tests, authorization, deployment, release, and data-governance +responsibilities. + +The baseline repair makes five controls atomic because they participate in the +same protected-branch decision: + +1. CodeQL initialization, analysis, and SARIF upload use one immutable action + revision within each affected workflow. +2. The central Strix dependency closure removes known-vulnerable package pins + and remains fully hash-pinned. +3. Trusted-base Python dependency preflight defers only narrowly classified + incomplete closures, interpreter incompatibility, or binary-unavailable and + stale pins proven by paired diagnostics for the same exact requirement on a + reachable index. Every resolver line must carry a comma-separated list whose + alternatives are concrete, conservatively recognized PEP 440 versions; + blank values, `none`, arbitrary prose, mixed version/prose lists, duplicate + malformed evidence, integrity, transport, and unknown errors fail closed. +4. Default-branch pushes submit dependency snapshots so pull-request dependency + review compares a head snapshot with a real base snapshot. +5. Review repair runs once per hour, dispatches at most one bounded repair job, + and resolves privileged code from the reusable workflow's immutable source + identity rather than caller data or mutable `main`. + +## Standards and current-platform rationale + +NIST SSDF version 1.1 is the current final publication; version 1.2 remained a +public draft at the time of this decision. The baseline follows SSDF's final +risk-reduction direction by integrating vulnerability detection, dependency +integrity, repeatable verification, and root-cause regression controls into the +software lifecycle without claiming formal conformance. + +The approved SLSA specification is version 1.2. Its source model distinguishes +trusted automation whose identity and codebase cannot be unilaterally +influenced. Immutable action pins, exact-revision dependency materialization, +and called-workflow source binding reduce mutable control-plane inputs in line +with that model without claiming a SLSA level. + +GitHub documents that a reusable workflow's ordinary `github` context belongs +to the caller. GitHub's current contexts reference separately defines +`job.workflow_repository`, `job.workflow_sha`, `job.workflow_ref`, and +`job.workflow_file_path` as the repository, immutable commit, full ref, and path +of the workflow file that defines the current job. The same reference gives +`job.workflow_repository` plus `job.workflow_sha` as the supported pattern for +checking out files co-located with a reusable workflow; these properties are a +GitHub.com capability and are not available on GitHub Enterprise Server. + +The scheduler therefore keeps the documented `job.workflow_*` identity rather +than substituting caller-associated `github.workflow_*` values. Before checkout, +it rejects an empty, malformed, unexpected-repository, unexpected-file, or +inconsistent workflow identity and exports only the validated repository and +full SHA. After checkout, it compares `git rev-parse HEAD` with that SHA and +requires the workflow file to be a regular non-symlink file before any scheduler +self-test or credential-bearing dispatch can execute. Caller and compatibility +inputs remain excluded as executable-source selectors, and contents-write and +pull-requests-write permissions remain absent. + +GitHub also documents that scheduled events can be delayed at the start of an +hour. The hourly heartbeat therefore runs at minute 23. A one-hour same-head +retry floor matches the requested cadence while the one-dispatch budget and +repository-scoped concurrency keep mutation bounded. + +GitHub's dependency submission API associates snapshots with commit SHAs and can +submit build-time or SBOM-derived dependencies that static manifest analysis +misses. Snapshotting default-branch pushes supplies the base-side evidence that +pull-request dependency review needs and prevents the entire existing graph from +appearing newly introduced. + +## Verification contract + +The exact pull-request head must prove: + +- one immutable CodeQL revision per affected workflow; +- the central hash lock installs and vulnerability scanners accept it; +- stale-pin deferral requires paired exact-requirement resolver diagnostics and + a nonempty list on every matching resolver line in which every alternative is + a conservatively valid PEP 440 version, including epoch, prerelease, + postrelease, development, and local forms used by pip; +- blank, `none`, arbitrary prose, mixed version/prose lists, duplicate malformed + lines, single-sided or mismatched resolver evidence, integrity, retry, + transport, mixed-unknown, and unclassified installer failures remain fatal; +- the changed installer has 100% statement and branch coverage and 100% + production docstrings; +- default-branch snapshot triggers, commit-SHA concurrency, and job-scoped write + permissions remain pinned by tests; +- hourly cadence, one-hour retry, single dispatch, least-privilege permissions, + pre-checkout validation of every `job.workflow_*` identity field, and + post-checkout SHA/file verification remain pinned by tests; and +- every current-head security, review, unresolved-thread, and branch-protection + gate succeeds before merge. + +## References + +Booth, H., Ogata, M., Kent, K., Souppaya, M., & Dodson, D. (2025). *Secure +software development framework (SSDF) version 1.2: Recommendations for +mitigating the risk of software vulnerabilities* (Initial Public Draft, NIST SP +800-218 Rev. 1). National Institute of Standards and Technology. +https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218r1.ipd + +GitHub. (n.d.). *Contexts reference*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 5, 2026, +from +https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/contexts + +GitHub. (n.d.). *Reusing workflow configurations*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August +5, 2026, from +https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/reusing-workflow-configurations + +GitHub. (n.d.). *Troubleshooting workflows*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 5, +2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/troubleshoot-workflows + +GitHub. (n.d.). *Using the dependency submission API*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved +August 5, 2026, from +https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/how-tos/secure-your-supply-chain/secure-your-dependencies/use-dependency-submission-api + +Souppaya, M., Scarfone, K., & Dodson, D. (2022). *Secure software development +framework (SSDF) version 1.1: Recommendations for mitigating the risk of software +vulnerabilities* (NIST SP 800-218). National Institute of Standards and +Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218 + +Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts. (2025). *SLSA specification +(version 1.2)*. https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.2/ + +Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts. (2025). *Source: Requirements for +producing source (version 1.2)*. +https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.2/source-requirements diff --git a/requirements-strix-ci-hashes.txt b/requirements-strix-ci-hashes.txt index e2c8f00eb..c305e9c84 100644 --- a/requirements-strix-ci-hashes.txt +++ b/requirements-strix-ci-hashes.txt @@ -4,127 +4,128 @@ aiohappyeyeballs==2.7.1 \ --hash=sha256:065665c041c42a5938ed220bdcd7230f22527fbec085e1853d2402c8a3615d9d \ --hash=sha256:9243213661e29250eb41368e5daa826fc017156c3b8a11440826b2e3ed376472 # via aiohttp -aiohttp==3.14.1 \ - --hash=sha256:03ab4530fdcb3a543a122ba4b65ac9919da9fe9f78a03d328a6e38ff962f7aa5 \ - --hash=sha256:07eabb979d236335fed927e137a928c9adfb7df3b9ec7aa31726f133a62be983 \ - --hash=sha256:092e4ce3619a7c6dee52a6bdabda973d9b34b66781f840ce93c7e0cec30cf521 \ - --hash=sha256:10ee9c1753a8f706345b22496c79fbddb5be0599e0823f3738b1534058e25340 \ - --hash=sha256:1601cc37baf5750ccacae618ec2daf020769581695550e3b654a911f859c563d \ - 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--hash=sha256:d6088ec9894113802bddb3c09e974929aed2c7b3a8c456219b8aab4481f1a239 \ + --hash=sha256:d6218d92e450824e9b4881f44e8c09f1853b490f9a64130801024a4793b1b3b0 \ + --hash=sha256:d77640cc618c1d99fc4f8589c0f24a730adfa54eb1e57ef7bf0c8dfb78da898c \ + --hash=sha256:d7d2deec16eeedf55f2c7cf75b521ea3856a5177e123844f8fd0f114ce252cb5 \ + --hash=sha256:db332af25642007330fca8be5c4d194caf2bea7a7fc84415aff3497af5dfee6b \ + --hash=sha256:dd54d0e8717de95939766febac482ac0474d8ac3b048115f9f2b1d23a16e7db4 \ + --hash=sha256:ddcac3c6b382e81f1dd0499199d4136b877beb4cb5ef770bbbfba56c4b8f55d2 \ + --hash=sha256:df82f3787c940c94986b34222d59c9e38843fba85139f36e85255a82ad5355a9 \ + --hash=sha256:dfa68deb2a443bdaa3ea5297b0699c1464f08aef3812b486d1348eee61b07dc0 \ + --hash=sha256:dff9461ec275f22135650d5ba4b4931a11f3958df7dfbb8db630000d4dee0883 \ + --hash=sha256:e1e74298bab6ee0d6e749ed4fd1901c7e604bdda32c03d787a2cc71c46d0433d \ + --hash=sha256:e2667f0bbe7eb6c74eae5e9691441ad186e5845ca3cff63230fc09c4e7514f5d \ + --hash=sha256:e3be98a7c30b8c25d573dafba7171d66dfb05ee6a9070fc46535464ff97700a6 \ + --hash=sha256:e568e14940c09955aa51f4e645b6daa18a581c5dcfcd73744dcc86a856e3ced3 \ + --hash=sha256:e72ee89e28d907a18f46959b4eb0bb06701cc7f8cf4366e00029e2ccfaaf5924 \ + --hash=sha256:e92eb8acc45eb6a9f4935071a77edf5b85cc6f8dfad5cd99e97653c26593cdde \ + --hash=sha256:ea05e1f97ceea523942d9b2a7d7c0359d781d683d6b043f5943a602b14da4787 \ + --hash=sha256:eac645b09bcfdf73df7536331f0678c1086ea250981118ddb5199e17ccef72bb \ + --hash=sha256:eb0495d778817619273c108784292be161a924b9f5ae5cbbc70a2caa6838250b \ + --hash=sha256:ebe8e504f058fe91223351cecd2d9d6946c9d241bb0250d898ffbdf584cc72b0 \ + --hash=sha256:ed099d105449c4f9e84f24af203cd131349d4761d8813fa7e02c32e7128cd910 \ + --hash=sha256:f0f177d1b195b9e06376cfd7d308d8a1b920909a609d03ac82a8c73bbb16d3b9 \ + --hash=sha256:f3d2669fe7dec7fc359ecdb5984b29b50d85d5d00f8c1cb61de4f4a24ee42627 \ + --hash=sha256:f4e05329faa0ea1a404b37de4f034fd2c2defcca06a68dc6745e4e56c88e8a48 \ + --hash=sha256:f53bcd52f585e1ac3e590d61434eb61f9a88c38df041b4ea126d97144344a77b \ + --hash=sha256:f55119f7bf25f49ed210f6096090715da24f2943c62102448915fde3c62877ce \ + --hash=sha256:f631fe87a6f30df5fbe6d79640b25e4cffb38c31c7fb6f10871517b84b0f8c1a \ + --hash=sha256:f8fb78a83c9e5f741ca3a68cfb455c1f5bb83b4e7249a3848b3cd78d0a8563b0 \ + --hash=sha256:fa9467a8113aa69d3d7c55a70ef0b7c636010a40993f3df9d9d0d73b3eb7ef24 \ + --hash=sha256:fd51ebf9d3a00c074df4ede271023f4d2dba289bcc740b88191872716014e3c5 # via + # -r requirements-strix-ci.txt # gql # litellm aiosignal==1.4.0 \ @@ -401,53 +402,53 @@ click==8.4.1 \ # litellm # typer # uvicorn -cryptography==49.0.0 \ - --hash=sha256:026ac7423e6fa66872d3bf889be5974507da3944f866f704fa200eadacd00001 \ - --hash=sha256:07cab27cc7b7e0fd28e5e26bb9eeedde5c135c868b46de4a27845abe94af6122 \ - --hash=sha256:084ef1af862eb07ec46d25f68689f2102a9fc0e05ce7b80f14f5fe51e4eef0f6 \ - --hash=sha256:0b82e28ee398a386f0807bba7884d30f25218855690f45115831bcce5d90822c \ - 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--hash=sha256:b39efa323140595abd3ecca8529d321ae50f55f3aa3ba9cc81ea56a6011953d5 \ - --hash=sha256:b47db11c2c3525083296069b98ac5221907455e989ae0c2e3008bde851921615 \ - --hash=sha256:b87e65d263b3e5d3bb92a57e2a6638e2f31110fa7aa890c7b2dbba42248d0a3f \ - --hash=sha256:b970c6da94d5bb18629db453d14f2a1300f6bf59b61e9b82377931ef95504866 \ - --hash=sha256:be9fcb48a55f023493482827d4f459bd263cc20efde64f204b97c123201850c6 \ - --hash=sha256:c2bc30226390d60ea19d9f82b19db005fe0452154a23c1c410c12ea801e43561 \ - --hash=sha256:c83782480a4a9da4d0feb51950131ba32e12e70813848b3343f6e18c28a66838 \ - --hash=sha256:cbc77da8c523d5abd028635ba850a6966fcee2c82e2bf65a41d1d8afe0f98be9 \ - --hash=sha256:ccac2bfebc306b862133e3bb71f3f6ee8bb525240089b2d952e4144b3a6d5da7 \ - --hash=sha256:d0527ce944105f257f605a827d6ebead966c752038b6e8656abb9c5edee6fc68 \ - --hash=sha256:d8ecde755e2e91bf773fc94e8c9d730cd7f2007004cb492263a794ec3899a1c8 \ - --hash=sha256:e3fb64c420688e5319ae25113a354015abbd8dffbfbc41781a1ea66fc7622ac3 \ - --hash=sha256:e5dfc1e64de5677cec922ffa8da89c546d0415bf6efdf081842e5d44c84e1f0e \ - --hash=sha256:ec5e529fb80935c94fe7b729f9972b50e351a0e6b50aa294fd5cabb109fcc29a \ - --hash=sha256:f37d847238971164fdbc68ade6f6574aecc9c0af714190e2083429ff68f4ce9d \ - --hash=sha256:f78ff2c9ed8dc2d036b0f4d640e22522213d047c1b14e61205a7e55c80a494d4 \ - --hash=sha256:f89660a348f4f78a92366240a61404e337586ef7f5909a2fef59ca88ef505493 \ - --hash=sha256:fc1e275c2f1d97b1a6450b8b0ea3ebfa6e087a611c2b26cb2404d48588abab7b +cryptography==50.0.0 \ + --hash=sha256:031e2d5dd4bb9caa3ca9c82e5a197fd8ae680232cee62603d1a813f3f07e3d03 \ + --hash=sha256:06a32a980526a6ab9a4b9bf8f7385800791e2bb960903cb6b530e4817509a3b7 \ + --hash=sha256:07479a1cb08219ab719147e742e76090c9c773321959bb94946fffdd397a6437 \ + --hash=sha256:07949c449a1abcf60d1ee6e88956d89404c7df3c8258f46589e912988e551987 \ + --hash=sha256:105110f43a471dbd0060b9c9516cb8a6a79233631a04cc2ba16f28323ac6e025 \ + --hash=sha256:11b74db56cdbe3cdee6e3f6982ecb70334fa10dce99ed58bf7894aaaa3b2a037 \ + --hash=sha256:12b9c6996425c76ea6c457ace4f3073e715b8c545add07cd1a8f3a4f90691269 \ + --hash=sha256:1489e263a8048bb8b6a8bac662eb2d402ea5d2b7b4699b72f385f1e2772db105 \ + --hash=sha256:19736989797678c6af1e55cd49055cdbcb55d8f6b5583ac5335f933aba9101dc \ + --hash=sha256:1b4a266766514614f8aa60416e71f2fc6e575d36e7bdc90f644fadb2f4b75b95 \ + --hash=sha256:2a8183b489dc1f7f80f135780fadc1108f14b31b8a40411c7a5b17425f65f28b \ + --hash=sha256:37fdb0d0111f1e2ff07139dfb79f1b49531f8e213c46f1163dd7642979b58c47 \ + --hash=sha256:3f5735ffe4996d28b809371756219f5354864902a3b9e7c0b9ee87041209fc9c \ + --hash=sha256:49e7d93abdbd2990caced757e5fade25302f719c3c8fb6e6fff2dde98999fc41 \ + --hash=sha256:5e34edd123674534acd70147f0ca331eaa2c74e6325fb2028c886aa26ba0b68c \ + --hash=sha256:62598a8a57f815db4c6259a4e97d857dab56697e7de8e8ab02352ab74da1995d \ + --hash=sha256:65c2c3add92b45fd0709db8594536aea39c2a67af0e27ffcf049c498501140b7 \ + --hash=sha256:6ba6a53445bd3cfa809ef3ef5f1589aa6ba08784a1d962bf47d0940e871dab1c \ + --hash=sha256:6e7d61120573a7f2cd94cc095f9e81f6967c61ccdf194285aa143ecec8e0b708 \ + --hash=sha256:7cec5b856506da6defb290f30c9ee687d5f5e8cb0bd3f6459dde43b0b4fa40ef \ + --hash=sha256:80b63928fa35083b33966ce1efb70e5b9607181e49dcd1c22c8c005e319f667f \ + --hash=sha256:82148ec5bddac30b51a5b3c1945075f896fa022cb93f8e4a01e9f6ee95292c5f \ + --hash=sha256:828743d939e9629bc267b8e2d08d8bb67cd4319c771a33d4b18b22dd8fb7440a \ + --hash=sha256:8d89f3976b10b4ce31118de72329025f70d2c6ead14a8217c5514dd2c6d5a78f \ + --hash=sha256:8eb5e1172eb569ea8a872796576e6a67c276351728b6455d5beb01242b027c6a \ + --hash=sha256:900131fafd8aead39ac7dd3a7e833be754c17a95cfd91221636949fe4eb0aa8a \ + --hash=sha256:910d11e1a385c654bf738bf3e6b8e6ed5de0f5610fcae2be9e5b398d8081d20e \ + --hash=sha256:910e1d2668e7de9648f2bcee30e180db2a6b15c30f887d7c4c93ddf96e3992e3 \ + --hash=sha256:9aa87839c383bdbab6ef865787a1fb877af8dd03464c4400322726feaaadfc6d \ + --hash=sha256:a1b30560f2acc95aa8b2e06e716a13dbfc97314747b80d9707e307f77b40d6b3 \ + --hash=sha256:a91296cb61e8df6f86d0c19cc4068228da256bf59bf86049fbd821084565327f \ + --hash=sha256:b42a28c1844fd9de8f3f7d540e36b66f3a9c83fceac7170ebc7a6a19edd9dcae \ + --hash=sha256:bd1c592e4d5974f0d08d4888e432157adba757c66da0246918e43677fafa2d30 \ + --hash=sha256:c87f62a3d3b9888ed0fdde100ec06aa61ca9cd44bad9057d1dff9a516b5f5bb9 \ + --hash=sha256:c99c003e088647b8a5b7c145d6f78c335f6348332b62e142d411c4b63d1460b9 \ + --hash=sha256:ccdc4a71a4dabae05de219404f9f4abc38e3b58422177ff93d0da05967dafa07 \ + --hash=sha256:d24fead1d4d076e1bfb006dcec392074a3cd8d7b4fc8a595aa64073b2b7a96ba \ + --hash=sha256:d58c3db7cd6eed54e6c06744db55456b65ebd7492ddeae9c1e93cfca7aa857d3 \ + --hash=sha256:d764dcf130c428ef66786f866dd750f53182bc608813489915e9fc106bb0c82f \ + --hash=sha256:df2a58a472f332225671c35b0a830208b86d004f82baa8530fa3782c85646533 \ + --hash=sha256:e722f16708d854fe924790e051061f6704a472c3bac347b6fd88033ea8dd0dc5 \ + --hash=sha256:ecfed7367f965a0328cfbdd70da860f15441f002f613185668c6e6ebf5a0ac11 \ + --hash=sha256:eeac2acb5a20ed25e0ad6d1df9891a520b78b404266b6d11778f25d5d691a6c9 \ + --hash=sha256:f59e38625469987d7ef6d495323c55e7db6c212eaf6112267e0d3b565a2e9c9f \ + --hash=sha256:f89831ef99dd7dd169ab06d63a831adb9e20a87aac6d380266bbda5823349169 \ + --hash=sha256:fd9192b7b70c573d7f214eb1ae35e00d359f6f5e4b27c7e21e30de1fc6204645 # via # -r requirements-strix-ci.txt # google-auth @@ -1680,9 +1681,9 @@ pyjwt==2.13.0 \ --hash=sha256:41571c89ca91598c79e8ef18a2d07367d4810fbbd6f637794879baf1b7703423 \ --hash=sha256:66adcc2aff09b3f1bbd95fc1e1577df8ac8723c978552fd43304c8a290ac5728 # via mcp -pyopenssl==26.3.0 \ - --hash=sha256:46367f8f66b92271e6d218da9c87607e1ef5a0bc5c8dea5bb3db82f395c385a3 \ - --hash=sha256:589de7fae1c9ea670d18422ed00fc04da787bbde8e1454aea872aa57b49ad341 +pyopenssl==26.4.0 \ + --hash=sha256:28dfcce0162b9211413e26dfbfdf1d24317fbeba18fc93c12400a1856b2a0bc7 \ + --hash=sha256:f0eb0cb2d581d3ad2b9c489468485e7f2ab6727d08401bcf9d824c3caddf3c1c # via google-auth python-dateutil==2.9.0.post0 \ --hash=sha256:37dd54208da7e1cd875388217d5e00ebd4179249f90fb72437e91a35459a0ad3 \ diff --git a/requirements-strix-ci.txt b/requirements-strix-ci.txt index e32bd39a9..441e79a26 100644 --- a/requirements-strix-ci.txt +++ b/requirements-strix-ci.txt @@ -1,6 +1,11 @@ strix-agent==1.0.4 google-cloud-aiplatform==1.133.0 protobuf<7.0.0 -cryptography==49.0.0 +cryptography==50.0.0 python-multipart==0.0.32 pyasn1==0.6.4 +# Transitive via strix-agent. 3.14.3 clears GHSA-cq5v-8q36-5273 (HIGH, OOB heap +# read in the C HTTP response parser), GHSA-mq44-7p77-q5h7 (unnegotiated +# permessage-deflate frames accepted) and GHSA-mfx4-hv73-q22v (request smuggling +# via WebSocket upgrade). Floor, not a pin, so Dependabot can keep moving it. +aiohttp>=3.14.3 diff --git a/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py b/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py index 518fcd689..253544976 100644 --- a/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py +++ b/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ """Install independently complete base-commit Python hash locks. The coverage image build may discover several hash-bearing requirements files -from a trusted base commit. A file can hash every requirement it names while +from a trusted base commit. A file can hash every requirement it names while still being only a supplement to another lock, so syntax alone cannot prove -that pip can install it as an independent dependency closure. Preflight every +that pip can install it as an independent dependency closure. Preflight every candidate with pip's hash enforcement, recover supplements only with sibling locks from the same source directory, and skip candidates that still cannot -prove a complete closure. Later coverage execution remains responsible for +prove a complete closure. Later coverage execution remains responsible for proving that the resulting offline environment is sufficient for the target repository. """ @@ -39,6 +39,70 @@ ), re.compile(r"requires a different Python", re.IGNORECASE), ) +# A recognized deferable diagnostic must never hide independent integrity or +# transport evidence emitted by the same failed pip process. These markers are +# deliberately narrow and correspond to pip's stable failure wording already +# enforced by the trusted-build regression suite. +FATAL_PREFLIGHT_FAILURES = ( + re.compile( + r"THESE PACKAGES DO NOT MATCH THE HASHES FROM THE REQUIREMENTS FILE", + re.IGNORECASE, + ), + re.compile(r"WARNING:\s*Retrying\b", re.IGNORECASE), + re.compile(r"Could not fetch URL", re.IGNORECASE), +) +# Defer only exact pip error lines that explain an incomplete hash closure or +# interpreter mismatch. Binary-unavailability lines are handled separately and +# must form a same-requirement pair; a second unknown ``ERROR:`` line therefore +# remains fatal. +DEFERABLE_ERROR_LINES = ( + re.compile( + r"^ERROR:\s*In --require-hashes mode, all requirements must have " + r"their versions pinned with ==", + re.IGNORECASE, + ), + re.compile( + r"^ERROR:\s*Hashes are required in --require-hashes mode, but they " + r"are missing from some requirements", + re.IGNORECASE, + ), + re.compile(r"^ERROR:.*requires a different Python", re.IGNORECASE), + # Pip can emit either context line before a paired binary-unavailability + # diagnostic. Neither context line is independently deferable. + re.compile( + r"^ERROR:\s*Ignored the following yanked versions:", + re.IGNORECASE, + ), + re.compile( + r"^ERROR:\s*Ignored the following versions that require a different " + r"python version:", + re.IGNORECASE, + ), +) +UNSATISFIED_REQUIREMENT_RE = re.compile( + r"^ERROR:\s*Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + r"(?P[^\s(]+)[^\n]*" + r"\(from versions:\s*(?P[^)\n]*)\)", + re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE, +) +NO_MATCHING_DISTRIBUTION_RE = re.compile( + r"^ERROR:\s*No matching distribution found for " + r"(?P\S+)", + re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE, +) +# Conservative PEP 440 subset for pip's normalized ``from versions`` tokens. +# False negatives fail closed and keep the protected base lock blocking; false +# positives would incorrectly skip a lock, so arbitrary alphanumeric prose is +# intentionally rejected even when it contains digits. +CONCRETE_VERSION_RE = re.compile( + r"^(?:v)?(?:[0-9]+!)?" + r"[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)*" + r"(?:(?:a|b|rc)[0-9]+)?" + r"(?:(?:\.post|-)[0-9]+)?" + r"(?:\.dev[0-9]+)?" + r"(?:\+[a-z0-9]+(?:[._-][a-z0-9]+)*)?$", + re.IGNORECASE, +) Runner = Callable[..., subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]] @@ -146,19 +210,106 @@ def _bounded_failure_output(output: str, *, maximum_lines: int = 120) -> str: ) +def _normalized_requirement_token(requirement: str) -> str: + """Normalize harmless diagnostic punctuation for exact token comparison.""" + return requirement.rstrip(".,").casefold() + + +def _is_concrete_version_list(version_list: str) -> bool: + """Return whether every comma-separated token is a concrete PEP 440 version. + + Pip's diagnostic is used as evidence that an index was reached and offered + at least one alternative distribution. Empty values, ``none``, arbitrary + prose such as ``unavailable``, and mixed version/prose lists are not proof of + reachability and therefore fail closed. + """ + tokens = [token.strip() for token in version_list.split(",")] + return bool(tokens) and all( + bool(token) and CONCRETE_VERSION_RE.fullmatch(token) is not None + for token in tokens + ) + + +def _matching_binary_unavailability_requirements(output: str) -> set[str]: + """Return exact pins paired across pip's binary-unavailability diagnostics.""" + unsatisfied = { + _normalized_requirement_token(match.group("requirement")) + for match in UNSATISFIED_REQUIREMENT_RE.finditer(output) + if _is_concrete_version_list(match.group("versions")) + } + unmatched = { + _normalized_requirement_token(match.group("requirement")) + for match in NO_MATCHING_DISTRIBUTION_RE.finditer(output) + } + return unsatisfied if unsatisfied and unsatisfied == unmatched else set() + + +def _contains_unclassified_error(output: str) -> bool: + """Return whether pip emitted an error outside the deferable contract.""" + matching_requirements = _matching_binary_unavailability_requirements(output) + for line in output.splitlines(): + normalized_line = line.strip() + if not normalized_line.casefold().startswith("error:"): + continue + + unsatisfied_match = UNSATISFIED_REQUIREMENT_RE.search(normalized_line) + if unsatisfied_match is not None: + requirement = _normalized_requirement_token( + unsatisfied_match.group("requirement") + ) + if requirement in matching_requirements and _is_concrete_version_list( + unsatisfied_match.group("versions") + ): + continue + return True + + unmatched_distribution = NO_MATCHING_DISTRIBUTION_RE.search(normalized_line) + if unmatched_distribution is not None: + requirement = _normalized_requirement_token( + unmatched_distribution.group("requirement") + ) + if requirement in matching_requirements: + continue + return True + + if any(pattern.search(normalized_line) for pattern in DEFERABLE_ERROR_LINES): + continue + return True + return False + + def _is_deferable_preflight_failure(output: str) -> bool: """Return whether a failed candidate may be grouped or safely skipped. A hash-bearing supplement can fail pip's independent-closure check because a - transitive pin/hash lives in a sibling lock, and a base lock can explicitly - reject the pinned coverage-image interpreter. Those states are safe to - recover through a same-directory group or defer to the later networkless - coverage run. Hash mismatches, resolver crashes, empty diagnostics, and - registry/network failures remain fatal so a broken trusted build cannot be - mistaken for an optional lock. + transitive pin/hash lives in a sibling lock, a base lock can explicitly + reject the pinned coverage-image interpreter, and a base lock can pin a + version for which the reachable index exposes no matching binary for that + interpreter. Binary unavailability is deferable only when pip emits both + resolver lines for the same exact requirement and every listed alternative + is a concrete PEP 440 version. Those states are safe to recover through a + same-directory group or defer to the later networkless coverage run. Hash + mismatches, resolver crashes, empty diagnostics, and registry/network + failures — including fatal evidence mixed with an otherwise deferable + diagnostic — remain fatal so a broken trusted build cannot be mistaken for + an optional lock. Deferred paths retain a warning and bounded pip diagnostics + so the incompatibility stays visible without blocking unrelated coverage + evidence. """ - return bool(output.strip()) and any( - pattern.search(output) for pattern in DEFERABLE_PREFLIGHT_FAILURES + normalized_output = output.strip() + return ( + bool(normalized_output) + and not any( + pattern.search(normalized_output) for pattern in FATAL_PREFLIGHT_FAILURES + ) + and not _contains_unclassified_error(normalized_output) + and ( + any( + pattern.search(normalized_output) + for pattern in DEFERABLE_PREFLIGHT_FAILURES + ) + or bool(_matching_binary_unavailability_requirements(normalized_output)) + ) ) @@ -171,8 +322,9 @@ def _report_fatal_preflight_failure( """Publish one bounded, source-aware fatal preflight failure.""" print( "::error::Trusted base Python lock preflight failed for " - f"{entry_label}; only incomplete hash closures or explicit Python " - "interpreter incompatibility may be deferred.", + f"{entry_label}; only incomplete hash closures, explicit Python " + "interpreter incompatibility, or paired same-requirement binary " + "unavailability with concrete version evidence may be deferred.", file=stderr, ) failure_output = _bounded_failure_output(output) @@ -280,9 +432,9 @@ def install_materialized_locks( skipped += 1 print( "::warning::Skipping trusted base Python requirement candidate " - f"{entry.source}: hash-bearing content is not an independently " - "installable dependency closure and no same-directory lock group " - "completed it.", + f"{entry.source}: it is not an independently complete dependency " + "closure for the coverage interpreter and no same-directory lock " + "group completed it.", file=stderr, ) failure_output = _bounded_failure_output( diff --git a/tests/test_install_base_python_lock_missing_pin.py b/tests/test_install_base_python_lock_missing_pin.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5de4056ea --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_install_base_python_lock_missing_pin.py @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +"""Regression tests for unavailable pins in trusted base Python locks.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import io +import json +import subprocess +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +from scripts.ci import install_base_python_locks as installer + + +def _write_candidate(root: Path) -> None: + """Write one trusted materialized lock candidate and its manifest.""" + + (root / "manifest.json").write_text( + json.dumps( + [ + { + "file": "requirements-000.txt", + "source": "requirements-hashes.txt", + } + ] + ), + encoding="utf-8", + ) + (root / "requirements-000.txt").write_text( + "pypdf==6.13.3 --hash=sha256:" + ("a" * 64) + "\n", + encoding="utf-8", + ) + + +def _run_preflight_failure(root: Path, output: str) -> tuple[int, str, str]: + """Run the installer with one deterministic pip preflight failure.""" + + _write_candidate(root) + + def fake_runner(command: list[str], **kwargs): + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 1, stdout=output) + + stdout = io.StringIO() + stderr = io.StringIO() + result = installer.install_materialized_locks( + root, + runner=fake_runner, + stdout=stdout, + stderr=stderr, + ) + return result, stdout.getvalue(), stderr.getvalue() + + +def test_reachable_index_missing_pin_is_visible_and_nonfatal(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """A reachable index proving newer versions exist may defer a stale pin.""" + + output = ( + "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + "pypdf==6.13.3 (from versions: 6.14.1, 6.14.2)\n" + "ERROR: No matching distribution found for pypdf==6.13.3" + ) + + result, stdout, stderr = _run_preflight_failure(tmp_path, output) + + assert result == 0 + assert "candidates=1 installed=0 skipped=1" in stdout + assert "Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement" in stderr + + +def test_pep440_version_evidence_is_deferable(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """Epoch, prerelease, postrelease, development, and local versions remain valid.""" + + output = ( + "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + "pypdf==6.13.3 (from versions: v1!6.14.0rc1.post2.dev3+linux.x86_64)\n" + "ERROR: No matching distribution found for pypdf==6.13.3" + ) + + result, stdout, stderr = _run_preflight_failure(tmp_path, output) + + assert result == 0 + assert "candidates=1 installed=0 skipped=1" in stdout + assert "v1!6.14.0rc1.post2.dev3+linux.x86_64" in stderr + + +def test_reachable_index_context_lines_remain_deferable(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """Pip's yanked and incompatible-version context does not mask a proven stale pin.""" + + output = ( + "ERROR: Ignored the following yanked versions: 6.13.3\n" + "ERROR: Ignored the following versions that require a different python " + "version: 6.13.4 Requires-Python <3.14\n" + "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + "pypdf==6.13.3 (from versions: 6.14.1, 6.14.2)\n" + "ERROR: No matching distribution found for pypdf==6.13.3" + ) + + result, stdout, stderr = _run_preflight_failure(tmp_path, output) + + assert result == 0 + assert "candidates=1 installed=0 skipped=1" in stdout + assert "Ignored the following yanked versions" in stderr + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "fatal_fragment", + [ + "ERROR: THESE PACKAGES DO NOT MATCH THE HASHES FROM THE REQUIREMENTS FILE", + "WARNING: Retrying after connection broken by ConnectionError", + "ERROR: Could not fetch URL https://pypi.org/simple/pypdf/", + "ERROR: pip resolver crashed after candidate enumeration", + ], +) +def test_reachable_index_message_cannot_mask_fatal_failure( + tmp_path: Path, + fatal_fragment: str, +) -> None: + """Any independent fatal evidence must dominate a stale-pin diagnostic.""" + + output = ( + "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + "pypdf==6.13.3 (from versions: 6.14.1, 6.14.2)\n" + "ERROR: No matching distribution found for pypdf==6.13.3\n" + f"{fatal_fragment}" + ) + + result, stdout, stderr = _run_preflight_failure(tmp_path, output) + + assert result == 1 + assert "preflight failed" in stderr + assert fatal_fragment in stderr + assert "installed=" not in stdout + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "version_list", + [ + "none", + "", + "unavailable", + "latest", + "release-6", + "6.14.1, unavailable", + "6.14.1 extra-text", + ], +) +def test_non_version_index_evidence_remains_fatal( + tmp_path: Path, + version_list: str, +) -> None: + """Only a complete comma-separated PEP 440 version list proves reachability.""" + + output = ( + "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + f"pypdf==6.13.3 (from versions: {version_list})\n" + "ERROR: No matching distribution found for pypdf==6.13.3" + ) + + result, stdout, stderr = _run_preflight_failure(tmp_path, output) + + assert result == 1 + assert "preflight failed" in stderr + assert "installed=" not in stdout + + +def test_valid_pair_cannot_mask_duplicate_malformed_version_evidence( + tmp_path: Path, +) -> None: + """Every resolver line for a paired requirement must carry concrete versions.""" + + output = ( + "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + "pypdf==6.13.3 (from versions: 6.14.1)\n" + "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + "pypdf==6.13.3 (from versions: unavailable)\n" + "ERROR: No matching distribution found for pypdf==6.13.3" + ) + + result, stdout, stderr = _run_preflight_failure(tmp_path, output) + + assert result == 1 + assert "preflight failed" in stderr + assert "unavailable" in stderr + assert "installed=" not in stdout + + +def test_atheris_binary_wheel_unavailability_is_deferable(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """The real Python 3.14 binary-only diagnostic is a visible skipped lock.""" + + output = ( + "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + "atheris==3.0.0 (from versions: 3.1.0)\n" + "ERROR: No matching distribution found for atheris==3.0.0" + ) + + result, stdout, stderr = _run_preflight_failure(tmp_path, output) + + assert result == 0 + assert "candidates=1 installed=0 skipped=1" in stdout + assert "atheris==3.0.0" in stderr + + +def test_mismatched_binary_diagnostics_remain_fatal(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """Two resolver lines for different exact pins cannot authorize deferral.""" + + output = ( + "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + "pypdf==6.13.3 (from versions: 6.14.2)\n" + "ERROR: No matching distribution found for atheris==3.0.0" + ) + + result, stdout, stderr = _run_preflight_failure(tmp_path, output) + + assert result == 1 + assert "preflight failed" in stderr + assert "installed=" not in stdout + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "output", + [ + ( + "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement " + "atheris==3.0.0 (from versions: 3.1.0)" + ), + "ERROR: No matching distribution found for atheris==3.0.0", + ], +) +def test_single_binary_diagnostic_remains_fatal( + tmp_path: Path, + output: str, +) -> None: + """Neither half of pip's binary-unavailability evidence is sufficient alone.""" + + result, stdout, stderr = _run_preflight_failure(tmp_path, output) + + assert result == 1 + assert "preflight failed" in stderr + assert "installed=" not in stdout diff --git a/tests/test_pr_review_fix_hourly_contract.py b/tests/test_pr_review_fix_hourly_contract.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f55408fc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_pr_review_fix_hourly_contract.py @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +"""Static contract for the central hourly PR review-fix scheduler.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from pathlib import Path + + +_WORKFLOW = Path(".github/workflows/pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml") + + +def _workflow_text() -> str: + """Return the canonical scheduler workflow text.""" + return _WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + +def test_review_fix_scheduler_runs_once_each_hour() -> None: + """The bounded repair dispatcher uses the requested hourly heartbeat.""" + text = _workflow_text() + + assert 'cron: "23 * * * *"' in text + assert 'cron: "23 */2 * * *"' not in text + + +def test_review_fix_scheduler_retries_same_head_after_one_hour() -> None: + """A blocked head can be retried on the next hourly cycle, not a day later.""" + text = _workflow_text() + + retry_block = text.split("retry_hours:", maxsplit=1)[1].split( + "autofix_workflow:", maxsplit=1 + )[0] + assert 'default: "1"' in retry_block + assert "inputs.retry_hours || '1'" in text + assert "inputs.retry_hours || '24'" not in text + + +def test_review_fix_scheduler_remains_bounded_and_single_flight() -> None: + """Higher cadence never expands mutation volume or parallel execution.""" + text = _workflow_text() + + dispatch_block = text.split("max_dispatches:", maxsplit=1)[1].split( + "target_repository:", maxsplit=1 + )[0] + assert 'default: "1"' in dispatch_block + assert "cancel-in-progress: true" in text + assert "MAX_DISPATCHES" in text diff --git a/tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_source_pin.py b/tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_source_pin.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bb5a6bbc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_source_pin.py @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +"""Supply-chain contract for the reusable PR-review autofix scheduler.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from pathlib import Path + + +_REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] +_WORKFLOW = _REPO_ROOT / ".github" / "workflows" / "pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml" + + +def _workflow_text() -> str: + """Read the reusable scheduler workflow as UTF-8 text.""" + return _WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + +def test_reusable_scheduler_validates_called_workflow_identity_before_checkout() -> None: + """Missing workflow identity must fail before checkout can use defaults.""" + workflow = _workflow_text() + guard = workflow.index("Resolve immutable called-workflow source") + checkout = workflow.index("Checkout immutable called-workflow source") + + assert guard < checkout + assert "WORKFLOW_REPOSITORY: ${{ job.workflow_repository }}" in workflow + assert "WORKFLOW_SHA: ${{ job.workflow_sha }}" in workflow + assert "WORKFLOW_REF: ${{ job.workflow_ref }}" in workflow + assert "WORKFLOW_FILE_PATH: ${{ job.workflow_file_path }}" in workflow + assert 'expected_repository="ContextualWisdomLab/.github"' in workflow + assert 'expected_file=".github/workflows/pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml"' in workflow + assert '[[ "$WORKFLOW_SHA" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]' in workflow + assert "repository: ${{ steps.trusted_source.outputs.repository }}" in workflow + assert "ref: ${{ steps.trusted_source.outputs.sha }}" in workflow + + +def test_reusable_scheduler_verifies_checked_out_called_workflow_sha() -> None: + """The checked-out commit must equal the validated called-workflow SHA.""" + workflow = _workflow_text() + verification = workflow.index("Verify immutable called-workflow checkout") + self_test = workflow.index("Self-test fix scheduler contract") + + assert verification < self_test + assert 'actual_sha="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"' in workflow + assert '[ "$actual_sha" != "$EXPECTED_SHA" ]' in workflow + assert '[ ! -f "$EXPECTED_FILE" ] || [ -L "$EXPECTED_FILE" ]' in workflow + + +def test_reusable_scheduler_source_is_not_caller_input_controlled() -> None: + """No caller-supplied ref or ordinary caller GitHub SHA selects trusted code.""" + workflow = _workflow_text() + assert "inputs.canonical_ref" not in workflow + assert "github.event.client_payload.canonical_ref" not in workflow + assert "ref: ${{ env.CANONICAL_REF }}" not in workflow + assert "ref: ${{ github.sha }}" not in workflow + assert "ref: ${{ github.workflow_sha }}" not in workflow + + +def test_deprecated_canonical_ref_input_is_accepted_but_never_consumed() -> None: + """Existing callers can upgrade pins without controlling privileged source.""" + workflow = _workflow_text() + declaration = workflow.split("canonical_ref:", 1)[1].split( + "repository_dispatch:", 1 + )[0] + + assert "Deprecated compatibility input" in declaration + assert "ignored" in declaration + assert 'default: ""' in declaration + assert workflow.count("canonical_ref") == 1 + + +def test_reusable_scheduler_retains_least_privilege_and_bounded_dispatch() -> None: + """Source pinning does not broaden token scope or queue fan-out.""" + workflow = _workflow_text() + assert "contents: write" not in workflow + assert "pull-requests: write" not in workflow + assert "MAX_DISPATCHES:" in workflow + assert "RETRY_HOURS:" in workflow + assert "cancel-in-progress: true" in workflow diff --git a/tests/test_sbom_generation_push_contract.py b/tests/test_sbom_generation_push_contract.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..011be9737 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_sbom_generation_push_contract.py @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +"""Contracts for default-branch dependency snapshot generation.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from pathlib import Path + + +WORKFLOW = Path(".github/workflows/sbom-generation.yml") + + +def _workflow_text() -> str: + """Return the centrally versioned SBOM workflow as UTF-8 text.""" + + return WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + +def test_sbom_workflow_snapshots_supported_default_branch_pushes() -> None: + """Default-branch commits must receive dependency graph snapshots.""" + + workflow = _workflow_text() + + assert "on:\n push:\n branches: [main, master, develop]\n" in workflow + assert " pull_request:\n" in workflow + assert " release:\n" in workflow + assert "dependency-snapshot: true" in workflow + + +def test_sbom_push_concurrency_is_bound_to_the_commit_sha() -> None: + """A later default-branch push must not cancel another commit's snapshot.""" + + workflow = _workflow_text() + group_line = next( + line.strip() for line in workflow.splitlines() if line.strip().startswith("group:") + ) + + assert "github.event.release.tag_name || github.sha" in group_line + assert "github.event.release.tag_name || github.ref" not in group_line + + +def test_sbom_job_conditions_keep_push_runs_active_and_closed_prs_inert() -> None: + """Pushes run the snapshot job while closed-PR events only cancel stale work.""" + + workflow = _workflow_text() + + assert ( + "if: github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.action == 'closed'" + in workflow + ) + assert ( + "if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.action != 'closed'" + in workflow + ) + assert "generate-sbom:\n" in workflow + assert " contents: write\n" in workflow From 7dda47da90a7ec4aee2b0b9b2d5234910806eb0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 08:03:14 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 13/75] fix(ci): install validated Python locks atomically --- scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py | 210 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py b/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py index 253544976..aad07980c 100644 --- a/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py +++ b/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py @@ -1,14 +1,10 @@ -"""Install independently complete base-commit Python hash locks. - -The coverage image build may discover several hash-bearing requirements files -from a trusted base commit. A file can hash every requirement it names while -still being only a supplement to another lock, so syntax alone cannot prove -that pip can install it as an independent dependency closure. Preflight every -candidate with pip's hash enforcement, recover supplements only with sibling -locks from the same source directory, and skip candidates that still cannot -prove a complete closure. Later coverage execution remains responsible for -proving that the resulting offline environment is sufficient for the target -repository. +"""Install trusted base-commit Python hash locks without package overlays. + +The coverage image can contain several independently hash-complete requirement +files. Installing those files in separate pip transactions can leave a package +partially overlaid when multiple locks pin the same distribution. This module +preflights candidates and same-directory supplement groups, then resolves every +accepted requirement file in one aggregate dry run and one aggregate install. """ from __future__ import annotations @@ -24,25 +20,18 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass from typing import Any, TextIO - GENERATED_LOCK_RE = re.compile(r"^requirements-[0-9]{3}\.txt$") DEFERABLE_PREFLIGHT_FAILURES = ( re.compile( - r"In --require-hashes mode, all requirements must have their versions " - r"pinned with ==", + r"In --require-hashes mode, all requirements must have their versions pinned with ==", re.IGNORECASE, ), re.compile( - r"Hashes are required in --require-hashes mode, but they are missing " - r"from some requirements", + r"Hashes are required in --require-hashes mode, but they are missing from some requirements", re.IGNORECASE, ), re.compile(r"requires a different Python", re.IGNORECASE), ) -# A recognized deferable diagnostic must never hide independent integrity or -# transport evidence emitted by the same failed pip process. These markers are -# deliberately narrow and correspond to pip's stable failure wording already -# enforced by the trusted-build regression suite. FATAL_PREFLIGHT_FAILURES = ( re.compile( r"THESE PACKAGES DO NOT MATCH THE HASHES FROM THE REQUIREMENTS FILE", @@ -51,31 +40,19 @@ re.compile(r"WARNING:\s*Retrying\b", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile(r"Could not fetch URL", re.IGNORECASE), ) -# Defer only exact pip error lines that explain an incomplete hash closure or -# interpreter mismatch. Binary-unavailability lines are handled separately and -# must form a same-requirement pair; a second unknown ``ERROR:`` line therefore -# remains fatal. DEFERABLE_ERROR_LINES = ( re.compile( - r"^ERROR:\s*In --require-hashes mode, all requirements must have " - r"their versions pinned with ==", + r"^ERROR:\s*In --require-hashes mode, all requirements must have their versions pinned with ==", re.IGNORECASE, ), re.compile( - r"^ERROR:\s*Hashes are required in --require-hashes mode, but they " - r"are missing from some requirements", + r"^ERROR:\s*Hashes are required in --require-hashes mode, but they are missing from some requirements", re.IGNORECASE, ), re.compile(r"^ERROR:.*requires a different Python", re.IGNORECASE), - # Pip can emit either context line before a paired binary-unavailability - # diagnostic. Neither context line is independently deferable. - re.compile( - r"^ERROR:\s*Ignored the following yanked versions:", - re.IGNORECASE, - ), + re.compile(r"^ERROR:\s*Ignored the following yanked versions:", re.IGNORECASE), re.compile( - r"^ERROR:\s*Ignored the following versions that require a different " - r"python version:", + r"^ERROR:\s*Ignored the following versions that require a different python version:", re.IGNORECASE, ), ) @@ -86,21 +63,13 @@ re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE, ) NO_MATCHING_DISTRIBUTION_RE = re.compile( - r"^ERROR:\s*No matching distribution found for " - r"(?P\S+)", + r"^ERROR:\s*No matching distribution found for (?P\S+)", re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE, ) -# Conservative PEP 440 subset for pip's normalized ``from versions`` tokens. -# False negatives fail closed and keep the protected base lock blocking; false -# positives would incorrectly skip a lock, so arbitrary alphanumeric prose is -# intentionally rejected even when it contains digits. CONCRETE_VERSION_RE = re.compile( - r"^(?:v)?(?:[0-9]+!)?" - r"[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)*" - r"(?:(?:a|b|rc)[0-9]+)?" - r"(?:(?:\.post|-)[0-9]+)?" - r"(?:\.dev[0-9]+)?" - r"(?:\+[a-z0-9]+(?:[._-][a-z0-9]+)*)?$", + r"^(?:v)?(?:[0-9]+!)?[0-9]+(?:\.[0-9]+)*" + r"(?:(?:a|b|rc)[0-9]+)?(?:(?:\.post|-)[0-9]+)?" + r"(?:\.dev[0-9]+)?(?:\+[a-z0-9]+(?:[._-][a-z0-9]+)*)?$", re.IGNORECASE, ) Runner = Callable[..., subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]] @@ -117,14 +86,14 @@ class LockCandidate: @property def source_directory(self) -> str: """Return the source directory used for supplement recovery groups.""" + parent = str(pathlib.PurePosixPath(self.source).parent) return "" if parent == "." else parent -def _manifest_entries( - requirements_root: pathlib.Path, -) -> list[LockCandidate]: +def _manifest_entries(requirements_root: pathlib.Path) -> list[LockCandidate]: """Load and validate trusted materializer output.""" + root = requirements_root.resolve() manifest_path = root / "manifest.json" if not manifest_path.is_file() or manifest_path.is_symlink(): @@ -158,24 +127,20 @@ def _manifest_entries( if generated_file in seen_files: raise ValueError("base Python lock manifest contains duplicate file names") seen_files.add(generated_file) - candidate = root / generated_file if not candidate.is_file() or candidate.is_symlink(): raise ValueError( f"materialized base Python lock {generated_file} must be a regular file" ) entries.append( - LockCandidate( - generated_file=generated_file, - source=str(source_path), - path=candidate, - ) + LockCandidate(generated_file, str(source_path), candidate) ) return entries def _pip_command(requirements: Sequence[pathlib.Path], *, preflight: bool) -> list[str]: - """Build a hash-enforced pip command for one candidate or recovery group.""" + """Build one hash-enforced pip command for the supplied lock closure.""" + command = [ sys.executable, "-m", @@ -194,7 +159,8 @@ def _pip_command(requirements: Sequence[pathlib.Path], *, preflight: bool) -> li def _bounded_failure_output(output: str, *, maximum_lines: int = 120) -> str: - """Keep the dependency root cause visible without flooding Actions logs.""" + """Keep dependency root causes visible without flooding Actions logs.""" + lines = output.rstrip().splitlines() if len(lines) <= maximum_lines: return "\n".join(lines) @@ -212,17 +178,13 @@ def _bounded_failure_output(output: str, *, maximum_lines: int = 120) -> str: def _normalized_requirement_token(requirement: str) -> str: """Normalize harmless diagnostic punctuation for exact token comparison.""" + return requirement.rstrip(".,").casefold() def _is_concrete_version_list(version_list: str) -> bool: - """Return whether every comma-separated token is a concrete PEP 440 version. + """Return whether every comma-separated token is a concrete PEP 440 version.""" - Pip's diagnostic is used as evidence that an index was reached and offered - at least one alternative distribution. Empty values, ``none``, arbitrary - prose such as ``unavailable``, and mixed version/prose lists are not proof of - reachability and therefore fail closed. - """ tokens = [token.strip() for token in version_list.split(",")] return bool(tokens) and all( bool(token) and CONCRETE_VERSION_RE.fullmatch(token) is not None @@ -231,7 +193,8 @@ def _is_concrete_version_list(version_list: str) -> bool: def _matching_binary_unavailability_requirements(output: str) -> set[str]: - """Return exact pins paired across pip's binary-unavailability diagnostics.""" + """Return exact pins paired across pip binary-unavailability diagnostics.""" + unsatisfied = { _normalized_requirement_token(match.group("requirement")) for match in UNSATISFIED_REQUIREMENT_RE.finditer(output) @@ -246,12 +209,12 @@ def _matching_binary_unavailability_requirements(output: str) -> set[str]: def _contains_unclassified_error(output: str) -> bool: """Return whether pip emitted an error outside the deferable contract.""" + matching_requirements = _matching_binary_unavailability_requirements(output) for line in output.splitlines(): normalized_line = line.strip() if not normalized_line.casefold().startswith("error:"): continue - unsatisfied_match = UNSATISFIED_REQUIREMENT_RE.search(normalized_line) if unsatisfied_match is not None: requirement = _normalized_requirement_token( @@ -262,7 +225,6 @@ def _contains_unclassified_error(output: str) -> bool: ): continue return True - unmatched_distribution = NO_MATCHING_DISTRIBUTION_RE.search(normalized_line) if unmatched_distribution is not None: requirement = _normalized_requirement_token( @@ -271,7 +233,6 @@ def _contains_unclassified_error(output: str) -> bool: if requirement in matching_requirements: continue return True - if any(pattern.search(normalized_line) for pattern in DEFERABLE_ERROR_LINES): continue return True @@ -279,23 +240,8 @@ def _contains_unclassified_error(output: str) -> bool: def _is_deferable_preflight_failure(output: str) -> bool: - """Return whether a failed candidate may be grouped or safely skipped. - - A hash-bearing supplement can fail pip's independent-closure check because a - transitive pin/hash lives in a sibling lock, a base lock can explicitly - reject the pinned coverage-image interpreter, and a base lock can pin a - version for which the reachable index exposes no matching binary for that - interpreter. Binary unavailability is deferable only when pip emits both - resolver lines for the same exact requirement and every listed alternative - is a concrete PEP 440 version. Those states are safe to recover through a - same-directory group or defer to the later networkless coverage run. Hash - mismatches, resolver crashes, empty diagnostics, and registry/network - failures — including fatal evidence mixed with an otherwise deferable - diagnostic — remain fatal so a broken trusted build cannot be mistaken for - an optional lock. Deferred paths retain a warning and bounded pip diagnostics - so the incompatibility stays visible without blocking unrelated coverage - evidence. - """ + """Return whether a failed candidate may be grouped or safely skipped.""" + normalized_output = output.strip() return ( bool(normalized_output) @@ -320,6 +266,7 @@ def _report_fatal_preflight_failure( stderr: TextIO, ) -> None: """Publish one bounded, source-aware fatal preflight failure.""" + print( "::error::Trusted base Python lock preflight failed for " f"{entry_label}; only incomplete hash closures, explicit Python " @@ -332,6 +279,22 @@ def _report_fatal_preflight_failure( print(failure_output, file=stderr) +def _run_preflight( + requirements: Sequence[pathlib.Path], + *, + runner: Runner, +) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: + """Run one isolated resolver-only hash validation.""" + + return runner( + _pip_command(requirements, preflight=True), + check=False, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, + text=True, + ) + + def install_materialized_locks( requirements_root: pathlib.Path, *, @@ -339,14 +302,14 @@ def install_materialized_locks( stdout: TextIO = sys.stdout, stderr: TextIO = sys.stderr, ) -> int: - """Preflight and install independent base lock closures.""" + """Preflight accepted locks and install them in one atomic pip transaction.""" + try: entries = _manifest_entries(requirements_root) except (OSError, ValueError) as exc: print(f"::error::Could not validate base Python locks: {exc}", file=stderr) return 2 - installed = 0 skipped = 0 preflight_results: dict[str, subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]] = {} independently_valid: set[str] = set() @@ -357,21 +320,13 @@ def install_materialized_locks( file=stdout, flush=True, ) - preflight = runner( - _pip_command([entry.path], preflight=True), - check=False, - stdout=subprocess.PIPE, - stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, - text=True, - ) + preflight = _run_preflight([entry.path], runner=runner) preflight_results[entry.generated_file] = preflight if preflight.returncode == 0: independently_valid.add(entry.generated_file) elif not _is_deferable_preflight_failure(preflight.stdout or ""): _report_fatal_preflight_failure( - entry.source, - preflight.stdout or "", - stderr=stderr, + entry.source, preflight.stdout or "", stderr=stderr ) return preflight.returncode or 1 @@ -379,7 +334,7 @@ def install_materialized_locks( for entry in entries: by_source_directory[entry.source_directory].append(entry) - install_plans: list[list[LockCandidate]] = [] + accepted: list[LockCandidate] = [] covered_files: set[str] = set() for source_directory, directory_entries in by_source_directory.items(): invalid_entries = [ @@ -396,12 +351,8 @@ def install_materialized_locks( file=stdout, flush=True, ) - group_preflight = runner( - _pip_command([entry.path for entry in directory_entries], preflight=True), - check=False, - stdout=subprocess.PIPE, - stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, - text=True, + group_preflight = _run_preflight( + [entry.path for entry in directory_entries], runner=runner ) if group_preflight.returncode != 0: if not _is_deferable_preflight_failure(group_preflight.stdout or ""): @@ -412,7 +363,7 @@ def install_materialized_locks( ) return group_preflight.returncode or 1 continue - install_plans.append(directory_entries) + accepted.extend(directory_entries) covered_files.update(entry.generated_file for entry in directory_entries) print( "Recovered trusted base Python supplement(s) through a complete " @@ -425,10 +376,9 @@ def install_materialized_locks( if entry.generated_file in covered_files: continue if entry.generated_file in independently_valid: - install_plans.append([entry]) + accepted.append(entry) covered_files.add(entry.generated_file) continue - skipped += 1 print( "::warning::Skipping trusted base Python requirement candidate " @@ -440,31 +390,54 @@ def install_materialized_locks( failure_output = _bounded_failure_output( preflight_results[entry.generated_file].stdout or "" ) - print(failure_output, file=stderr) - - for plan in install_plans: - plan_sources = ", ".join(entry.source for entry in plan) + if failure_output: + print(failure_output, file=stderr) + + unique_accepted: list[LockCandidate] = [] + seen_accepted: set[str] = set() + for entry in accepted: + if entry.generated_file not in seen_accepted: + seen_accepted.add(entry.generated_file) + unique_accepted.append(entry) + + if unique_accepted: + accepted_paths = [entry.path for entry in unique_accepted] + accepted_sources = ", ".join(entry.source for entry in unique_accepted) + print( + "Preflighting aggregate trusted base Python lock closure: " + f"{accepted_sources}.", + file=stdout, + flush=True, + ) + aggregate_preflight = _run_preflight(accepted_paths, runner=runner) + if aggregate_preflight.returncode != 0: + _report_fatal_preflight_failure( + accepted_sources, + aggregate_preflight.stdout or "", + stderr=stderr, + ) + return aggregate_preflight.returncode or 1 print( - f"Installing validated trusted base Python lock closure: {plan_sources}.", + "Installing aggregate trusted base Python lock closure in one " + f"transaction: {accepted_sources}.", file=stdout, flush=True, ) installation = runner( - _pip_command([entry.path for entry in plan], preflight=False), + _pip_command(accepted_paths, preflight=False), check=False, ) if installation.returncode != 0: print( - "::error::A preflight-valid trusted base Python lock closure failed " - f"during installation: {plan_sources}.", + "::error::The aggregate preflight-valid trusted base Python " + f"lock closure failed during installation: {accepted_sources}.", file=stderr, ) return installation.returncode or 1 - installed += len(plan) print( "Trusted base Python lock installation summary: " - f"candidates={len(entries)} installed={installed} skipped={skipped}.", + f"candidates={len(entries)} installed={len(unique_accepted)} skipped={skipped}.", file=stdout, ) return 0 @@ -472,6 +445,7 @@ def install_materialized_locks( def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: """Install materialized lock candidates supplied by the trusted workflow.""" + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("--requirements-root", required=True, type=pathlib.Path) args = parser.parse_args(argv) From 17c196da08da8e25c39d407526098223e56b4fe6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 08:04:32 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 14/75] fix(ci): preserve lock preflight contract --- scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py | 60 ++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py b/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py index aad07980c..257fa789c 100644 --- a/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py +++ b/scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py @@ -1,10 +1,9 @@ """Install trusted base-commit Python hash locks without package overlays. -The coverage image can contain several independently hash-complete requirement -files. Installing those files in separate pip transactions can leave a package -partially overlaid when multiple locks pin the same distribution. This module -preflights candidates and same-directory supplement groups, then resolves every -accepted requirement file in one aggregate dry run and one aggregate install. +Each candidate is preflighted independently, incomplete supplements may be +recovered only with sibling locks, and accepted closures are installed in one +pip transaction. The single transaction prevents repeated installs from +leaving packages such as NumPy partially overlaid in the coverage image. """ from __future__ import annotations @@ -104,7 +103,6 @@ def _manifest_entries(requirements_root: pathlib.Path) -> list[LockCandidate]: raise ValueError(f"base Python lock manifest is invalid: {exc}") from exc if not isinstance(manifest, list): raise ValueError("base Python lock manifest must be a JSON array") - entries: list[LockCandidate] = [] seen_files: set[str] = set() for entry in manifest: @@ -132,9 +130,7 @@ def _manifest_entries(requirements_root: pathlib.Path) -> list[LockCandidate]: raise ValueError( f"materialized base Python lock {generated_file} must be a regular file" ) - entries.append( - LockCandidate(generated_file, str(source_path), candidate) - ) + entries.append(LockCandidate(generated_file, str(source_path), candidate)) return entries @@ -279,12 +275,10 @@ def _report_fatal_preflight_failure( print(failure_output, file=stderr) -def _run_preflight( - requirements: Sequence[pathlib.Path], - *, - runner: Runner, +def _preflight( + requirements: Sequence[pathlib.Path], runner: Runner ) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: - """Run one isolated resolver-only hash validation.""" + """Run one resolver-only hash validation.""" return runner( _pip_command(requirements, preflight=True), @@ -302,7 +296,7 @@ def install_materialized_locks( stdout: TextIO = sys.stdout, stderr: TextIO = sys.stderr, ) -> int: - """Preflight accepted locks and install them in one atomic pip transaction.""" + """Preflight accepted locks and install them in one pip transaction.""" try: entries = _manifest_entries(requirements_root) @@ -320,7 +314,7 @@ def install_materialized_locks( file=stdout, flush=True, ) - preflight = _run_preflight([entry.path], runner=runner) + preflight = _preflight([entry.path], runner) preflight_results[entry.generated_file] = preflight if preflight.returncode == 0: independently_valid.add(entry.generated_file) @@ -336,6 +330,7 @@ def install_materialized_locks( accepted: list[LockCandidate] = [] covered_files: set[str] = set() + accepted_plan_count = 0 for source_directory, directory_entries in by_source_directory.items(): invalid_entries = [ entry @@ -351,8 +346,8 @@ def install_materialized_locks( file=stdout, flush=True, ) - group_preflight = _run_preflight( - [entry.path for entry in directory_entries], runner=runner + group_preflight = _preflight( + [entry.path for entry in directory_entries], runner ) if group_preflight.returncode != 0: if not _is_deferable_preflight_failure(group_preflight.stdout or ""): @@ -365,6 +360,7 @@ def install_materialized_locks( continue accepted.extend(directory_entries) covered_files.update(entry.generated_file for entry in directory_entries) + accepted_plan_count += 1 print( "Recovered trusted base Python supplement(s) through a complete " f"same-directory hash closure: {source_directory or '.'}.", @@ -378,6 +374,7 @@ def install_materialized_locks( if entry.generated_file in independently_valid: accepted.append(entry) covered_files.add(entry.generated_file) + accepted_plan_count += 1 continue skipped += 1 print( @@ -403,20 +400,21 @@ def install_materialized_locks( if unique_accepted: accepted_paths = [entry.path for entry in unique_accepted] accepted_sources = ", ".join(entry.source for entry in unique_accepted) - print( - "Preflighting aggregate trusted base Python lock closure: " - f"{accepted_sources}.", - file=stdout, - flush=True, - ) - aggregate_preflight = _run_preflight(accepted_paths, runner=runner) - if aggregate_preflight.returncode != 0: - _report_fatal_preflight_failure( - accepted_sources, - aggregate_preflight.stdout or "", - stderr=stderr, + if accepted_plan_count > 1: + print( + "Preflighting aggregate trusted base Python lock closure: " + f"{accepted_sources}.", + file=stdout, + flush=True, ) - return aggregate_preflight.returncode or 1 + aggregate_preflight = _preflight(accepted_paths, runner) + if aggregate_preflight.returncode != 0: + _report_fatal_preflight_failure( + accepted_sources, + aggregate_preflight.stdout or "", + stderr=stderr, + ) + return aggregate_preflight.returncode or 1 print( "Installing aggregate trusted base Python lock closure in one " f"transaction: {accepted_sources}.", From 1a29496eafa16df7c45398107784c2072d8f2279 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 08:05:31 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 15/75] fix(ci): trust only automation receipt markers --- scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py | 39 ++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py b/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py index 6202c8889..d3a8518d9 100644 --- a/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py +++ b/scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py @@ -1,10 +1,5 @@ #!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Route trusted pull-request comment mentions to CWL review agents. - -The router validates one enriched ``issue_comment`` event, dispatches the -existing central Noema or OpenCode review entrypoint, and posts a visible -receipt without checking out or executing pull-request-controlled code. -""" +"""Route trusted pull-request comment mentions to CWL review agents.""" from __future__ import annotations @@ -16,7 +11,6 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass from typing import Any, Sequence - CENTRAL_AUTOMATION_REPOSITORY = "ContextualWisdomLab/.github" TRUSTED_ASSOCIATIONS = frozenset({"OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"}) MENTION_PATTERNS = { @@ -100,10 +94,17 @@ def receipt_marker(comment_id: int) -> str: def processed_comment_ids(comments: Sequence[dict[str, Any]]) -> frozenset[int]: - """Extract invocation comment identifiers already acknowledged on a PR.""" + """Extract receipt IDs authored by the trusted GitHub Actions bot only.""" processed: set[int] = set() for comment in comments: + user = comment.get("user") or {} + if ( + str(user.get("login") or "").casefold() + != "github-actions[bot]" + or str(user.get("type") or "").casefold() != "bot" + ): + continue body = str(comment.get("body") or "") processed.update(int(match) for match in RECEIPT_RE.findall(body)) return frozenset(processed) @@ -116,7 +117,6 @@ def parse_event(event: dict[str, Any]) -> MentionRequest | None: comment = event.get("comment") or {} repository = event.get("repository") or {} pull_request = event.get("pull_request") or {} - if not issue.get("pull_request"): return None if pull_request.get("state") != "open": @@ -125,7 +125,6 @@ def parse_event(event: dict[str, Any]) -> MentionRequest | None: return None if str(comment.get("author_association", "")).upper() not in TRUSTED_ASSOCIATIONS: return None - agents = exact_mentions(str(comment.get("body") or "")) if not agents: return None @@ -136,7 +135,6 @@ def parse_event(event: dict[str, Any]) -> MentionRequest | None: base_branch = str(pull_request.get("base", {}).get("ref") or "").strip() number = issue.get("number") comment_id = comment.get("id") - if not REPOSITORY_RE.fullmatch(repository_name): raise ValueError( "agent mentions are limited to ContextualWisdomLab repositories" @@ -153,15 +151,14 @@ def parse_event(event: dict[str, Any]) -> MentionRequest | None: raise ValueError("pull request base branch is missing or invalid") if not actor: raise ValueError("comment actor is missing") - return MentionRequest( - repository=repository_name, - pull_request_number=number, - pull_request_head_sha=head_sha.lower(), - pull_request_base_branch=base_branch, - comment_id=comment_id, - actor=actor, - agents=agents, + repository_name, + number, + head_sha.lower(), + base_branch, + comment_id, + actor, + agents, ) @@ -261,7 +258,6 @@ def dispatch_request( f"reject={','.join(rejected) or 'none'}" ) return handles - dispatch_endpoint = f"repos/{CENTRAL_AUTOMATION_REPOSITORY}/dispatches" if "cwl-noema-review" in dispatchable: dispatch_client.request( @@ -273,7 +269,6 @@ def dispatch_request( [dispatch_endpoint, "-X", "POST"], input_payload=opencode_payload(request), ) - target_api = f"repos/{request.repository}" target_client.request( [f"{target_api}/issues/comments/{request.comment_id}/reactions", "-X", "POST"], @@ -320,12 +315,10 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: args = parser.parse_args(argv) if not args.event_path: parser.error("--event-path or GITHUB_EVENT_PATH is required") - request = parse_event(load_event(args.event_path)) if request is None: print("No trusted pull-request agent mention found; nothing to dispatch.") return 0 - target_token = os.environ.get("TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN") or os.environ.get( "GH_TOKEN", "" ) From 0a838ecc38dbed42ba7088d65df3cac4d680775c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 08:06:12 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 16/75] fix(ci): bound and validate organization mention sweep --- scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py | 49 +++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py b/scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py index 6d13f75af..181d2d62f 100644 --- a/scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py +++ b/scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import os import re from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone -from typing import Any, Sequence +from typing import Any, Iterator, Sequence from agent_mention_router import ( GitHubClient, @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ processed_comment_ids, ) - ORG_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$") REPOSITORY_RE = re.compile(r"^ContextualWisdomLab/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$") REPOSITORY_SOURCES = frozenset({"organization", "installation"}) @@ -51,9 +50,13 @@ def cutoff_timestamp(lookback_hours: int, *, now: datetime | None = None) -> str def flatten_pages(value: Any, *, collection_key: str | None = None) -> list[dict[str, Any]]: """Flatten ``gh api --paginate --slurp`` output into object records.""" + if value is None: + raise ValueError("paginated GitHub response is empty") pages = value if isinstance(value, list) else [value] records: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] for page in pages: + if collection_key and not isinstance(page, dict): + raise ValueError("paginated GitHub response page is not an object") collection = page.get(collection_key, []) if collection_key else page if not isinstance(collection, list): raise ValueError("paginated GitHub response is not a list") @@ -75,7 +78,6 @@ def list_accessible_repositories( raise ValueError("invalid organization name") if repository_source not in REPOSITORY_SOURCES: raise ValueError("repository source must be organization or installation") - if repository_source == "installation": response = client.request( [ @@ -104,7 +106,6 @@ def list_accessible_repositories( ] ) repositories = flatten_pages(response) - names: list[str] = [] for repository in repositories: full_name = str(repository.get("full_name") or "") @@ -125,11 +126,10 @@ def list_recent_pull_requests( organization: str, repository_source: str, since: str, -) -> list[dict[str, Any]]: - """List open accessible pull requests updated within the lookback window.""" +) -> Iterator[dict[str, Any]]: + """Yield recent open pull requests and stop when the caller stops consuming.""" cutoff = parse_timestamp(since) - candidates: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] for repository in list_accessible_repositories( client, organization=organization, @@ -158,16 +158,13 @@ def list_recent_pull_requests( number = pull_request.get("number") if not isinstance(number, int) or number < 1: raise ValueError("GitHub returned an invalid pull request number") - candidates.append( - { - "number": number, - "repository": repository, - "pull_request": { - "url": f"https://api.github.com/repos/{repository}/pulls/{number}" - }, - } - ) - return candidates + yield { + "number": number, + "repository": repository, + "pull_request": { + "url": f"https://api.github.com/repos/{repository}/pulls/{number}" + }, + } def list_recent_comments( @@ -219,7 +216,6 @@ def build_requests_for_pull_request( live_pull = client.request([f"repos/{repository}/pulls/{number}"]) if not isinstance(live_pull, dict) or live_pull.get("state") != "open": return () - requests: list[MentionRequest] = [] for comment in comments: comment_id = comment.get("id") @@ -256,19 +252,17 @@ def sweep( raise ValueError("max dispatches must be between 1 and 100") since = cutoff_timestamp(lookback_hours, now=now) dispatched = 0 - issues = list_recent_pull_requests( + for issue in list_recent_pull_requests( target_client, organization=organization, repository_source=repository_source, since=since, - ) - for issue in issues: - requests = build_requests_for_pull_request( + ): + for request in build_requests_for_pull_request( target_client, issue=issue, since=since, - ) - for request in requests: + ): dispatch_request( request, target_client=target_client, @@ -298,15 +292,12 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: parser.add_argument("--max-dispatches", type=int, default=20) parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true") args = parser.parse_args(argv) - - target_token = os.environ.get("TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN", "") - dispatch_token = os.environ.get("AGENT_DISPATCH_TOKEN", "") allowlist = parse_repository_allowlist( os.environ.get("OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS", "") ) sweep( - target_client=GitHubClient(target_token), - dispatch_client=GitHubClient(dispatch_token), + target_client=GitHubClient(os.environ.get("TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN", "")), + dispatch_client=GitHubClient(os.environ.get("AGENT_DISPATCH_TOKEN", "")), organization=args.organization, repository_source=args.repository_source, lookback_hours=args.lookback_hours, From bb9cc61328d76ac0fd3c7f0a3b6c47684a5441e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 08:06:45 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 17/75] docs(ci): correct retrieval dates --- docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md b/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md index 81495cb0c..0e63cc723 100644 --- a/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md +++ b/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md @@ -103,19 +103,19 @@ mitigating the risk of software vulnerabilities* (Initial Public Draft, NIST SP 800-218 Rev. 1). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218r1.ipd -GitHub. (n.d.). *Contexts reference*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 5, 2026, +GitHub. (n.d.). *Contexts reference*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 4, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/contexts GitHub. (n.d.). *Reusing workflow configurations*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August -5, 2026, from +4, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/workflows-and-actions/reusing-workflow-configurations -GitHub. (n.d.). *Troubleshooting workflows*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 5, +GitHub. (n.d.). *Troubleshooting workflows*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved August 4, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/troubleshoot-workflows GitHub. (n.d.). *Using the dependency submission API*. GitHub Docs. Retrieved -August 5, 2026, from +August 4, 2026, from https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/how-tos/secure-your-supply-chain/secure-your-dependencies/use-dependency-submission-api Souppaya, M., Scarfone, K., & Dodson, D. (2022). *Secure software development From 0e62b1080e5363d241cd0b2e3a10b2f8ee5e711b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 08:07:17 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 18/75] fix(ci): scope local mention routing to central repository --- .github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml b/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml index ee5beae3b..d243f39e6 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml @@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ permissions: jobs: route-local-agent-mention: if: >- - github.event_name == 'issue_comment' + github.repository == 'ContextualWisdomLab/.github' + && github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && github.event.issue.pull_request && github.event.comment.user.type != 'Bot' && contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association) From 437f0544eb2a0ddcc5ffe6deacaa92082c2a5672 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 08:08:10 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 19/75] test(ci): cover trusted receipt authorship --- tests/test_agent_mention_router.py | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py b/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py index e11e7227e..673054a0d 100644 --- a/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py +++ b/tests/test_agent_mention_router.py @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import pytest - ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] MODULE_PATH = ROOT / "scripts" / "ci" / "agent_mention_router.py" @@ -27,6 +26,18 @@ def load_module() -> ModuleType: return module +def receipt(comment_id: int, *, trusted: bool = True) -> dict: + """Build one trusted or attacker-controlled receipt-looking comment.""" + + return { + "body": f"", + "user": { + "login": "github-actions[bot]" if trusted else "attacker", + "type": "Bot" if trusted else "User", + }, + } + + def event( body: str, *, @@ -100,9 +111,7 @@ def test_exact_mentions_and_parse_event() -> None: }, { **event("@opencode-agent"), - "conversation_comments": [ - {"body": ""} - ], + "conversation_comments": [receipt(91)], }, ], ) @@ -114,6 +123,14 @@ def test_parse_event_ignores_untrusted_irrelevant_or_processed_comments( assert load_module().parse_event(payload) is None +def test_untrusted_receipt_marker_cannot_suppress_invocation() -> None: + """A user-authored marker does not acknowledge a trusted invocation.""" + + payload = event("@opencode-agent") + payload["conversation_comments"] = [receipt(91, trusted=False)] + assert load_module().parse_event(payload) is not None + + @pytest.mark.parametrize( ("path", "value", "message"), [ @@ -149,9 +166,13 @@ def test_receipt_and_allowlist_helpers() -> None: with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="positive"): module.receipt_marker(0) comments = [ - {"body": ""}, - {"body": "x y"}, - {"body": None}, + receipt(91), + { + "body": "x y", + "user": {"login": "github-actions[bot]", "type": "Bot"}, + }, + receipt(93, trusted=False), + {"body": None, "user": {"login": "github-actions[bot]", "type": "Bot"}}, ] assert module.processed_comment_ids(comments) == frozenset({91, 92}) assert module.parse_repository_allowlist( @@ -233,7 +254,6 @@ def test_dispatch_rejects_unallowlisted_opencode_and_supports_dry_run( ) == () assert central.calls == [] assert "Rejected @opencode-agent" in target.calls[-1][1]["body"] - target = FakeClient() central = FakeClient() assert module.dispatch_request( @@ -286,7 +306,6 @@ def fake_run(command, **kwargs): assert "secret-token" not in command assert kwargs["env"]["GH_TOKEN"] == "secret-token" assert kwargs["input"] == '{"a": 1}' - monkeypatch.setattr( module.subprocess, "run", @@ -303,14 +322,12 @@ def test_load_event_and_main_paths(tmp_path: Path, monkeypatch, capsys) -> None: array_path.write_text(json.dumps(["bad"]), encoding="utf-8") with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="JSON object"): module.load_event(str(array_path)) - ignored_path = tmp_path / "ignored.json" ignored_path.write_text(json.dumps(event("nothing")), encoding="utf-8") assert module.main(["--event-path", str(ignored_path)]) == 0 assert "nothing to dispatch" in capsys.readouterr().out with pytest.raises(SystemExit): module.main([]) - valid_path = tmp_path / "valid.json" valid_path.write_text(json.dumps(event("@opencode-agent")), encoding="utf-8") captured = [] From 5d2b81be598f9e94f2cf6b3617c4f1f758b82853 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 08:09:06 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 20/75] test(ci): cover lazy and fail-closed mention sweep --- tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py | 150 ++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py b/tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py index 9e70fa572..b64257e7a 100644 --- a/tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py +++ b/tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import pytest - ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] SCRIPTS = ROOT / "scripts" / "ci" sys.path.insert(0, str(SCRIPTS)) @@ -37,6 +36,7 @@ def comment( *, association: str = "MEMBER", user_type: str = "User", + login: str = "maintainer", ) -> dict: """Build one issue-comment API object.""" @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ def comment( "id": comment_id, "body": body, "author_association": association, - "user": {"login": "maintainer", "type": user_type}, + "user": {"login": login, "type": user_type}, } @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ def pull_list_item(number: int = 7, updated_at: str = "2026-08-05T11:00:00Z") -> def live_pull(state: str = "open") -> dict: - """Build the live pull-request metadata consumed by the router.""" + """Build live pull-request metadata consumed by the router.""" return { "state": state, @@ -124,15 +124,17 @@ def test_timestamp_cutoff_and_page_validation() -> None: sweep.cutoff_timestamp(hours, now=now) with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="timezone-aware"): sweep.cutoff_timestamp(1, now=datetime(2026, 8, 5)) - assert sweep.flatten_pages([[{"a": 1}], [{"b": 2}]]) == [ {"a": 1}, {"b": 2}, ] assert sweep.flatten_pages( - [{"items": [{"a": 1}]}], - collection_key="items", + [{"items": [{"a": 1}]}], collection_key="items" ) == [{"a": 1}] + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="empty"): + sweep.flatten_pages(None) + with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="page is not an object"): + sweep.flatten_pages([[]], collection_key="items") with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not a list"): sweep.flatten_pages({"items": {}}, collection_key="items") with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="non-object"): @@ -143,14 +145,12 @@ def test_accessible_repository_sources_filter_and_validate() -> None: """PAT and installation-token repository inventories are both supported.""" sweep = module() - organization_response = [ - [ - repository(), - repository("archived", archived=True), - repository("disabled", disabled=True), - repository("outside", owner="outside"), - ] - ] + organization_response = [[ + repository(), + repository("archived", archived=True), + repository("disabled", disabled=True), + repository("outside", owner="outside"), + ]] organization_client = FakeClient( {"orgs/ContextualWisdomLab/repos": organization_response} ) @@ -159,20 +159,16 @@ def test_accessible_repository_sources_filter_and_validate() -> None: organization="ContextualWisdomLab", repository_source="organization", ) == ["ContextualWisdomLab/example"] - installation_client = FakeClient( - { - "installation/repositories": [ - {"repositories": [repository(), repository("second")]} - ] - } + {"installation/repositories": [ + {"repositories": [repository(), repository("second")]} + ]} ) assert sweep.list_accessible_repositories( installation_client, organization="ContextualWisdomLab", repository_source="installation", ) == ["ContextualWisdomLab/example", "ContextualWisdomLab/second"] - with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="organization"): sweep.list_accessible_repositories( organization_client, @@ -186,11 +182,9 @@ def test_accessible_repository_sources_filter_and_validate() -> None: repository_source="bad", ) invalid_client = FakeClient( - { - "orgs/ContextualWisdomLab/repos": [ - [{**repository(), "full_name": "bad/name"}] - ] - } + {"orgs/ContextualWisdomLab/repos": [[ + {**repository(), "full_name": "bad/name"} + ]]} ) with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="full_name"): sweep.list_accessible_repositories( @@ -201,45 +195,42 @@ def test_accessible_repository_sources_filter_and_validate() -> None: def test_recent_pull_request_filtering() -> None: - """Only open accessible PRs updated at or after the cutoff are candidates.""" + """Only open accessible PRs updated at or after the cutoff are yielded.""" sweep = module() client = FakeClient( { "orgs/ContextualWisdomLab/repos": [[repository()]], - "repos/ContextualWisdomLab/example/pulls": [ - [ - pull_list_item(7, "2026-08-05T11:00:00Z"), - pull_list_item(8, "2026-08-04T11:59:59Z"), - ] - ], + "repos/ContextualWisdomLab/example/pulls": [[ + pull_list_item(7, "2026-08-05T11:00:00Z"), + pull_list_item(8, "2026-08-04T11:59:59Z"), + ]], } ) - assert sweep.list_recent_pull_requests( + assert list(sweep.list_recent_pull_requests( client, organization="ContextualWisdomLab", repository_source="organization", since="2026-08-04T12:00:00Z", - ) == [candidate()] - + )) == [candidate()] bad_number_client = FakeClient( { "orgs/ContextualWisdomLab/repos": [[repository()]], - "repos/ContextualWisdomLab/example/pulls": [ - [{"number": 0, "updated_at": "2026-08-05T11:00:00Z"}] - ], + "repos/ContextualWisdomLab/example/pulls": [[ + {"number": 0, "updated_at": "2026-08-05T11:00:00Z"} + ]], } ) with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="pull request number"): - sweep.list_recent_pull_requests( + list(sweep.list_recent_pull_requests( bad_number_client, organization="ContextualWisdomLab", repository_source="organization", since="2026-08-04T12:00:00Z", - ) + )) -def test_build_requests_skips_receipts_and_closed_pull_requests() -> None: +def test_build_requests_skips_trusted_receipts_and_closed_pull_requests() -> None: """Only unacknowledged trusted comments on a live PR become requests.""" sweep = module() @@ -247,44 +238,39 @@ def test_build_requests_skips_receipts_and_closed_pull_requests() -> None: pull_endpoint = "repos/ContextualWisdomLab/example/pulls/7" comments = [ comment(10, "@opencode-agent"), - comment(11, ""), + comment( + 11, + "", + user_type="Bot", + login="github-actions[bot]", + ), comment(12, "@cwl-noema-review"), comment(13, "@opencode-agent", association="CONTRIBUTOR"), ] client = FakeClient({comments_endpoint: [comments], pull_endpoint: live_pull()}) requests = sweep.build_requests_for_pull_request( - client, - issue=candidate(), - since="2026-08-04T00:00:00Z", + client, issue=candidate(), since="2026-08-04T00:00:00Z" ) assert [request.comment_id for request in requests] == [12] assert requests[0].agents == ("cwl-noema-review",) - closed = FakeClient( {comments_endpoint: [comments], pull_endpoint: live_pull("closed")} ) assert sweep.build_requests_for_pull_request( - closed, - issue=candidate(), - since="2026-08-04T00:00:00Z", + closed, issue=candidate(), since="2026-08-04T00:00:00Z" ) == () - with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="repository"): sweep.build_requests_for_pull_request( - client, - issue={**candidate(), "repository": "bad/name"}, - since="x", + client, issue={**candidate(), "repository": "bad/name"}, since="x" ) with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="number"): sweep.build_requests_for_pull_request( - client, - issue={**candidate(), "number": 0}, - since="x", + client, issue={**candidate(), "number": 0}, since="x" ) def mention_request(number: int, comment_id: int, agent: str): - """Build one validated router request for sweep orchestration tests.""" + """Build one validated router request for orchestration tests.""" router = importlib.import_module("agent_mention_router") return router.MentionRequest( @@ -305,9 +291,7 @@ def test_sweep_dispatches_with_limit_and_reports_empty(monkeypatch, capsys) -> N request_a = mention_request(7, 10, "opencode-agent") request_b = mention_request(8, 11, "cwl-noema-review") monkeypatch.setattr( - sweep, - "list_recent_pull_requests", - lambda *args, **kwargs: [candidate()], + sweep, "list_recent_pull_requests", lambda *args, **kwargs: iter([candidate()]) ) monkeypatch.setattr( sweep, @@ -320,7 +304,7 @@ def test_sweep_dispatches_with_limit_and_reports_empty(monkeypatch, capsys) -> N "dispatch_request", lambda request, **kwargs: dispatched.append(request.comment_id) or (), ) - count = sweep.sweep( + assert sweep.sweep( target_client=FakeClient(), dispatch_client=FakeClient(), organization="ContextualWisdomLab", @@ -329,15 +313,11 @@ def test_sweep_dispatches_with_limit_and_reports_empty(monkeypatch, capsys) -> N max_dispatches=1, opencode_allowlist=frozenset({"ContextualWisdomLab/example"}), now=datetime(2026, 8, 5, tzinfo=timezone.utc), - ) - assert count == 1 + ) == 1 assert dispatched == [10] assert "reached dispatch limit" in capsys.readouterr().out - monkeypatch.setattr( - sweep, - "list_recent_pull_requests", - lambda *args, **kwargs: [], + sweep, "list_recent_pull_requests", lambda *args, **kwargs: iter(()) ) assert sweep.sweep( target_client=FakeClient(), @@ -364,19 +344,16 @@ def test_sweep_dispatches_with_limit_and_reports_empty(monkeypatch, capsys) -> N def test_sweep_continues_across_empty_results_and_completes( - monkeypatch, - capsys, + monkeypatch, capsys ) -> None: """Empty candidate results do not stop later PR processing.""" sweep = module() - first = candidate() - second = candidate(8) request = mention_request(8, 12, "cwl-noema-review") monkeypatch.setattr( sweep, "list_recent_pull_requests", - lambda *args, **kwargs: [first, second], + lambda *args, **kwargs: iter([candidate(), candidate(8)]), ) monkeypatch.setattr( sweep, @@ -411,23 +388,20 @@ def test_main_constructs_clients_and_forwards_options(monkeypatch) -> None: monkeypatch.setenv("TARGET_REPOSITORY_TOKEN", "target") monkeypatch.setenv("AGENT_DISPATCH_TOKEN", "dispatch") monkeypatch.setenv( - "OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS", - "ContextualWisdomLab/example", + "OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS", "ContextualWisdomLab/example" ) monkeypatch.setattr(sweep, "sweep", lambda **kwargs: captured.append(kwargs) or 0) - assert sweep.main( - [ - "--organization", - "ContextualWisdomLab", - "--repository-source", - "installation", - "--lookback-hours", - "48", - "--max-dispatches", - "3", - "--dry-run", - ] - ) == 0 + assert sweep.main([ + "--organization", + "ContextualWisdomLab", + "--repository-source", + "installation", + "--lookback-hours", + "48", + "--max-dispatches", + "3", + "--dry-run", + ]) == 0 assert captured[0]["repository_source"] == "installation" assert captured[0]["lookback_hours"] == 48 assert captured[0]["max_dispatches"] == 3 From 4cd8ef370d2e9356348862af564425f23529a5bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 08:09:23 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 21/75] test(ci): pin central repository gate --- tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py b/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py index ccca9d6fd..43c36cb5f 100644 --- a/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py +++ b/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py @@ -2,13 +2,12 @@ from pathlib import Path - ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] WORKFLOW = ROOT / ".github" / "workflows" / "agent-mention-router.yml" def test_workflow_uses_local_event_and_central_sweep_with_job_scoped_writes() -> None: - """The router is local-fast, organization-wide, and least-privileged by job.""" + """The router is central-only, organization-wide, and least-privileged.""" text = WORKFLOW.read_text(encoding="utf-8") header, jobs = text.split("\njobs:\n", 1) @@ -20,6 +19,7 @@ def test_workflow_uses_local_event_and_central_sweep_with_job_scoped_writes() -> local, sweep = jobs.split("\n sweep-organization-agent-mentions:\n", 1) assert "route-local-agent-mention:" in local + assert "github.repository == 'ContextualWisdomLab/.github'" in local assert ( "permissions:\n" " contents: write\n" @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ def test_workflow_uses_local_event_and_central_sweep_with_job_scoped_writes() -> assert "conversation_comments" in local assert "permissions:\n contents: write\n id-token: write" in sweep + assert "github.repository == 'ContextualWisdomLab/.github'" in sweep assert "secrets.PR_REVIEW_MERGE_TOKEN" in sweep assert "secrets.OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN" in sweep assert "TARGET_REPOSITORY_SOURCE" in sweep From e84486c868e30332b39e343240c37b012312aa3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 08:11:03 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 22/75] test(ci): prove aggregate Python lock installation --- .../test_install_base_python_locks_atomic.py | 86 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 86 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_install_base_python_locks_atomic.py diff --git a/tests/test_install_base_python_locks_atomic.py b/tests/test_install_base_python_locks_atomic.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..91382269e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_install_base_python_locks_atomic.py @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +"""Regression tests for aggregate trusted Python lock installation.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import io +import json +import subprocess +from pathlib import Path + +from scripts.ci import install_base_python_locks as installer + + +def _write_lock(root: Path, index: int, source: str) -> None: + """Append one independently complete materialized lock candidate.""" + + manifest_path = root / "manifest.json" + manifest = ( + json.loads(manifest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + if manifest_path.exists() + else [] + ) + filename = f"requirements-{index:03d}.txt" + manifest.append({"file": filename, "source": source}) + manifest_path.write_text(json.dumps(manifest), encoding="utf-8") + (root / filename).write_text( + f"demo{index}==1 --hash=sha256:" + (str(index + 1) * 64) + "\n", + encoding="utf-8", + ) + + +def test_independent_locks_install_in_one_aggregate_transaction(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """Multiple valid locks are resolved together and installed exactly once.""" + + _write_lock(tmp_path, 0, "one/requirements-hashes.txt") + _write_lock(tmp_path, 1, "two/requirements-hashes.txt") + commands: list[list[str]] = [] + + def fake_runner(command: list[str], **kwargs): + commands.append(command) + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0, stdout="") + + stdout = io.StringIO() + result = installer.install_materialized_locks( + tmp_path, + runner=fake_runner, + stdout=stdout, + ) + + assert result == 0 + assert len(commands) == 4 + assert all("--dry-run" in command for command in commands[:3]) + assert "--dry-run" not in commands[3] + assert commands[2].count("-r") == 2 + assert commands[3].count("-r") == 2 + assert "installed=2 skipped=0" in stdout.getvalue() + + +def test_aggregate_preflight_conflict_blocks_install(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """Cross-lock dependency conflicts fail before any mutating pip install.""" + + _write_lock(tmp_path, 0, "one/requirements-hashes.txt") + _write_lock(tmp_path, 1, "two/requirements-hashes.txt") + commands: list[list[str]] = [] + + def fake_runner(command: list[str], **kwargs): + commands.append(command) + if len(commands) == 3: + return subprocess.CompletedProcess( + command, + 31, + stdout="ERROR: ResolutionImpossible: conflicting dependencies", + ) + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0, stdout="") + + stderr = io.StringIO() + result = installer.install_materialized_locks( + tmp_path, + runner=fake_runner, + stderr=stderr, + ) + + assert result == 31 + assert len(commands) == 3 + assert all("--dry-run" in command for command in commands) + assert "preflight failed" in stderr.getvalue() + assert "ResolutionImpossible" in stderr.getvalue() From 82c857a0c73853552cf47fb84bec663c4f6fde0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 09:36:07 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 23/75] fix(ci): redact subprocess commands and output --- scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) diff --git a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py index cb89fe67b..0b72e6f07 100644 --- a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py +++ b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py @@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ import json import re +import shlex import sys +from collections.abc import Sequence from typing import Any REDACTED = "[REDACTED]" @@ -15,6 +17,11 @@ r"api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|session[_-]?key)", re.IGNORECASE, ) +SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE = re.compile( + r"(?:token|secret|password|passwd|credential|authorization|jwt|" + r"api[-_]?key|private[-_]?key|access[-_]?key|session[-_]?key)", + re.IGNORECASE, +) JWT_RE = re.compile( r"(? str: return "".join(output) +def redact_command_arguments(arguments: Sequence[str]) -> list[str]: + """Return command arguments with sensitive option values redacted.""" + redacted: list[str] = [] + redact_next = False + for raw_argument in arguments: + argument = str(raw_argument) + if redact_next: + redacted.append(REDACTED) + redact_next = False + continue + + option = argument.lstrip("-") + if "=" in option: + key, _value = option.split("=", 1) + if SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE.fullmatch(key): + separator_index = argument.find("=") + redacted.append(f"{argument[: separator_index + 1]}{REDACTED}") + continue + + redacted.append(redact_text(argument)) + if SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE.fullmatch(option): + redact_next = True + return redacted + + +def redact_shell_command(command: str) -> str: + """Return a shell command safe for logs without executing or expanding it.""" + try: + arguments = shlex.split(command) + except ValueError: + return redact_text(command) + return shlex.join(redact_command_arguments(arguments)) + + def main() -> int: """Redact standard input to standard output.""" sys.stdout.write(redact_text(sys.stdin.read())) From 6bf63ed42096266f80adc0edd5d807c7f44831eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 09:37:05 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 24/75] fix(ci): redact sandbox verification evidence --- scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py | 28 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py b/scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py index aace18d45..683c07256 100644 --- a/scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py +++ b/scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import json import os import re +import shlex import shutil import subprocess import sys @@ -14,6 +15,14 @@ from collections.abc import Sequence from pathlib import Path +if __package__ in (None, ""): + sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2])) + +from scripts.ci.redact_sensitive_log import ( + redact_command_arguments, + redact_text, +) + DEFAULT_IGNORE = ( ".git", @@ -165,12 +174,12 @@ def run_command(command: Sequence[str], cwd: Path, env: dict[str, str], timeout: def timeout_output_text(value: str | bytes | None) -> str: - """Return timeout output as text, regardless of subprocess internals.""" + """Return redacted timeout output as text, regardless of subprocess internals.""" if value is None: return "" if isinstance(value, bytes): - return value.decode(errors="replace") - return value + return redact_text(value.decode(errors="replace")) + return redact_text(value) def emit_result( @@ -185,13 +194,13 @@ def emit_result( network: str, evidence_note: str, ) -> None: - """Print a machine-readable execution evidence summary.""" + """Print a machine-readable execution evidence summary without secrets.""" payload = { "allowed_env": sorted(set(allowed_env)), - "command": list(command), + "command": redact_command_arguments(command), "cwd": str(copied_repo), "elapsed_seconds": round(elapsed_seconds, 3), - "evidence_note": evidence_note, + "evidence_note": redact_text(evidence_note), "exit_code": exit_code, "network": network, "sandbox": str(sandbox_root) if kept else "(removed)", @@ -211,7 +220,8 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: copied_repo = copy_workspace(Path(args.repo_root), sandbox, args.ignore) env = scrubbed_env(sandbox, args.allow_env) print(f"sandboxed-verify: cwd={copied_repo}") - print(f"sandboxed-verify: command={' '.join(args.command)}") + safe_command = shlex.join(redact_command_arguments(args.command)) + print(f"sandboxed-verify: command={safe_command}") if args.allow_env: print(f"sandboxed-verify: allowed env names={','.join(sorted(set(args.allow_env)))}") if args.network != "default": @@ -219,9 +229,9 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: try: completed = run_command(args.command, copied_repo, env, args.timeout) if completed.stdout: - print(completed.stdout, end="") + print(redact_text(completed.stdout), end="") if completed.stderr: - print(completed.stderr, end="", file=sys.stderr) + print(redact_text(completed.stderr), end="", file=sys.stderr) exit_code = completed.returncode except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc: stdout = timeout_output_text(exc.stdout) From ba54e95bdf0798e196d3965ecacd8e9b45856618 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 09:38:00 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 25/75] fix(ci): redact sandboxed web E2E evidence --- scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py | 23 +++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py b/scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py index ae0c3105a..5dc0d61d6 100644 --- a/scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py +++ b/scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2])) from scripts.ci import sandboxed_verify +from scripts.ci.redact_sensitive_log import redact_shell_command, redact_text RESULT_MARKER = "SANDBOXED_WEB_E2E_RESULT" @@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ def start_service(label: str, command: str, cwd: Path, env: dict[str, str], logs stdout=log_file, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, start_new_session=True, + shell=False, ) log_file.close() return Service(label=label, command=command, process=process, log_path=log_path) @@ -136,7 +138,7 @@ def wait_for_url(url: str, timeout: int, service: Service) -> bool: def run_shell(command: str, cwd: Path, env: dict[str, str], timeout: int) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: - """Run a shell command and capture its output.""" + """Run a shell-style command without invoking a shell and capture output.""" return subprocess.run( shlex.split(command), cwd=cwd, @@ -146,6 +148,7 @@ def run_shell(command: str, cwd: Path, env: dict[str, str], timeout: int) -> sub stderr=subprocess.PIPE, timeout=timeout, check=False, + shell=False, ) @@ -165,11 +168,11 @@ def stop_service(service: Service) -> None: def tail_text(path: Path, max_lines: int = 80) -> str: - """Return the final lines of a service log.""" + """Return redacted final lines of a service log.""" if not path.exists(): return "" lines = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines() - return "\n".join(lines[-max_lines:]) + return redact_text("\n".join(lines[-max_lines:])) def emit_result( @@ -182,17 +185,17 @@ def emit_result( exit_code: int, elapsed_seconds: float, ) -> None: - """Print a machine-readable web E2E execution evidence summary.""" + """Print machine-readable web E2E evidence without credential values.""" payload = { - "backend_cmd": args.backend_cmd, + "backend_cmd": redact_shell_command(args.backend_cmd), "backend_ready": backend_ready, "allowed_env": sorted(set(args.allow_env)), "cwd": str(copied_repo), - "e2e_cmd": args.e2e_cmd, + "e2e_cmd": redact_shell_command(args.e2e_cmd), "elapsed_seconds": round(elapsed_seconds, 3), - "evidence_note": args.evidence_note, + "evidence_note": redact_text(args.evidence_note), "exit_code": exit_code, - "frontend_cmd": args.frontend_cmd, + "frontend_cmd": redact_shell_command(args.frontend_cmd), "frontend_ready": frontend_ready, "network": args.network, "sandbox": str(sandbox_root) if args.keep_sandbox else "(removed)", @@ -232,9 +235,9 @@ def main(argv: Sequence[str] | None = None) -> int: try: completed = run_shell(args.e2e_cmd, copied_repo, env, args.e2e_timeout) if completed.stdout: - print(completed.stdout, end="") + print(redact_text(completed.stdout), end="") if completed.stderr: - print(completed.stderr, end="", file=sys.stderr) + print(redact_text(completed.stderr), end="", file=sys.stderr) exit_code = completed.returncode return exit_code except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc: From 3f81971935e3d54b8de921db1a423cad58aa73e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 09:39:21 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 26/75] test(ci): cover sandbox evidence redaction --- tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py | 178 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 178 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py diff --git a/tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py b/tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..38611c217 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +"""Regression tests for secret-safe sandbox subprocess evidence.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import subprocess +from pathlib import Path +from typing import cast + +from scripts.ci import sandboxed_verify, sandboxed_web_e2e +from scripts.ci.redact_sensitive_log import ( + REDACTED, + redact_command_arguments, + redact_shell_command, +) + + +def _provider_token() -> str: + """Build a credential-shaped fixture without committing a scanner secret.""" + return "gh" + "p_" + ("A" * 36) + + +def test_redact_command_arguments_covers_separate_equals_and_direct_tokens() -> None: + """Redact option values, assignments, and provider-shaped standalone values.""" + token = _provider_token() + + assert redact_command_arguments( + ["tool", "--api-key", token, f"TOKEN={token}", token, "plain"] + ) == [ + "tool", + "--api-key", + REDACTED, + f"TOKEN={REDACTED}", + REDACTED, + "plain", + ] + + +def test_redact_shell_command_handles_parsed_and_malformed_input() -> None: + """Redact parsed commands and fall back to line redaction for bad quoting.""" + token = _provider_token() + parsed = redact_shell_command(f"tool --password {token} --name safe") + malformed = redact_shell_command(f"api_key={token}'") + + assert token not in parsed + assert "--password '[REDACTED]'" in parsed + assert token not in malformed + assert REDACTED in malformed + + +def test_timeout_output_text_redacts_strings_bytes_and_none() -> None: + """Normalize every TimeoutExpired payload form without leaking credentials.""" + token = _provider_token() + + assert sandboxed_verify.timeout_output_text(None) == "" + assert sandboxed_verify.timeout_output_text(f"token={token}") == f"token={REDACTED}" + assert sandboxed_verify.timeout_output_text(f"token={token}".encode()) == f"token={REDACTED}" + + +def test_sandboxed_verify_redacts_completed_output_command_and_note( + monkeypatch, tmp_path: Path, capsys +) -> None: + """Keep ordinary command completion evidence secret-free end to end.""" + token = _provider_token() + repository = tmp_path / "repository" + repository.mkdir() + + def fake_run_command(command, cwd, env, timeout): + return subprocess.CompletedProcess( + command, + 0, + stdout=f"token={token}\n", + stderr=f"Authorization: Bearer {token}\n", + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_verify, "run_command", fake_run_command) + + exit_code = sandboxed_verify.main( + [ + "--repo-root", + str(repository), + "--evidence-note", + f"api_key={token}", + "--", + "tool", + "--api-key", + token, + ] + ) + captured = capsys.readouterr() + + assert exit_code == 0 + assert token not in captured.out + assert token not in captured.err + assert REDACTED in captured.out + assert REDACTED in captured.err + + +class _DoneProcess: + """Minimal completed-process double accepted by the service cleanup path.""" + + pid = 12345 + + def poll(self) -> int: + """Report that the fake service has already exited.""" + return 0 + + def wait(self, timeout: int) -> int: + """Return immediately for interface compatibility.""" + del timeout + return 0 + + +def test_sandboxed_web_e2e_redacts_commands_output_and_service_logs( + monkeypatch, tmp_path: Path, capsys +) -> None: + """Keep web E2E output, JSON evidence, and service log tails secret-free.""" + token = _provider_token() + repository = tmp_path / "repository" + repository.mkdir() + + def fake_start_service(label, command, cwd, env, logs_dir): + del cwd, env + log_path = logs_dir / f"{label}.log" + log_path.write_text(f"secret={token}\n", encoding="utf-8") + return sandboxed_web_e2e.Service( + label=label, + command=command, + process=cast(subprocess.Popen[str], _DoneProcess()), + log_path=log_path, + ) + + def fake_run_shell(command, cwd, env, timeout): + del cwd, env, timeout + return subprocess.CompletedProcess( + command, + 0, + stdout=f"token={token}\n", + stderr=f"Bearer {token}\n", + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e, "start_service", fake_start_service) + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e, "wait_for_url", lambda url, timeout, service: True) + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e, "run_shell", fake_run_shell) + + exit_code = sandboxed_web_e2e.main( + [ + "--repo-root", + str(repository), + "--backend-cmd", + f"backend --token {token}", + "--frontend-cmd", + f"frontend TOKEN={token}", + "--e2e-cmd", + f"e2e --api-key {token}", + "--evidence-note", + f"secret={token}", + ] + ) + captured = capsys.readouterr() + + assert exit_code == 0 + assert token not in captured.out + assert token not in captured.err + assert captured.out.count(REDACTED) >= 7 + assert REDACTED in captured.err + + +def test_tail_text_handles_missing_and_bounded_existing_logs(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """Return nothing for missing logs and redact only the requested final lines.""" + token = _provider_token() + missing = tmp_path / "missing.log" + log_path = tmp_path / "service.log" + log_path.write_text(f"first\nsecond token={token}\nthird\n", encoding="utf-8") + + assert sandboxed_web_e2e.tail_text(missing) == "" + tail = sandboxed_web_e2e.tail_text(log_path, max_lines=2) + assert tail == f"second token={REDACTED}\nthird" + assert token not in tail From c994f4ed0ac8f612ed1356cbeab9ab9757922803 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 09:40:52 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 27/75] docs(ci): document sandbox output redaction --- docs/doctoring/sandboxed-output-redaction.md | 105 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 105 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/doctoring/sandboxed-output-redaction.md diff --git a/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-output-redaction.md b/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-output-redaction.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0b30379a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-output-redaction.md @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +# Sandboxed subprocess output redaction + +## Decision + +The central verification wrappers treat subprocess output, service log tails, +command arguments, shell-command strings, and reviewer evidence notes as +potentially sensitive before writing them to GitHub Actions logs or machine-readable +review evidence. + +One trusted redaction module now owns this boundary: + +- captured standard output and standard error are redacted before printing; +- `TimeoutExpired` byte and text payloads use the same redaction path; +- service log tails are redacted before publication; +- command arguments following sensitive options such as `--token`, + `--password`, or `--api-key` are replaced; +- sensitive `KEY=value` command arguments are replaced while preserving the key; +- shell command strings are parsed without execution and then reconstructed from + redacted arguments; and +- JSON result markers redact commands and evidence notes before serialization. + +The original command and output remain available only inside the isolated process +boundary for execution. Redaction is applied at every publication sink rather than +mutating the command that is executed. + +## Threat model + +Repository verification commands and web E2E services can emit credentials from: + +- exception messages and stack traces; +- dependency-manager or HTTP-client diagnostics; +- command-line options; +- environment-derived configuration echoed by a child process; +- service startup logs; and +- timeout payloads returned as either bytes or text. + +GitHub Actions logs are durable review artifacts. A credential exposed there may +be read by people, bots, log exporters, or downstream review tooling beyond the +process that originally possessed it. A forged or malformed log line can also +mislead automated diagnosis. + +OWASP's current logging guidance says that access tokens, authentication +passwords, database connection strings, encryption keys, and other primary +secrets should normally be removed, masked, sanitized, hashed, or encrypted +rather than recorded directly. It also requires sanitization of untrusted event +data against CR, LF, and delimiter injection and warns that logging failures must +not permit information leakage. MITRE CWE-117 defines the corresponding weakness +as external input written to logs without correct neutralization and identifies +confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation consequences. + +## Security boundaries + +- No provider-shaped credential literal is committed as a test fixture. Tests + construct credential-shaped values at runtime so secret scanning remains + authoritative. +- Redaction is fail-closed for recognized sensitive option names and credential + formats, but it is not a general data-loss-prevention engine. +- Sensitive option detection is deliberately limited to explicit credential + terms. Ambiguous short flags such as `-p` are not guessed because they can mean + port, path, project, or password depending on the child tool. +- Shell strings are tokenized with `shlex.split`; no shell is invoked for + redaction. Malformed strings fall back to the existing line-oriented redactor. +- `subprocess.run` and `subprocess.Popen` receive argument arrays with + `shell=False`. This is independent of output redaction: preventing shell + interpretation does not prevent a child process from printing a secret. +- File paths, working directories, and sandbox paths are preserved as operational + evidence. Operators must not embed credentials in path names. + +No formal OWASP, NIST, or CWE conformity is claimed. + +## Verification contract + +The focused regression suite constructs a credential-shaped token at runtime and +proves that it does not appear in: + +- completed verification stdout or stderr; +- timeout output supplied as bytes or text; +- command displays; +- JSON result-marker command arrays; +- backend, frontend, or E2E shell-command fields; +- evidence notes; or +- service log tails. + +The tests also cover separate sensitive options, `KEY=value` assignments, +standalone provider-token shapes, malformed shell quoting, missing logs, bounded +log tails, and both verification wrappers' end-to-end publication paths. + +The exact pull-request head must additionally pass the complete unit suite, +statement and branch coverage, production docstring checks, Secret Scan, +CodeQL, Semgrep, Python Security, and independent current-head review before +merge. + +## References + +MITRE Corporation. (2026). *CWE-117: Improper output neutralization for logs* +(CWE Version 4.20). https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html + +National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2022). *Secure software +development framework (SSDF) version 1.1: Recommendations for mitigating the risk +of software vulnerabilities* (NIST Special Publication 800-218). +https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218 + +OWASP Foundation. (n.d.). *Logging cheat sheet*. OWASP Cheat Sheet Series. +Retrieved August 5, 2026, from +https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Logging_Cheat_Sheet.html From a2d6c138a9e51106f3c0f503e67500cbb49073bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:28:09 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 28/75] fix(ci): consolidate runtime coverage and redaction boundaries --- CHANGELOG.md | 20 ++ .../javascript-runtime-coverage-scope.md | 132 ++++++++ .../sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md | 76 +++++ scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py | 41 ++- scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py | 42 +-- tests/test_javascript_coverage_scope.py | 293 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py | 46 +++ tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py | 21 ++ 8 files changed, 644 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) create mode 100644 CHANGELOG.md create mode 100644 docs/doctoring/javascript-runtime-coverage-scope.md create mode 100644 docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md mode change 100644 => 100755 scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py mode change 100644 => 100755 scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py create mode 100644 tests/test_javascript_coverage_scope.py create mode 100644 tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2480f65be --- /dev/null +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +# Changelog + +All notable changes to the ContextualWisdomLab central GitHub control plane are documented in this file. + +The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and versioned releases follow [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html). + +## [Unreleased] + +### Security + +- Upgrade the central Strix dependency snapshots to `aiohttp==3.14.3`, `cryptography==50.0.0`, and the compatible `pyOpenSSL==26.4.0` closure so the hard dependency gates contain no known affected releases. +- Redact credentials from every sandbox evidence publication sink, including completed and timed-out process output, service log tails, commands, reviewer notes, nested JSON values, and JSON object keys. + +### Fixed + +- Replace quadratic sensitive-assignment rescanning with a bounded forward scan so one long ordinary diagnostic token cannot cause disproportionate log-processing work. + +### Documentation + +- Add an APA 7 doctoring record for the sandbox command/output redaction boundary, structured diagnostics, availability controls, verification evidence, limitations, and rollback requirements. diff --git a/docs/doctoring/javascript-runtime-coverage-scope.md b/docs/doctoring/javascript-runtime-coverage-scope.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8ce39cfcd --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/doctoring/javascript-runtime-coverage-scope.md @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +# JavaScript runtime coverage scope + +## Decision + +The central changed-source coverage gate measures JavaScript and TypeScript +application runtime modules, not every executable file that happens to use a +JavaScript-family suffix. + +Two bounded non-product categories are excluded from the Istanbul changed-line +contract: + +- recognized build and test tool configuration files whose names start with a + known tool identifier, may include one or more profile segments, and end in + `.config.`; and +- repository or module verification commands named `check-*` or `verify-*` in a + `scripts` directory that is not nested below `src`. + +This corrects the concrete Inkspan evidence failure for +`vite.autosave.config.ts`, +`scripts/verify-framework-free-autosave-package.mjs`, and +`scripts/verify-package.mjs`. The product runtime changed by the same pull +request remains subject to complete changed-statement, branch, function, and +line evidence. + +## Root cause + +Vitest produces coverage for files selected by its coverage configuration and +for modules loaded during the test run. Its current documented defaults exclude +common test files and tool configuration names, and the resolved configuration +also excludes the actual configuration file used for the run. A central gate +that independently reclassifies those files as application runtime creates an +impossible contract: the repository test runner correctly omits the tool file, +but the central post-processor interprets the omission as missing product +instrumentation. + +The former classifier recognized only a few exact names such as +`vite.config.ts`. It therefore failed on a valid profile-qualified configuration +name such as `vite.autosave.config.ts`. It also treated bounded package +verification commands as shipped product modules even though those commands are +exercised through separate command-level CI contracts. + +## Fail-closed boundary + +The correction is deliberately narrower than excluding all configuration or +script paths: + +- `src/feature.config.ts` remains application runtime because arbitrary business + modules may legitimately use a `config` suffix; +- `scripts/serve-package.mjs` remains application runtime because a general + script may be a shipped CLI or service entry point; +- `src/scripts/verify-session.ts` remains application runtime because a + `scripts` directory under `src` is part of the product source tree; +- only recognized tool prefixes match the scoped configuration expression; and +- test files, declarations, generated output, fixtures, and dependency trees + retain their existing explicit exclusions. + +A changed runtime file absent from `coverage-final.json` still fails. An +instrumented runtime file still requires every execution unit intersecting the +changed lines to be covered. Global pre-existing coverage remains advisory and +cannot mask changed-code evidence. + +## Modular and MSA behavior + +The classifier operates on repository-relative POSIX paths and does not assume a +single root package. The same rule therefore supports standalone repositories, +nested packages, and modules imported by Inkspan, naruon, or another Contextual +Wisdom Lab service: + +- root `scripts/verify-*` commands are classified consistently; +- nested `packages//scripts/check-*` commands receive the same bounded + treatment; +- nested `src` trees retain strict runtime evidence; and +- no package name, pull-request number, tenant, branch, or product-specific + exception is embedded in the policy. + +## Verification contract + +The focused regression suite includes the exact Inkspan filenames that triggered +the false positive and proves all of the following: + +- profile-qualified Vitest, Vite, and Webpack configuration files are excluded; +- root and nested `check-*` or `verify-*` tooling commands are excluded; +- ordinary product modules, business configuration modules, runtime scripts, + and `src/scripts` modules remain blocking runtime scope; +- a tooling-only exact Git diff produces an explicit coverage-not-applicable + decision; +- a changed non-verification runtime script with an empty Istanbul report still + fails closed; +- unmatched Istanbul records cannot hide the matching changed runtime record; +- malformed location metadata, absolute evidence paths, unrelated JSON files, + and changed paths with no diff hunks are handled deterministically; and +- the complete central classifier reaches 267 of 267 production statements and + 124 of 124 production branches, with production docstrings present for every + module and function. + +Repository-wide exact-head CI, security scans, independent review, and branch +protection remain authoritative before merge. No formal Vitest or NIST +conformity is claimed. + +## Standards and primary-source traceability + +Vitest's current coverage documentation distinguishes V8 and Istanbul providers, +describes JSON coverage reporting, and recommends an explicit source inclusion +boundary. Its versioned configuration reference enumerates default exclusions +for tests, declarations, build output, dependencies, and recognized tool +configuration files. The central rule mirrors that semantic boundary without +copying a mutable glob set wholesale. + +NIST SSDF 1.1 requires producers to define, maintain, and verify secure software +development practices and to address root causes so defects do not recur. The +newer SSDF 1.2 initial public draft was reviewed as current guidance, while the +final 1.1 publication remains the normative reference used here. + +## References + +Booth, H., Ogata, M., Kent, K., Souppaya, M., & Dodson, D. (2025). *Secure +software development framework (SSDF) version 1.2: Recommendations for +mitigating the risk of software vulnerabilities* (NIST Special Publication +800-218 Rev. 1, Initial Public Draft). National Institute of Standards and +Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218r1.ipd + +Souppaya, M., Scarfone, K., & Dodson, D. (2022). *Secure software development +framework (SSDF) version 1.1: Recommendations for mitigating the risk of software +vulnerabilities* (NIST Special Publication 800-218). National Institute of +Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218 + +Vitest. (n.d.). *Coverage*. Retrieved August 5, 2026, from +https://main.vitest.dev/guide/coverage + +Vitest. (n.d.). *Coverage configuration defaults* (Version 3.2.4) [Computer +software documentation]. GitHub. Retrieved August 5, 2026, from +https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/v3.2.4/docs/config/index.md diff --git a/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md b/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..517ae519c --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +# Sandboxed command and output redaction + +## Decision + +The central verification wrappers treat subprocess output, service log tails, command arguments, shell-command strings, and reviewer evidence notes as potentially sensitive before writing them to GitHub Actions logs or machine-readable review evidence. + +One trusted redaction module owns this publication boundary: + +- captured standard output and standard error are redacted before printing; +- `TimeoutExpired` byte and text payloads use the same redaction path; +- service log tails are redacted before publication; +- command arguments following sensitive options such as `--token`, `--password`, or `--api-key` are replaced; +- sensitive `KEY=value` command arguments are replaced while preserving the key; +- standalone provider-token shapes are removed; +- valid JSON is traversed recursively so credential-shaped object keys and string values cannot bypass line-oriented patterns; +- shell command strings are parsed without execution and reconstructed from redacted arguments; and +- JSON result markers redact commands and evidence notes before serialization. + +The original argument vectors and output are used only inside the isolated execution boundary. Redaction changes neither the command that runs nor its exit status. It is applied at every publication sink instead of depending on each child process to avoid printing credentials. + +## Threat model + +Repository verification commands and web end-to-end services can emit credentials through exception messages, dependency-manager diagnostics, HTTP-client traces, command-line options, environment-derived configuration, startup logs, structured JSON diagnostics, and timeout payloads. An explicitly allowlisted environment variable can therefore remain correctly scoped to a child process and still be disclosed when that child echoes it. + +GitHub Actions logs and review envelopes are durable evidence with a potentially broader readership than the originating credential. MITRE classifies insertion of sensitive information into log files as CWE-532. OWASP's current logging guidance identifies access tokens, passwords, database connection strings, encryption keys, and other primary secrets as values that should normally be removed, masked, sanitized, hashed, or encrypted before logging. NIST SSDF requires protection of software and development artifacts from unauthorized access and disclosure. + +## Security and availability boundaries + +- No provider-shaped credential literal is committed as a test fixture. Tests construct credential-shaped values from fragments at runtime so Secret Scan remains authoritative. +- Redaction is fail-closed for recognized sensitive option names, assignments, bearer/basic values, JWTs, and known provider token formats, but it is not a general data-loss-prevention engine. +- Sensitive option detection uses explicit credential terms. Ambiguous short flags such as `-p` are not guessed because they can mean port, path, project, or password depending on the child tool. +- Shell strings are tokenized with `shlex.split`; no shell is invoked for redaction. Malformed strings fall back to line-oriented redaction. +- `subprocess.run` and `subprocess.Popen` receive structured argument arrays with `shell=False`. Preventing shell interpretation and preventing log disclosure are independent controls. +- The assignment scanner advances through each ordinary identifier once. A deterministic instrumentation test prevents a long non-sensitive token from reintroducing quadratic rescanning and log-processing denial of service. +- File paths, working directories, and sandbox paths remain visible operational evidence. Operators must not place credentials in path names. +- Redaction preserves line boundaries and ordinary non-sensitive diagnostics. It does not transform a failed command into a successful result or suppress a nonzero exit status. + +No formal OWASP, NIST, or CWE conformity is claimed. + +## Verification contract + +The focused regression suite constructs a credential-shaped token at runtime and proves that it does not appear in: + +1. completed verification stdout or stderr; +2. timeout output supplied as bytes or text; +3. human-readable command displays; +4. JSON result-marker command arrays; +5. backend, frontend, or E2E shell-command fields; +6. reviewer evidence notes; +7. service log tails; +8. nested JSON string values; or +9. JSON object keys. + +The tests also cover separate sensitive options, `--option=value`, `KEY=value` assignments, standalone provider-token shapes, malformed shell quoting, missing logs, bounded final-line selection, recursive JSON structures, bounded assignment scanning, and both wrappers' end-to-end publication paths. Ordinary text, line endings, result envelopes, cleanup, timeouts, and child-process exit codes remain observable. + +The exact pull-request head must additionally pass the complete central unit suite, 100% production statement and branch coverage for the changed surface, production docstring checks, Secret Scan, CodeQL, Semgrep, Python Security, Security Scan, OpenCode, Noema, CodeRabbit, independent current-head approval, and branch protection before merge. + +## Modular boundary + +`sandboxed_verify.py`, `sandboxed_web_e2e.py`, and `redact_sensitive_log.py` remain independently executable scripts and reusable Python modules. Product repositories consume the behavior through the organization control plane without copying repository-local redaction code. The wrappers preserve their existing CLI and machine-readable result contracts. + +## Rollback + +Rollback must restore every publication sink as one atomic change. Removing only command redaction, JSON traversal, service-tail redaction, or result-envelope redaction would recreate a bypass around the remaining controls. Before rollback, operators must prove that no allowlisted credential can reach child output or command metadata and must retain equivalent focused regression evidence. + +## APA 7 references + +MITRE Corporation. (2026). *CWE-117: Improper output neutralization for logs* (CWE Version 4.20). https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html + +MITRE Corporation. (2026). *CWE-532: Insertion of sensitive information into log file* (CWE Version 4.20). https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/532.html + +National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2022). *Secure software development framework (SSDF) version 1.1: Recommendations for mitigating the risk of software vulnerabilities* (NIST Special Publication 800-218). https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218 + +OWASP Foundation. (n.d.). *Logging cheat sheet*. OWASP Cheat Sheet Series. Retrieved August 5, 2026, from https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Logging_Cheat_Sheet.html + +Python Software Foundation. (2026). *subprocess—Subprocess management* (Python 3.14.6 documentation). https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html diff --git a/scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py b/scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py old mode 100644 new mode 100755 index b8c39e920..f03ee5fb7 --- a/scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py +++ b/scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py @@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ "tests", } TEST_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"\.(?:spec|test)\.[cm]?[jt]sx?$") +TOOL_CONFIG_NAME_RE = re.compile( + r"^(?:ava|babel|build|cypress|eslint|jest|karma|next|nyc|playwright|" + r"prettier|rollup|tsup|vite|vitest|webpack)" + r"(?:\.[a-z0-9_-]+)*\.config\.[cm]?[jt]sx?$" +) +VERIFICATION_SCRIPT_PREFIXES = ("check-", "verify-") HUNK_RE = re.compile(r"^@@ -\d+(?:,\d+)? \+(\d+)(?:,(\d+))? @@") @@ -59,6 +65,29 @@ def git(repo_root: Path, *args: str) -> str: return completed.stdout.decode("utf-8", errors="surrogateescape") +def is_repository_verification_script(path: PurePosixPath) -> bool: + """Return whether ``path`` is a non-product check under a scripts directory. + + Package and repository verification commands commonly live in a top-level + or module-level ``scripts`` directory. They are executable CI tooling, but + they are not application runtime modules and are often validated by a + separate command-level test contract rather than imported by Vitest. A + ``scripts`` directory nested below ``src`` remains runtime scope so a + product module cannot evade changed-line coverage merely by its directory + name. + """ + directory_parts = tuple(part.casefold() for part in path.parts[:-1]) + name = path.name.casefold() + for index, part in enumerate(directory_parts): + if part != "scripts": + continue + return ( + "src" not in directory_parts[:index] + and name.startswith(VERIFICATION_SCRIPT_PREFIXES) + ) + return False + + def is_runtime_source(path: str) -> bool: """Return whether a changed path is instrumentable runtime JS/TS source.""" normalized = PurePosixPath(path) @@ -70,15 +99,9 @@ def is_runtime_source(path: str) -> bool: return False if lowered_parts & EXCLUDED_PARTS: return False - if name in { - "eslint.config.js", - "next.config.js", - "next.config.mjs", - "vite.config.js", - "vite.config.ts", - "vitest.config.js", - "vitest.config.ts", - }: + if TOOL_CONFIG_NAME_RE.fullmatch(name): + return False + if is_repository_verification_script(normalized): return False return True diff --git a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py old mode 100644 new mode 100755 index 0b72e6f07..129810220 --- a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py +++ b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py @@ -40,19 +40,26 @@ def _redact_json(value: Any) -> Any: - """Recursively replace values whose JSON keys identify credentials.""" + """Recursively redact sensitive keys and credential-shaped JSON strings.""" if isinstance(value, dict): return { - key: REDACTED if SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(str(key)) else _redact_json(item) + _redact_unstructured(str(key)): ( + REDACTED if SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(str(key)) else _redact_json(item) + ) for key, item in value.items() } if isinstance(value, list): return [_redact_json(item) for item in value] + if isinstance(value, str): + return _redact_unstructured(value) return value -def _consume_sensitive_assignment(text: str, start: int) -> tuple[str, int] | None: - """Return a redacted key/value assignment parsed in linear time.""" +def _consume_sensitive_assignment( + text: str, + start: int, +) -> tuple[str | None, int]: + """Parse one possible assignment and return replacement plus next cursor.""" cursor = start key_quote = "" if cursor < len(text) and text[cursor] in "\"'": @@ -60,25 +67,25 @@ def _consume_sensitive_assignment(text: str, start: int) -> tuple[str, int] | No cursor += 1 key_start = cursor if cursor >= len(text) or text[cursor] not in KEY_CHARS or text[cursor].isdigit(): - return None + return None, start + 1 while cursor < len(text) and text[cursor] in KEY_CHARS: cursor += 1 key = text[key_start:cursor] if key_quote: if cursor >= len(text) or text[cursor] != key_quote: - return None + return None, start + 1 cursor += 1 if not SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key): - return None + return None, cursor while cursor < len(text) and text[cursor].isspace(): cursor += 1 if cursor >= len(text) or text[cursor] not in ":=": - return None + return None, cursor cursor += 1 while cursor < len(text) and text[cursor].isspace(): cursor += 1 if cursor >= len(text): - return None + return None, cursor value_start = cursor if text[cursor] in "\"'": @@ -98,22 +105,21 @@ def _consume_sensitive_assignment(text: str, start: int) -> tuple[str, int] | No while cursor < len(text) and not text[cursor].isspace() and text[cursor] not in ",}": cursor += 1 if cursor == value_start: - return None + return None, cursor return text[start:value_start] + REDACTED, cursor def _redact_assignments(text: str) -> str: - """Redact sensitive key/value assignments without backtracking regexes.""" + """Redact sensitive key/value assignments in one bounded forward scan.""" output: list[str] = [] cursor = 0 while cursor < len(text): - match = _consume_sensitive_assignment(text, cursor) - if match is None: - output.append(text[cursor]) - cursor += 1 - continue - replacement, cursor = match - output.append(replacement) + replacement, next_cursor = _consume_sensitive_assignment(text, cursor) + if replacement is None: + output.append(text[cursor:next_cursor]) + else: + output.append(replacement) + cursor = next_cursor return "".join(output) diff --git a/tests/test_javascript_coverage_scope.py b/tests/test_javascript_coverage_scope.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b3e75087d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_javascript_coverage_scope.py @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +"""Regression tests for central JavaScript runtime-source classification.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import json +import subprocess +from pathlib import Path + +import pytest + +from scripts.ci import javascript_coverage_gate as gate + + +def git(repo_root: Path, *args: str) -> str: + """Run Git in a temporary regression fixture and return stdout.""" + return subprocess.run( + ["git", "-C", str(repo_root), *args], + check=True, + text=True, + stdout=subprocess.PIPE, + stderr=subprocess.PIPE, + ).stdout.strip() + + +def commit(repo_root: Path, message: str) -> str: + """Commit the temporary fixture and return the immutable commit SHA.""" + git(repo_root, "add", ".") + git(repo_root, "commit", "-m", message) + return git(repo_root, "rev-parse", "HEAD") + + +def initialise_repo(repo_root: Path) -> None: + """Create a deterministic Git repository for changed-file evidence tests.""" + repo_root.mkdir() + git(repo_root, "init", "-b", "main") + git(repo_root, "config", "user.name", "Coverage Scope Test") + git(repo_root, "config", "user.email", "coverage-scope@example.invalid") + + +def empty_coverage_list(repo_root: Path) -> Path: + """Write an empty Istanbul final report and return its list file.""" + coverage_dir = repo_root / "coverage" + coverage_dir.mkdir() + final_path = coverage_dir / "coverage-final.json" + final_path.write_text(json.dumps({}), encoding="utf-8") + summary_list = repo_root / "coverage-files.txt" + summary_list.write_text("coverage/coverage-final.json\n", encoding="utf-8") + return summary_list + + +def run_gate( + repo_root: Path, + base_sha: str, + head_sha: str, + summary_list: Path, +) -> int: + """Run the current central coverage gate for one exact fixture head.""" + return gate.main( + [ + "--repo-root", + str(repo_root), + "--base-sha", + base_sha, + "--head-sha", + head_sha, + "--summary-list", + str(summary_list), + ] + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "path", + [ + "vite.autosave.config.ts", + "packages/editor/vitest.browser.config.ts", + "webpack.server.config.js", + "scripts/verify-framework-free-autosave-package.mjs", + "scripts/verify-package.mjs", + "packages/editor/scripts/check-bundle.cjs", + ], +) +def test_tool_configs_and_repository_verifiers_are_not_product_runtime( + path: str, +) -> None: + """Exclude build/test configuration and bounded verification commands.""" + assert not gate.is_runtime_source(path) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "path", + [ + "src/runtime.ts", + "src/feature.config.ts", + "scripts/serve-package.mjs", + "src/scripts/verify-session.ts", + ], +) +def test_runtime_modules_cannot_hide_behind_similar_names(path: str) -> None: + """Keep product modules and non-verification scripts in blocking scope.""" + assert gate.is_runtime_source(path) + + +def test_tooling_only_change_is_explicitly_not_applicable( + tmp_path: Path, + capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str], +) -> None: + """Reproduce the Inkspan false positive without weakening runtime evidence.""" + repo_root = tmp_path / "repo" + initialise_repo(repo_root) + tooling_files = { + "vite.autosave.config.ts": "export default { test: true };\n", + "scripts/verify-framework-free-autosave-package.mjs": ( + "console.log('verify framework-free package');\n" + ), + "scripts/verify-package.mjs": "console.log('verify package');\n", + } + for relative_path, content in tooling_files.items(): + file_path = repo_root / relative_path + file_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + file_path.write_text(content, encoding="utf-8") + base_sha = commit(repo_root, "base tooling") + tooling_updates = { + "vite.autosave.config.ts": ( + "export default { test: true, version: 2 };\n" + ), + "scripts/verify-framework-free-autosave-package.mjs": ( + "console.log('verify framework-free package v2');\n" + ), + "scripts/verify-package.mjs": "console.log('verify package v2');\n", + } + for relative_path, content in tooling_updates.items(): + (repo_root / relative_path).write_text(content, encoding="utf-8") + head_sha = commit(repo_root, "update tooling") + summary_list = empty_coverage_list(repo_root) + + assert run_gate(repo_root, base_sha, head_sha, summary_list) == 0 + report = capsys.readouterr().out + assert "No changed JavaScript/TypeScript runtime source files" in report + assert "Result: PASS" in report + + +def test_non_verification_script_remains_fail_closed( + tmp_path: Path, + capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str], +) -> None: + """Require instrumentation when an executable scripts module is product code.""" + repo_root = tmp_path / "repo" + initialise_repo(repo_root) + runtime_script = repo_root / "scripts" / "serve-package.mjs" + runtime_script.parent.mkdir() + runtime_script.write_text("export const port = 8000;\n", encoding="utf-8") + base_sha = commit(repo_root, "base runtime script") + runtime_script.write_text("export const port = 8080;\n", encoding="utf-8") + head_sha = commit(repo_root, "change runtime script") + summary_list = empty_coverage_list(repo_root) + + assert run_gate(repo_root, base_sha, head_sha, summary_list) == 1 + report = capsys.readouterr().out + assert "scripts/serve-package.mjs is absent from coverage-final.json" in report + assert "Result: FAIL" in report + + +def test_runtime_path_without_diff_hunks_is_not_measured( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, + tmp_path: Path, +) -> None: + """Ignore a runtime path when Git reports no added or modified line hunk.""" + enumerated = subprocess.CompletedProcess( + args=["git"], + returncode=0, + stdout=b"src/runtime.ts\0", + stderr=b"", + ) + monkeypatch.setattr(gate.subprocess, "run", lambda *args, **kwargs: enumerated) + monkeypatch.setattr(gate, "git", lambda *args, **kwargs: "") + + assert gate.changed_runtime_lines(tmp_path, "base", "head") == {} + + +def test_global_summary_ignores_non_integer_statement_locations() -> None: + """Treat malformed line metadata as absent instead of inventing coverage.""" + summary = gate.summarize_final( + { + "runtime.ts": { + "statementMap": { + "0": { + "start": {"line": "one"}, + "end": {"line": "one"}, + } + }, + "s": {"0": 1}, + "fnMap": {}, + "f": {}, + "branchMap": {}, + "b": {}, + } + } + ) + + assert summary == { + "statements": 100.0, + "branches": 100.0, + "functions": 100.0, + "lines": 100.0, + } + + +def test_coverage_path_nonmatches_fall_through_safely(tmp_path: Path) -> None: + """Reject unmatched absolute and relative Istanbul paths without ambiguity.""" + changed_paths = {"src/runtime.ts"} + + assert ( + gate.normalize_coverage_path( + str(tmp_path / "src" / "other.ts"), + tmp_path, + changed_paths, + ) + is None + ) + assert ( + gate.normalize_coverage_path( + "src/other.ts", + tmp_path, + changed_paths, + ) + is None + ) + + +def test_coverage_loader_accepts_absolute_paths_and_ignores_other_json( + tmp_path: Path, +) -> None: + """Load bounded final evidence while ignoring an unrelated listed JSON file.""" + final_path = tmp_path / "coverage-final.json" + other_path = tmp_path / "metadata.json" + final_path.write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8") + other_path.write_text("{}", encoding="utf-8") + summary_list = tmp_path / "coverage-files.txt" + summary_list.write_text( + f"{other_path}\n{final_path}\n", + encoding="utf-8", + ) + + summaries, finals = gate.load_coverage_files(tmp_path, summary_list) + + assert summaries == [] + assert finals == [(final_path, {})] + + +def test_unmatched_coverage_record_does_not_mask_matching_runtime_evidence( + tmp_path: Path, + capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str], +) -> None: + """Skip unrelated Istanbul records and still enforce the changed runtime file.""" + repo_root = tmp_path / "repo" + initialise_repo(repo_root) + source = repo_root / "src" / "runtime.ts" + source.parent.mkdir() + source.write_text("export const value = 1;\n", encoding="utf-8") + base_sha = commit(repo_root, "base runtime") + source.write_text("export const value = 2;\n", encoding="utf-8") + head_sha = commit(repo_root, "change runtime") + coverage_dir = repo_root / "coverage" + coverage_dir.mkdir() + coverage_record = { + "statementMap": { + "0": { + "start": {"line": 1, "column": 0}, + "end": {"line": 1, "column": 23}, + } + }, + "s": {"0": 1}, + "fnMap": {}, + "f": {}, + "branchMap": {}, + "b": {}, + } + final_path = coverage_dir / "coverage-final.json" + final_path.write_text( + json.dumps( + { + str(repo_root / "src" / "unrelated.ts"): coverage_record, + str(source): coverage_record, + } + ), + encoding="utf-8", + ) + summary_list = repo_root / "coverage-files.txt" + summary_list.write_text("coverage/coverage-final.json\n", encoding="utf-8") + + assert run_gate(repo_root, base_sha, head_sha, summary_list) == 0 + assert "src/runtime.ts: statements 1/1" in capsys.readouterr().out diff --git a/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py b/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e4c8621a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +"""Regression evidence for credential-shaped JSON keys and bounded scanning.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import re + +from scripts.ci import redact_sensitive_log as redactor + + +def test_json_object_keys_use_the_unstructured_redaction_boundary(monkeypatch) -> None: + """A JSON key matching a credential format must never bypass redaction.""" + + monkeypatch.setattr( + redactor, + "PROVIDER_TOKEN_RES", + (re.compile(r"\bcredential_key_marker\b"),), + ) + + assert redactor.redact_text('{"credential_key_marker":"safe"}\n') == ( + '{"[REDACTED]":"safe"}\n' + ) + + +def test_assignment_scan_does_not_rescan_one_long_ordinary_identifier( + monkeypatch, +) -> None: + """A long non-sensitive token must be inspected once rather than quadratically.""" + + class CountingSensitivePattern: + """Count the total candidate characters inspected by key classification.""" + + def __init__(self) -> None: + self.inspected_characters = 0 + + def search(self, value: str): + """Record one candidate and report that it is not a sensitive key.""" + + self.inspected_characters += len(value) + return None + + counting_pattern = CountingSensitivePattern() + monkeypatch.setattr(redactor, "SENSITIVE_KEY_RE", counting_pattern) + ordinary_identifier = "ordinary_identifier_" * 512 + + assert redactor.redact_text(ordinary_identifier) == ordinary_identifier + assert counting_pattern.inspected_characters <= len(ordinary_identifier) diff --git a/tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py b/tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py index 38611c217..bab3956e7 100644 --- a/tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py +++ b/tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ REDACTED, redact_command_arguments, redact_shell_command, + redact_text, ) @@ -19,6 +20,26 @@ def _provider_token() -> str: return "gh" + "p_" + ("A" * 36) +def test_json_string_values_are_redacted_recursively() -> None: + """Valid JSON cannot bypass token redaction through non-sensitive value keys.""" + token = _provider_token() + raw = ( + '{"message":"provider ' + + token + + '","nested":{"notes":["Bearer ' + + token + + '","safe"]}}\n' + ) + + redacted = redact_text(raw) + + assert token not in redacted + assert redacted == ( + '{"message":"provider [REDACTED]",' + '"nested":{"notes":["Bearer [REDACTED]","safe"]}}\n' + ) + + def test_redact_command_arguments_covers_separate_equals_and_direct_tokens() -> None: """Redact option values, assignments, and provider-shaped standalone values.""" token = _provider_token() From 4508edfc36dc72ec7e182f39e2bf5cd54b4ee018 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:28:32 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 29/75] docs(doctoring): replace superseded sandbox redaction record --- docs/doctoring/sandboxed-output-redaction.md | 105 ------------------- 1 file changed, 105 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 docs/doctoring/sandboxed-output-redaction.md diff --git a/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-output-redaction.md b/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-output-redaction.md deleted file mode 100644 index 0b30379a6..000000000 --- a/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-output-redaction.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,105 +0,0 @@ -# Sandboxed subprocess output redaction - -## Decision - -The central verification wrappers treat subprocess output, service log tails, -command arguments, shell-command strings, and reviewer evidence notes as -potentially sensitive before writing them to GitHub Actions logs or machine-readable -review evidence. - -One trusted redaction module now owns this boundary: - -- captured standard output and standard error are redacted before printing; -- `TimeoutExpired` byte and text payloads use the same redaction path; -- service log tails are redacted before publication; -- command arguments following sensitive options such as `--token`, - `--password`, or `--api-key` are replaced; -- sensitive `KEY=value` command arguments are replaced while preserving the key; -- shell command strings are parsed without execution and then reconstructed from - redacted arguments; and -- JSON result markers redact commands and evidence notes before serialization. - -The original command and output remain available only inside the isolated process -boundary for execution. Redaction is applied at every publication sink rather than -mutating the command that is executed. - -## Threat model - -Repository verification commands and web E2E services can emit credentials from: - -- exception messages and stack traces; -- dependency-manager or HTTP-client diagnostics; -- command-line options; -- environment-derived configuration echoed by a child process; -- service startup logs; and -- timeout payloads returned as either bytes or text. - -GitHub Actions logs are durable review artifacts. A credential exposed there may -be read by people, bots, log exporters, or downstream review tooling beyond the -process that originally possessed it. A forged or malformed log line can also -mislead automated diagnosis. - -OWASP's current logging guidance says that access tokens, authentication -passwords, database connection strings, encryption keys, and other primary -secrets should normally be removed, masked, sanitized, hashed, or encrypted -rather than recorded directly. It also requires sanitization of untrusted event -data against CR, LF, and delimiter injection and warns that logging failures must -not permit information leakage. MITRE CWE-117 defines the corresponding weakness -as external input written to logs without correct neutralization and identifies -confidentiality, integrity, availability, and non-repudiation consequences. - -## Security boundaries - -- No provider-shaped credential literal is committed as a test fixture. Tests - construct credential-shaped values at runtime so secret scanning remains - authoritative. -- Redaction is fail-closed for recognized sensitive option names and credential - formats, but it is not a general data-loss-prevention engine. -- Sensitive option detection is deliberately limited to explicit credential - terms. Ambiguous short flags such as `-p` are not guessed because they can mean - port, path, project, or password depending on the child tool. -- Shell strings are tokenized with `shlex.split`; no shell is invoked for - redaction. Malformed strings fall back to the existing line-oriented redactor. -- `subprocess.run` and `subprocess.Popen` receive argument arrays with - `shell=False`. This is independent of output redaction: preventing shell - interpretation does not prevent a child process from printing a secret. -- File paths, working directories, and sandbox paths are preserved as operational - evidence. Operators must not embed credentials in path names. - -No formal OWASP, NIST, or CWE conformity is claimed. - -## Verification contract - -The focused regression suite constructs a credential-shaped token at runtime and -proves that it does not appear in: - -- completed verification stdout or stderr; -- timeout output supplied as bytes or text; -- command displays; -- JSON result-marker command arrays; -- backend, frontend, or E2E shell-command fields; -- evidence notes; or -- service log tails. - -The tests also cover separate sensitive options, `KEY=value` assignments, -standalone provider-token shapes, malformed shell quoting, missing logs, bounded -log tails, and both verification wrappers' end-to-end publication paths. - -The exact pull-request head must additionally pass the complete unit suite, -statement and branch coverage, production docstring checks, Secret Scan, -CodeQL, Semgrep, Python Security, and independent current-head review before -merge. - -## References - -MITRE Corporation. (2026). *CWE-117: Improper output neutralization for logs* -(CWE Version 4.20). https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html - -National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2022). *Secure software -development framework (SSDF) version 1.1: Recommendations for mitigating the risk -of software vulnerabilities* (NIST Special Publication 800-218). -https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218 - -OWASP Foundation. (n.d.). *Logging cheat sheet*. OWASP Cheat Sheet Series. -Retrieved August 5, 2026, from -https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Logging_Cheat_Sheet.html From 8782eecbc280adfd44a93ed6b75da387254fcdbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:28:59 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 30/75] docs(changelog): record consolidated control-plane fixes --- CHANGELOG.md | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 2480f65be..cfcbc4add 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -6,15 +6,24 @@ The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and ## [Unreleased] +### Added + +- Add a trusted pull-request comment router for `@cwl-noema-review` and review-only `@opencode-agent` invocations, with bounded organization-wide sweeping, immutable current-head dispatch payloads, idempotent receipts, and fail-closed author/repository validation. +- Add hourly bounded review-repair scheduling that preserves the existing reviewer identities and credential chain while continuing non-conflicting maintenance during pending checks or reviews. + ### Security - Upgrade the central Strix dependency snapshots to `aiohttp==3.14.3`, `cryptography==50.0.0`, and the compatible `pyOpenSSL==26.4.0` closure so the hard dependency gates contain no known affected releases. - Redact credentials from every sandbox evidence publication sink, including completed and timed-out process output, service log tails, commands, reviewer notes, nested JSON values, and JSON object keys. +- Keep pull-request-controlled code outside the mention-router trust boundary, retain least-privilege workflow permissions, validate reusable workflow sources immutably, and preserve default-branch dependency snapshots for meaningful dependency review. ### Fixed - Replace quadratic sensitive-assignment rescanning with a bounded forward scan so one long ordinary diagnostic token cannot cause disproportionate log-processing work. +- Scope central JavaScript and TypeScript changed-source coverage to product runtime modules instead of incorrectly requiring Istanbul instrumentation for recognized tool configuration files and bounded `check-*` or `verify-*` repository commands. +- Preserve fail-closed 100% changed-statement, branch, function, and line evidence for runtime modules, including ordinary executable scripts and `src/scripts` modules. +- Preflight trusted-base Python dependency locks atomically so missing, malformed, or unsafe lock inputs fail with bounded diagnostics instead of partially mutating the review environment. ### Documentation -- Add an APA 7 doctoring record for the sandbox command/output redaction boundary, structured diagnostics, availability controls, verification evidence, limitations, and rollback requirements. +- Add APA 7 doctoring records for trusted review-agent invocation, hourly repair, central security baselines, JavaScript runtime coverage classification, and sandbox command/output redaction boundaries, including verification evidence, modular behavior, limitations, and rollback requirements. From 791312156ca2f17b36979517d04c8f70928fcfca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:35:47 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 31/75] docs(doctoring): pin coverage semantics to Vitest 3.2.7 --- .../javascript-runtime-coverage-scope.md | 35 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/doctoring/javascript-runtime-coverage-scope.md b/docs/doctoring/javascript-runtime-coverage-scope.md index 8ce39cfcd..dc984b136 100644 --- a/docs/doctoring/javascript-runtime-coverage-scope.md +++ b/docs/doctoring/javascript-runtime-coverage-scope.md @@ -24,14 +24,13 @@ line evidence. ## Root cause -Vitest produces coverage for files selected by its coverage configuration and -for modules loaded during the test run. Its current documented defaults exclude -common test files and tool configuration names, and the resolved configuration -also excludes the actual configuration file used for the run. A central gate -that independently reclassifies those files as application runtime creates an -impossible contract: the repository test runner correctly omits the tool file, -but the central post-processor interprets the omission as missing product -instrumentation. +Inkspan's locked test toolchain uses Vitest 3.2.7. That exact release enables +coverage for matching source modules while its versioned defaults exclude test +files, declarations, generated output, dependency trees, and recognized tool +configuration names. A central gate that independently reclassifies those files +as application runtime creates an impossible contract: the repository test +runner correctly omits the tool file, but the central post-processor interprets +the omission as missing product instrumentation. The former classifier recognized only a few exact names such as `vite.config.ts`. It therefore failed on a valid profile-qualified configuration @@ -39,6 +38,12 @@ name such as `vite.autosave.config.ts`. It also treated bounded package verification commands as shipped product modules even though those commands are exercised through separate command-level CI contracts. +Vitest 4 subsequently simplified its generic coverage defaults and emphasizes +an explicit `coverage.include` boundary. The central classifier therefore does +not copy either release's mutable glob list wholesale. It preserves a narrow, +repository-owned product-runtime contract that remains stable across supported +runner versions. + ## Fail-closed boundary The correction is deliberately narrower than excluding all configuration or @@ -101,10 +106,10 @@ conformity is claimed. Vitest's current coverage documentation distinguishes V8 and Istanbul providers, describes JSON coverage reporting, and recommends an explicit source inclusion -boundary. Its versioned configuration reference enumerates default exclusions -for tests, declarations, build output, dependencies, and recognized tool -configuration files. The central rule mirrors that semantic boundary without -copying a mutable glob set wholesale. +boundary. The exact 3.2.7 source used by Inkspan records the older release's +resolved exclusions for tests, declarations, build output, dependencies, and +recognized tool configuration files. The central rule mirrors the product/tool +semantic boundary without inheriting a mutable third-party glob set. NIST SSDF 1.1 requires producers to define, maintain, and verify secure software development practices and to address root causes so defects do not recur. The @@ -127,6 +132,6 @@ Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-218 Vitest. (n.d.). *Coverage*. Retrieved August 5, 2026, from https://main.vitest.dev/guide/coverage -Vitest. (n.d.). *Coverage configuration defaults* (Version 3.2.4) [Computer -software documentation]. GitHub. Retrieved August 5, 2026, from -https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/v3.2.4/docs/config/index.md +Vitest. (2025). *Coverage configuration defaults* (Version 3.2.7) [Computer +software source code]. GitHub. Retrieved August 5, 2026, from +https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/v3.2.7/packages/vitest/src/defaults.ts From a908eb0a96be2f03a1d1a5b985fb04caf6ac2581 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:37:57 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 32/75] fix(security): bound deeply nested JSON redaction --- scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py | 332 +++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 198 insertions(+), 134 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py index 129810220..d7fcd43ec 100755 --- a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py +++ b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py @@ -1,198 +1,262 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env python3 -"""Redact credentials from CI log text before it becomes review evidence.""" +"""Redact credential-shaped values before publishing subprocess evidence.""" from __future__ import annotations import json import re import shlex -import sys -from collections.abc import Sequence -from typing import Any +from typing import Any, Sequence + REDACTED = "[REDACTED]" -KEY_CHARS = frozenset("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789_.-") SENSITIVE_KEY_RE = re.compile( - r"(?:token|secret|password|passwd|credential|authorization|jwt|" - r"api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|session[_-]?key)", - re.IGNORECASE, + r"(?i)(?:^|[_-])(?:api[_-]?key|auth|authorization|bearer|credential|password|passwd|private[_-]?key|secret|session[_-]?key|token)(?:$|[_-])" ) SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE = re.compile( - r"(?:token|secret|password|passwd|credential|authorization|jwt|" - r"api[-_]?key|private[-_]?key|access[-_]?key|session[-_]?key)", - re.IGNORECASE, + r"(?i)^--?(?:api[_-]?key|auth|authorization|bearer|credential|password|passwd|private[_-]?key|secret|session[_-]?key|token)$" ) -JWT_RE = re.compile( - r"(?\b(?:authorization\s*:\s*)?(?:bearer|basic)\s+)" - r"[^\s\"'\\]+", - re.IGNORECASE, +BEARER_BASIC_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)\b(Bearer|Basic)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+") +JWT_RE = re.compile( + r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6,}\b" ) PROVIDER_TOKEN_RES = ( - re.compile(r"\b(?:gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,})\b"), - re.compile(r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b"), - re.compile(r"\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}\b"), + re.compile(r"\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b"), + re.compile(r"\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b"), re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"), + re.compile(r"\bASIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"), + re.compile(r"\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}\b"), + re.compile(r"\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b"), + re.compile(r"\bnvapi-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b"), + re.compile(r"\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b"), ) +MAX_IDENTIFIER_CHARS = 4096 +MAX_JSON_DEPTH = 64 -def _redact_json(value: Any) -> Any: - """Recursively redact sensitive keys and credential-shaped JSON strings.""" - if isinstance(value, dict): - return { - _redact_unstructured(str(key)): ( - REDACTED if SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(str(key)) else _redact_json(item) - ) - for key, item in value.items() - } - if isinstance(value, list): - return [_redact_json(item) for item in value] - if isinstance(value, str): - return _redact_unstructured(value) - return value +def _redact_scalar(value: str) -> str: + """Redact one scalar that may itself be a credential.""" + redacted = SENSITIVE_ASSIGNMENT_RE.sub(lambda match: match.group(1) + REDACTED, value) + redacted = BEARER_BASIC_RE.sub(lambda match: f"{match.group(1)} {REDACTED}", redacted) + redacted = JWT_RE.sub(REDACTED, redacted) + for pattern in PROVIDER_TOKEN_RES: + redacted = pattern.sub(REDACTED, redacted) + return redacted -def _consume_sensitive_assignment( - text: str, - start: int, -) -> tuple[str | None, int]: - """Parse one possible assignment and return replacement plus next cursor.""" - cursor = start - key_quote = "" - if cursor < len(text) and text[cursor] in "\"'": - key_quote = text[cursor] +def _consume_json_string(text: str, start: int, *, depth: int) -> tuple[str, int] | None: + """Return one decoded/redacted JSON string and the first following index.""" + cursor = start + 1 + escaped = False + while cursor < len(text): + character = text[cursor] + if escaped: + escaped = False + elif character == "\\": + escaped = True + elif character == '"': + candidate = text[start : cursor + 1] + try: + decoded = json.loads(candidate) + except json.JSONDecodeError: + return None + if not isinstance(decoded, str): + return None + redacted = _redact_unstructured(decoded, depth=depth + 1) + return json.dumps(redacted, ensure_ascii=False), cursor + 1 cursor += 1 - key_start = cursor - if cursor >= len(text) or text[cursor] not in KEY_CHARS or text[cursor].isdigit(): + return None + + +def _consume_sensitive_assignment(text: str, start: int) -> tuple[str | None, int]: + """Inspect one identifier once and redact its assigned scalar when sensitive. + + The returned index always advances beyond the identifier that was already + classified. That invariant prevents the historical suffix-by-suffix + rescanning behavior from becoming quadratic on a long ordinary token. + """ + if not (text[start].isalpha() or text[start] == "_"): return None, start + 1 - while cursor < len(text) and text[cursor] in KEY_CHARS: - cursor += 1 - key = text[key_start:cursor] - if key_quote: - if cursor >= len(text) or text[cursor] != key_quote: - return None, start + 1 + + cursor = start + 1 + identifier_end = min(len(text), start + MAX_IDENTIFIER_CHARS) + while cursor < identifier_end and (text[cursor].isalnum() or text[cursor] in "_-"): cursor += 1 - if not SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key): + if cursor < len(text) and cursor == identifier_end and ( + text[cursor].isalnum() or text[cursor] in "_-" + ): return None, cursor - while cursor < len(text) and text[cursor].isspace(): - cursor += 1 - if cursor >= len(text) or text[cursor] not in ":=": + + key = text[start:cursor] + assignment_cursor = cursor + while assignment_cursor < len(text) and text[assignment_cursor].isspace(): + assignment_cursor += 1 + if assignment_cursor >= len(text) or text[assignment_cursor] not in "=:": return None, cursor - cursor += 1 - while cursor < len(text) and text[cursor].isspace(): - cursor += 1 - if cursor >= len(text): + if not SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key): return None, cursor - value_start = cursor - if text[cursor] in "\"'": - value_quote = text[cursor] - cursor += 1 + value_start = assignment_cursor + 1 + while value_start < len(text) and text[value_start].isspace(): + value_start += 1 + if value_start >= len(text): + return None, cursor + + prefix = text[start:value_start] + if text[value_start] in {'"', "'"}: + quote = text[value_start] + value_end = value_start + 1 escaped = False - while cursor < len(text): - char = text[cursor] - cursor += 1 + while value_end < len(text): + character = text[value_end] if escaped: escaped = False - elif char == "\\": + elif character == "\\": escaped = True - elif char == value_quote: - break - else: - while cursor < len(text) and not text[cursor].isspace() and text[cursor] not in ",}": - cursor += 1 - if cursor == value_start: - return None, cursor - return text[start:value_start] + REDACTED, cursor + elif character == quote: + return prefix + quote + REDACTED + quote, value_end + 1 + value_end += 1 + return prefix + quote + REDACTED, len(text) + + value_end = value_start + while value_end < len(text) and not text[value_end].isspace() and text[value_end] not in ",;}": + value_end += 1 + return prefix + REDACTED, value_end -def _redact_assignments(text: str) -> str: - """Redact sensitive key/value assignments in one bounded forward scan.""" +def _redact_unstructured(text: str, *, depth: int = 0) -> str: + """Redact arbitrary diagnostic text without invoking a shell or regex loop.""" + if depth > 8: + return _redact_scalar(text) + output: list[str] = [] cursor = 0 + plain_start = 0 while cursor < len(text): + if text[cursor] == '"': + parsed = _consume_json_string(text, cursor, depth=depth) + if parsed is not None: + replacement, next_cursor = parsed + output.append(_redact_scalar(text[plain_start:cursor])) + output.append(replacement) + cursor = next_cursor + plain_start = cursor + continue replacement, next_cursor = _consume_sensitive_assignment(text, cursor) - if replacement is None: - output.append(text[cursor:next_cursor]) - else: + if replacement is not None: + output.append(_redact_scalar(text[plain_start:cursor])) output.append(replacement) - cursor = next_cursor - return "".join(output) + cursor = next_cursor + plain_start = cursor + continue + cursor = max(cursor + 1, next_cursor) + output.append(_redact_scalar(text[plain_start:])) + return "".join(output) -def _redact_unstructured(text: str) -> str: - """Redact credential-shaped values from non-JSON diagnostic text.""" - cleaned = _redact_assignments(text) - cleaned = BEARER_RE.sub(lambda match: f"{match.group('prefix')}{REDACTED}", cleaned) - cleaned = JWT_RE.sub(REDACTED, cleaned) - for pattern in PROVIDER_TOKEN_RES: - cleaned = pattern.sub(REDACTED, cleaned) - return cleaned +def _redact_json(value: Any, *, depth: int = 0) -> Any: + """Return a recursively redacted JSON-compatible value with bounded depth. -def _redact_line(line: str) -> str: - """Redact one log line, preferring recursive JSON handling when valid.""" - try: - value = json.loads(line) - except json.JSONDecodeError: - return _redact_unstructured(line) - return json.dumps(_redact_json(value), ensure_ascii=False, separators=(",", ":")) + A subtree at or beyond :data:`MAX_JSON_DEPTH` is replaced wholesale rather + than recursed into. This keeps untrusted structured diagnostics from using + extreme nesting to exhaust the publication boundary or to bypass secret + handling through a recursion failure. + """ + if depth >= MAX_JSON_DEPTH: + return REDACTED + if isinstance(value, dict): + redacted_mapping: dict[str, Any] = {} + for key, nested in value.items(): + redacted_key = _redact_unstructured(str(key)) + if SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(str(key)): + redacted_mapping[redacted_key] = REDACTED + else: + redacted_mapping[redacted_key] = _redact_json( + nested, + depth=depth + 1, + ) + return redacted_mapping + if isinstance(value, list): + return [_redact_json(item, depth=depth + 1) for item in value] + if isinstance(value, str): + return _redact_unstructured(value) + return value def redact_text(text: str) -> str: - """Return redacted log text while preserving line boundaries.""" + """Return text with recognized credential forms removed. + + Valid JSON lines are traversed recursively so a token stored under an + ordinary key, or used as an object key, cannot bypass line-oriented + patterns. Deeply nested JSON that exceeds the parser or encoder recursion + boundary is replaced as one redacted line, preserving confidentiality and + bounded availability instead of falling back to a weaker parser. + """ + redacted_lines: list[str] = [] + for line in text.splitlines(keepends=True): + stripped = line.rstrip("\r\n") + line_ending = line[len(stripped) :] + if stripped and stripped[0] in "[{": + try: + parsed = json.loads(stripped) + encoded = json.dumps( + _redact_json(parsed), + separators=(",", ":"), + ensure_ascii=False, + ) + except json.JSONDecodeError: + redacted_lines.append(_redact_unstructured(stripped) + line_ending) + except RecursionError: + redacted_lines.append(REDACTED + line_ending) + else: + redacted_lines.append(encoded + line_ending) + else: + redacted_lines.append(_redact_unstructured(stripped) + line_ending) if not text: - return text - output: list[str] = [] - for raw_line in text.splitlines(keepends=True): - line = raw_line.rstrip("\r\n") - ending = raw_line[len(line) :] - output.append(_redact_line(line) + ending) - return "".join(output) + return "" + if not redacted_lines: + return _redact_unstructured(text) + return "".join(redacted_lines) + + +def _redact_assignment(argument: str) -> str: + """Redact a sensitive ``KEY=value`` or ``--option=value`` argument.""" + if "=" not in argument: + return argument + key, separator, value = argument.partition("=") + if value and (SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key) or SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE.match(key)): + return f"{key}{separator}{REDACTED}" + return argument def redact_command_arguments(arguments: Sequence[str]) -> list[str]: - """Return command arguments with sensitive option values redacted.""" + """Return a printable argument vector with sensitive values removed.""" redacted: list[str] = [] redact_next = False - for raw_argument in arguments: - argument = str(raw_argument) + for argument in arguments: if redact_next: redacted.append(REDACTED) redact_next = False continue - - option = argument.lstrip("-") - if "=" in option: - key, _value = option.split("=", 1) - if SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE.fullmatch(key): - separator_index = argument.find("=") - redacted.append(f"{argument[: separator_index + 1]}{REDACTED}") - continue - - redacted.append(redact_text(argument)) - if SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE.fullmatch(option): + assigned = _redact_assignment(str(argument)) + if assigned != argument: + redacted.append(assigned) + continue + if SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE.match(str(argument)): + redacted.append(str(argument)) redact_next = True + continue + redacted.append(_redact_unstructured(str(argument))) return redacted def redact_shell_command(command: str) -> str: - """Return a shell command safe for logs without executing or expanding it.""" + """Return a printable shell command while preserving the command execution.""" try: - arguments = shlex.split(command) + arguments = shlex.split(command, posix=True) except ValueError: - return redact_text(command) + return _redact_unstructured(command) return shlex.join(redact_command_arguments(arguments)) - - -def main() -> int: - """Redact standard input to standard output.""" - sys.stdout.write(redact_text(sys.stdin.read())) - return 0 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - raise SystemExit(main()) From c5255962106603d759a854224b739159d6f07b2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:38:28 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 33/75] test(security): prove fail-closed nested JSON redaction --- tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py | 85 ++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py b/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py index e4c8621a4..82aaf03c8 100644 --- a/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py +++ b/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py @@ -1,46 +1,77 @@ -"""Regression evidence for credential-shaped JSON keys and bounded scanning.""" +"""Additional fail-closed JSON redaction boundary tests.""" from __future__ import annotations -import re +import json + +import pytest from scripts.ci import redact_sensitive_log as redactor -def test_json_object_keys_use_the_unstructured_redaction_boundary(monkeypatch) -> None: - """A JSON key matching a credential format must never bypass redaction.""" +def test_json_object_keys_are_redacted_when_the_key_contains_a_provider_token() -> None: + """Credential-shaped JSON object keys must not survive structured redaction.""" + provider_token = "nv" + "api-" + ("K" * 24) + raw = json.dumps({provider_token: "ordinary-value"}) - monkeypatch.setattr( - redactor, - "PROVIDER_TOKEN_RES", - (re.compile(r"\bcredential_key_marker\b"),), - ) + redacted = redactor.redact_text(raw) - assert redactor.redact_text('{"credential_key_marker":"safe"}\n') == ( - '{"[REDACTED]":"safe"}\n' - ) + assert provider_token not in redacted + assert redactor.REDACTED in redacted + + +def test_json_object_keys_are_redacted_when_the_key_contains_an_assignment() -> None: + """Assignment-shaped JSON object keys must pass through the shared scanner.""" + assignment_key = "api_key=" + ("S" * 24) + raw = json.dumps({assignment_key: "ordinary-value"}) + redacted = redactor.redact_text(raw) -def test_assignment_scan_does_not_rescan_one_long_ordinary_identifier( + assert assignment_key not in redacted + assert redactor.REDACTED in redacted + + +def test_long_ordinary_identifier_does_not_restart_assignment_scanning( monkeypatch, ) -> None: - """A long non-sensitive token must be inspected once rather than quadratically.""" + """One long ordinary token must cause only one assignment classification.""" + original = redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment + starts: list[int] = [] - class CountingSensitivePattern: - """Count the total candidate characters inspected by key classification.""" + def instrument(text: str, start: int): + starts.append(start) + return original(text, start) - def __init__(self) -> None: - self.inspected_characters = 0 + monkeypatch.setattr(redactor, "_consume_sensitive_assignment", instrument) + ordinary_identifier = "a" * 100_000 - def search(self, value: str): - """Record one candidate and report that it is not a sensitive key.""" + assert redactor.redact_text(ordinary_identifier) == ordinary_identifier + assert starts == [0, redactor.MAX_IDENTIFIER_CHARS] - self.inspected_characters += len(value) - return None - counting_pattern = CountingSensitivePattern() - monkeypatch.setattr(redactor, "SENSITIVE_KEY_RE", counting_pattern) - ordinary_identifier = "ordinary_identifier_" * 512 +def test_json_depth_limit_replaces_the_remaining_subtree() -> None: + """Excessive valid JSON nesting is redacted before recursive publication.""" + nested: object = "plain-secret" + for _ in range(redactor.MAX_JSON_DEPTH + 1): + nested = {"safe": nested} - assert redactor.redact_text(ordinary_identifier) == ordinary_identifier - assert counting_pattern.inspected_characters <= len(ordinary_identifier) + encoded = json.dumps(redactor._redact_json(nested)) + + assert "plain-secret" not in encoded + assert redactor.REDACTED in encoded + + +def test_json_parser_recursion_failure_redacts_the_entire_line( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, +) -> None: + """A parser recursion failure must not fall back to weaker key handling.""" + + def raise_recursion(_value: str) -> object: + raise RecursionError("synthetic deeply nested diagnostic") + + monkeypatch.setattr(redactor.json, "loads", raise_recursion) + + assert ( + redactor.redact_text('{"api_key":"plain-secret"}\n') + == f"{redactor.REDACTED}\n" + ) From 9493a7dd576ccec20290626271637c5dbc4b73a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:40:48 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 34/75] docs(doctoring): record bounded deep JSON redaction --- docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md b/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md index 517ae519c..564425d44 100644 --- a/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md +++ b/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ One trusted redaction module owns this publication boundary: - sensitive `KEY=value` command arguments are replaced while preserving the key; - standalone provider-token shapes are removed; - valid JSON is traversed recursively so credential-shaped object keys and string values cannot bypass line-oriented patterns; +- JSON traversal is depth-bounded, and parser or encoder recursion failure replaces the complete diagnostic line rather than falling back to weaker handling; - shell command strings are parsed without execution and reconstructed from redacted arguments; and - JSON result markers redact commands and evidence notes before serialization. @@ -24,6 +25,8 @@ Repository verification commands and web end-to-end services can emit credential GitHub Actions logs and review envelopes are durable evidence with a potentially broader readership than the originating credential. MITRE classifies insertion of sensitive information into log files as CWE-532. OWASP's current logging guidance identifies access tokens, passwords, database connection strings, encryption keys, and other primary secrets as values that should normally be removed, masked, sanitized, hashed, or encrypted before logging. NIST SSDF requires protection of software and development artifacts from unauthorized access and disclosure. +Untrusted tools can also emit deeply nested structured diagnostics. Recursive parsing without an explicit bound creates an availability risk and, if a recursion failure falls back to partial string processing, can recreate a confidentiality bypass. The redaction boundary therefore replaces a subtree at the configured maximum JSON depth and replaces the entire line when the JSON parser or encoder itself raises `RecursionError`. + ## Security and availability boundaries - No provider-shaped credential literal is committed as a test fixture. Tests construct credential-shaped values from fragments at runtime so Secret Scan remains authoritative. @@ -32,6 +35,8 @@ GitHub Actions logs and review envelopes are durable evidence with a potentially - Shell strings are tokenized with `shlex.split`; no shell is invoked for redaction. Malformed strings fall back to line-oriented redaction. - `subprocess.run` and `subprocess.Popen` receive structured argument arrays with `shell=False`. Preventing shell interpretation and preventing log disclosure are independent controls. - The assignment scanner advances through each ordinary identifier once. A deterministic instrumentation test prevents a long non-sensitive token from reintroducing quadratic rescanning and log-processing denial of service. +- Structured JSON traversal stops at `MAX_JSON_DEPTH`; the remaining subtree is represented only as `[REDACTED]`. +- A JSON parser or encoder `RecursionError` redacts the complete line and preserves its line ending. It never reprocesses the same line through a weaker fallback parser. - File paths, working directories, and sandbox paths remain visible operational evidence. Operators must not place credentials in path names. - Redaction preserves line boundaries and ordinary non-sensitive diagnostics. It does not transform a failed command into a successful result or suppress a nonzero exit status. @@ -48,10 +53,11 @@ The focused regression suite constructs a credential-shaped token at runtime and 5. backend, frontend, or E2E shell-command fields; 6. reviewer evidence notes; 7. service log tails; -8. nested JSON string values; or -9. JSON object keys. +8. nested JSON string values; +9. JSON object keys; or +10. a structured diagnostic beyond the supported JSON nesting depth. -The tests also cover separate sensitive options, `--option=value`, `KEY=value` assignments, standalone provider-token shapes, malformed shell quoting, missing logs, bounded final-line selection, recursive JSON structures, bounded assignment scanning, and both wrappers' end-to-end publication paths. Ordinary text, line endings, result envelopes, cleanup, timeouts, and child-process exit codes remain observable. +The tests also cover separate sensitive options, `--option=value`, `KEY=value` assignments, standalone provider-token shapes, malformed shell quoting, missing logs, bounded final-line selection, recursive JSON structures, bounded assignment scanning, synthetic parser recursion failure, and both wrappers' end-to-end publication paths. Ordinary text, line endings, result envelopes, cleanup, timeouts, and child-process exit codes remain observable. The exact pull-request head must additionally pass the complete central unit suite, 100% production statement and branch coverage for the changed surface, production docstring checks, Secret Scan, CodeQL, Semgrep, Python Security, Security Scan, OpenCode, Noema, CodeRabbit, independent current-head approval, and branch protection before merge. @@ -61,7 +67,7 @@ The exact pull-request head must additionally pass the complete central unit sui ## Rollback -Rollback must restore every publication sink as one atomic change. Removing only command redaction, JSON traversal, service-tail redaction, or result-envelope redaction would recreate a bypass around the remaining controls. Before rollback, operators must prove that no allowlisted credential can reach child output or command metadata and must retain equivalent focused regression evidence. +Rollback must restore every publication sink as one atomic change. Removing only command redaction, JSON traversal, depth limits, service-tail redaction, or result-envelope redaction would recreate a bypass around the remaining controls. Before rollback, operators must prove that no allowlisted credential can reach child output or command metadata and must retain equivalent focused regression evidence. ## APA 7 references From aa1e0c9acacde9d61b285884a9dbd34bcdc7e77d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:41:09 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 35/75] docs(changelog): record fail-closed JSON depth handling --- CHANGELOG.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index cfcbc4add..d6916a4e0 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and - Upgrade the central Strix dependency snapshots to `aiohttp==3.14.3`, `cryptography==50.0.0`, and the compatible `pyOpenSSL==26.4.0` closure so the hard dependency gates contain no known affected releases. - Redact credentials from every sandbox evidence publication sink, including completed and timed-out process output, service log tails, commands, reviewer notes, nested JSON values, and JSON object keys. +- Bound structured-diagnostic traversal and replace over-deep subtrees or parser/encoder recursion failures with fail-closed redacted evidence instead of crashing or retrying through weaker handling. - Keep pull-request-controlled code outside the mention-router trust boundary, retain least-privilege workflow permissions, validate reusable workflow sources immutably, and preserve default-branch dependency snapshots for meaningful dependency review. ### Fixed From 41e9253292693ad5e9e051aa8d91135a776c9f4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:44:09 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 36/75] fix(security): classify long assignments in one pass --- scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py index d7fcd43ec..d249b8a27 100755 --- a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py +++ b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py @@ -73,29 +73,31 @@ def _consume_json_string(text: str, start: int, *, depth: int) -> tuple[str, int def _consume_sensitive_assignment(text: str, start: int) -> tuple[str | None, int]: """Inspect one identifier once and redact its assigned scalar when sensitive. - The returned index always advances beyond the identifier that was already - classified. That invariant prevents the historical suffix-by-suffix - rescanning behavior from becoming quadratic on a long ordinary token. + The returned index advances beyond the complete identifier that was already + classified. Identifiers larger than :data:`MAX_IDENTIFIER_CHARS` are never + copied into the credential-key matcher; when followed by an assignment they + are handled conservatively as sensitive. This preserves linear scanning, + bounds classification work, and prevents an oversized key from becoming a + redaction bypass. """ if not (text[start].isalpha() or text[start] == "_"): return None, start + 1 cursor = start + 1 - identifier_end = min(len(text), start + MAX_IDENTIFIER_CHARS) - while cursor < identifier_end and (text[cursor].isalnum() or text[cursor] in "_-"): + while cursor < len(text) and (text[cursor].isalnum() or text[cursor] in "_-"): cursor += 1 - if cursor < len(text) and cursor == identifier_end and ( - text[cursor].isalnum() or text[cursor] in "_-" - ): - return None, cursor - key = text[start:cursor] assignment_cursor = cursor while assignment_cursor < len(text) and text[assignment_cursor].isspace(): assignment_cursor += 1 if assignment_cursor >= len(text) or text[assignment_cursor] not in "=:": return None, cursor - if not SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key): + + key_length = cursor - start + is_sensitive = key_length > MAX_IDENTIFIER_CHARS or bool( + SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(text[start:cursor]) + ) + if not is_sensitive: return None, cursor value_start = assignment_cursor + 1 From 5f3a4c48aa32f4aa30f3f72f41be134bbd34cac1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:44:34 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 37/75] test(security): verify one-pass long assignment handling --- tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py b/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py index 82aaf03c8..17062e003 100644 --- a/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py +++ b/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ def test_json_object_keys_are_redacted_when_the_key_contains_an_assignment() -> def test_long_ordinary_identifier_does_not_restart_assignment_scanning( - monkeypatch, + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, ) -> None: """One long ordinary token must cause only one assignment classification.""" original = redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment @@ -46,7 +46,18 @@ def instrument(text: str, start: int): ordinary_identifier = "a" * 100_000 assert redactor.redact_text(ordinary_identifier) == ordinary_identifier - assert starts == [0, redactor.MAX_IDENTIFIER_CHARS] + assert starts == [0] + + +def test_oversized_assignment_key_is_redacted_conservatively() -> None: + """An oversized key cannot evade redaction by exceeding matcher limits.""" + oversized_key = "ordinary" * (redactor.MAX_IDENTIFIER_CHARS + 1) + secret_value = "plain-secret" + + redacted = redactor.redact_text(f"{oversized_key}={secret_value}") + + assert secret_value not in redacted + assert redacted.endswith(redactor.REDACTED) def test_json_depth_limit_replaces_the_remaining_subtree() -> None: From 59b4f827e38c8c6503c1d9f053e040e01ab781fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:44:44 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 38/75] test(redaction): cover echoed separate secret options --- tests/test_unstructured_separate_option_redaction.py | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_unstructured_separate_option_redaction.py diff --git a/tests/test_unstructured_separate_option_redaction.py b/tests/test_unstructured_separate_option_redaction.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c56a52a0f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_unstructured_separate_option_redaction.py @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +"""Regression evidence for separate sensitive options echoed in child output.""" + +from scripts.ci import redact_sensitive_log as redactor + + +def test_unstructured_output_redacts_separate_sensitive_option_values() -> None: + """A child that echoes a separate secret option must not disclose its value.""" + + assert redactor.redact_text( + "running tool --api-key ordinary-value --mode safe" + ) == "running tool --api-key [REDACTED] --mode safe" From f39af5e5b2b6f6669f7b8acf31d357f261d1ef7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:45:59 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 39/75] fix(security): redact concatenated credential key names --- scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py index d249b8a27..026306b98 100755 --- a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py +++ b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ REDACTED = "[REDACTED]" SENSITIVE_KEY_RE = re.compile( - r"(?i)(?:^|[_-])(?:api[_-]?key|auth|authorization|bearer|credential|password|passwd|private[_-]?key|secret|session[_-]?key|token)(?:$|[_-])" + r"(?i)(?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|auth|authorization|bearer|credential|jwt|password|passwd|private[_-]?key|secret|session[_-]?key|token)" ) SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE = re.compile( r"(?i)^--?(?:api[_-]?key|auth|authorization|bearer|credential|password|passwd|private[_-]?key|secret|session[_-]?key|token)$" @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6,}\b" ) PROVIDER_TOKEN_RES = ( - re.compile(r"\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b"), + re.compile(r"\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b"), re.compile(r"\bgithub_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b"), re.compile(r"\bAKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"), re.compile(r"\bASIA[0-9A-Z]{16}\b"), From 72a9ef61b8c3ae8703d6c7bba7935698be16b185 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:46:26 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 40/75] test(security): cover concatenated sensitive JSON keys --- tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py b/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py index 17062e003..8005d1839 100644 --- a/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py +++ b/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py @@ -31,6 +31,30 @@ def test_json_object_keys_are_redacted_when_the_key_contains_an_assignment() -> assert redactor.REDACTED in redacted +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "sensitive_key", + [ + "clientSecret", + "databasePassword", + "serviceAuthorizationHeader", + "privateKeyMaterial", + "sessionTokenValue", + ], +) +def test_concatenated_sensitive_json_keys_redact_their_values( + sensitive_key: str, +) -> None: + """CamelCase and concatenated credential keys cannot retain plain values.""" + secret_value = "plain-secret" + + redacted = redactor.redact_text( + json.dumps({sensitive_key: secret_value}) + ) + + assert secret_value not in redacted + assert redactor.REDACTED in redacted + + def test_long_ordinary_identifier_does_not_restart_assignment_scanning( monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, ) -> None: From 538cd061dafe83384513d6b4808d4f61a44915a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:48:01 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 41/75] fix(redaction): scrub echoed separate secret options --- scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py index 026306b98..6f0fc6e8e 100755 --- a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py +++ b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py @@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE = re.compile( r"(?i)^--?(?:api[_-]?key|auth|authorization|bearer|credential|password|passwd|private[_-]?key|secret|session[_-]?key|token)$" ) +SENSITIVE_SEPARATE_OPTION_RE = re.compile( + r"(?i)(?P(?(?!--?[A-Za-z])(?:\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|[^\s,;}]+))" +) SENSITIVE_ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile( r"(?i)(\b[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:API[_-]?KEY|AUTH|AUTHORIZATION|BEARER|CREDENTIAL|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PRIVATE[_-]?KEY|SECRET|SESSION[_-]?KEY|TOKEN)[A-Za-z0-9_-]*\s*[=:]\s*)([^\s,;]+)" ) @@ -38,7 +43,14 @@ def _redact_scalar(value: str) -> str: """Redact one scalar that may itself be a credential.""" - redacted = SENSITIVE_ASSIGNMENT_RE.sub(lambda match: match.group(1) + REDACTED, value) + redacted = SENSITIVE_SEPARATE_OPTION_RE.sub( + lambda match: match.group("prefix") + REDACTED, + value, + ) + redacted = SENSITIVE_ASSIGNMENT_RE.sub( + lambda match: match.group(1) + REDACTED, + redacted, + ) redacted = BEARER_BASIC_RE.sub(lambda match: f"{match.group(1)} {REDACTED}", redacted) redacted = JWT_RE.sub(REDACTED, redacted) for pattern in PROVIDER_TOKEN_RES: From 84d2a1c6fbb111a6be08540fab0389575338eab9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:49:45 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 42/75] fix(security): fail closed for JSON-like diagnostic parse errors --- scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py index 6f0fc6e8e..d6cd487ca 100755 --- a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py +++ b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py @@ -205,28 +205,28 @@ def redact_text(text: str) -> str: Valid JSON lines are traversed recursively so a token stored under an ordinary key, or used as an object key, cannot bypass line-oriented - patterns. Deeply nested JSON that exceeds the parser or encoder recursion - boundary is replaced as one redacted line, preserving confidentiality and - bounded availability instead of falling back to a weaker parser. + patterns. JSON-like lines that cannot be parsed or encoded safely are + replaced wholesale, preserving confidentiality and bounded availability + instead of falling back to a weaker parser. """ redacted_lines: list[str] = [] for line in text.splitlines(keepends=True): stripped = line.rstrip("\r\n") line_ending = line[len(stripped) :] - if stripped and stripped[0] in "[{": + json_candidate = stripped.lstrip() + leading_space = stripped[: len(stripped) - len(json_candidate)] + if json_candidate and json_candidate[0] in "[{": try: - parsed = json.loads(stripped) + parsed = json.loads(json_candidate) encoded = json.dumps( _redact_json(parsed), separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=False, ) - except json.JSONDecodeError: - redacted_lines.append(_redact_unstructured(stripped) + line_ending) - except RecursionError: - redacted_lines.append(REDACTED + line_ending) + except (json.JSONDecodeError, RecursionError): + redacted_lines.append(leading_space + REDACTED + line_ending) else: - redacted_lines.append(encoded + line_ending) + redacted_lines.append(leading_space + encoded + line_ending) else: redacted_lines.append(_redact_unstructured(stripped) + line_ending) if not text: From f295e5f3736f12e968db46af356e8326a14640e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:50:50 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 43/75] test(security): cover JSON-like and echoed option boundaries --- tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py b/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py index 8005d1839..ecf46d3fc 100644 --- a/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py +++ b/tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py @@ -47,14 +47,55 @@ def test_concatenated_sensitive_json_keys_redact_their_values( """CamelCase and concatenated credential keys cannot retain plain values.""" secret_value = "plain-secret" + redacted = redactor.redact_text(json.dumps({sensitive_key: secret_value})) + + assert secret_value not in redacted + assert redactor.REDACTED in redacted + + +def test_leading_whitespace_does_not_bypass_structured_json_redaction() -> None: + """Indented JSON diagnostics retain indentation but never a sensitive value.""" + secret_value = "plain-secret" + redacted = redactor.redact_text( - json.dumps({sensitive_key: secret_value}) + " " + json.dumps({"clientSecret": secret_value}) + "\n" ) + assert redacted == f' {{"clientSecret":"{redactor.REDACTED}"}}\n' assert secret_value not in redacted + + +def test_malformed_json_like_diagnostic_fails_closed() -> None: + """A JSON-looking line that cannot be parsed is replaced as one safe record.""" + raw = ' {"clientSecret":"plain-secret"\n' + + assert redactor.redact_text(raw) == f" {redactor.REDACTED}\n" + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + "raw", + [ + "tool --token plain-secret --name safe", + 'tool --password "plain secret" --name safe', + "tool --api-key 'plain secret' --name safe", + ], +) +def test_echoed_separate_sensitive_options_are_redacted(raw: str) -> None: + """Child-process command echoes cannot disclose separate option values.""" + redacted = redactor.redact_text(raw) + + assert "plain-secret" not in redacted + assert "plain secret" not in redacted assert redactor.REDACTED in redacted +def test_sensitive_option_without_value_does_not_consume_the_next_option() -> None: + """A missing value leaves the following option visible for diagnosis.""" + raw = "tool --token --name safe" + + assert redactor.redact_text(raw) == raw + + def test_long_ordinary_identifier_does_not_restart_assignment_scanning( monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, ) -> None: @@ -110,3 +151,19 @@ def raise_recursion(_value: str) -> object: redactor.redact_text('{"api_key":"plain-secret"}\n') == f"{redactor.REDACTED}\n" ) + + +def test_json_encoder_recursion_failure_redacts_the_entire_line( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, +) -> None: + """An encoder recursion failure follows the same fail-closed line boundary.""" + + def raise_recursion(*_args, **_kwargs) -> str: + raise RecursionError("synthetic encoder recursion") + + monkeypatch.setattr(redactor.json, "dumps", raise_recursion) + + assert ( + redactor.redact_text('{"message":"ordinary"}\n') + == f"{redactor.REDACTED}\n" + ) From 6a05c2972b61e0b9408bba19a0dd846d40dbd998 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:51:41 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 44/75] docs(doctoring): fail closed on malformed JSON-like evidence --- .../sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md | 39 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md b/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md index 564425d44..c426ee943 100644 --- a/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md +++ b/docs/doctoring/sandboxed-command-log-redaction.md @@ -11,9 +11,11 @@ One trusted redaction module owns this publication boundary: - service log tails are redacted before publication; - command arguments following sensitive options such as `--token`, `--password`, or `--api-key` are replaced; - sensitive `KEY=value` command arguments are replaced while preserving the key; +- child-process text that echoes a sensitive option and its separate value is redacted even outside a structured command array; - standalone provider-token shapes are removed; - valid JSON is traversed recursively so credential-shaped object keys and string values cannot bypass line-oriented patterns; -- JSON traversal is depth-bounded, and parser or encoder recursion failure replaces the complete diagnostic line rather than falling back to weaker handling; +- leading indentation is preserved when a valid JSON diagnostic is normalized; +- JSON-looking lines that are malformed, too deeply nested, or rejected by the parser or encoder are replaced as complete redacted records rather than retried through weaker handling; - shell command strings are parsed without execution and reconstructed from redacted arguments; and - JSON result markers redact commands and evidence notes before serialization. @@ -25,18 +27,20 @@ Repository verification commands and web end-to-end services can emit credential GitHub Actions logs and review envelopes are durable evidence with a potentially broader readership than the originating credential. MITRE classifies insertion of sensitive information into log files as CWE-532. OWASP's current logging guidance identifies access tokens, passwords, database connection strings, encryption keys, and other primary secrets as values that should normally be removed, masked, sanitized, hashed, or encrypted before logging. NIST SSDF requires protection of software and development artifacts from unauthorized access and disclosure. -Untrusted tools can also emit deeply nested structured diagnostics. Recursive parsing without an explicit bound creates an availability risk and, if a recursion failure falls back to partial string processing, can recreate a confidentiality bypass. The redaction boundary therefore replaces a subtree at the configured maximum JSON depth and replaces the entire line when the JSON parser or encoder itself raises `RecursionError`. +Untrusted tools can also emit malformed or deeply nested structured diagnostics. Recursive parsing without an explicit bound creates an availability risk. Treating a JSON-looking record as ordinary text after a syntax or recursion failure can also recreate a confidentiality bypass because the relationship between a sensitive object key and an otherwise ordinary string value has been lost. The redaction boundary therefore replaces the complete JSON-looking record on parse or encode failure and replaces a subtree at the configured maximum JSON depth. ## Security and availability boundaries - No provider-shaped credential literal is committed as a test fixture. Tests construct credential-shaped values from fragments at runtime so Secret Scan remains authoritative. -- Redaction is fail-closed for recognized sensitive option names, assignments, bearer/basic values, JWTs, and known provider token formats, but it is not a general data-loss-prevention engine. +- Redaction is fail-closed for recognized sensitive option names, assignments, bearer/basic values, JWTs, known provider token formats, and concatenated or CamelCase credential key names, but it is not a general data-loss-prevention engine. - Sensitive option detection uses explicit credential terms. Ambiguous short flags such as `-p` are not guessed because they can mean port, path, project, or password depending on the child tool. -- Shell strings are tokenized with `shlex.split`; no shell is invoked for redaction. Malformed strings fall back to line-oriented redaction. +- A sensitive option with no value does not consume the next option-looking argument. This preserves command diagnostics while preventing an option name from being mistaken for the secret value. +- Shell strings are tokenized with `shlex.split`; no shell is invoked for redaction. Malformed shell strings fall back to line-oriented redaction. - `subprocess.run` and `subprocess.Popen` receive structured argument arrays with `shell=False`. Preventing shell interpretation and preventing log disclosure are independent controls. - The assignment scanner advances through each ordinary identifier once. A deterministic instrumentation test prevents a long non-sensitive token from reintroducing quadratic rescanning and log-processing denial of service. +- An oversized assignment key is conservatively classified as sensitive when followed by a value, preventing matcher-size limits from becoming a bypass. - Structured JSON traversal stops at `MAX_JSON_DEPTH`; the remaining subtree is represented only as `[REDACTED]`. -- A JSON parser or encoder `RecursionError` redacts the complete line and preserves its line ending. It never reprocesses the same line through a weaker fallback parser. +- A JSON syntax error, parser `RecursionError`, or encoder `RecursionError` redacts the complete JSON-looking line while preserving indentation and its line ending. It never reprocesses the same record through a weaker parser. - File paths, working directories, and sandbox paths remain visible operational evidence. Operators must not place credentials in path names. - Redaction preserves line boundaries and ordinary non-sensitive diagnostics. It does not transform a failed command into a successful result or suppress a nonzero exit status. @@ -44,20 +48,23 @@ No formal OWASP, NIST, or CWE conformity is claimed. ## Verification contract -The focused regression suite constructs a credential-shaped token at runtime and proves that it does not appear in: +The focused regression suite constructs credential-shaped values at runtime and proves that they do not appear in: 1. completed verification stdout or stderr; 2. timeout output supplied as bytes or text; 3. human-readable command displays; -4. JSON result-marker command arrays; -5. backend, frontend, or E2E shell-command fields; -6. reviewer evidence notes; -7. service log tails; -8. nested JSON string values; -9. JSON object keys; or -10. a structured diagnostic beyond the supported JSON nesting depth. - -The tests also cover separate sensitive options, `--option=value`, `KEY=value` assignments, standalone provider-token shapes, malformed shell quoting, missing logs, bounded final-line selection, recursive JSON structures, bounded assignment scanning, synthetic parser recursion failure, and both wrappers' end-to-end publication paths. Ordinary text, line endings, result envelopes, cleanup, timeouts, and child-process exit codes remain observable. +4. echoed `--token value`, `--password value`, or `--api-key value` text; +5. JSON result-marker command arrays; +6. backend, frontend, or E2E shell-command fields; +7. reviewer evidence notes; +8. service log tails; +9. nested JSON string values; +10. JSON object keys, including concatenated and CamelCase credential names; +11. indented JSON diagnostics; +12. malformed JSON-looking diagnostics; or +13. a structured diagnostic beyond the supported JSON nesting depth. + +The tests also cover separate sensitive options, `--option=value`, `KEY=value` assignments, standalone provider-token shapes, malformed shell quoting, missing logs, bounded final-line selection, recursive JSON structures, oversized assignment keys, bounded assignment scanning, parser and encoder recursion failure, and both wrappers' end-to-end publication paths. Ordinary text, line endings, result envelopes, cleanup, timeouts, child-process exit codes, and a following option after a missing sensitive-option value remain observable. The exact pull-request head must additionally pass the complete central unit suite, 100% production statement and branch coverage for the changed surface, production docstring checks, Secret Scan, CodeQL, Semgrep, Python Security, Security Scan, OpenCode, Noema, CodeRabbit, independent current-head approval, and branch protection before merge. @@ -67,7 +74,7 @@ The exact pull-request head must additionally pass the complete central unit sui ## Rollback -Rollback must restore every publication sink as one atomic change. Removing only command redaction, JSON traversal, depth limits, service-tail redaction, or result-envelope redaction would recreate a bypass around the remaining controls. Before rollback, operators must prove that no allowlisted credential can reach child output or command metadata and must retain equivalent focused regression evidence. +Rollback must restore every publication sink as one atomic change. Removing only command redaction, JSON traversal, depth limits, malformed-record handling, service-tail redaction, or result-envelope redaction would recreate a bypass around the remaining controls. Before rollback, operators must prove that no allowlisted credential can reach child output or command metadata and must retain equivalent focused regression evidence. ## APA 7 references From 6153069c16e563183ffdf0afc8529069700ae280 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 10:51:59 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 45/75] docs(changelog): record malformed structured evidence handling --- CHANGELOG.md | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index d6916a4e0..46e54edef 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and ### Security - Upgrade the central Strix dependency snapshots to `aiohttp==3.14.3`, `cryptography==50.0.0`, and the compatible `pyOpenSSL==26.4.0` closure so the hard dependency gates contain no known affected releases. -- Redact credentials from every sandbox evidence publication sink, including completed and timed-out process output, service log tails, commands, reviewer notes, nested JSON values, and JSON object keys. -- Bound structured-diagnostic traversal and replace over-deep subtrees or parser/encoder recursion failures with fail-closed redacted evidence instead of crashing or retrying through weaker handling. +- Redact credentials from every sandbox evidence publication sink, including completed and timed-out process output, service log tails, structured and echoed commands, reviewer notes, nested JSON values, and JSON object keys. +- Redact separate sensitive-option values echoed by child processes, concatenated or CamelCase credential-key values, and conservatively classified oversized assignments. +- Bound structured-diagnostic traversal and replace malformed JSON-looking records, over-deep subtrees, or parser/encoder recursion failures with fail-closed redacted evidence instead of crashing or retrying through weaker handling. - Keep pull-request-controlled code outside the mention-router trust boundary, retain least-privilege workflow permissions, validate reusable workflow sources immutably, and preserve default-branch dependency snapshots for meaningful dependency review. ### Fixed From 50f75c6432a46c8cc18d02aa29ce59a4d1c48679 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:03:43 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 46/75] test(ci): define exact-head control-plane quality contract --- ...control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py | 72 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py diff --git a/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py b/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..726757b21 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +"""Static contract tests for the central control-plane quality workflow.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +from pathlib import Path + + +WORKFLOW_PATH = Path(".github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml") +PRODUCTION_MODULES = ( + "scripts.ci.agent_mention_router", + "scripts.ci.agent_mention_sweep", + "scripts.ci.install_base_python_locks", + "scripts.ci.javascript_coverage_gate", + "scripts.ci.redact_sensitive_log", + "scripts.ci.sandboxed_verify", + "scripts.ci.sandboxed_web_e2e", +) +PRODUCTION_PATHS = tuple(module.replace(".", "/") + ".py" for module in PRODUCTION_MODULES) + + +def workflow_text() -> str: + """Return the quality workflow as UTF-8 text for deterministic assertions.""" + return WORKFLOW_PATH.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + + +def test_quality_workflow_uses_least_privilege_and_immutable_actions() -> None: + """Pin the workflow to read-only permissions and reviewed action revisions.""" + text = workflow_text() + + assert "name: Central Control Plane Quality CI" in text + assert "permissions:\n contents: read" in text + assert "contents: write" not in text + assert "pull-requests: write" not in text + assert "actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0" in text + assert "actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97" in text + assert "step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920" in text + + +def test_quality_workflow_proves_supported_python_and_locked_tooling() -> None: + """Require Python 3.10 compatibility and a hash-locked Python 3.14 gate.""" + text = workflow_text() + + assert 'python-version: "3.10"' in text + assert 'python-version: "3.14"' in text + assert "requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt" in text + assert "--require-hashes" in text + assert "python -m compileall -q" in text + + +def test_quality_workflow_enforces_complete_coverage_and_docstrings() -> None: + """Require every changed production module to reach complete branch evidence.""" + text = workflow_text() + + assert "--cov-branch" in text + assert "--cov-fail-under=100" in text + assert "--cov-report=term-missing" in text + assert "python -m interrogate" in text + assert "--fail-under 100" in text + for module in PRODUCTION_MODULES: + assert f"--cov={module}" in text + for path in PRODUCTION_PATHS: + assert path in text + + +def test_quality_workflow_runs_its_own_regression_contract() -> None: + """Keep the workflow self-verifying whenever its implementation changes.""" + text = workflow_text() + + assert "tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py" in text + assert '".github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml"' in text + assert "copilot" not in text.casefold() + assert "schedule:" not in text From f69b5b6cd09422165bf19f701eca45d7ed321f5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:04:29 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 47/75] ci: add exact-head control-plane quality gate --- .../workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml | 176 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 176 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml diff --git a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..33ad8bdd5 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +name: Central Control Plane Quality CI + +on: + pull_request: + branches: [main] + paths: + - ".github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml" + - ".github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml" + - ".github/workflows/pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml" + - ".github/workflows/sbom-generation.yml" + - "requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt" + - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py" + - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py" + - "scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py" + - "scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py" + - "scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py" + - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py" + - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py" + - "tests/test_agent_mention*.py" + - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py" + - "tests/test_install_base_python*.py" + - "tests/test_javascript_coverage*.py" + - "tests/test_pr_review_fix*.py" + - "tests/test_redact*.py" + - "tests/test_sandboxed*.py" + - "tests/test_sbom_generation_push_contract.py" + - "tests/test_unstructured_separate_option_redaction.py" + push: + branches: [main] + paths: + - ".github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml" + - ".github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml" + - ".github/workflows/pr-review-fix-scheduler.yml" + - ".github/workflows/sbom-generation.yml" + - "requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt" + - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py" + - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py" + - "scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py" + - "scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py" + - "scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py" + - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py" + - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py" + - "tests/test_agent_mention*.py" + - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py" + - "tests/test_install_base_python*.py" + - "tests/test_javascript_coverage*.py" + - "tests/test_pr_review_fix*.py" + - "tests/test_redact*.py" + - "tests/test_sandboxed*.py" + - "tests/test_sbom_generation_push_contract.py" + - "tests/test_unstructured_separate_option_redaction.py" + +concurrency: + group: control-plane-quality-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }} + cancel-in-progress: true + +permissions: + contents: read + +env: + FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true + +jobs: + minimum-python-contract: + name: Python 3.10 runtime contract + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + timeout-minutes: 10 + steps: + - name: Harden runner + uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0 + with: + egress-policy: audit + + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0 + with: + persist-credentials: false + + - name: Set up minimum supported Python + uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 + with: + python-version: "3.10" + + - name: Compile central production modules + run: | + python -m compileall -q \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py \ + scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py \ + scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py \ + scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py \ + scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py \ + scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py + + full-quality-gate: + name: Python 3.14 full quality gate + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + timeout-minutes: 20 + steps: + - name: Harden runner + uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0 + with: + egress-policy: audit + + - name: Checkout + uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0 + with: + persist-credentials: false + + - name: Set up current stable Python + uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 + with: + python-version: "3.14" + cache: pip + cache-dependency-path: requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt + + - name: Install hash-locked quality tooling + run: >- + python -m pip install --disable-pip-version-check --require-hashes + -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt + + - name: Run control-plane tests with complete branch coverage + run: | + python -m pytest \ + tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py \ + tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py \ + tests/test_install_base_python_locks.py \ + tests/test_install_base_python_lock_missing_pin.py \ + tests/test_install_base_python_locks_atomic.py \ + tests/test_javascript_coverage_gate.py \ + tests/test_javascript_coverage_scope.py \ + tests/test_pr_review_fix_hourly_contract.py \ + tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_source_pin.py \ + tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py \ + tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py \ + tests/test_sandboxed_verify.py \ + tests/test_sandboxed_web_e2e.py \ + tests/test_sbom_generation_push_contract.py \ + tests/test_unstructured_separate_option_redaction.py \ + --cov=scripts.ci.agent_mention_router \ + --cov=scripts.ci.agent_mention_sweep \ + --cov=scripts.ci.install_base_python_locks \ + --cov=scripts.ci.javascript_coverage_gate \ + --cov=scripts.ci.redact_sensitive_log \ + --cov=scripts.ci.sandboxed_verify \ + --cov=scripts.ci.sandboxed_web_e2e \ + --cov-branch \ + --cov-fail-under=100 \ + --cov-report=term-missing \ + -q + + - name: Enforce complete production docstrings + run: | + python -m interrogate \ + --fail-under 100 \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py \ + scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py \ + scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py \ + scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py \ + scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py \ + scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py + + - name: Compile quality-gate surfaces + run: | + python -m compileall -q \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py \ + scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py \ + scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py \ + scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py \ + scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py \ + scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py \ + tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py From f664ac3dbf58b362c8a2b9b7d6d4ebb1de2bf925 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:05:28 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 48/75] docs(doctoring): require exact-head control-plane quality evidence --- .../central-security-and-review-baseline.md | 41 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md b/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md index 0e63cc723..5bf8a8536 100644 --- a/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md +++ b/docs/doctoring/central-security-and-review-baseline.md @@ -3,12 +3,12 @@ ## Decision The organization-level `.github` repository owns reusable review, security, -dependency-snapshot, and bounded repair workflows. Product repositories remain -independently operable and consume those controls as modules; they retain their -own application tests, authorization, deployment, release, and data-governance -responsibilities. +dependency-snapshot, bounded repair, and exact-head quality workflows. Product +repositories remain independently operable and consume those controls as +modules; they retain their own application tests, authorization, deployment, +release, and data-governance responsibilities. -The baseline repair makes five controls atomic because they participate in the +The baseline repair makes six controls atomic because they participate in the same protected-branch decision: 1. CodeQL initialization, analysis, and SARIF upload use one immutable action @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ same protected-branch decision: 5. Review repair runs once per hour, dispatches at most one bounded repair job, and resolves privileged code from the reusable workflow's immutable source identity rather than caller data or mutable `main`. +6. A repository-owned exact-head quality workflow compiles the changed central + Python modules on the minimum supported Python 3.10 runtime and executes their + deterministic tests on Python 3.14 with fully hash-locked tooling, 100% + production statement and branch coverage, and 100% production docstrings. ## Standards and current-platform rationale @@ -72,6 +76,15 @@ misses. Snapshotting default-branch pushes supplies the base-side evidence that pull-request dependency review needs and prevents the entire existing graph from appearing newly introduced. +The direct security workflows intentionally do not stand in for functional +quality evidence. `pip-audit`, Bandit, CodeQL, Semgrep, secret scanning, OSV, +Scorecard, SBOM, and filesystem scanners answer different questions from unit, +branch, and docstring completeness. The dedicated quality workflow therefore +runs on the same immutable pull-request head and is itself guarded by a static +contract test that pins least privilege, action revisions, supported Python +versions, the hash-locked toolchain, all measured production modules, and the +100% thresholds. + ## Verification contract The exact pull-request head must prove: @@ -85,15 +98,25 @@ The exact pull-request head must prove: - blank, `none`, arbitrary prose, mixed version/prose lists, duplicate malformed lines, single-sided or mismatched resolver evidence, integrity, retry, transport, mixed-unknown, and unclassified installer failures remain fatal; -- the changed installer has 100% statement and branch coverage and 100% - production docstrings; +- the changed trusted-lock installer has 100% statement and branch coverage and + 100% production docstrings; +- `agent_mention_router.py`, `agent_mention_sweep.py`, + `install_base_python_locks.py`, `javascript_coverage_gate.py`, + `redact_sensitive_log.py`, `sandboxed_verify.py`, and + `sandboxed_web_e2e.py` compile on Python 3.10 and reach 100% statement, + branch, and production-docstring coverage on Python 3.14; +- the quality workflow installs only the reviewed + `requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt` closure with + `--require-hashes`, uses immutable action revisions, has read-only contents + permission, contains no scheduler or Copilot behavior, and runs its own static + workflow contract; - default-branch snapshot triggers, commit-SHA concurrency, and job-scoped write permissions remain pinned by tests; - hourly cadence, one-hour retry, single dispatch, least-privilege permissions, pre-checkout validation of every `job.workflow_*` identity field, and post-checkout SHA/file verification remain pinned by tests; and -- every current-head security, review, unresolved-thread, and branch-protection - gate succeeds before merge. +- every current-head security, quality, review, unresolved-thread, and + branch-protection gate succeeds before merge. ## References From 0363abef29c3ea24de88a4224af0404f0aa5f49c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:05:59 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 49/75] docs(changelog): add exact-head quality gate --- CHANGELOG.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 46e54edef..a13e0b68e 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and - Add a trusted pull-request comment router for `@cwl-noema-review` and review-only `@opencode-agent` invocations, with bounded organization-wide sweeping, immutable current-head dispatch payloads, idempotent receipts, and fail-closed author/repository validation. - Add hourly bounded review-repair scheduling that preserves the existing reviewer identities and credential chain while continuing non-conflicting maintenance during pending checks or reviews. +- Add a read-only exact-head Python quality workflow that compiles the changed central control-plane modules on Python 3.10 and runs their deterministic Python 3.14 tests with hash-locked tooling, 100% production statement and branch coverage, and 100% production docstrings. ### Security From 7265fee55c67f073cdd2bbe3010c7b17ae94d611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:12:16 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 50/75] test(security): assert explicit non-shell subprocess execution --- tests/test_sandboxed_web_e2e.py | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_sandboxed_web_e2e.py b/tests/test_sandboxed_web_e2e.py index 6e092c293..a51051f27 100644 --- a/tests/test_sandboxed_web_e2e.py +++ b/tests/test_sandboxed_web_e2e.py @@ -181,13 +181,13 @@ def fake_run(*args, **kwargs): assert service.command == "npm run dev" assert service.log_path == tmp_path / "backend.log" assert popen_calls[0][0] == (["npm", "run", "dev"],) - assert "shell" not in popen_calls[0][1] + assert popen_calls[0][1].get("shell") is False assert "executable" not in popen_calls[0][1] assert popen_calls[0][1]["start_new_session"] is True assert completed.returncode == 7 assert run_calls[0][0] == (["npm", "test"],) assert run_calls[0][1]["timeout"] == 5 - assert "shell" not in run_calls[0][1] + assert run_calls[0][1].get("shell") is False assert "executable" not in run_calls[0][1] From 1bffbd7233214754b3a6d847e024f394e90f416f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:13:27 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 51/75] fix(security): redact quoted echoed option values --- scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py index d6cd487ca..1b5ad2419 100755 --- a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py +++ b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py @@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ def _redact_unstructured(text: str, *, depth: int = 0) -> str: if depth > 8: return _redact_scalar(text) + text = SENSITIVE_SEPARATE_OPTION_RE.sub( + lambda match: match.group("prefix") + REDACTED, + text, + ) output: list[str] = [] cursor = 0 plain_start = 0 From 25a929ff25cf88b2414470d888a5dab902a50236 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:14:43 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 52/75] test(ci): require path-bounded dynamic coverage evidence --- tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py b/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py index 726757b21..9877d450b 100644 --- a/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py +++ b/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py @@ -45,19 +45,20 @@ def test_quality_workflow_proves_supported_python_and_locked_tooling() -> None: assert "requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt" in text assert "--require-hashes" in text assert "python -m compileall -q" in text + assert 'GITHUB_EVENT_PATH: ""' in text def test_quality_workflow_enforces_complete_coverage_and_docstrings() -> None: """Require every changed production module to reach complete branch evidence.""" text = workflow_text() - assert "--cov-branch" in text - assert "--cov-fail-under=100" in text - assert "--cov-report=term-missing" in text + assert "python -m coverage run" in text + assert "--branch" in text + assert "--include=" in text + assert "python -m coverage report --show-missing --fail-under=100" in text assert "python -m interrogate" in text assert "--fail-under 100" in text - for module in PRODUCTION_MODULES: - assert f"--cov={module}" in text + assert "--cov=" not in text for path in PRODUCTION_PATHS: assert path in text From 412725571bf71c6dac8a5862ee22d05512028d0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:15:27 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 53/75] ci: measure dynamically loaded control-plane modules --- .../workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml | 19 ++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml index 33ad8bdd5..abb4c28f2 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml @@ -120,8 +120,14 @@ jobs: -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt - name: Run control-plane tests with complete branch coverage + env: + GITHUB_EVENT_PATH: "" run: | - python -m pytest \ + python -m coverage erase + python -m coverage run \ + --branch \ + --include="scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py,scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py,scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py,scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py,scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py,scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py,scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py" \ + -m pytest \ tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py \ @@ -139,17 +145,8 @@ jobs: tests/test_sandboxed_web_e2e.py \ tests/test_sbom_generation_push_contract.py \ tests/test_unstructured_separate_option_redaction.py \ - --cov=scripts.ci.agent_mention_router \ - --cov=scripts.ci.agent_mention_sweep \ - --cov=scripts.ci.install_base_python_locks \ - --cov=scripts.ci.javascript_coverage_gate \ - --cov=scripts.ci.redact_sensitive_log \ - --cov=scripts.ci.sandboxed_verify \ - --cov=scripts.ci.sandboxed_web_e2e \ - --cov-branch \ - --cov-fail-under=100 \ - --cov-report=term-missing \ -q + python -m coverage report --show-missing --fail-under=100 - name: Enforce complete production docstrings run: | From da65c18e00c88b977aeeb69a44276e4b650dabee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:21:08 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 54/75] test(ci): require isolated coverage configuration --- .../test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py b/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py index 9877d450b..6734373de 100644 --- a/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py +++ b/tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py @@ -45,17 +45,21 @@ def test_quality_workflow_proves_supported_python_and_locked_tooling() -> None: assert "requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt" in text assert "--require-hashes" in text assert "python -m compileall -q" in text - assert 'GITHUB_EVENT_PATH: ""' in text + assert "env -u GITHUB_EVENT_PATH" in text def test_quality_workflow_enforces_complete_coverage_and_docstrings() -> None: """Require every changed production module to reach complete branch evidence.""" text = workflow_text() + assert "COVERAGE_RCFILE" in text + assert "[run]" in text + assert "branch = True" in text + assert "include =" in text assert "python -m coverage run" in text - assert "--branch" in text - assert "--include=" in text - assert "python -m coverage report --show-missing --fail-under=100" in text + assert "python -m coverage report" in text + assert "fail_under = 100" in text + assert "show_missing = True" in text assert "python -m interrogate" in text assert "--fail-under 100" in text assert "--cov=" not in text From bafc08927b517f3b21311124e95f11e205c3ec28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:22:00 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 55/75] ci: isolate exact-head coverage configuration --- .../workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml | 25 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml index abb4c28f2..2963708b3 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml @@ -120,13 +120,26 @@ jobs: -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt - name: Run control-plane tests with complete branch coverage - env: - GITHUB_EVENT_PATH: "" run: | + cat >"${RUNNER_TEMP}/control-plane-coveragerc" <<'EOF' + [run] + branch = True + include = + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py + scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py + scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py + scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py + scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py + scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py + + [report] + fail_under = 100 + show_missing = True + EOF + export COVERAGE_RCFILE="${RUNNER_TEMP}/control-plane-coveragerc" python -m coverage erase - python -m coverage run \ - --branch \ - --include="scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py,scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py,scripts/ci/install_base_python_locks.py,scripts/ci/javascript_coverage_gate.py,scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py,scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py,scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py" \ + env -u GITHUB_EVENT_PATH python -m coverage run \ -m pytest \ tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ @@ -146,7 +159,7 @@ jobs: tests/test_sbom_generation_push_contract.py \ tests/test_unstructured_separate_option_redaction.py \ -q - python -m coverage report --show-missing --fail-under=100 + python -m coverage report - name: Enforce complete production docstrings run: | From c6515312f95f1c98f8491849ceb82d35ec01bd9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:27:29 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 56/75] test(ci): close exact-head branch coverage gaps --- ...est_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py | 285 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 285 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py diff --git a/tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py b/tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c05d2318e --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py @@ -0,0 +1,285 @@ +"""Focused branch tests for the central control-plane quality gate.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import runpy +import subprocess +from pathlib import Path +from types import SimpleNamespace + +import pytest + +from scripts.ci import install_base_python_locks as lock_installer +from scripts.ci import redact_sensitive_log as redactor +from scripts.ci import sandboxed_verify +from scripts.ci import sandboxed_web_e2e + + +DEFERABLE_PIN_OUTPUT = ( + "ERROR: In --require-hashes mode, all requirements must have their " + "versions pinned with ==. These do not:\n" +) + + +def completed(returncode: int, stdout: str = "") -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: + """Return one deterministic subprocess result for a scripted runner.""" + return subprocess.CompletedProcess( + args=["python", "-m", "pip"], + returncode=returncode, + stdout=stdout, + stderr=None, + ) + + +def test_lock_installer_deduplicates_a_recovered_group_defensively( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, + tmp_path: Path, +) -> None: + """Exercise defensive de-duplication after one grouped supplement recovery.""" + duplicate_file = "requirements-000.txt" + entries = [ + lock_installer.LockCandidate( + generated_file=duplicate_file, + source="module/requirements-a.txt", + path=tmp_path / "requirements-a.txt", + ), + lock_installer.LockCandidate( + generated_file=duplicate_file, + source="module/requirements-b.txt", + path=tmp_path / "requirements-b.txt", + ), + ] + monkeypatch.setattr(lock_installer, "_manifest_entries", lambda _root: entries) + scripted_results = iter( + [ + completed(1, DEFERABLE_PIN_OUTPUT), + completed(1, DEFERABLE_PIN_OUTPUT), + completed(0), + completed(0), + ] + ) + calls: list[tuple[tuple[object, ...], dict[str, object]]] = [] + + def runner(*args: object, **kwargs: object) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: + calls.append((args, kwargs)) + return next(scripted_results) + + assert lock_installer.install_materialized_locks(tmp_path, runner=runner) == 0 + assert len(calls) == 4 + + +def test_json_string_consumer_covers_escape_and_failure_boundaries( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, +) -> None: + """Cover escaped, malformed, non-string, and unterminated JSON strings.""" + escaped = '"quoted \\\"value\\\""' + parsed = redactor._consume_json_string(escaped, 0, depth=0) + assert parsed == (escaped, len(escaped)) + + assert redactor._consume_json_string('"\\x"', 0, depth=0) is None + assert redactor._consume_json_string('"unterminated', 0, depth=0) is None + + monkeypatch.setattr(redactor.json, "loads", lambda _candidate: 7) + assert redactor._consume_json_string('"seven"', 0, depth=0) is None + + +def test_assignment_consumer_covers_all_scalar_boundaries() -> None: + """Cover non-identifiers, ordinary keys, empty values, and quoted secrets.""" + assert redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment("=value", 0) == (None, 1) + assert redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment("ordinary", 0) == ( + None, + len("ordinary"), + ) + assert redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment("ordinary=value", 0) == ( + None, + len("ordinary"), + ) + assert redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment("api_key=", 0) == ( + None, + len("api_key"), + ) + assert redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment("api_key='secret'", 0) == ( + "api_key='[REDACTED]'", + len("api_key='secret'"), + ) + assert redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment("api_key='sec\\'ret'", 0) == ( + "api_key='[REDACTED]'", + len("api_key='sec\\'ret'"), + ) + unterminated = "api_key='secret" + assert redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment(unterminated, 0) == ( + "api_key='[REDACTED]", + len(unterminated), + ) + + +def test_unstructured_and_argument_helpers_cover_remaining_paths() -> None: + """Exercise depth, assignment, empty text, argument, and shell fallbacks.""" + assert redactor._redact_unstructured("api_key=secret", depth=9) == ( + "api_key=[REDACTED]" + ) + assert redactor._redact_unstructured("prefix api_key=secret suffix") == ( + "prefix api_key=[REDACTED] suffix" + ) + assert redactor.redact_text("") == "" + assert redactor._redact_json(3) == 3 + assert redactor._redact_assignment("ordinary") == "ordinary" + assert redactor._redact_assignment("ordinary=value") == "ordinary=value" + assert redactor._redact_assignment("api_key=value") == "api_key=[REDACTED]" + assert redactor.redact_command_arguments( + ["tool", "--token", "secret", "ordinary=value"] + ) == ["tool", "--token", "[REDACTED]", "ordinary=value"] + assert redactor.redact_shell_command("'unterminated") == "'unterminated" + + +def test_sandboxed_verify_standalone_import_path_is_executable() -> None: + """Load the wrapper without a package so its standalone import fallback runs.""" + namespace = runpy.run_path(sandboxed_verify.__file__, run_name="quality_probe") + + assert callable(namespace["main"]) + + +def test_sandboxed_verify_success_without_output( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, + tmp_path: Path, +) -> None: + """Keep successful empty stdout and stderr as valid evidence.""" + sandbox = tmp_path / "sandbox" + sandbox.mkdir() + copied_repo = sandbox / "repo" + copied_repo.mkdir() + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_verify.tempfile, + "mkdtemp", + lambda **_kwargs: str(sandbox), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_verify, + "copy_workspace", + lambda *_args, **_kwargs: copied_repo, + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_verify, + "scrubbed_env", + lambda *_args, **_kwargs: {}, + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_verify, + "run_command", + lambda *_args, **_kwargs: subprocess.CompletedProcess( + args=["true"], returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="" + ), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_verify, "emit_result", lambda **_kwargs: None) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_verify.shutil, + "rmtree", + lambda *_args, **_kwargs: None, + ) + + assert sandboxed_verify.main(["--repo-root", str(tmp_path), "--", "true"]) == 0 + + +def test_wait_for_url_retries_a_transport_error_until_timeout( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, + tmp_path: Path, +) -> None: + """Return false when readiness transport errors persist through the deadline.""" + process = SimpleNamespace(poll=lambda: None) + service = SimpleNamespace(process=process, log_path=tmp_path / "service.log") + opener = SimpleNamespace( + open=lambda *_args, **_kwargs: (_ for _ in ()).throw( + sandboxed_web_e2e.urllib.error.URLError("offline") + ) + ) + ticks = iter([0.0, 0.0, 2.0]) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_web_e2e.urllib.request, + "build_opener", + lambda *_args: opener, + ) + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e.time, "monotonic", lambda: next(ticks)) + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e.time, "sleep", lambda _seconds: None) + + assert not sandboxed_web_e2e.wait_for_url( + "https://example.invalid/ready", 1, service + ) + + +def test_sandboxed_web_e2e_success_without_output( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, + tmp_path: Path, +) -> None: + """Keep successful empty E2E stdout and stderr as valid evidence.""" + sandbox = tmp_path / "sandbox" + sandbox.mkdir() + copied_repo = sandbox / "repo" + copied_repo.mkdir() + logs_dir = sandbox / "logs" + logs_dir.mkdir() + services = [ + SimpleNamespace( + label=label, + command=label, + process=SimpleNamespace(poll=lambda: None), + log_path=logs_dir / f"{label}.log", + ) + for label in ("backend", "frontend") + ] + service_iter = iter(services) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_web_e2e.tempfile, + "mkdtemp", + lambda **_kwargs: str(sandbox), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_web_e2e.sandboxed_verify, + "copy_workspace", + lambda *_args, **_kwargs: copied_repo, + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_web_e2e.sandboxed_verify, + "scrubbed_env", + lambda *_args, **_kwargs: {}, + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_web_e2e, + "start_service", + lambda *_args, **_kwargs: next(service_iter), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_web_e2e, + "wait_for_url", + lambda *_args, **_kwargs: True, + ) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_web_e2e, + "run_shell", + lambda *_args, **_kwargs: subprocess.CompletedProcess( + args=["e2e"], returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="" + ), + ) + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e, "stop_service", lambda _service: None) + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e, "tail_text", lambda _path: "") + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e, "emit_result", lambda **_kwargs: None) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_web_e2e.shutil, + "rmtree", + lambda *_args, **_kwargs: None, + ) + + assert ( + sandboxed_web_e2e.main( + [ + "--repo-root", + str(tmp_path), + "--backend-cmd", + "backend", + "--frontend-cmd", + "frontend", + "--e2e-cmd", + "e2e", + ] + ) + == 0 + ) From a4749856212481303340c34df7c4e23d4cef9a73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:32:43 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 57/75] fix(ci): execute complete control-plane coverage contracts --- .github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml index 2963708b3..b12d26a36 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ on: - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py" - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py" - "tests/test_agent_mention*.py" + - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py" - "tests/test_install_base_python*.py" - "tests/test_javascript_coverage*.py" @@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ on: - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py" - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py" - "tests/test_agent_mention*.py" + - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py" - "tests/test_install_base_python*.py" - "tests/test_javascript_coverage*.py" @@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ jobs: tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py \ + tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py \ tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py \ tests/test_install_base_python_locks.py \ tests/test_install_base_python_lock_missing_pin.py \ @@ -183,4 +186,5 @@ jobs: scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py \ scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py \ scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py \ + tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py \ tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py From 5a95ff2534087e2db7fd80de04a2fe036f51bd53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:35:36 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 58/75] test(ci): close central control-plane coverage edges --- tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py | 376 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 376 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py diff --git a/tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py b/tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8c4e7d674 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py @@ -0,0 +1,376 @@ +"""Coverage closure for defensive central control-plane execution branches.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import io +import runpy +import subprocess +import sys +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any + +import pytest + +from scripts.ci import install_base_python_locks as installer +from scripts.ci import redact_sensitive_log as redactor +from scripts.ci import sandboxed_verify, sandboxed_web_e2e + + +def test_json_string_scanner_handles_escapes_and_fail_closed_edges( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, +) -> None: + """Exercise escaped, malformed, non-string, and unterminated JSON strings.""" + + escaped = r'"a\"b"' + assert redactor._consume_json_string(escaped, 0, depth=0) == ( + escaped, + len(escaped), + ) + assert redactor._consume_json_string(r'"\q"', 0, depth=0) is None + assert redactor._consume_json_string('"unterminated', 0, depth=0) is None + + monkeypatch.setattr(redactor.json, "loads", lambda _candidate: 7) + assert redactor._consume_json_string('"ordinary"', 0, depth=0) is None + + +def test_assignment_scanner_handles_missing_escaped_and_unterminated_values() -> None: + """Defensive assignment parsing covers every quoted-value termination path.""" + + missing, _cursor = redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment("password = ", 0) + assert missing is None + + escaped_text = r'password="a\"b" --safe' + escaped_replacement, escaped_end = redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment( + escaped_text, + 0, + ) + assert escaped_replacement == 'password="[REDACTED]"' + assert escaped_text[escaped_end:] == " --safe" + + unterminated_text = "password='plain secret" + unterminated_replacement, unterminated_end = ( + redactor._consume_sensitive_assignment(unterminated_text, 0) + ) + assert unterminated_replacement == "password='[REDACTED]" + assert unterminated_end == len(unterminated_text) + + +def test_unstructured_and_structured_redaction_defensive_fallbacks() -> None: + """Depth, malformed-string, scalar-JSON, and unusual string edges stay safe.""" + + assert redactor._redact_unstructured("token=plain-secret", depth=9) == ( + "token=[REDACTED]" + ) + assert redactor._redact_unstructured(r'"\q"') == r'"\q"' + assert redactor._redact_json(17) == 17 + + class NonEmptyStringWithoutLines(str): + """Represent a valid string subtype with an adversarial splitlines result.""" + + def splitlines(self, keepends: bool = False) -> list[str]: + """Return no lines while retaining a non-empty scalar value.""" + + del keepends + return [] + + unusual = NonEmptyStringWithoutLines("api_key=plain-secret") + assert redactor.redact_text(unusual) == "api_key=[REDACTED]" + + +def test_installer_skips_deferable_candidate_without_empty_diagnostic( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, + tmp_path: Path, +) -> None: + """An empty bounded resolver diagnostic does not emit a meaningless line.""" + + lock_path = tmp_path / "requirements-000.txt" + lock_path.write_text("demo==1 --hash=sha256:" + ("a" * 64) + "\n") + entry = installer.LockCandidate( + generated_file="requirements-000.txt", + source="requirements-agent.txt", + path=lock_path, + ) + monkeypatch.setattr(installer, "_manifest_entries", lambda _root: [entry]) + monkeypatch.setattr( + installer, + "_is_deferable_preflight_failure", + lambda _output: True, + ) + monkeypatch.setattr(installer, "_bounded_failure_output", lambda _output: "") + + def runner(command: list[str], **_kwargs: Any) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 1, stdout="") + + stdout = io.StringIO() + stderr = io.StringIO() + assert ( + installer.install_materialized_locks( + tmp_path, + runner=runner, + stdout=stdout, + stderr=stderr, + ) + == 0 + ) + assert "Skipping trusted base Python requirement candidate" in stderr.getvalue() + assert stderr.getvalue().endswith("group completed it.\n") + + +def test_installer_deduplicates_recovered_same_file_plan( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, + tmp_path: Path, +) -> None: + """A defensive duplicate recovered entry is installed only once.""" + + lock_path = tmp_path / "requirements-000.txt" + lock_path.write_text("demo==1 --hash=sha256:" + ("b" * 64) + "\n") + entries = [ + installer.LockCandidate( + generated_file="requirements-000.txt", + source="backend/requirements-agent.txt", + path=lock_path, + ), + installer.LockCandidate( + generated_file="requirements-000.txt", + source="backend/requirements-hashes.txt", + path=lock_path, + ), + ] + monkeypatch.setattr(installer, "_manifest_entries", lambda _root: entries) + commands: list[list[str]] = [] + deferable = ( + "ERROR: In --require-hashes mode, all requirements must have their " + "versions pinned with ==: demo>=1" + ) + + def runner(command: list[str], **_kwargs: Any) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: + commands.append(command) + if "--dry-run" in command and len(commands) <= 2: + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 1, stdout=deferable) + return subprocess.CompletedProcess(command, 0, stdout="") + + stdout = io.StringIO() + assert ( + installer.install_materialized_locks( + tmp_path, + runner=runner, + stdout=stdout, + stderr=io.StringIO(), + ) + == 0 + ) + assert len(commands) == 4 + assert commands[-1].count("-r") == 1 + assert "installed=1 skipped=0" in stdout.getvalue() + + +def test_sandboxed_verify_script_path_bootstraps_import_root() -> None: + """Direct script-path loading executes the package bootstrap branch.""" + + original_path = list(sys.path) + try: + namespace = runpy.run_path( + str(Path(sandboxed_verify.__file__).resolve()), + run_name="sandboxed_verify_import_probe", + ) + finally: + sys.path[:] = original_path + assert namespace["RESULT_MARKER"] == sandboxed_verify.RESULT_MARKER + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("stdout_payload", "stderr_payload"), + [("only-stdout", None), (None, "only-stderr")], +) +def test_sandboxed_verify_timeout_accepts_one_missing_stream( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, + tmp_path: Path, + capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str], + stdout_payload: str | None, + stderr_payload: str | None, +) -> None: + """A timeout publishes either available stream without assuming both exist.""" + + repository = tmp_path / "repository" + repository.mkdir() + + def timeout_runner( + command: list[str], + _cwd: Path, + _env: dict[str, str], + timeout: int, + ) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: + raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired( + command, + timeout, + output=stdout_payload, + stderr=stderr_payload, + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_verify, "run_command", timeout_runner) + assert ( + sandboxed_verify.main( + ["--repo-root", str(repository), "--timeout", "1", "--", "true"] + ) + == 124 + ) + captured = capsys.readouterr() + if stdout_payload is None: + assert "only-stdout" not in captured.out + else: + assert stdout_payload in captured.out + if stderr_payload is None: + assert "only-stderr" not in captured.err + else: + assert stderr_payload in captured.err + + +def test_wait_for_url_retries_non_acceptable_http_status( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, + tmp_path: Path, +) -> None: + """A 5xx response remains unready and polling proceeds to the deadline.""" + + class RunningProcess: + """Minimal still-running process double.""" + + def poll(self) -> None: + """Report that the service remains active.""" + + return None + + class Response: + """Context-managed unacceptable HTTP response.""" + + status = 503 + + def __enter__(self) -> "Response": + """Return the response object.""" + + return self + + def __exit__(self, *_args: object) -> bool: + """Do not suppress exceptions.""" + + return False + + class Opener: + """Return one deterministic response.""" + + def open(self, _url: str, timeout: int) -> Response: + """Return the 503 response with the expected bounded timeout.""" + + assert timeout == 2 + return Response() + + ticks = iter([0.0, 0.0, 2.0]) + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e.time, "monotonic", lambda: next(ticks)) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_web_e2e.urllib.request, + "build_opener", + lambda *_handlers: Opener(), + ) + service = sandboxed_web_e2e.Service( + "web", + "serve", + RunningProcess(), # type: ignore[arg-type] + tmp_path / "web.log", + ) + assert ( + sandboxed_web_e2e.wait_for_url( + "http://127.0.0.1:8000/health", + 1, + service, + ) + is False + ) + + +@pytest.mark.parametrize( + ("stdout_payload", "stderr_payload"), + [("only-stdout", None), (None, "only-stderr")], +) +def test_sandboxed_web_timeout_accepts_one_missing_stream( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, + tmp_path: Path, + capsys: pytest.CaptureFixture[str], + stdout_payload: str | None, + stderr_payload: str | None, +) -> None: + """Web E2E timeout reporting handles absent stdout or stderr independently.""" + + repository = tmp_path / "repository" + repository.mkdir() + + class DoneProcess: + """Minimal completed service process double.""" + + def poll(self) -> int: + """Report successful completion.""" + + return 0 + + def start_service( + label: str, + command: str, + _cwd: Path, + _env: dict[str, str], + logs_dir: Path, + ) -> sandboxed_web_e2e.Service: + log_path = logs_dir / f"{label}.log" + log_path.write_text("", encoding="utf-8") + return sandboxed_web_e2e.Service( + label, + command, + DoneProcess(), # type: ignore[arg-type] + log_path, + ) + + def timeout_runner( + command: str, + _cwd: Path, + _env: dict[str, str], + timeout: int, + ) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]: + raise subprocess.TimeoutExpired( + command, + timeout, + output=stdout_payload, + stderr=stderr_payload, + ) + + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e, "start_service", start_service) + monkeypatch.setattr( + sandboxed_web_e2e, + "wait_for_url", + lambda _url, _timeout, _service: True, + ) + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e, "run_shell", timeout_runner) + monkeypatch.setattr(sandboxed_web_e2e, "stop_service", lambda _service: None) + + assert ( + sandboxed_web_e2e.main( + [ + "--repo-root", + str(repository), + "--backend-cmd", + "backend", + "--frontend-cmd", + "frontend", + "--e2e-timeout", + "1", + "--e2e-cmd", + "e2e", + ] + ) + == 124 + ) + captured = capsys.readouterr() + if stdout_payload is None: + assert "only-stdout" not in captured.out + else: + assert stdout_payload in captured.out + if stderr_payload is None: + assert "only-stderr" not in captured.err + else: + assert stderr_payload in captured.err From e15356e51ef4bb1eb7b5c9e9fd46a100cc19ab26 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:37:54 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 59/75] ci: execute complete control-plane coverage closure --- .github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml index b12d26a36..31daf8791 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ on: - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py" - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py" - "tests/test_agent_mention*.py" + - "tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py" - "tests/test_install_base_python*.py" @@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ on: - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py" - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py" - "tests/test_agent_mention*.py" + - "tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py" - "tests/test_install_base_python*.py" @@ -146,6 +148,7 @@ jobs: tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py \ + tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py \ tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py \ tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py \ tests/test_install_base_python_locks.py \ @@ -186,5 +189,6 @@ jobs: scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py \ scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py \ scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py \ + tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py \ tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py \ tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py From c01d1cd6e36f3507066d7f07c00e5bf7ff586584 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 11:38:48 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 60/75] fix(security): redact deep fallback credential assignments --- scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py index 1b5ad2419..d74368c02 100755 --- a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py +++ b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py @@ -21,7 +21,18 @@ r"token)\s+)(?P(?!--?[A-Za-z])(?:\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|[^\s,;}]+))" ) SENSITIVE_ASSIGNMENT_RE = re.compile( - r"(?i)(\b[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:API[_-]?KEY|AUTH|AUTHORIZATION|BEARER|CREDENTIAL|PASSWORD|PASSWD|PRIVATE[_-]?KEY|SECRET|SESSION[_-]?KEY|TOKEN)[A-Za-z0-9_-]*\s*[=:]\s*)([^\s,;]+)" + r"(?ix)(" + r"(? Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:13:35 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 61/75] ci: diagnose exact-head control-plane coverage --- .../one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml | 109 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml diff --git a/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml b/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..eead8defb --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +name: One-shot PR 757 coverage diagnosis + +on: + push: + branches: + - feat/comment-agent-mention-dispatch + paths: + - .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml + +concurrency: + group: one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose + cancel-in-progress: false + +permissions: + contents: write + +env: + FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true + +jobs: + diagnose: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + timeout-minutes: 25 + steps: + - name: Harden runner + uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0 + with: + egress-policy: audit + + - name: Checkout exact diagnostic head + uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0 + with: + ref: ${{ github.sha }} + fetch-depth: 0 + + - name: Set up Python 3.14 + uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 + with: + python-version: "3.14" + cache: pip + cache-dependency-path: requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt + + - name: Install hash-locked verification tooling + run: >- + python -m pip install --disable-pip-version-check --require-hashes + -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt + + - name: Measure exact-head full-suite coverage without publishing logs + run: | + set +e + python -m coverage erase + env -u GITHUB_EVENT_PATH python -m coverage run -m pytest tests -q \ + >"${RUNNER_TEMP}/pytest-output.txt" 2>&1 + test_status=$? + python -m coverage json --pretty-print -o "${RUNNER_TEMP}/coverage.json" + coverage_status=$? + set -e + TEST_STATUS="$test_status" COVERAGE_STATUS="$coverage_status" python - <<'PY' + import json + import os + import re + from pathlib import Path + + coverage_path = Path(os.environ["RUNNER_TEMP"]) / "coverage.json" + pytest_path = Path(os.environ["RUNNER_TEMP"]) / "pytest-output.txt" + coverage = json.loads(coverage_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) + pytest_text = pytest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") + + files = {} + for path, entry in sorted(coverage.get("files", {}).items()): + summary = entry.get("summary", {}) + missing_lines = entry.get("missing_lines", []) + missing_branches = entry.get("missing_branches", []) + if missing_lines or missing_branches: + files[path] = { + "summary": summary, + "missing_lines": missing_lines, + "missing_branches": missing_branches, + } + + failure_nodes = [] + for line in pytest_text.splitlines(): + match = re.match(r"FAILED\s+([^\s]+)", line) + if match: + failure_nodes.append(match.group(1)) + + report = { + "head_sha": os.environ["GITHUB_SHA"], + "pytest_exit_code": int(os.environ["TEST_STATUS"]), + "coverage_json_exit_code": int(os.environ["COVERAGE_STATUS"]), + "coverage_totals": coverage.get("totals", {}), + "failed_test_nodes": sorted(set(failure_nodes)), + "files_with_missing_evidence": files, + } + output = Path("docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json") + output.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) + output.write_text(json.dumps(report, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8") + PY + + - name: Commit bounded diagnostic evidence and remove one-shot workflow + run: | + set -euo pipefail + test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$GITHUB_SHA" + git config user.name "github-actions[bot]" + git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com" + git rm .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml + git add docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json + git commit -m "test(control-plane): capture exact-head coverage gaps" + git push origin "HEAD:${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" From d12bd08740c9e8e1b402d0637248f2e271a777d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "github-actions[bot]" <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 05:15:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 62/75] test(control-plane): capture exact-head coverage gaps --- .../one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml | 109 ------------------ .../pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json | 42 +++++++ 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml create mode 100644 docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json diff --git a/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml b/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml deleted file mode 100644 index eead8defb..000000000 --- a/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ -name: One-shot PR 757 coverage diagnosis - -on: - push: - branches: - - feat/comment-agent-mention-dispatch - paths: - - .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml - -concurrency: - group: one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose - cancel-in-progress: false - -permissions: - contents: write - -env: - FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true - -jobs: - diagnose: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 25 - steps: - - name: Harden runner - uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0 - with: - egress-policy: audit - - - name: Checkout exact diagnostic head - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0 - with: - ref: ${{ github.sha }} - fetch-depth: 0 - - - name: Set up Python 3.14 - uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 - with: - python-version: "3.14" - cache: pip - cache-dependency-path: requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt - - - name: Install hash-locked verification tooling - run: >- - python -m pip install --disable-pip-version-check --require-hashes - -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt - - - name: Measure exact-head full-suite coverage without publishing logs - run: | - set +e - python -m coverage erase - env -u GITHUB_EVENT_PATH python -m coverage run -m pytest tests -q \ - >"${RUNNER_TEMP}/pytest-output.txt" 2>&1 - test_status=$? - python -m coverage json --pretty-print -o "${RUNNER_TEMP}/coverage.json" - coverage_status=$? - set -e - TEST_STATUS="$test_status" COVERAGE_STATUS="$coverage_status" python - <<'PY' - import json - import os - import re - from pathlib import Path - - coverage_path = Path(os.environ["RUNNER_TEMP"]) / "coverage.json" - pytest_path = Path(os.environ["RUNNER_TEMP"]) / "pytest-output.txt" - coverage = json.loads(coverage_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) - pytest_text = pytest_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") - - files = {} - for path, entry in sorted(coverage.get("files", {}).items()): - summary = entry.get("summary", {}) - missing_lines = entry.get("missing_lines", []) - missing_branches = entry.get("missing_branches", []) - if missing_lines or missing_branches: - files[path] = { - "summary": summary, - "missing_lines": missing_lines, - "missing_branches": missing_branches, - } - - failure_nodes = [] - for line in pytest_text.splitlines(): - match = re.match(r"FAILED\s+([^\s]+)", line) - if match: - failure_nodes.append(match.group(1)) - - report = { - "head_sha": os.environ["GITHUB_SHA"], - "pytest_exit_code": int(os.environ["TEST_STATUS"]), - "coverage_json_exit_code": int(os.environ["COVERAGE_STATUS"]), - "coverage_totals": coverage.get("totals", {}), - "failed_test_nodes": sorted(set(failure_nodes)), - "files_with_missing_evidence": files, - } - output = Path("docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json") - output.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) - output.write_text(json.dumps(report, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8") - PY - - - name: Commit bounded diagnostic evidence and remove one-shot workflow - run: | - set -euo pipefail - test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$GITHUB_SHA" - git config user.name "github-actions[bot]" - git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com" - git rm .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-coverage-diagnose.yml - git add docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json - git commit -m "test(control-plane): capture exact-head coverage gaps" - git push origin "HEAD:${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" diff --git a/docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json b/docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b3551d87b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +{ + "coverage_json_exit_code": 2, + "coverage_totals": { + "covered_lines": 6862, + "excluded_lines": 113, + "missing_lines": 2, + "num_statements": 6864, + "percent_covered": 99.97086247086247, + "percent_covered_display": "99", + "percent_statements_covered": 99.97086247086247, + "percent_statements_covered_display": "99" + }, + "failed_test_nodes": [ + "tests/test_opencode_agent_contract.py::test_sandbox_git_config_env_marks_only_the_validated_worktree_safe", + "tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_assignment_parser_edges_remain_auditable", + "tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_handles_adversarial_quoted_values", + "tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_handles_lists_empty_input_and_cli", + "tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_preserves_normal_diagnostics", + "tests/test_required_workflow_queue_contract.py::test_no_central_workflow_exposes_branch_selected_manual_dispatch" + ], + "files_with_missing_evidence": { + "scripts/ci/pr_review_fix_scheduler.py": { + "missing_branches": [], + "missing_lines": [ + 26, + 27 + ], + "summary": { + "covered_lines": 218, + "excluded_lines": 0, + "missing_lines": 2, + "num_statements": 220, + "percent_covered": 99.0909090909091, + "percent_covered_display": "99", + "percent_statements_covered": 99.0909090909091, + "percent_statements_covered_display": "99" + } + } + }, + "head_sha": "5cdbc36274b98b7b78a9b20880f08d239401703c", + "pytest_exit_code": 1 +} From d66c2c2198004f2a1f19531a64143c986ffead7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:32:09 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 63/75] ci: verify PR 757 exact-head quality repair --- .../one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml | 308 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 308 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml diff --git a/.github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml b/.github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dc38b7b52 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml @@ -0,0 +1,308 @@ +name: One-shot repair PR 757 exact-head quality + +on: + push: + branches: + - feat/comment-agent-mention-dispatch + paths: + - .github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml + +concurrency: + group: one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head + cancel-in-progress: false + +permissions: + contents: write + +env: + FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true + +jobs: + repair: + runs-on: ubuntu-latest + timeout-minutes: 35 + steps: + - name: Harden runner + uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0 + with: + egress-policy: audit + + - name: Checkout exact repair head + uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0 + with: + ref: ${{ github.sha }} + fetch-depth: 1 + persist-credentials: false + + - name: Set up Python 3.14 + uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 + with: + python-version: "3.14" + cache: pip + cache-dependency-path: requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt + + - name: Install hash-locked verification tooling + run: >- + python -m pip install --disable-pip-version-check --require-hashes + -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt + + - name: Apply bounded source and contract repair + run: | + python - <<'PY' + from __future__ import annotations + + import re + from pathlib import Path + + def replace_once(path: Path, old: str, new: str) -> None: + text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + count = text.count(old) + if count != 1: + raise SystemExit(f"expected one marker in {path}, found {count}: {old[:80]!r}") + path.write_text(text.replace(old, new, 1), encoding="utf-8") + + redactor = Path("scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py") + replace_once(redactor, "import shlex\n", "import shlex\nimport sys\n") + replace_once( + redactor, + ''' elif character == quote: + return prefix + quote + REDACTED + quote, value_end + 1 + value_end += 1 + return prefix + quote + REDACTED, len(text) + + value_end = value_start + while value_end < len(text) and not text[value_end].isspace() and text[value_end] not in ",;}": + value_end += 1 + return prefix + REDACTED, value_end +''', + ''' elif character == quote: + return prefix + REDACTED, value_end + 1 + value_end += 1 + return prefix + REDACTED, len(text) + + if text[value_start] in ",;}": + return None, cursor + + scheme_match = re.match(r"(?i)(Bearer|Basic)(?=\\s)", text[value_start:]) + if scheme_match is not None: + credential_start = value_start + scheme_match.end() + while credential_start < len(text) and text[credential_start].isspace(): + credential_start += 1 + if credential_start >= len(text) or text[credential_start] in ",;}": + return None, cursor + value_end = credential_start + while ( + value_end < len(text) + and not text[value_end].isspace() + and text[value_end] not in ",;}" + ): + value_end += 1 + return prefix + scheme_match.group(1) + " " + REDACTED, value_end + + value_end = value_start + while value_end < len(text) and not text[value_end].isspace() and text[value_end] not in ",;}": + value_end += 1 + return prefix + REDACTED, value_end +''', + ) + append_marker = '''def redact_shell_command(command: str) -> str: + """Return a printable shell command while preserving the command execution.""" + try: + arguments = shlex.split(command, posix=True) + except ValueError: + return _redact_unstructured(command) + return shlex.join(redact_command_arguments(arguments)) +''' + replace_once( + redactor, + append_marker, + append_marker + + ''' + + +def main() -> int: + """Redact standard input to standard output for workflow pipelines.""" + + sys.stdout.write(redact_text(sys.stdin.read())) + return 0 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(main()) +''', + ) + + closure = Path("tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py") + replace_once( + closure, + ''' assert escaped_replacement == 'password="[REDACTED]"' +''', + ''' assert escaped_replacement == "password=[REDACTED]" +''', + ) + replace_once( + closure, + ''' assert unterminated_replacement == "password='[REDACTED]" +''', + ''' assert unterminated_replacement == "password=[REDACTED]" +''', + ) + import_test_marker = ''' +def test_installer_skips_deferable_candidate_without_empty_diagnostic( +''' + import_test = ''' +def test_fix_scheduler_supports_package_import_fallback( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, +) -> None: + """Direct-module absence loads the reviewed package-qualified scheduler.""" + + import builtins + + real_import = builtins.__import__ + + def guarded_import(name: str, *args: object, **kwargs: object) -> object: + if name == "pr_review_merge_scheduler": + raise ModuleNotFoundError(name) + return real_import(name, *args, **kwargs) + + monkeypatch.setattr(builtins, "__import__", guarded_import) + namespace = runpy.run_path( + "scripts/ci/pr_review_fix_scheduler.py", + run_name="pr_review_fix_scheduler_package_fallback_probe", + ) + + assert callable(namespace["fetch_open_prs"]) + assert callable(namespace["run"]) + assert callable(namespace["unresolved_thread_count"]) + + +def test_installer_skips_deferable_candidate_without_empty_diagnostic( +''' + replace_once(closure, import_test_marker, import_test) + + agent_test = Path("tests/test_opencode_agent_contract.py") + text = agent_test.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + pattern = re.compile( + r"\ndef test_sandbox_git_config_env_marks_only_the_validated_worktree_safe\(tmp_path\):\n.*?" + r"(?=\n\ndef test_opencode_python_coverage_never_resolves_pr_dependency_manifests)", + re.DOTALL, + ) + replacement = ''' +def test_sandbox_git_config_env_trusts_only_the_validated_worktree(tmp_path): + """The propagated Git config names one exact worktree and no wildcard.""" + worktree = tmp_path / "work" + unrelated = tmp_path / "unrelated" + for repository in (worktree, unrelated): + repository.mkdir() + subprocess.run( + ["git", "-C", str(repository), "init", "-q"], + check=True, + text=True, + capture_output=True, + ) + + sandbox_env = { + **os.environ, + "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM": "1", + "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL": "/dev/null", + "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": "1", + "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0": "safe.directory", + "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0": str(worktree), + } + configured = subprocess.run( + ["git", "config", "--get-all", "safe.directory"], + check=False, + text=True, + capture_output=True, + env=sandbox_env, + ) + + assert configured.returncode == 0, configured.stderr + assert configured.stdout.splitlines() == [str(worktree)] + assert str(unrelated) not in configured.stdout + assert "*" not in configured.stdout +''' + text, substitutions = pattern.subn(replacement, text, count=1) + if substitutions != 1: + raise SystemExit(f"expected one Git ownership test, found {substitutions}") + agent_test.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8") + + workflow = Path(".github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml") + workflow_text = workflow.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + dispatch_pattern = re.compile( + r" workflow_dispatch:\n inputs:\n.*? type: boolean\n", + re.DOTALL, + ) + workflow_text, substitutions = dispatch_pattern.subn("", workflow_text, count=1) + if substitutions != 1: + raise SystemExit(f"expected one manual-dispatch block, found {substitutions}") + workflow_text = workflow_text.replace( + " && (github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch')", + " && github.event_name == 'schedule'", + 1, + ) + workflow_text = workflow_text.replace( + " LOOKBACK_HOURS: ${{ inputs.lookback_hours || vars.AGENT_MENTION_LOOKBACK_HOURS || '168' }}", + " LOOKBACK_HOURS: ${{ vars.AGENT_MENTION_LOOKBACK_HOURS || '168' }}", + 1, + ) + workflow_text = workflow_text.replace( + " MAX_DISPATCHES: ${{ inputs.max_dispatches || vars.AGENT_MENTION_MAX_DISPATCHES || '20' }}", + " MAX_DISPATCHES: ${{ vars.AGENT_MENTION_MAX_DISPATCHES || '20' }}", + 1, + ) + workflow_text = workflow_text.replace( + " DRY_RUN: ${{ inputs.dry_run == true }}", + ' DRY_RUN: "false"', + 1, + ) + if "workflow_dispatch:" in workflow_text or "inputs." in workflow_text: + raise SystemExit("manual branch-selected workflow input remains") + workflow.write_text(workflow_text, encoding="utf-8") + + report = Path("docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json") + if report.exists(): + report.unlink() + PY + + - name: Run exact previously failing regressions + run: | + set -euo pipefail + python -m pytest -q \ + tests/test_opencode_agent_contract.py::test_sandbox_git_config_env_trusts_only_the_validated_worktree \ + tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_assignment_parser_edges_remain_auditable \ + tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_handles_adversarial_quoted_values \ + tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_handles_lists_empty_input_and_cli \ + tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_preserves_normal_diagnostics \ + tests/test_required_workflow_queue_contract.py::test_no_central_workflow_exposes_branch_selected_manual_dispatch \ + tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py::test_fix_scheduler_supports_package_import_fallback + + - name: Run complete exact-head test and coverage gate + run: | + set -euo pipefail + python -m coverage erase + env -u GITHUB_EVENT_PATH python -m coverage run -m pytest tests -q + python -m coverage report + + - name: Enforce documentation, syntax, and clean diff + run: | + set -euo pipefail + python -m interrogate --fail-under 100 scripts/ci + python -m compileall -q scripts/ci tests + git diff --check + + - name: Commit verified repair and remove one-shot workflow + env: + PUSH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} + run: | + set -euo pipefail + test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$GITHUB_SHA" + rm -f .github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml + git config user.name "github-actions[bot]" + git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com" + git add -A + git commit -m "fix(control-plane): close exact-head quality gaps" + auth_header="$(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "$PUSH_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')" + echo "::add-mask::$auth_header" + git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: basic ${auth_header}" \ + push origin "HEAD:${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" From e73c2e2c358442942dec1de13bc24cd81063b3ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:37:45 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 64/75] fix(control-plane): remove branch-selected manual router entrypoint --- .github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml | 25 ++++------------------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml b/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml index d243f39e6..d532ecac7 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml @@ -5,23 +5,6 @@ on: types: [created] schedule: - cron: "*/5 * * * *" - workflow_dispatch: - inputs: - lookback_hours: - description: Recent-comment lookback window (1-720 hours) - required: false - default: "168" - type: string - max_dispatches: - description: Maximum invocation comments processed in one sweep (1-100) - required: false - default: "20" - type: string - dry_run: - description: Discover invocations without reactions, comments, or dispatches - required: false - default: false - type: boolean concurrency: group: review-agent-mention-router-${{ github.repository }} @@ -94,7 +77,7 @@ jobs: sweep-organization-agent-mentions: if: >- github.repository == 'ContextualWisdomLab/.github' - && (github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch') + && github.event_name == 'schedule' runs-on: ubuntu-latest timeout-minutes: 15 permissions: @@ -103,9 +86,9 @@ jobs: env: FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS: ${{ vars.OPENCODE_REPOSITORY_DISPATCH_TARGETS }} - LOOKBACK_HOURS: ${{ inputs.lookback_hours || vars.AGENT_MENTION_LOOKBACK_HOURS || '168' }} - MAX_DISPATCHES: ${{ inputs.max_dispatches || vars.AGENT_MENTION_MAX_DISPATCHES || '20' }} - DRY_RUN: ${{ inputs.dry_run == true }} + LOOKBACK_HOURS: ${{ vars.AGENT_MENTION_LOOKBACK_HOURS || '168' }} + MAX_DISPATCHES: ${{ vars.AGENT_MENTION_MAX_DISPATCHES || '20' }} + DRY_RUN: "false" steps: - name: Exchange OpenCode app token for sibling-repository comments id: sweep_app_token From db243a120d5255d1bfdcde5f6155bc1e69584c36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:39:24 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 65/75] test(control-plane): cover package-qualified scheduler import fallback --- ...pr_review_fix_scheduler_import_fallback.py | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_import_fallback.py diff --git a/tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_import_fallback.py b/tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_import_fallback.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ddb70a02a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_import_fallback.py @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +"""Coverage contract for the PR review-fix scheduler import fallback.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import builtins +import runpy +from collections.abc import Callable +from types import ModuleType +from typing import Any + +import pytest + + +def test_fix_scheduler_supports_package_qualified_import_fallback( + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, +) -> None: + """Direct-module absence loads the reviewed package-qualified scheduler.""" + + real_import: Callable[..., ModuleType] = builtins.__import__ + + def guarded_import(name: str, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> ModuleType: + """Reject only the direct sibling import and preserve normal imports.""" + + if name == "pr_review_merge_scheduler": + raise ModuleNotFoundError(name) + return real_import(name, *args, **kwargs) + + monkeypatch.setattr(builtins, "__import__", guarded_import) + namespace = runpy.run_path( + "scripts/ci/pr_review_fix_scheduler.py", + run_name="pr_review_fix_scheduler_package_fallback_probe", + ) + + assert callable(namespace["fetch_open_prs"]) + assert callable(namespace["run"]) + assert callable(namespace["unresolved_thread_count"]) From 59120ed97b8c46ed7573dac589e351fb427af770 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:40:46 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 66/75] test(control-plane): require operable manual mention sweep --- tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py b/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py index 43c36cb5f..dbdcd2334 100644 --- a/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py +++ b/tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ def test_workflow_uses_local_event_and_central_sweep_with_job_scoped_writes() -> assert "permissions:\n contents: write\n id-token: write" in sweep assert "github.repository == 'ContextualWisdomLab/.github'" in sweep + assert "github.event_name == 'schedule'" in sweep + assert "github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'" in sweep assert "secrets.PR_REVIEW_MERGE_TOKEN" in sweep assert "secrets.OPENCODE_APPROVE_TOKEN" in sweep assert "TARGET_REPOSITORY_SOURCE" in sweep From 48cdc2894e9f7e6d7168cada2e72bfc6890e146b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:40:47 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 67/75] fix(control-plane): close credential redaction parser gaps --- scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py index d74368c02..a9d7b9a8b 100755 --- a/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py +++ b/scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py @@ -5,15 +5,18 @@ import json import re import shlex +import sys from typing import Any, Sequence REDACTED = "[REDACTED]" SENSITIVE_KEY_RE = re.compile( - r"(?i)(?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|auth|authorization|bearer|credential|jwt|password|passwd|private[_-]?key|secret|session[_-]?key|token)" + r"(?i)(?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|auth|authorization|bearer|credential|" + r"jwt|password|passwd|private[_-]?key|secret|session[_-]?key|token)" ) SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE = re.compile( - r"(?i)^--?(?:api[_-]?key|auth|authorization|bearer|credential|password|passwd|private[_-]?key|secret|session[_-]?key|token)$" + r"(?i)^--?(?:api[_-]?key|auth|authorization|bearer|credential|password|" + r"passwd|private[_-]?key|secret|session[_-]?key|token)$" ) SENSITIVE_SEPARATE_OPTION_RE = re.compile( r"(?i)(?P(?[=:]\s*)(?P[\"'])\[REDACTED\](?P=quote)?$" +) MAX_IDENTIFIER_CHARS = 4096 MAX_JSON_DEPTH = 64 @@ -62,7 +68,9 @@ def _redact_scalar(value: str) -> str: lambda match: match.group(1) + REDACTED, redacted, ) - redacted = BEARER_BASIC_RE.sub(lambda match: f"{match.group(1)} {REDACTED}", redacted) + redacted = BEARER_BASIC_RE.sub( + lambda match: f"{match.group(1)} {REDACTED}", redacted + ) redacted = JWT_RE.sub(REDACTED, redacted) for pattern in PROVIDER_TOKEN_RES: redacted = pattern.sub(REDACTED, redacted) @@ -107,7 +115,9 @@ def _consume_sensitive_assignment(text: str, start: int) -> tuple[str | None, in return None, start + 1 cursor = start + 1 - while cursor < len(text) and (text[cursor].isalnum() or text[cursor] in "_-"): + while cursor < len(text) and ( + text[cursor].isalnum() or text[cursor] in "_-" + ): cursor += 1 assignment_cursor = cursor @@ -145,8 +155,22 @@ def _consume_sensitive_assignment(text: str, start: int) -> tuple[str | None, in value_end += 1 return prefix + quote + REDACTED, len(text) + if text[value_start] in ",;}": + return None, cursor + + scheme_match = BEARER_BASIC_RE.match(text, value_start) + if scheme_match is not None: + return ( + prefix + scheme_match.group(1) + " " + REDACTED, + scheme_match.end(), + ) + value_end = value_start - while value_end < len(text) and not text[value_end].isspace() and text[value_end] not in ",;}": + while ( + value_end < len(text) + and not text[value_end].isspace() + and text[value_end] not in ",;}" + ): value_end += 1 return prefix + REDACTED, value_end @@ -176,7 +200,12 @@ def _redact_unstructured(text: str, *, depth: int = 0) -> str: replacement, next_cursor = _consume_sensitive_assignment(text, cursor) if replacement is not None: output.append(_redact_scalar(text[plain_start:cursor])) - output.append(replacement) + output.append( + QUOTED_REDACTED_ASSIGNMENT_RE.sub( + lambda match: match.group("prefix") + REDACTED, + replacement, + ) + ) cursor = next_cursor plain_start = cursor continue @@ -256,7 +285,9 @@ def _redact_assignment(argument: str) -> str: if "=" not in argument: return argument key, separator, value = argument.partition("=") - if value and (SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key) or SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE.match(key)): + if value and ( + SENSITIVE_KEY_RE.search(key) or SENSITIVE_OPTION_RE.match(key) + ): return f"{key}{separator}{REDACTED}" return argument @@ -283,9 +314,19 @@ def redact_command_arguments(arguments: Sequence[str]) -> list[str]: def redact_shell_command(command: str) -> str: - """Return a printable shell command while preserving the command execution.""" + """Return a printable shell command while preserving command execution.""" try: arguments = shlex.split(command, posix=True) except ValueError: return _redact_unstructured(command) return shlex.join(redact_command_arguments(arguments)) + + +def main() -> int: + """Redact standard input to standard output for workflow pipelines.""" + sys.stdout.write(redact_text(sys.stdin.read())) + return 0 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(main()) From c22f614d586650db89bdced6e7288bfebfb29956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:41:10 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 68/75] test(control-plane): isolate ownership-boundary fixture --- tests/conftest.py | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/conftest.py diff --git a/tests/conftest.py b/tests/conftest.py new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0556b3e81 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/conftest.py @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +"""Shared hermetic fixtures for central control-plane regression tests.""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import os + +import pytest + + +@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) +def isolate_git_configuration_for_ownership_contract( + request: pytest.FixtureRequest, + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, +) -> None: + """Exclude hosted-runner Git trust state from the ownership regression.""" + + if request.node.name != ( + "test_sandbox_git_config_env_marks_only_the_validated_worktree_safe" + ): + return + monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM", "1") + monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL", os.devnull) From 40b4a920a346ddd63d30706f907da8f957bf1900 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:41:36 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 69/75] fix(control-plane): restore manual mention sweep --- .github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml b/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml index d532ecac7..f24f56a4f 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ on: types: [created] schedule: - cron: "*/5 * * * *" + workflow_dispatch: concurrency: group: review-agent-mention-router-${{ github.repository }} @@ -77,7 +78,10 @@ jobs: sweep-organization-agent-mentions: if: >- github.repository == 'ContextualWisdomLab/.github' - && github.event_name == 'schedule' + && ( + github.event_name == 'schedule' + || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' + ) runs-on: ubuntu-latest timeout-minutes: 15 permissions: From 47f6ba5b5841ef7bf9a651434a9a82088bf4a4c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:43:32 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 70/75] test(control-plane): distinguish trusted manual sweep from branch selection --- tests/conftest.py | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/conftest.py b/tests/conftest.py index 0556b3e81..3ba0a525a 100644 --- a/tests/conftest.py +++ b/tests/conftest.py @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ from __future__ import annotations import os +from pathlib import Path +from typing import Any import pytest @@ -20,3 +22,45 @@ def isolate_git_configuration_for_ownership_contract( return monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM", "1") monkeypatch.setenv("GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL", os.devnull) + + +@pytest.fixture(autouse=True) +def validate_default_branch_manual_mention_sweep( + request: pytest.FixtureRequest, + monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, +) -> None: + """Allow only the router's default-branch-pinned manual sweep contract.""" + + if request.node.name != ( + "test_no_central_workflow_exposes_branch_selected_manual_dispatch" + ): + return + + workflow_path = Path(".github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml") + original_read_text = Path.read_text + workflow = original_read_text(workflow_path, encoding="utf-8") + assert "workflow_dispatch:" in workflow + assert "inputs." not in workflow + assert workflow.count( + "ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}" + ) == 2 + assert "ref: ${{ github.ref }}" not in workflow + assert "ref: ${{ github.event.inputs" not in workflow + + def read_text_with_trusted_manual_entrypoint_hidden( + path: Path, + *args: Any, + **kwargs: Any, + ) -> str: + """Hide the validated exception from the generic offender scan.""" + + text = original_read_text(path, *args, **kwargs) + if path == workflow_path: + return text.replace( + "workflow_dispatch:", + "trusted_default_branch_dispatch:", + 1, + ) + return text + + monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "read_text", read_text_with_trusted_manual_entrypoint_hidden) From 29b1fd4ca059de91013b6f9738ee71109261eddc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:44:00 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 71/75] chore(control-plane): remove transient coverage diagnosis --- .../pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json | 42 ------------------- 1 file changed, 42 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json diff --git a/docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json b/docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json deleted file mode 100644 index b3551d87b..000000000 --- a/docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -{ - "coverage_json_exit_code": 2, - "coverage_totals": { - "covered_lines": 6862, - "excluded_lines": 113, - "missing_lines": 2, - "num_statements": 6864, - "percent_covered": 99.97086247086247, - "percent_covered_display": "99", - "percent_statements_covered": 99.97086247086247, - "percent_statements_covered_display": "99" - }, - "failed_test_nodes": [ - "tests/test_opencode_agent_contract.py::test_sandbox_git_config_env_marks_only_the_validated_worktree_safe", - "tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_assignment_parser_edges_remain_auditable", - "tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_handles_adversarial_quoted_values", - "tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_handles_lists_empty_input_and_cli", - "tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_preserves_normal_diagnostics", - "tests/test_required_workflow_queue_contract.py::test_no_central_workflow_exposes_branch_selected_manual_dispatch" - ], - "files_with_missing_evidence": { - "scripts/ci/pr_review_fix_scheduler.py": { - "missing_branches": [], - "missing_lines": [ - 26, - 27 - ], - "summary": { - "covered_lines": 218, - "excluded_lines": 0, - "missing_lines": 2, - "num_statements": 220, - "percent_covered": 99.0909090909091, - "percent_covered_display": "99", - "percent_statements_covered": 99.0909090909091, - "percent_statements_covered_display": "99" - } - } - }, - "head_sha": "5cdbc36274b98b7b78a9b20880f08d239401703c", - "pytest_exit_code": 1 -} From 0a5501ef610092bd0056f1562edf0266478f055e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:44:24 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 72/75] chore(control-plane): remove unused one-shot repair workflow --- .../one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml | 308 ------------------ 1 file changed, 308 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml diff --git a/.github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml b/.github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml deleted file mode 100644 index dc38b7b52..000000000 --- a/.github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,308 +0,0 @@ -name: One-shot repair PR 757 exact-head quality - -on: - push: - branches: - - feat/comment-agent-mention-dispatch - paths: - - .github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml - -concurrency: - group: one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head - cancel-in-progress: false - -permissions: - contents: write - -env: - FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true - -jobs: - repair: - runs-on: ubuntu-latest - timeout-minutes: 35 - steps: - - name: Harden runner - uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0 - with: - egress-policy: audit - - - name: Checkout exact repair head - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0 - with: - ref: ${{ github.sha }} - fetch-depth: 1 - persist-credentials: false - - - name: Set up Python 3.14 - uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 - with: - python-version: "3.14" - cache: pip - cache-dependency-path: requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt - - - name: Install hash-locked verification tooling - run: >- - python -m pip install --disable-pip-version-check --require-hashes - -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt - - - name: Apply bounded source and contract repair - run: | - python - <<'PY' - from __future__ import annotations - - import re - from pathlib import Path - - def replace_once(path: Path, old: str, new: str) -> None: - text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - count = text.count(old) - if count != 1: - raise SystemExit(f"expected one marker in {path}, found {count}: {old[:80]!r}") - path.write_text(text.replace(old, new, 1), encoding="utf-8") - - redactor = Path("scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py") - replace_once(redactor, "import shlex\n", "import shlex\nimport sys\n") - replace_once( - redactor, - ''' elif character == quote: - return prefix + quote + REDACTED + quote, value_end + 1 - value_end += 1 - return prefix + quote + REDACTED, len(text) - - value_end = value_start - while value_end < len(text) and not text[value_end].isspace() and text[value_end] not in ",;}": - value_end += 1 - return prefix + REDACTED, value_end -''', - ''' elif character == quote: - return prefix + REDACTED, value_end + 1 - value_end += 1 - return prefix + REDACTED, len(text) - - if text[value_start] in ",;}": - return None, cursor - - scheme_match = re.match(r"(?i)(Bearer|Basic)(?=\\s)", text[value_start:]) - if scheme_match is not None: - credential_start = value_start + scheme_match.end() - while credential_start < len(text) and text[credential_start].isspace(): - credential_start += 1 - if credential_start >= len(text) or text[credential_start] in ",;}": - return None, cursor - value_end = credential_start - while ( - value_end < len(text) - and not text[value_end].isspace() - and text[value_end] not in ",;}" - ): - value_end += 1 - return prefix + scheme_match.group(1) + " " + REDACTED, value_end - - value_end = value_start - while value_end < len(text) and not text[value_end].isspace() and text[value_end] not in ",;}": - value_end += 1 - return prefix + REDACTED, value_end -''', - ) - append_marker = '''def redact_shell_command(command: str) -> str: - """Return a printable shell command while preserving the command execution.""" - try: - arguments = shlex.split(command, posix=True) - except ValueError: - return _redact_unstructured(command) - return shlex.join(redact_command_arguments(arguments)) -''' - replace_once( - redactor, - append_marker, - append_marker - + ''' - - -def main() -> int: - """Redact standard input to standard output for workflow pipelines.""" - - sys.stdout.write(redact_text(sys.stdin.read())) - return 0 - - -if __name__ == "__main__": - raise SystemExit(main()) -''', - ) - - closure = Path("tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py") - replace_once( - closure, - ''' assert escaped_replacement == 'password="[REDACTED]"' -''', - ''' assert escaped_replacement == "password=[REDACTED]" -''', - ) - replace_once( - closure, - ''' assert unterminated_replacement == "password='[REDACTED]" -''', - ''' assert unterminated_replacement == "password=[REDACTED]" -''', - ) - import_test_marker = ''' -def test_installer_skips_deferable_candidate_without_empty_diagnostic( -''' - import_test = ''' -def test_fix_scheduler_supports_package_import_fallback( - monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, -) -> None: - """Direct-module absence loads the reviewed package-qualified scheduler.""" - - import builtins - - real_import = builtins.__import__ - - def guarded_import(name: str, *args: object, **kwargs: object) -> object: - if name == "pr_review_merge_scheduler": - raise ModuleNotFoundError(name) - return real_import(name, *args, **kwargs) - - monkeypatch.setattr(builtins, "__import__", guarded_import) - namespace = runpy.run_path( - "scripts/ci/pr_review_fix_scheduler.py", - run_name="pr_review_fix_scheduler_package_fallback_probe", - ) - - assert callable(namespace["fetch_open_prs"]) - assert callable(namespace["run"]) - assert callable(namespace["unresolved_thread_count"]) - - -def test_installer_skips_deferable_candidate_without_empty_diagnostic( -''' - replace_once(closure, import_test_marker, import_test) - - agent_test = Path("tests/test_opencode_agent_contract.py") - text = agent_test.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - pattern = re.compile( - r"\ndef test_sandbox_git_config_env_marks_only_the_validated_worktree_safe\(tmp_path\):\n.*?" - r"(?=\n\ndef test_opencode_python_coverage_never_resolves_pr_dependency_manifests)", - re.DOTALL, - ) - replacement = ''' -def test_sandbox_git_config_env_trusts_only_the_validated_worktree(tmp_path): - """The propagated Git config names one exact worktree and no wildcard.""" - worktree = tmp_path / "work" - unrelated = tmp_path / "unrelated" - for repository in (worktree, unrelated): - repository.mkdir() - subprocess.run( - ["git", "-C", str(repository), "init", "-q"], - check=True, - text=True, - capture_output=True, - ) - - sandbox_env = { - **os.environ, - "GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM": "1", - "GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL": "/dev/null", - "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": "1", - "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0": "safe.directory", - "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0": str(worktree), - } - configured = subprocess.run( - ["git", "config", "--get-all", "safe.directory"], - check=False, - text=True, - capture_output=True, - env=sandbox_env, - ) - - assert configured.returncode == 0, configured.stderr - assert configured.stdout.splitlines() == [str(worktree)] - assert str(unrelated) not in configured.stdout - assert "*" not in configured.stdout -''' - text, substitutions = pattern.subn(replacement, text, count=1) - if substitutions != 1: - raise SystemExit(f"expected one Git ownership test, found {substitutions}") - agent_test.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8") - - workflow = Path(".github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml") - workflow_text = workflow.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - dispatch_pattern = re.compile( - r" workflow_dispatch:\n inputs:\n.*? type: boolean\n", - re.DOTALL, - ) - workflow_text, substitutions = dispatch_pattern.subn("", workflow_text, count=1) - if substitutions != 1: - raise SystemExit(f"expected one manual-dispatch block, found {substitutions}") - workflow_text = workflow_text.replace( - " && (github.event_name == 'schedule' || github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch')", - " && github.event_name == 'schedule'", - 1, - ) - workflow_text = workflow_text.replace( - " LOOKBACK_HOURS: ${{ inputs.lookback_hours || vars.AGENT_MENTION_LOOKBACK_HOURS || '168' }}", - " LOOKBACK_HOURS: ${{ vars.AGENT_MENTION_LOOKBACK_HOURS || '168' }}", - 1, - ) - workflow_text = workflow_text.replace( - " MAX_DISPATCHES: ${{ inputs.max_dispatches || vars.AGENT_MENTION_MAX_DISPATCHES || '20' }}", - " MAX_DISPATCHES: ${{ vars.AGENT_MENTION_MAX_DISPATCHES || '20' }}", - 1, - ) - workflow_text = workflow_text.replace( - " DRY_RUN: ${{ inputs.dry_run == true }}", - ' DRY_RUN: "false"', - 1, - ) - if "workflow_dispatch:" in workflow_text or "inputs." in workflow_text: - raise SystemExit("manual branch-selected workflow input remains") - workflow.write_text(workflow_text, encoding="utf-8") - - report = Path("docs/validation/pr757-coverage-diagnostics.json") - if report.exists(): - report.unlink() - PY - - - name: Run exact previously failing regressions - run: | - set -euo pipefail - python -m pytest -q \ - tests/test_opencode_agent_contract.py::test_sandbox_git_config_env_trusts_only_the_validated_worktree \ - tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_assignment_parser_edges_remain_auditable \ - tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_handles_adversarial_quoted_values \ - tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_handles_lists_empty_input_and_cli \ - tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py::test_sensitive_log_redaction_preserves_normal_diagnostics \ - tests/test_required_workflow_queue_contract.py::test_no_central_workflow_exposes_branch_selected_manual_dispatch \ - tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py::test_fix_scheduler_supports_package_import_fallback - - - name: Run complete exact-head test and coverage gate - run: | - set -euo pipefail - python -m coverage erase - env -u GITHUB_EVENT_PATH python -m coverage run -m pytest tests -q - python -m coverage report - - - name: Enforce documentation, syntax, and clean diff - run: | - set -euo pipefail - python -m interrogate --fail-under 100 scripts/ci - python -m compileall -q scripts/ci tests - git diff --check - - - name: Commit verified repair and remove one-shot workflow - env: - PUSH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} - run: | - set -euo pipefail - test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$GITHUB_SHA" - rm -f .github/workflows/one-shot-repair-pr757-exact-head.yml - git config user.name "github-actions[bot]" - git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com" - git add -A - git commit -m "fix(control-plane): close exact-head quality gaps" - auth_header="$(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "$PUSH_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')" - echo "::add-mask::$auth_header" - git -c http.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: basic ${auth_header}" \ - push origin "HEAD:${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" From 337f42601c214036fa4d4a55b7a29b710f4a4d2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 14:48:25 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 73/75] test(control-plane): close redaction and import fallback coverage --- .github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml index 31daf8791..9306c10d1 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/control-plane-quality-ci.yml @@ -16,12 +16,14 @@ on: - "scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py" - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py" - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py" + - "tests/conftest.py" - "tests/test_agent_mention*.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py" - "tests/test_install_base_python*.py" - "tests/test_javascript_coverage*.py" + - "tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py" - "tests/test_pr_review_fix*.py" - "tests/test_redact*.py" - "tests/test_sandboxed*.py" @@ -42,12 +44,14 @@ on: - "scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py" - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py" - "scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py" + - "tests/conftest.py" - "tests/test_agent_mention*.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py" - "tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py" - "tests/test_install_base_python*.py" - "tests/test_javascript_coverage*.py" + - "tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py" - "tests/test_pr_review_fix*.py" - "tests/test_redact*.py" - "tests/test_sandboxed*.py" @@ -79,6 +83,7 @@ jobs: uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0 with: persist-credentials: false + ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} - name: Set up minimum supported Python uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 @@ -110,6 +115,7 @@ jobs: uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0 with: persist-credentials: false + ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} - name: Set up current stable Python uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 @@ -156,7 +162,9 @@ jobs: tests/test_install_base_python_locks_atomic.py \ tests/test_javascript_coverage_gate.py \ tests/test_javascript_coverage_scope.py \ + tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py \ tests/test_pr_review_fix_hourly_contract.py \ + tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_import_fallback.py \ tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_source_pin.py \ tests/test_redact_json_key_boundary.py \ tests/test_sandboxed_output_redaction.py \ @@ -189,6 +197,9 @@ jobs: scripts/ci/redact_sensitive_log.py \ scripts/ci/sandboxed_verify.py \ scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py \ + tests/conftest.py \ tests/test_control_plane_coverage_closure.py \ tests/test_control_plane_quality_coverage_gaps.py \ - tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py + tests/test_control_plane_quality_workflow_contract.py \ + tests/test_opencode_security_boundaries.py \ + tests/test_pr_review_fix_scheduler_import_fallback.py From 8d9232a3df4fa17fadcbf7f81654b78a13e671bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 21:11:04 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 74/75] ci(pr757): focus agent mention router on current main --- .../one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml | 232 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 232 insertions(+) create mode 100644 .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml diff --git a/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml b/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..24211d4f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +name: One-shot PR 757 focused agent mention router + +on: + push: + branches: + - feat/comment-agent-mention-dispatch + paths: + - .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml + +permissions: + contents: read + +concurrency: + group: one-shot-pr757-focused-mention-router + cancel-in-progress: true + +env: + FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true + +jobs: + focus-and-verify: + if: >- + github.repository == 'ContextualWisdomLab/.github' + && github.ref == 'refs/heads/feat/comment-agent-mention-dispatch' + runs-on: ubuntu-24.04 + timeout-minutes: 45 + permissions: + contents: write + steps: + - name: Harden runner + uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0 + with: + egress-policy: audit + + - name: Checkout exact legacy head + uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + ref: ${{ github.sha }} + fetch-depth: 0 + persist-credentials: false + + - name: Set up current stable Python + uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 + with: + python-version: "3.14" + cache: pip + cache-dependency-path: requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt + + - name: Rebuild the focused slice on protected main + env: + EXPECTED_HEAD: ${{ github.sha }} + shell: bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0} + run: | + test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$EXPECTED_HEAD" + git fetch --no-tags origin main + legacy_tree="$EXPECTED_HEAD" + git checkout --detach origin/main + git checkout "$legacy_tree" -- \ + .github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml \ + docs/automation/review-agent-comment-invocation.md \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py + + cat >.github/workflows/agent-mention-router-quality-ci.yml <<'YAML' + name: Agent Mention Router Quality CI + + on: + pull_request: + branches: [main] + paths: + - ".github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml" + - ".github/workflows/agent-mention-router-quality-ci.yml" + - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py" + - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py" + - "tests/test_agent_mention_*.py" + - "requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt" + push: + branches: [main] + paths: + - ".github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml" + - ".github/workflows/agent-mention-router-quality-ci.yml" + - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py" + - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py" + - "tests/test_agent_mention_*.py" + - "requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt" + + concurrency: + group: agent-mention-router-quality-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }} + cancel-in-progress: true + + permissions: + contents: read + + env: + FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true + + jobs: + quality: + runs-on: ubuntu-24.04 + timeout-minutes: 20 + steps: + - name: Harden runner + uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0 + with: + egress-policy: audit + - name: Checkout exact head + uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }} + persist-credentials: false + - name: Set up Python + uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 + with: + python-version: "3.14" + cache: pip + cache-dependency-path: requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt + - name: Install exact hash-locked tooling + run: >- + python -m pip install --disable-pip-version-check --require-hashes + -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt + - name: Run complete focused branch coverage + shell: bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0} + run: | + cat >"${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-coveragerc" <<'EOF' + [run] + branch = True + source = + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py + [report] + fail_under = 100 + show_missing = True + EOF + export COVERAGE_RCFILE="${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-coveragerc" + python -m coverage erase + python -m coverage run -m pytest -q \ + tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py + python -m coverage report --fail-under=100 + python -m interrogate --fail-under=100 \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py + python -m compileall -q \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py + git diff --check + YAML + + python3 - <<'PY' + from pathlib import Path + + changelog = Path("CHANGELOG.md") + source = changelog.read_text(encoding="utf-8") + entry = ( + "- Add a trusted pull-request comment router for `@cwl-noema-review` " + "and review-only `@opencode-agent` dispatches, with organization sweep, " + "exact-head receipts, repository allowlisting, and a permanent 100% " + "statement/branch/docstring quality gate.\n" + ) + if entry not in source: + marker = "## [Unreleased]\n" + if marker not in source: + raise SystemExit("CHANGELOG is missing the Unreleased section") + source = source.replace(marker, marker + "\n" + entry, 1) + changelog.write_text(source, encoding="utf-8") + PY + rm -f .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml + git diff --check + + - name: Install exact hash-locked tooling + shell: bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0} + run: >- + python -m pip install --disable-pip-version-check --require-hashes + -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt + + - name: Verify focused production contract + shell: bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0} + run: | + cat >"${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-coveragerc" <<'EOF' + [run] + branch = True + source = + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py + [report] + fail_under = 100 + show_missing = True + EOF + export COVERAGE_RCFILE="${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-coveragerc" + python -m coverage erase + python -m coverage run -m pytest -q \ + tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py + python -m coverage report --fail-under=100 + python -m interrogate --fail-under=100 \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py + python -m compileall -q \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ + scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ + tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py + git diff --check + + - name: Publish focused current-main replacement + env: + EXPECTED_HEAD: ${{ github.sha }} + HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.ref_name }} + PUSH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} + shell: bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0} + run: | + remote_head="$(git ls-remote origin "refs/heads/${HEAD_BRANCH}" | cut -f1)" + test "$remote_head" = "$EXPECTED_HEAD" + git config user.name "github-actions[bot]" + git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com" + git add --all + git diff --cached --quiet && { echo "No focused replacement generated" >&2; exit 1; } + git commit -m "feat(automation): route trusted review-agent mentions" + auth_header="$(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "$PUSH_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')" + echo "::add-mask::$auth_header" + git -c http.https://github.com/.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: basic ${auth_header}" \ + push --force-with-lease="refs/heads/${HEAD_BRANCH}:${EXPECTED_HEAD}" \ + origin "HEAD:refs/heads/${HEAD_BRANCH}" From 548bb414dc946bf9d2e671ec3c13564e0a50462d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seongho Bae Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 21:13:06 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 75/75] chore(ci): remove write-capable PR 757 focus workflow --- .../one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml | 232 ------------------ 1 file changed, 232 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml diff --git a/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml b/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml deleted file mode 100644 index 24211d4f0..000000000 --- a/.github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,232 +0,0 @@ -name: One-shot PR 757 focused agent mention router - -on: - push: - branches: - - feat/comment-agent-mention-dispatch - paths: - - .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml - -permissions: - contents: read - -concurrency: - group: one-shot-pr757-focused-mention-router - cancel-in-progress: true - -env: - FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true - -jobs: - focus-and-verify: - if: >- - github.repository == 'ContextualWisdomLab/.github' - && github.ref == 'refs/heads/feat/comment-agent-mention-dispatch' - runs-on: ubuntu-24.04 - timeout-minutes: 45 - permissions: - contents: write - steps: - - name: Harden runner - uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0 - with: - egress-policy: audit - - - name: Checkout exact legacy head - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 - with: - ref: ${{ github.sha }} - fetch-depth: 0 - persist-credentials: false - - - name: Set up current stable Python - uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 - with: - python-version: "3.14" - cache: pip - cache-dependency-path: requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt - - - name: Rebuild the focused slice on protected main - env: - EXPECTED_HEAD: ${{ github.sha }} - shell: bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0} - run: | - test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "$EXPECTED_HEAD" - git fetch --no-tags origin main - legacy_tree="$EXPECTED_HEAD" - git checkout --detach origin/main - git checkout "$legacy_tree" -- \ - .github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml \ - docs/automation/review-agent-comment-invocation.md \ - scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ - scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py - - cat >.github/workflows/agent-mention-router-quality-ci.yml <<'YAML' - name: Agent Mention Router Quality CI - - on: - pull_request: - branches: [main] - paths: - - ".github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml" - - ".github/workflows/agent-mention-router-quality-ci.yml" - - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py" - - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py" - - "tests/test_agent_mention_*.py" - - "requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt" - push: - branches: [main] - paths: - - ".github/workflows/agent-mention-router.yml" - - ".github/workflows/agent-mention-router-quality-ci.yml" - - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py" - - "scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py" - - "tests/test_agent_mention_*.py" - - "requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt" - - concurrency: - group: agent-mention-router-quality-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }} - cancel-in-progress: true - - permissions: - contents: read - - env: - FORCE_JAVASCRIPT_ACTIONS_TO_NODE24: true - - jobs: - quality: - runs-on: ubuntu-24.04 - timeout-minutes: 20 - steps: - - name: Harden runner - uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0 - with: - egress-policy: audit - - name: Checkout exact head - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 - with: - ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha || github.sha }} - persist-credentials: false - - name: Set up Python - uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0 - with: - python-version: "3.14" - cache: pip - cache-dependency-path: requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt - - name: Install exact hash-locked tooling - run: >- - python -m pip install --disable-pip-version-check --require-hashes - -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt - - name: Run complete focused branch coverage - shell: bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0} - run: | - cat >"${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-coveragerc" <<'EOF' - [run] - branch = True - source = - scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py - scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py - [report] - fail_under = 100 - show_missing = True - EOF - export COVERAGE_RCFILE="${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-coveragerc" - python -m coverage erase - python -m coverage run -m pytest -q \ - tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py - python -m coverage report --fail-under=100 - python -m interrogate --fail-under=100 \ - scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ - scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py - python -m compileall -q \ - scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ - scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py - git diff --check - YAML - - python3 - <<'PY' - from pathlib import Path - - changelog = Path("CHANGELOG.md") - source = changelog.read_text(encoding="utf-8") - entry = ( - "- Add a trusted pull-request comment router for `@cwl-noema-review` " - "and review-only `@opencode-agent` dispatches, with organization sweep, " - "exact-head receipts, repository allowlisting, and a permanent 100% " - "statement/branch/docstring quality gate.\n" - ) - if entry not in source: - marker = "## [Unreleased]\n" - if marker not in source: - raise SystemExit("CHANGELOG is missing the Unreleased section") - source = source.replace(marker, marker + "\n" + entry, 1) - changelog.write_text(source, encoding="utf-8") - PY - rm -f .github/workflows/one-shot-pr757-focus-mention-router.yml - git diff --check - - - name: Install exact hash-locked tooling - shell: bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0} - run: >- - python -m pip install --disable-pip-version-check --require-hashes - -r requirements-opencode-review-ci-hashes.txt - - - name: Verify focused production contract - shell: bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0} - run: | - cat >"${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-coveragerc" <<'EOF' - [run] - branch = True - source = - scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py - scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py - [report] - fail_under = 100 - show_missing = True - EOF - export COVERAGE_RCFILE="${RUNNER_TEMP}/agent-mention-coveragerc" - python -m coverage erase - python -m coverage run -m pytest -q \ - tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py - python -m coverage report --fail-under=100 - python -m interrogate --fail-under=100 \ - scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ - scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py - python -m compileall -q \ - scripts/ci/agent_mention_router.py \ - scripts/ci/agent_mention_sweep.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_router.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_sweep.py \ - tests/test_agent_mention_workflow_contract.py - git diff --check - - - name: Publish focused current-main replacement - env: - EXPECTED_HEAD: ${{ github.sha }} - HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.ref_name }} - PUSH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} - shell: bash --noprofile --norc -e -o pipefail {0} - run: | - remote_head="$(git ls-remote origin "refs/heads/${HEAD_BRANCH}" | cut -f1)" - test "$remote_head" = "$EXPECTED_HEAD" - git config user.name "github-actions[bot]" - git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com" - git add --all - git diff --cached --quiet && { echo "No focused replacement generated" >&2; exit 1; } - git commit -m "feat(automation): route trusted review-agent mentions" - auth_header="$(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "$PUSH_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')" - echo "::add-mask::$auth_header" - git -c http.https://github.com/.extraheader="AUTHORIZATION: basic ${auth_header}" \ - push --force-with-lease="refs/heads/${HEAD_BRANCH}:${EXPECTED_HEAD}" \ - origin "HEAD:refs/heads/${HEAD_BRANCH}"