diff --git a/.changeset/refuse-unsupported-image-formats.md b/.changeset/refuse-unsupported-image-formats.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5a8c43f76f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/refuse-unsupported-image-formats.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+---
+"@moonshot-ai/kimi-code": patch
+---
+
+Stop unsupported image formats (AVIF, BMP, TIFF, ICO, …) from breaking sessions at every entry point — including remote image URLs and images mislabeled by a tool — and recover an already-stuck session by dropping the offending image and retrying, so one such image can no longer make every later request fail.
diff --git a/packages/acp-adapter/src/convert.ts b/packages/acp-adapter/src/convert.ts
index 4e28a1c62c..3d388f7b7c 100644
--- a/packages/acp-adapter/src/convert.ts
+++ b/packages/acp-adapter/src/convert.ts
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ import {
   log,
   buildImageCompressionCaption,
   compressBase64ForModel,
+  gateImageFormatParts,
+  parseImageDataUrl,
   persistOriginalImage,
   type PromptPart,
   type TelemetryClient,
@@ -16,6 +18,9 @@ import { isHideOutputMarker } from './marker';
  * Convert an array of ACP {@link ContentBlock}s into the SDK's
  * {@link PromptPart} array.
  *
+ * Image parts are built from the client-declared MIME verbatim; run the
+ * result through {@link compressPromptImageParts} before submitting so
+ * unsupported formats are dropped and MIME aliases canonicalized.
  */
 export function acpBlocksToPromptParts(
   blocks: readonly ContentBlock[],
@@ -81,6 +86,13 @@ export function acpBlocksToPromptParts(
  * server's upload-time step. Best effort: a part that cannot be compressed is
  * passed through unchanged.
  *
+ * The format gate (`gateImageFormatParts`) runs first: parts whose MIME is
+ * outside the provider-accepted set are never forwarded — the part is
+ * dropped and a text notice stands in, so one unsupported image cannot
+ * poison the session history; accepted MIME aliases (`image/jpg`,
+ * case/whitespace variants) are rewritten to the canonical form strict
+ * provider whitelists require.
+ *
  * Compression is never silent: a re-encoded image gains a caption text part
  * immediately before it stating what the original was, and the original bytes
  * are persisted (into `originalsDir` — typically the session's
@@ -102,7 +114,7 @@ export async function compressPromptImageParts(
   } = {},
 ): Promise<PromptPart[]> {
   const out: PromptPart[] = [];
-  for (const part of parts) {
+  for (const part of gateImageFormatParts(parts) as PromptPart[]) {
     if (part.type === 'image_url') {
       const parsed = parseImageDataUrl(part.imageUrl.url);
       if (parsed !== null) {
@@ -150,12 +162,6 @@ export async function compressPromptImageParts(
   return out;
 }
 
-function parseImageDataUrl(url: string): { mimeType: string; base64: string } | null {
-  const match = /^data:([^;,]+);base64,(.*)$/s.exec(url);
-  if (match === null) return null;
-  return { mimeType: match[1]!, base64: match[2]! };
-}
-
 /**
  * Minimum-viable XML-attribute escaping for prompt-embedded resource
  * wrappers. The output is consumed by an LLM, not parsed by a canonical
diff --git a/packages/acp-adapter/test/convert.test.ts b/packages/acp-adapter/test/convert.test.ts
index 0a280ab6b4..c9f3aa9c9e 100644
--- a/packages/acp-adapter/test/convert.test.ts
+++ b/packages/acp-adapter/test/convert.test.ts
@@ -426,4 +426,32 @@ describe('compressPromptImageParts', () => {
     const compressed = await compressPromptImageParts(parts);
     expect(compressed).toEqual(parts);
   });
+
+  it('replaces an image the provider cannot accept with a text notice', async () => {
+    // An AVIF image must never reach the session history — the provider
+    // rejects it and every later request would fail. A notice stands in.
+    const parts = acpBlocksToPromptParts([
+      textBlock('look at this'),
+      imageBlock(Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]).toString('base64'), 'image/avif'),
+    ]);
+    const compressed = await compressPromptImageParts(parts);
+
+    expect(compressed).toHaveLength(2);
+    expect(compressed[0]).toEqual({ type: 'text', text: 'look at this' });
+    const notice = compressed[1];
+    if (notice?.type !== 'text') throw new Error('expected a text notice');
+    expect(notice.text).toContain('image/avif');
+  });
+
+  it('forwards accepted MIME aliases in canonical form', async () => {
+    // Strict provider whitelists reject the raw `image/jpg` alias — the part
+    // must land in the session with the canonical MIME.
+    const base64 = Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]).toString('base64');
+    const parts = acpBlocksToPromptParts([imageBlock(base64, 'image/jpg')]);
+    const compressed = await compressPromptImageParts(parts);
+
+    expect(compressed).toEqual([
+      { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${base64}` } },
+    ]);
+  });
 });
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/agent/compaction/full.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/agent/compaction/full.ts
index a982ee568e..b3a17b752f 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/agent/compaction/full.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/agent/compaction/full.ts
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import {
   APIRequestTooLargeError,
   APIStatusError,
   createUserMessage,
+  isImageFormatError,
 } from '@moonshot-ai/kosong';
 
 import type { Agent } from '..';
@@ -468,16 +469,20 @@ export class FullCompaction {
           summary = extractCompactionSummary(response);
           break;
         } catch (error) {
-          // A request-body-size rejection (HTTP 413) is first retried with
-          // media parts replaced by text markers: accumulated base64 payloads
-          // are the usual culprit, and a text summary does not need them —
-          // the conversation already narrates what was seen, and the
-          // ReadMediaFile `<image path="...">` text wrapper survives. Only
-          // the summarizer input copy is rewritten; the real history keeps
-          // its media. A 413 after the strip (or with no media to strip)
-          // falls through to the overflow shrink below — dropping oldest
-          // messages shrinks the body too.
-          if (error instanceof APIRequestTooLargeError && !mediaStripAttempted) {
+          // A request-body-size rejection (HTTP 413) or an image-format
+          // rejection is first retried with media parts replaced by text
+          // markers: accumulated base64 payloads are the usual 413 culprit,
+          // a poisoned image the format-rejection culprit, and a text summary
+          // needs neither — the conversation already narrates what was seen,
+          // and the ReadMediaFile `<image path="...">` text wrapper survives.
+          // Only the summarizer input copy is rewritten; the real history
+          // keeps its media. A rejection after the strip (or with no media to
+          // strip) falls through to the overflow shrink below for a 413, and
+          // propagates for a format error — dropping oldest messages cannot
+          // fix a poisoned image's format.
+          const mediaRejected =
+            error instanceof APIRequestTooLargeError || isImageFormatError(error);
+          if (mediaRejected && !mediaStripAttempted) {
             mediaStripAttempted = true;
             const stripped = replaceMediaPartsWithMarkers(historyForModel);
             if (stripped !== historyForModel) {
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/agent/context/index.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/agent/context/index.ts
index 286c936556..7967b188a6 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/agent/context/index.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/agent/context/index.ts
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import {
 import {
   degradeOlderMediaParts,
   MEDIA_DEGRADE_KEEP_RECENT,
+  MEDIA_STRIPPED_PLACEHOLDERS,
   project,
   type ProjectionAnomaly,
   type ProjectOptions,
@@ -501,6 +502,16 @@ export class ContextMemory {
     return degradeOlderMediaParts(this.messages, MEDIA_DEGRADE_KEEP_RECENT);
   }
 
+  // Fallback projection for the image-format resend: EVERY media part
+  // replaced by a text marker. Unlike the 413 case (too MUCH media), a
+  // format rejection means at least one image is poison and the error never
+  // says which — only a full strip guarantees the resend carries none.
+  // Purely read-side, and only used after the provider already rejected an
+  // image; see the image-format fallback in `turn-step`.
+  get mediaStrippedMessages(): Message[] {
+    return degradeOlderMediaParts(this.messages, 0, MEDIA_STRIPPED_PLACEHOLDERS);
+  }
+
   useProjectedHistoryFrom(source: ContextMemory): void {
     this.clear();
     this.pushHistory(...trimTrailingOpenToolExchange(source.project(source.history)));
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/agent/context/projector.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/agent/context/projector.ts
index bace0331a4..b19877f40a 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/agent/context/projector.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/agent/context/projector.ts
@@ -482,26 +482,46 @@ const MEDIA_DEGRADED_PLACEHOLDERS = {
     '[video omitted: dropped to fit the provider request size limit; re-read the file to view it]',
 } as const;
 
+/**
+ * Markers for the media-stripped resend after the provider rejected an
+ * image's FORMAT (not its size): the image marker points the model at
+ * re-reading the file, whose refusal carries per-OS conversion instructions;
+ * audio/video are collateral of the full strip and say so.
+ */
+export const MEDIA_STRIPPED_PLACEHOLDERS = {
+  image_url:
+    '[image omitted: the provider rejected this image; re-read the file for conversion instructions]',
+  audio_url:
+    '[audio omitted: dropped along with a rejected image; re-read the file to hear it]',
+  video_url:
+    '[video omitted: dropped along with a rejected image; re-read the file to view it]',
+} as const;
+
+type MediaPlaceholderSet = typeof MEDIA_DEGRADED_PLACEHOLDERS | typeof MEDIA_STRIPPED_PLACEHOLDERS;
+
 function isDegradableMediaPart(
   part: ContentPart,
-): part is ContentPart & { type: keyof typeof MEDIA_DEGRADED_PLACEHOLDERS } {
+): part is ContentPart & { type: keyof MediaPlaceholderSet } {
   return part.type in MEDIA_DEGRADED_PLACEHOLDERS;
 }
 
 /**
  * Replace all but the `keepRecent` most recent media parts with deterministic
  * text markers. This is the media-degraded projection used to resend a request
- * the provider rejected as too large (HTTP 413 on accumulated base64 media):
- * a purely read-side transform — the underlying history is left untouched —
- * that trades old pixels for bytes while the surrounding text (including
- * ReadMediaFile's `<image path="...">` wrapper) survives, so the model can
- * re-read any file it still needs. Untouched messages are returned by
- * reference, and when nothing needs degrading the input array itself is
- * returned.
+ * the provider rejected as too large (HTTP 413 on accumulated base64 media)
+ * and — with `keepRecent = 0` and `MEDIA_STRIPPED_PLACEHOLDERS` — the resend
+ * after an image-format rejection, where the poisoned image could be anywhere
+ * and only a full strip guarantees a clean request. A purely read-side
+ * transform — the underlying history is left untouched — that trades pixels
+ * for deliverability while the surrounding text (including ReadMediaFile's
+ * `<image path="...">` wrapper) survives, so the model can re-read any file
+ * it still needs. Untouched messages are returned by reference, and when
+ * nothing needs degrading the input array itself is returned.
  */
 export function degradeOlderMediaParts(
   messages: readonly Message[],
   keepRecent: number,
+  placeholders: MediaPlaceholderSet = MEDIA_DEGRADED_PLACEHOLDERS,
 ): Message[] {
   const mediaCount = messages.reduce(
     (count, message) => count + message.content.filter(isDegradableMediaPart).length,
@@ -515,7 +535,7 @@ export function degradeOlderMediaParts(
     const content = message.content.map((part): ContentPart => {
       if (toDegrade === 0 || !isDegradableMediaPart(part)) return part;
       toDegrade -= 1;
-      return { type: 'text', text: MEDIA_DEGRADED_PLACEHOLDERS[part.type] };
+      return { type: 'text', text: placeholders[part.type] };
     });
     return { ...message, content };
   });
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/agent/records/types.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/agent/records/types.ts
index 53cac76f07..fed30c675b 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/agent/records/types.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/agent/records/types.ts
@@ -177,9 +177,9 @@ export interface AgentRecordEvents {
     messageCount: number;
     turnStep?: string;
     attempt?: string;
-    /** Set when this request is a fallback resend (strict rebuild or
-     * media-degraded rebuild). */
-    projection?: 'strict' | 'media-degraded';
+    /** Set when this request is a fallback resend (strict rebuild,
+     * media-degraded rebuild, or media-stripped rebuild). */
+    projection?: 'strict' | 'media-degraded' | 'media-stripped';
     /** Compaction only: messages dropped so far by overflow/empty shrinking. */
     droppedCount?: number;
   };
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/agent/turn/index.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/agent/turn/index.ts
index 2ee83c5054..b392b41723 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/agent/turn/index.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/agent/turn/index.ts
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ import {
 } from '../../loop/index';
 import type { AgentEvent, TurnEndedEvent, TurnEndReason } from '../../rpc';
 import type { TelemetryPropertyValue } from '../../telemetry';
+import { gateImageFormatParts } from '../../tools/support/image-compress';
 import { abortable, isUserCancellation, userCancellationReason } from '../../utils/abort';
 import { USER_PROMPT_ORIGIN, type PromptOrigin } from '../context';
 import { renderUserPromptHookBlockResult, renderUserPromptHookResult } from '../../session/hooks';
@@ -134,20 +135,27 @@ export class TurnFlow {
 
   // Returns the new turnId, or null if the turn was marked as resuming.
   prompt(input: readonly ContentPart[], origin: PromptOrigin = USER_PROMPT_ORIGIN): number | null {
+    // The last funnel before a prompt lands in the session history: images
+    // in formats providers reject (AVIF, HEIC, …) become text notices here,
+    // so no caller — the SDK/RPC prompt path included — can poison the
+    // session. Upstream ingestion points already gate; this is the backstop.
+    const gated = gateImageFormatParts(input);
     this.agent.records.logRecord({
       type: 'turn.prompt',
-      input,
+      input: gated,
       origin,
     });
-    return this.launch(input, origin);
+    return this.launch(gated, origin);
   }
 
   // Returns the new turnId, or null if the input was buffered as a steer
   // message or the turn was marked as resuming.
   steer(input: readonly ContentPart[], origin: PromptOrigin = USER_PROMPT_ORIGIN): number | null {
+    // Same format gate as prompt() — steer input enters the history too.
+    const gated = gateImageFormatParts(input);
     this.agent.records.logRecord({
       type: 'turn.steer',
-      input,
+      input: gated,
       origin,
     });
     // Buffer while a turn is active OR a manual compaction holds the context;
@@ -155,10 +163,10 @@ export class TurnFlow {
     // (summary + reinjection) is done. Returning null means "buffered" — which is
     // exactly what fire-and-forget callers (background notifications, cron) assume.
     if (this.activeTurn || this.agent.fullCompaction.isCompacting) {
-      this.steerBuffer.push({ input, origin });
+      this.steerBuffer.push({ input: gated, origin });
       return null;
     }
-    return this.launch(input, origin);
+    return this.launch(gated, origin);
   }
 
   retry(trigger?: string): number | null {
@@ -725,6 +733,7 @@ export class TurnFlow {
           buildMessages: () => this.agent.context.messages,
           buildMessagesStrict: () => this.agent.context.strictMessages,
           buildMessagesMediaDegraded: () => this.agent.context.mediaDegradedMessages,
+          buildMessagesMediaStripped: () => this.agent.context.mediaStrippedMessages,
           dispatchEvent: this.buildDispatchEvent(turnId),
           // Re-read per step (not snapshotted per turn) so a select_tools load
           // is dispatchable on the very next step of the same turn.
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/index.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/index.ts
index b4ce829e27..afc53fccd2 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/index.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/index.ts
@@ -64,12 +64,24 @@ export {
   compressImageContentParts,
   cropImageForModel,
   formatByteSize,
+  gateImageFormatParts,
   resolveMaxImageEdgePx,
   resolveReadImageByteBudget,
   IMAGE_BYTE_BUDGET,
   MAX_IMAGE_EDGE_PX,
   READ_IMAGE_BYTE_BUDGET,
 } from './tools/support/image-compress';
+export {
+  MODEL_ACCEPTED_IMAGE_MIMES,
+  buildImageConversionGuidance,
+  buildUnsupportedImageNotice,
+  decodeBase64Prefix,
+  isModelAcceptedImageMime,
+  normalizeImageMime,
+  parseImageDataUrl,
+  resolveEffectiveImageMime,
+  unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl,
+} from './tools/support/image-format-policy';
 export { ImageLimits } from './tools/support/image-limits';
 export type {
   CompressAnnotateOptions,
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/loop/llm.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/loop/llm.ts
index 0e25ce6dfa..00ca36ded3 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/loop/llm.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/loop/llm.ts
@@ -34,9 +34,10 @@ export interface LLMRequestLogFields {
   /** Request purpose; absent means a regular loop step. */
   readonly kind?: 'loop' | 'compaction';
   /** Set when the messages are a fallback resend projection: the strict
-   * wire-compliant rebuild, or the media-degraded rebuild after a
-   * request-too-large rejection. */
-  readonly projection?: 'strict' | 'media-degraded';
+   * wire-compliant rebuild, the media-degraded rebuild after a
+   * request-too-large rejection, or the media-stripped rebuild after an
+   * image-format rejection. */
+  readonly projection?: 'strict' | 'media-degraded' | 'media-stripped';
   /** Compaction only: messages dropped so far by overflow/empty shrinking. */
   readonly droppedCount?: number;
 }
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/loop/run-turn.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/loop/run-turn.ts
index 767da02b78..b05f8cf7d7 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/loop/run-turn.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/loop/run-turn.ts
@@ -50,6 +50,15 @@ export interface RunTurnInput {
    * so each step does not pay a fresh rejection.
    */
   readonly buildMessagesMediaDegraded?: LoopMessageBuilder | undefined;
+  /**
+   * Optional media-stripped rebuild of the request messages: EVERY media
+   * part replaced by a text marker. Used to resend once after the provider
+   * rejects an image's format (see `executeLoopStep`); the poisoned image
+   * could be anywhere in the history, so only a full strip guarantees a
+   * clean request. After a successful stripped resend, later steps of the
+   * same turn build from this projection directly.
+   */
+  readonly buildMessagesMediaStripped?: LoopMessageBuilder | undefined;
   readonly dispatchEvent: LoopEventDispatcher;
   readonly tools?: readonly ExecutableTool[] | undefined;
   /**
@@ -84,6 +93,7 @@ export async function runTurn(input: RunTurnInput): Promise<TurnResult> {
     buildMessages,
     buildMessagesStrict,
     buildMessagesMediaDegraded,
+    buildMessagesMediaStripped,
     dispatchEvent,
     tools,
     buildTools,
@@ -104,6 +114,9 @@ export async function runTurn(input: RunTurnInput): Promise<TurnResult> {
   // history is deterministically over the provider's body-size limit, so
   // rebuilding it would pay a fresh rejection on every step.
   let mediaDegradedActive = false;
+  // Same for the media-stripped resend after an image-format rejection: the
+  // poison is still in the full history, so later steps stay stripped.
+  let mediaStrippedActive = false;
   const recordStepUsage = async (
     stepUsage: TokenUsage,
   ): Promise<RecordStepUsageResult | void> => {
@@ -125,11 +138,14 @@ export async function runTurn(input: RunTurnInput): Promise<TurnResult> {
         turnId,
         signal,
         buildMessages:
-          mediaDegradedActive && buildMessagesMediaDegraded !== undefined
-            ? buildMessagesMediaDegraded
-            : buildMessages,
+          mediaStrippedActive && buildMessagesMediaStripped !== undefined
+            ? buildMessagesMediaStripped
+            : mediaDegradedActive && buildMessagesMediaDegraded !== undefined
+              ? buildMessagesMediaDegraded
+              : buildMessages,
         buildMessagesStrict,
         buildMessagesMediaDegraded,
+        buildMessagesMediaStripped,
         dispatchEvent,
         llm,
         tools,
@@ -147,6 +163,7 @@ export async function runTurn(input: RunTurnInput): Promise<TurnResult> {
       });
       activeStep = undefined;
       mediaDegradedActive = mediaDegradedActive || stepResult.mediaDegradedResendUsed === true;
+      mediaStrippedActive = mediaStrippedActive || stepResult.mediaStrippedResendUsed === true;
 
       if (stepResult.stopReason === 'tool_use') {
         continue;
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/loop/turn-step.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/loop/turn-step.ts
index 09e83c5ee9..1a5a16650b 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/loop/turn-step.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/loop/turn-step.ts
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
 
 import {
   APIRequestTooLargeError,
+  isImageFormatError,
   isRecoverableRequestStructureError,
   type TokenUsage,
 } from '@moonshot-ai/kosong';
@@ -41,6 +42,8 @@ export interface ExecuteLoopStepDeps {
   readonly buildMessagesStrict?: LoopMessageBuilder | undefined;
   /** See RunTurnInput.buildMessagesMediaDegraded. */
   readonly buildMessagesMediaDegraded?: LoopMessageBuilder | undefined;
+  /** See RunTurnInput.buildMessagesMediaStripped. */
+  readonly buildMessagesMediaStripped?: LoopMessageBuilder | undefined;
   readonly dispatchEvent: LoopEventDispatcher;
   readonly llm: LLM;
   readonly tools?: readonly ExecutableTool[] | undefined;
@@ -70,6 +73,12 @@ export async function executeLoopStep(deps: ExecuteLoopStepDeps): Promise<{
    * rejection on every step of the turn.
    */
   readonly mediaDegradedResendUsed?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * True when this step only succeeded after resending with every media
+   * part stripped (image-format rejection). The turn loop keeps later steps
+   * on the stripped projection for the same reason as above.
+   */
+  readonly mediaStrippedResendUsed?: boolean;
 }> {
   const {
     turnId,
@@ -77,6 +86,7 @@ export async function executeLoopStep(deps: ExecuteLoopStepDeps): Promise<{
     buildMessages,
     buildMessagesStrict,
     buildMessagesMediaDegraded,
+    buildMessagesMediaStripped,
     dispatchEvent,
     llm,
     tools,
@@ -155,6 +165,7 @@ export async function executeLoopStep(deps: ExecuteLoopStepDeps): Promise<{
   } as const;
   let response: LLMChatResponse;
   let mediaDegradedResendUsed = false;
+  let mediaStrippedResendUsed = false;
   try {
     response = await chatWithRetry({ ...retryInput, params: chatParams });
   } catch (error) {
@@ -195,6 +206,45 @@ export async function executeLoopStep(deps: ExecuteLoopStepDeps): Promise<{
       log?.info('recovered after media-degraded resend', {
         turnStep: `${turnId}.${String(currentStep)}`,
       });
+    } else if (buildMessagesMediaStripped !== undefined && isImageFormatError(error)) {
+      // The provider rejected an IMAGE in the request (unsupported format or
+      // undecodable data). Unlike the 413 case — too MUCH media — the error
+      // never says WHICH image is poison, and the same history is re-sent
+      // every turn, so the session would stay stuck. Resend ONCE with every
+      // media part replaced by a text marker: the only projection guaranteed
+      // to carry no poison. Read-side only — the history keeps its media,
+      // and the `<image path="...">` wrappers survive so the model can
+      // re-read files (getting conversion guidance for refused formats). A
+      // rejection of that rebuild propagates unchanged.
+      signal.throwIfAborted();
+      log?.warn('provider rejected an image in the request; resending with all media stripped', {
+        turnStep: `${turnId}.${String(currentStep)}`,
+        model: llm.modelName,
+      });
+      const strippedMessages = await buildMessagesMediaStripped();
+      signal.throwIfAborted();
+      try {
+        response = await chatWithRetry({
+          ...retryInput,
+          params: {
+            ...chatParams,
+            messages: strippedMessages,
+            requestLogFields: { projection: 'media-stripped' },
+          },
+        });
+      } catch (strippedError) {
+        log?.error('media-stripped resend still rejected by provider', {
+          turnStep: `${turnId}.${String(currentStep)}`,
+          model: llm.modelName,
+          originalError: errorMessage(error),
+          strippedError: errorMessage(strippedError),
+        });
+        throw strippedError;
+      }
+      mediaStrippedResendUsed = true;
+      log?.info('recovered after media-stripped resend', {
+        turnStep: `${turnId}.${String(currentStep)}`,
+      });
     } else if (buildMessagesStrict !== undefined && isRecoverableRequestStructureError(error)) {
       // A structural request rejection (tool_use/tool_result pairing, empty or
       // whitespace-only text, non-user first message, non-alternating roles) means
@@ -300,6 +350,7 @@ export async function executeLoopStep(deps: ExecuteLoopStepDeps): Promise<{
     stopReason:
       stopTurnAfterStep && effectiveStopReason === 'tool_use' ? 'end_turn' : effectiveStopReason,
     mediaDegradedResendUsed,
+    mediaStrippedResendUsed,
   };
 }
 
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/mcp/output.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/mcp/output.ts
index 84e246a9d9..08fe82e9a1 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/mcp/output.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/mcp/output.ts
@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ import type { ContentPart } from '@moonshot-ai/kosong';
 import type { TelemetryClient } from '#/telemetry';
 
 import { compressImageContentParts } from '../tools/support/image-compress';
+import {
+  buildUnsupportedImageNotice,
+  isModelAcceptedImageMime,
+} from '../tools/support/image-format-policy';
 import { persistOriginalImage } from '../tools/support/image-originals';
 import type { MCPContentBlock, MCPToolResult } from './types';
 
@@ -133,6 +137,15 @@ export function convertMCPContentBlock(block: MCPContentBlock): ContentPart | nu
   if (block.type === 'resource_link' && typeof block.uri === 'string') {
     const mimeType = block.mimeType ?? 'application/octet-stream';
     if (mimeType.startsWith('image/')) {
+      // The declared MIME is the only format signal for a remote image: an
+      // extensionless or signed URL gives the extension gate nothing to work
+      // with, and the provider fetches it server-side. When the server
+      // honestly declares a format providers reject (e.g. an image search
+      // tool returning AVIF links), drop the image for a notice that keeps
+      // the URL — the model can still fetch and convert it.
+      if (!isModelAcceptedImageMime(mimeType)) {
+        return { type: 'text', text: buildUnsupportedImageNotice(mimeType, block.uri) };
+      }
       return { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: block.uri } };
     }
     if (mimeType.startsWith('audio/')) {
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/tools/builtin/file/read-media.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/tools/builtin/file/read-media.ts
index 4543c4e33c..05ce837ccd 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/tools/builtin/file/read-media.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/tools/builtin/file/read-media.ts
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ import {
   type ImageCompressionTelemetry,
   type ImageCropRegion,
 } from '../../support/image-compress';
+import {
+  buildImageConversionGuidance,
+  isModelAcceptedImageMime,
+} from '../../support/image-format-policy';
 import { ImageLimits } from '../../support/image-limits';
 import { toInputJsonSchema } from '../../support/input-schema';
 import { literalRulePattern, matchesPathRuleSubject } from '../../support/rule-match';
@@ -214,45 +218,6 @@ function buildMediaNote(input: {
 
 // ── Implementation ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-/**
- * Refusal message for HEIC/HEIF with a conversion command matching the
- * execution environment (`kaos.osEnv.osKind` — where Bash actually runs, so
- * SSH/container sessions get the right command too). macOS converts with the
- * built-in `sips`; Linux and Windows have no built-in HEIC decoder, so the
- * guidance names the common tools and how to get them.
- */
-function buildHeicConversionGuidance(path: string, mimeType: string, osKind: string): string {
-  const converted = path.replace(/\.[^./\\]+$/, '') + '.jpg';
-  return (
-    `"${path}" is a ${mimeType} image, which the provider does not accept. ` +
-    'Convert it to JPEG first, then read the converted file. ' +
-    heicConversionCommand(path, converted, osKind)
-  );
-}
-
-function heicConversionCommand(path: string, converted: string, osKind: string): string {
-  switch (osKind) {
-    case 'macOS':
-      return `On macOS: sips -s format jpeg "${path}" --out "${converted}"`;
-    case 'Linux':
-      return (
-        `On Linux: heif-convert "${path}" "${converted}" (package libheif-examples), ` +
-        `or with ImageMagick: magick "${path}" "${converted}"`
-      );
-    case 'Windows':
-      return (
-        `On Windows, with ImageMagick: magick "${path}" "${converted}" ` +
-        '(install it first if missing: winget install ImageMagick.ImageMagick)'
-      );
-    default:
-      return (
-        `Options: sips -s format jpeg "${path}" --out "${converted}" (macOS), ` +
-        `heif-convert "${path}" "${converted}" (Linux, package libheif-examples), ` +
-        `or magick "${path}" "${converted}" (ImageMagick)`
-      );
-  }
-}
-
 export class ReadMediaFileTool implements BuiltinTool<ReadMediaFileInput> {
   readonly name = 'ReadMediaFile' as const;
   readonly description: string;
@@ -336,15 +301,22 @@ export class ReadMediaFileTool implements BuiltinTool<ReadMediaFileInput> {
             'Tell the user to use a model with image input capability.',
         };
       }
-      // HEIC/HEIF must never reach the provider: no provider accepts them,
-      // and once the image_url lands in the history every subsequent request
-      // in the session is rejected. Refuse with a conversion command for the
-      // execution environment instead — the model can run it through Bash
-      // (under the normal permission flow) and read the converted file.
-      if (fileType.mimeType === 'image/heic' || fileType.mimeType === 'image/heif') {
+      // Formats outside the provider-accepted set (AVIF, HEIC, BMP, TIFF,
+      // ICO, …) must never reach the model: once the image_url lands in the
+      // history every subsequent request in the session is rejected. Refuse
+      // with a conversion command for the execution environment instead —
+      // the model can run it through Bash (under the normal permission flow)
+      // and read the converted file. The accepted set and guidance live in
+      // support/image-format-policy, the single source of truth every
+      // ingestion point shares.
+      if (fileType.kind === 'image' && !isModelAcceptedImageMime(fileType.mimeType)) {
         return {
           isError: true,
-          output: buildHeicConversionGuidance(args.path, fileType.mimeType, this.kaos.osEnv.osKind),
+          output: buildImageConversionGuidance(
+            args.path,
+            fileType.mimeType,
+            this.kaos.osEnv.osKind,
+          ),
         };
       }
       if (fileType.kind === 'video' && !this.capabilities.video_in) {
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/tools/support/image-compress.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/tools/support/image-compress.ts
index 75f9d46bdd..ecc8cdf9e7 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/src/tools/support/image-compress.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/tools/support/image-compress.ts
@@ -16,8 +16,12 @@
  *    prompt. Callers simply send the original instead.
  *  - PNG, JPEG, and (non-animated) WebP are re-encoded; WebP re-encodes
  *    through the PNG/JPEG ladder, so only its decoder wasm ships. GIF and
- *    animated WebP are passed through to preserve animation. Unknown formats
- *    are passed through.
+ *    animated WebP are passed through to preserve animation. Formats outside
+ *    the provider-accepted set (see ./image-format-policy) are never
+ *    forwarded by the part-level helpers — they are replaced with a text
+ *    notice; the byte-level helpers still pass anything they cannot
+ *    re-encode through unchanged, so callers must gate on
+ *    `isModelAcceptedImageMime` first.
  *  - Compression must never be silent to the model: results carry the
  *    original dimensions, {@link buildImageCompressionCaption} renders the
  *    shared "what was compressed, where is the original" note every ingestion
@@ -33,6 +37,17 @@ import type { ContentPart } from '@moonshot-ai/kosong';
 import type { TelemetryClient } from '#/telemetry';
 
 import { sniffImageDimensions } from './file-type';
+import {
+  buildMalformedImageNotice,
+  buildUnsupportedImageNotice,
+  decodeBase64Prefix,
+  isDataUrl,
+  isModelAcceptedImageMime,
+  normalizeImageMime,
+  parseImageDataUrl,
+  resolveEffectiveImageMime,
+  unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl,
+} from './image-format-policy';
 import { decodeWebp, isAnimatedWebp } from './webp-decode';
 
 /**
@@ -252,7 +267,7 @@ export async function compressImageForModel(
   const maxEdge = options.maxEdge ?? resolveMaxImageEdgePx();
   const byteBudget = options.byteBudget ?? IMAGE_BYTE_BUDGET;
   const maxDecodeBytes = options.maxDecodeBytes ?? MAX_DECODE_BYTES;
-  const normalizedMime = normalizeMime(mimeType);
+  const normalizedMime = normalizeImageMime(mimeType);
   const dims = sniffImageDimensions(bytes);
 
   const passthrough = (): CompressImageResult => ({
@@ -376,7 +391,10 @@ export interface CompressBase64Result {
 /**
  * Convenience wrapper for call sites that already hold base64 (MCP results,
  * data URLs). Decodes, compresses, and re-encodes to base64. Best effort:
- * returns the original base64 unchanged on any failure.
+ * returns the original base64 unchanged on any failure — including formats it
+ * cannot re-encode, so callers must refuse MIME types outside the
+ * provider-accepted set (`isModelAcceptedImageMime`) before building an
+ * image part from the result.
  */
 export async function compressBase64ForModel(
   base64: string,
@@ -404,7 +422,7 @@ export async function compressBase64ForModel(
     reportCompressEvent(options.telemetry, {
       outcome: 'passthrough_guard',
       startedAt,
-      inputMime: normalizeMime(mimeType),
+      inputMime: normalizeImageMime(mimeType),
       exifTransposed: false,
       result,
     });
@@ -428,7 +446,7 @@ export async function compressBase64ForModel(
     reportCompressEvent(options.telemetry, {
       outcome: 'passthrough_error',
       startedAt,
-      inputMime: normalizeMime(mimeType),
+      inputMime: normalizeImageMime(mimeType),
       exifTransposed: false,
       result,
     });
@@ -475,6 +493,78 @@ export interface CompressedContentParts {
   readonly captions: readonly string[];
 }
 
+/**
+ * Enforce the provider-accepted image format set (see ./image-format-policy)
+ * on a content-part list. Inline `data:` image parts whose MIME is outside
+ * the accepted set are dropped and replaced with a text notice, so one
+ * unsupported image cannot poison the session history. Accepted images are
+ * forwarded only as the byte-exact canonical data URL: an alias
+ * (`image/jpg`), case/whitespace variants, or MIME parameters
+ * (`image/jpeg;charset=utf-8`) all rebuild to the bare canonical form,
+ * because strict provider whitelists exact-match the full header. Remote
+ * (non-data) image URLs and non-image parts pass through — a URL carries no
+ * bytes to inspect.
+ *
+ * The BYTES are authoritative, not the declared MIME: the header of each
+ * inline image is sniffed, and a mismatch (e.g. AVIF bytes an MCP image
+ * search tool labels `image/png`) is gated on what the image IS — the
+ * provider decodes bytes, not labels. When the sniffer doesn't recognize
+ * the bytes (corrupt image, exotic container), the declared MIME stands
+ * and the 400-recovery path remains the backstop.
+ *
+ * This is the format gate shared by every ingestion point; run it BEFORE
+ * compression so unsupported bytes are never decoded.
+ */
+export function gateImageFormatParts(parts: readonly ContentPart[]): ContentPart[] {
+  const out: ContentPart[] = [];
+  for (const part of parts) {
+    if (part.type === 'image_url') {
+      const parsed = parseImageDataUrl(part.imageUrl.url);
+      if (parsed === null) {
+        // A `data:` URL that failed to parse (missing `;base64,` separator,
+        // empty MIME, …) is guaranteed to fail at the provider — Anthropic
+        // throws on it, OpenAI-compat servers 400. Drop it for a notice at
+        // ingestion instead of leaving it to poison the session and trigger
+        // the media-stripped resend on every later turn.
+        if (isDataUrl(part.imageUrl.url)) {
+          out.push({ type: 'text', text: buildMalformedImageNotice(part.imageUrl.url) });
+          continue;
+        }
+        // Remote image URL (no bytes to sniff): reject when its path
+        // extension names a format providers reject (e.g. a search-tool
+        // link ending in `.avif`) — the notice keeps the URL so the model
+        // can still fetch and convert the image. Extensionless / unknown
+        // URLs pass through to the provider — and to the 400 recovery.
+        const extMime = unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl(part.imageUrl.url);
+        if (extMime !== null) {
+          out.push({
+            type: 'text',
+            text: buildUnsupportedImageNotice(extMime, part.imageUrl.url),
+          });
+          continue;
+        }
+        out.push(part);
+        continue;
+      }
+      const effectiveMime = resolveEffectiveImageMime(
+        parsed.mimeType,
+        decodeBase64Prefix(parsed.base64),
+      );
+      if (!isModelAcceptedImageMime(effectiveMime)) {
+        out.push({ type: 'text', text: buildUnsupportedImageNotice(effectiveMime) });
+        continue;
+      }
+      const canonicalUrl = `data:${normalizeImageMime(effectiveMime)};base64,${parsed.base64}`;
+      if (part.imageUrl.url !== canonicalUrl) {
+        out.push({ type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { ...part.imageUrl, url: canonicalUrl } });
+        continue;
+      }
+    }
+    out.push(part);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
 /**
  * Compress any inline base64 image parts in a content-part list — used by
  * the MCP tool-result path (prompt ingestion compresses per image with
@@ -483,6 +573,13 @@ export interface CompressedContentParts {
  * through, as are non-image parts. Best effort: a part that fails to
  * compress is left unchanged.
  *
+ * The format gate ({@link gateImageFormatParts}) runs first: parts whose
+ * MIME is outside the provider-accepted set are never forwarded — the part
+ * is dropped and a text notice stands in, so one unsupported image cannot
+ * poison the session history. This is the MCP funnel's enforcement point —
+ * MCP servers can return any `image/*` MIME (e.g. AVIF from an image search
+ * tool).
+ *
  * With `annotate` set, every image that was actually re-encoded gets a
  * caption in {@link CompressedContentParts.captions} so the model knows it
  * is looking at a downsampled copy. `annotate.persistOriginal` additionally
@@ -497,7 +594,7 @@ export async function compressImageContentParts(
   const { annotate, ...compressOptions } = options;
   const out: ContentPart[] = [];
   const captions: string[] = [];
-  for (const part of parts) {
+  for (const part of gateImageFormatParts(parts)) {
     if (part.type === 'image_url') {
       const parsed = parseImageDataUrl(part.imageUrl.url);
       if (parsed !== null) {
@@ -624,7 +721,7 @@ export async function cropImageForModel(
   const maxEdge = options.maxEdge ?? resolveMaxImageEdgePx();
   const byteBudget = options.byteBudget ?? IMAGE_BYTE_BUDGET;
   const maxDecodeBytes = options.maxDecodeBytes ?? MAX_DECODE_BYTES;
-  const normalizedMime = normalizeMime(mimeType);
+  const normalizedMime = normalizeImageMime(mimeType);
 
   const fail = (errorKind: CropErrorKind, error: string): CropImageFailure => {
     reportCropEvent(options.telemetry, { startedAt, ok: false, errorKind });
@@ -857,12 +954,6 @@ export function formatByteSize(bytes: number): string {
   return `${(bytes / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(1)} MB`;
 }
 
-function parseImageDataUrl(url: string): { mimeType: string; base64: string } | null {
-  const match = /^data:([^;,]+);base64,(.*)$/s.exec(url);
-  if (match === null) return null;
-  return { mimeType: match[1]!, base64: match[2]! };
-}
-
 // ── internals ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /** The concrete jimp image instance type, derived from the lazily-loaded module. */
@@ -1006,11 +1097,6 @@ function fitWithinEdge(image: JimpImage, edge: number): boolean {
   return true;
 }
 
-function normalizeMime(mimeType: string): string {
-  const lower = mimeType.trim().toLowerCase();
-  return lower === 'image/jpg' ? 'image/jpeg' : lower;
-}
-
 // ── telemetry ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 /** Failure classification carried by the `image_crop` event. */
@@ -1055,7 +1141,7 @@ function reportCompressEvent(
       source: telemetry.source,
       outcome: input.outcome,
       input_mime: input.inputMime,
-      output_mime: normalizeMime(input.result.mimeType),
+      output_mime: normalizeImageMime(input.result.mimeType),
       original_bytes: input.result.originalByteLength,
       final_bytes: input.result.finalByteLength,
       original_width: input.result.originalWidth,
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/src/tools/support/image-format-policy.ts b/packages/agent-core/src/tools/support/image-format-policy.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..db72e4bb18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/packages/agent-core/src/tools/support/image-format-policy.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+/**
+ * Provider-accepted image formats — the single source of truth.
+ *
+ * Model providers accept only PNG, JPEG, GIF, and WebP image blocks. An
+ * `image_url` part carrying any other MIME (AVIF, HEIC, BMP, TIFF, ICO, …)
+ * is rejected by the API — and because prompts and tool results persist in
+ * the session history, that one part makes every subsequent request fail
+ * too ("session poisoning"). Every ingestion point therefore refuses
+ * unsupported formats instead of passing the bytes through: ReadMediaFile
+ * refuses with a conversion command the model can run, and prompt/MCP
+ * ingestion replaces the image with a text notice.
+ *
+ * The policy is deliberately a closed set, not a denylist: a format is only
+ * ever sent when it is known to be accepted. Supporting a new format means
+ * adding it to {@link MODEL_ACCEPTED_IMAGE_MIMES}; tailoring the refusal
+ * guidance for a newly-seen unsupported format means adding one row to
+ * {@link UNSUPPORTED_IMAGE_FORMATS}.
+ *
+ * Inbound MIME strings are normalized for the DECISION
+ * ({@link normalizeImageMime}: case, whitespace, `image/jpg`), but every
+ * call site must forward the CANONICAL MIME into the session — strict
+ * provider whitelists (e.g. Anthropic's) reject the raw alias, which would
+ * re-create the very session poisoning this module exists to prevent.
+ *
+ * Scope: only inline `data:` images can be gated. A remote http(s) image URL
+ * (an MCP `resource_link`, a REST `source.kind: 'url'` part) carries no
+ * bytes to inspect, and providers that support URL images fetch them
+ * server-side; those pass through unchanged.
+ */
+
+import { IMAGE_MIME_BY_SUFFIX, sniffMediaFromMagic } from './file-type';
+
+/** Image MIME types every provider accepts. The closed set. */
+export const MODEL_ACCEPTED_IMAGE_MIMES: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  'image/png',
+  'image/jpeg',
+  'image/gif',
+  'image/webp',
+]);
+
+/** Human-readable list of the accepted formats, for notices. */
+const ACCEPTED_FORMATS_TEXT = 'PNG, JPEG, GIF, and WebP';
+
+interface UnsupportedImageFormatInfo {
+  /**
+   * A format-specific Linux decoder named in the conversion guidance (e.g.
+   * heif-convert for HEIC/HEIF). Other OSes, and formats without a dedicated
+   * decoder, are guided to sips (macOS) or ImageMagick.
+   */
+  readonly linuxDecoder?: { readonly command: string; readonly packageName: string };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unsupported formats worth tailoring the guidance for, by normalized MIME.
+ * A missing entry still means "refuse" — the entry only adds a
+ * format-specific conversion hint.
+ */
+const UNSUPPORTED_IMAGE_FORMATS: Readonly<Record<string, UnsupportedImageFormatInfo>> =
+  Object.freeze({
+    'image/avif': {},
+    'image/heic': { linuxDecoder: { command: 'heif-convert', packageName: 'libheif-examples' } },
+    'image/heif': { linuxDecoder: { command: 'heif-convert', packageName: 'libheif-examples' } },
+    'image/bmp': {},
+    'image/tiff': {},
+    'image/x-icon': {},
+  });
+
+/**
+ * Lowercase, drop MIME parameters, and apply the `image/jpg` alias. Parameter
+ * stripping keeps a declared media type like `image/jpeg; charset=utf-8`
+ * consistent with a data-URL MIME token (which the parser already clips at
+ * the first `;`), so an accepted image with parameters is treated exactly
+ * like the bare form instead of being misread as unsupported.
+ */
+export function normalizeImageMime(mimeType: string): string {
+  const lower = mimeType.trim().toLowerCase();
+  const semi = lower.indexOf(';');
+  const base = (semi === -1 ? lower : lower.slice(0, semi)).trim();
+  return base === 'image/jpg' ? 'image/jpeg' : base;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Base64 characters decoded for magic sniffing: 48 chars ≈ 36 bytes, which
+ * covers every signature the sniffer reads (RIFF chunk at offset 8, ftyp
+ * brand at offset 8-12, ASF at 16).
+ */
+const BASE64_SNIFF_CHARS = 48;
+
+/**
+ * Decode just the prefix of a base64 payload needed for magic-byte
+ * sniffing, without allocating the full image. `Buffer.from` never throws
+ * on malformed base64 — it decodes what it can.
+ */
+export function decodeBase64Prefix(base64: string): Buffer {
+  return Buffer.from(base64.slice(0, BASE64_SNIFF_CHARS), 'base64');
+}
+
+/**
+ * The MIME an image should be judged by: the sniffed bytes when the magic
+ * header is recognized (bytes are authoritative — a mislabeled image, e.g.
+ * AVIF bytes an MCP image search tool labels `image/png`, is gated on what
+ * it IS, because the provider decodes bytes not labels), else the declared
+ * MIME. A header recognized as a non-image container also wins, so a video
+ * file hiding in an image part is refused instead of trusted.
+ */
+export function resolveEffectiveImageMime(declaredMime: string, header: Uint8Array): string {
+  const sniffed = sniffMediaFromMagic(header);
+  return sniffed !== null ? sniffed.mimeType : declaredMime;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether a non-data image URL points at a format providers reject, judged
+ * by its path extension. A best-effort heuristic for the case where there
+ * are no bytes to sniff (a remote http(s) image): catches the common
+ * search-tool direct link ending in `.avif`. Query string and fragment are
+ * ignored; the match is case-insensitive. URLs without an extension, or
+ * whose extension lies, fall through to the provider — and to the 400
+ * recovery — unchanged.
+ *
+ * Returns the unsupported MIME when the extension is known and not in the
+ * accepted set (so the notice names the right format), else null.
+ */
+export function unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl(url: string): string | null {
+  let path = url;
+  const query = path.indexOf('?');
+  if (query !== -1) path = path.slice(0, query);
+  const hash = path.indexOf('#');
+  if (hash !== -1) path = path.slice(0, hash);
+  const dot = path.lastIndexOf('.');
+  if (dot === -1) return null;
+  const ext = path.slice(dot).toLowerCase();
+  // `.svg` is deliberately absent from IMAGE_MIME_BY_SUFFIX — SVG files are
+  // text for the file tools — but as a remote image URL it is accepted by no
+  // provider, so flag it here without touching the shared suffix map.
+  const mime = ext === '.svg' ? 'image/svg+xml' : IMAGE_MIME_BY_SUFFIX[ext];
+  if (mime === undefined || isModelAcceptedImageMime(mime)) return null;
+  return mime;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse an image `data:` URL into its MIME and base64 payload. The MIME is
+ * returned raw — callers decide via {@link isModelAcceptedImageMime} and
+ * forward {@link normalizeImageMime}. MIME parameters are tolerated and
+ * ignored (`data:image/avif;charset=utf-8;base64,…`), so a parameter-bearing
+ * URL cannot slip past the format gate. The scheme and `base64` marker are
+ * matched case-insensitively (RFC 2045 encoding names are case-insensitive),
+ * so an uppercase `;BASE64,` cannot slip past either — and since callers
+ * rebuild to the canonical URL, the marker comes back out lowercase.
+ * Returns null for non-data URLs (e.g. a remote http(s) image — see the
+ * scope note in the module header).
+ */
+export function parseImageDataUrl(url: string): { mimeType: string; base64: string } | null {
+  const match = /^data:([^;,]+)(?:;[^;,]+)*?;base64,(.*)$/si.exec(url);
+  if (match === null) return null;
+  return { mimeType: match[1]!, base64: match[2]! };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether a URL claims to be a `data:` URL (the scheme is case-insensitive).
+ * Used to distinguish "failed to parse a data URL" (malformed — guaranteed
+ * to fail at the provider) from "not a data URL" (a remote http(s) image
+ * the provider fetches).
+ */
+export function isDataUrl(url: string): boolean {
+  return url.toLowerCase().startsWith('data:');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether an image with this MIME may be sent to the model. Only the closed
+ * accepted set passes; everything else must be refused at the entry point —
+ * once an unsupported `image_url` lands in the session history, every later
+ * request in the session is rejected by the provider.
+ */
+export function isModelAcceptedImageMime(mimeType: string): boolean {
+  return MODEL_ACCEPTED_IMAGE_MIMES.has(normalizeImageMime(mimeType));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refusal for an unsupported image that has a readable file path, with a
+ * conversion command matching the execution environment (`kaos.osEnv.osKind`
+ * — where Bash actually runs, so SSH/container sessions get the right command
+ * too). The model can run the command through Bash (under the normal
+ * permission flow) and read the converted file.
+ *
+ * macOS converts with the built-in `sips`; Linux and Windows have no built-in
+ * decoder for these formats, so the guidance names ImageMagick (plus the
+ * format's dedicated Linux decoder when one exists, e.g. heif-convert).
+ */
+export function buildImageConversionGuidance(
+  path: string,
+  mimeType: string,
+  osKind: string,
+): string {
+  const converted = path.replace(/\.[^./\\]+$/, '') + '.jpg';
+  return (
+    `"${path}" is an ${mimeType} image, which the provider does not accept. ` +
+    'Convert it to JPEG first, then read the converted file. ' +
+    imageConversionCommand(
+      path,
+      converted,
+      osKind,
+      UNSUPPORTED_IMAGE_FORMATS[normalizeImageMime(mimeType)],
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+function imageConversionCommand(
+  path: string,
+  converted: string,
+  osKind: string,
+  format: UnsupportedImageFormatInfo | undefined,
+): string {
+  const magick = `magick "${path}" "${converted}"`;
+  const linuxDecoder = format?.linuxDecoder;
+  switch (osKind) {
+    case 'macOS':
+      return `On macOS: sips -s format jpeg "${path}" --out "${converted}"`;
+    case 'Linux':
+      return linuxDecoder === undefined
+        ? `On Linux, with ImageMagick: ${magick}`
+        : `On Linux: ${linuxDecoder.command} "${path}" "${converted}" ` +
+            `(package ${linuxDecoder.packageName}), or with ImageMagick: ${magick}`;
+    case 'Windows':
+      return (
+        `On Windows, with ImageMagick: ${magick} ` +
+        '(install it first if missing: winget install ImageMagick.ImageMagick)'
+      );
+    default:
+      return (
+        `Options: sips -s format jpeg "${path}" --out "${converted}" (macOS)` +
+        (linuxDecoder === undefined
+          ? ''
+          : `, ${linuxDecoder.command} "${path}" "${converted}" ` +
+            `(Linux, package ${linuxDecoder.packageName})`) +
+        `, or ${magick} (ImageMagick)`
+      );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Short notice standing in for an unsupported image where there is no file
+ * path to point at (MCP tool results, prompt uploads): the image part is
+ * dropped and this text replaces it, so the model knows what happened and
+ * the session history stays free of formats the provider rejects.
+ */
+export function buildUnsupportedImageNotice(mimeType: string, name?: string): string {
+  const what =
+    name === undefined || name.length === 0
+      ? `unsupported image format ${mimeType}`
+      : `"${name}" uses unsupported image format ${mimeType}`;
+  return (
+    `[Image omitted: ${what}. Model providers accept only ${ACCEPTED_FORMATS_TEXT} — ` +
+    'convert it to PNG or JPEG and try again.]'
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Notice standing in for an image part whose `data:` URL could not be parsed
+ * at all (missing `;base64,` separator, empty MIME, …): the provider is
+ * guaranteed to reject it, so it is dropped at ingestion instead of being
+ * left to poison the session and trigger the media-stripped resend on every
+ * later turn. The URL is truncated — a malformed payload can be huge.
+ */
+export function buildMalformedImageNotice(url: string): string {
+  const shown = url.length > 80 ? `${url.slice(0, 80)}…` : url;
+  return (
+    `[Image omitted: "${shown}" is not a valid data URL (its header or payload ` +
+    'could not be parsed). Re-encode the image as PNG or JPEG and try again.]'
+  );
+}
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/test/agent/turn.test.ts b/packages/agent-core/test/agent/turn.test.ts
index 47335196b1..a0b0ae43e7 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/test/agent/turn.test.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/test/agent/turn.test.ts
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import {
   APIRequestTooLargeError,
   APIStatusError,
   APITimeoutError,
+  ChatProviderError,
   type ChatProvider,
   type Message,
   type ModelCapability,
@@ -33,7 +34,12 @@ import type {
 } from '../../src/session/subagent-host';
 import { recordingTelemetry, type TelemetryRecord } from '../fixtures/telemetry';
 import { createFakeKaos } from '../tools/fixtures/fake-kaos';
-import { createCommandKaos, testAgent, type TestAgentOptions } from './harness/agent';
+import {
+  createCommandKaos,
+  testAgent,
+  type TestAgentContext,
+  type TestAgentOptions,
+} from './harness/agent';
 import { executeTool } from '../tools/fixtures/execute-tool';
 import { agentTask } from './background/helpers';
 
@@ -132,6 +138,268 @@ describe('Agent turn flow', () => {
     ).toHaveLength(3);
   });
 
+  it('gates unsupported image formats at the prompt and steer entry so the session cannot be poisoned', async () => {
+    const histories: Message[][] = [];
+    const generate: GenerateFn = async (_provider, _system, _tools, history) => {
+      histories.push(structuredClone(history));
+      return {
+        id: 'mock-format-gate',
+        message: { role: 'assistant', content: [{ type: 'text', text: 'done' }], toolCalls: [] },
+        usage: { inputOther: 1, output: 1, inputCacheRead: 0, inputCacheCreation: 0 },
+        finishReason: 'completed',
+        rawFinishReason: 'stop',
+      };
+    };
+    const ctx = testAgent({ generate });
+    ctx.configure({
+      provider: { type: 'kimi', apiKey: 'test-key', model: 'kimi-code' },
+      modelCapabilities: {
+        image_in: true,
+        video_in: false,
+        audio_in: false,
+        thinking: false,
+        tool_use: true,
+        max_context_tokens: 256_000,
+      },
+    });
+
+    // The SDK/RPC prompt path carries no upstream gate: the turn entry is
+    // the last funnel before parts land in the session history.
+    await ctx.rpc.prompt({
+      input: [
+        { type: 'text', text: 'what is in these images?' },
+        { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: '' } },
+        { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: '' } },
+      ],
+    });
+    await ctx.untilTurnEnd();
+
+    // The AVIF image never reaches the model: a notice stands in, and the
+    // accepted image/jpg alias is forwarded as canonical image/jpeg.
+    const sentParts = histories[0]!.flatMap((message) => message.content);
+    const sentImages = sentParts.filter((part) => part.type === 'image_url');
+    expect(sentImages).toEqual([
+      { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: '' } },
+    ]);
+    const sentText = sentParts
+      .filter((part) => part.type === 'text')
+      .map((part) => part.text)
+      .join('\n');
+    expect(sentText).toContain('image/avif');
+
+    // The history itself is clean — no image/avif part can re-poison later turns.
+    const historyParts = ctx.agent.context.history.flatMap((message) => message.content);
+    expect(
+      historyParts.some(
+        (part) => part.type === 'image_url' && part.imageUrl.url.includes('image/avif'),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+
+    // Steer input enters the history the same way and gets the same gate.
+    await ctx.rpc.steer({
+      input: [{ type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: '' } }],
+    });
+    await ctx.untilTurnEnd();
+
+    // The steer turn's history also carries the first turn's (canonical)
+    // image; what must be gone is the HEIC one.
+    const steerParts = histories[1]!.flatMap((message) => message.content);
+    expect(
+      steerParts.some(
+        (part) => part.type === 'image_url' && part.imageUrl.url.includes('image/heic'),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      steerParts
+        .filter((part) => part.type === 'text')
+        .map((part) => part.text)
+        .join('\n'),
+    ).toContain('image/heic');
+
+    // A mislabeled image is gated on its real bytes: AVIF bytes labeled
+    // image/png never reach the model.
+    const avif = Buffer.alloc(16);
+    avif.writeUInt32BE(16, 0);
+    avif.write('ftyp', 4, 'latin1');
+    avif.write('avif', 8, 'latin1');
+    await ctx.rpc.prompt({
+      input: [
+        {
+          type: 'image_url',
+          imageUrl: { url: `data:image/png;base64,${avif.toString('base64')}` },
+        },
+      ],
+    });
+    await ctx.untilTurnEnd();
+
+    // The third turn's history also carries the first turn's canonical
+    // image; what must be gone is the mislabeled AVIF payload.
+    const mislabeledParts = histories[2]!.flatMap((message) => message.content);
+    expect(
+      mislabeledParts.some(
+        (part) =>
+          part.type === 'image_url' && part.imageUrl.url.includes(avif.toString('base64')),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      mislabeledParts
+        .filter((part) => part.type === 'text')
+        .map((part) => part.text)
+        .join('\n'),
+    ).toContain('image/avif');
+  });
+
+  describe('image-format recovery', () => {
+    const IMAGE_CAPABLE: ModelCapability = {
+      image_in: true,
+      video_in: false,
+      audio_in: false,
+      thinking: false,
+      tool_use: true,
+      max_context_tokens: 256_000,
+    };
+
+    // Simulate a legacy/pre-gate history that already carries a poisoned
+    // image. The turn.prompt gate only sanitizes NEW prompt input, not the
+    // pre-existing context, so this reaches the provider unmodified.
+    function plantPoisonedImage(ctx: TestAgentContext): void {
+      ctx.agent.context.appendUserMessage(
+        [
+          { type: 'text', text: '<image path="/workspace/old.avif">' },
+          { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: '' } },
+          { type: 'text', text: '</image>' },
+        ],
+        { kind: 'user' },
+      );
+    }
+
+    function okResponse() {
+      return {
+        id: 'mock-recovery',
+        message: {
+          role: 'assistant' as const,
+          content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: 'ok' }],
+          toolCalls: [],
+        },
+        usage: { inputOther: 1, output: 1, inputCacheRead: 0, inputCacheCreation: 0 },
+        finishReason: 'completed' as const,
+        rawFinishReason: 'stop',
+      };
+    }
+
+    it('strips all media and retries once on a server image-format 400', async () => {
+      let attempts = 0;
+      const histories: Message[][] = [];
+      const generate: GenerateFn = async (_p, _s, _t, history) => {
+        attempts += 1;
+        histories.push(structuredClone(history));
+        if (attempts === 1) throw new APIStatusError(400, 'unsupported image format');
+        return okResponse();
+      };
+      const ctx = testAgent({ generate });
+      ctx.configure({
+        provider: { type: 'kimi', apiKey: 'test-key', model: 'kimi-code' },
+        modelCapabilities: IMAGE_CAPABLE,
+      });
+      plantPoisonedImage(ctx);
+
+      await ctx.rpc.prompt({ input: [{ type: 'text', text: 'continue' }] });
+      await ctx.untilTurnEnd();
+
+      expect(attempts).toBe(2);
+      expect(histories[0]!.flatMap((m) => m.content).some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(true);
+      expect(histories[1]!.flatMap((m) => m.content).some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(false);
+      // Read-side only: the real history keeps the poisoned image.
+      expect(
+        ctx.agent.context.history.flatMap((m) => m.content).some((p) => p.type === 'image_url'),
+      ).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('strips all media and retries once on kosong client-side image error', async () => {
+      let attempts = 0;
+      const generate: GenerateFn = async () => {
+        attempts += 1;
+        if (attempts === 1) {
+          throw new ChatProviderError('Unsupported media type for base64 image: image/avif');
+        }
+        return okResponse();
+      };
+      const ctx = testAgent({ generate });
+      ctx.configure({
+        provider: { type: 'kimi', apiKey: 'test-key', model: 'kimi-code' },
+        modelCapabilities: IMAGE_CAPABLE,
+      });
+      plantPoisonedImage(ctx);
+
+      await ctx.rpc.prompt({ input: [{ type: 'text', text: 'continue' }] });
+      await ctx.untilTurnEnd();
+
+      // isRetryableGenerateError excludes image-format errors, so no transient
+      // retries burn first — exactly one throw then one recovered resend.
+      expect(attempts).toBe(2);
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT recover a non-image 400 (no wasted resend)', async () => {
+      let attempts = 0;
+      const generate: GenerateFn = async () => {
+        attempts += 1;
+        throw new APIStatusError(400, 'max_tokens must be positive');
+      };
+      const ctx = testAgent({ generate });
+      ctx.configure({
+        provider: { type: 'kimi', apiKey: 'test-key', model: 'kimi-code' },
+        modelCapabilities: IMAGE_CAPABLE,
+      });
+      plantPoisonedImage(ctx);
+
+      await ctx.rpc.prompt({ input: [{ type: 'text', text: 'continue' }] });
+      await ctx.untilTurnEnd();
+
+      expect(attempts).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    it('does NOT recover image count/size/support errors (no silent blind resend)', async () => {
+      // "too many images" mentions "image" but is not a format/data error:
+      // stripping media would let the turn complete with the model blind to
+      // the user's images, hiding the real problem. Surface it instead.
+      let attempts = 0;
+      const generate: GenerateFn = async () => {
+        attempts += 1;
+        throw new APIStatusError(400, 'too many images in request');
+      };
+      const ctx = testAgent({ generate });
+      ctx.configure({
+        provider: { type: 'kimi', apiKey: 'test-key', model: 'kimi-code' },
+        modelCapabilities: IMAGE_CAPABLE,
+      });
+      plantPoisonedImage(ctx);
+
+      await ctx.rpc.prompt({ input: [{ type: 'text', text: 'continue' }] });
+      await ctx.untilTurnEnd();
+
+      expect(attempts).toBe(1);
+    });
+
+    it('surfaces the error when the strip resend also fails (no infinite loop)', async () => {
+      let attempts = 0;
+      const generate: GenerateFn = async () => {
+        attempts += 1;
+        throw new APIStatusError(400, 'unsupported image format');
+      };
+      const ctx = testAgent({ generate });
+      ctx.configure({
+        provider: { type: 'kimi', apiKey: 'test-key', model: 'kimi-code' },
+        modelCapabilities: IMAGE_CAPABLE,
+      });
+      plantPoisonedImage(ctx);
+
+      await ctx.rpc.prompt({ input: [{ type: 'text', text: 'continue' }] });
+      await ctx.untilTurnEnd();
+
+      expect(attempts).toBe(2);
+    });
+  });
+
   it('tracks turn_started and turn_interrupted telemetry', async () => {
     const records: TelemetryRecord[] = [];
     const ctx = testAgent({ telemetry: recordingTelemetry(records) });
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/test/mcp/output.test.ts b/packages/agent-core/test/mcp/output.test.ts
index 24d2f9fd35..19023b0b54 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/test/mcp/output.test.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/test/mcp/output.test.ts
@@ -180,6 +180,22 @@ describe('convertMCPContentBlock', () => {
     });
   });
 
+  test('replaces resource_link with an unsupported image mimeType with a notice', () => {
+    // A signed/extensionless URL gives the extension gate nothing to work
+    // with; the declared MIME is the only signal — an honestly-declared
+    // unsupported format must not become an image_url.
+    const block = assertValidMcpBlock({
+      type: 'resource_link',
+      name: 'photo',
+      uri: 'https://cdn.example.com/v2/image?id=123',
+      mimeType: 'image/avif',
+    });
+    const part = convertMCPContentBlock(block);
+    if (part?.type !== 'text') throw new Error('expected a text notice');
+    expect(part.text).toContain('image/avif');
+    expect(part.text).toContain('https://cdn.example.com/v2/image?id=123');
+  });
+
   test('returns null for resource_link with unsupported mimeType', () => {
     const block = assertValidMcpBlock({
       type: 'resource_link',
@@ -280,6 +296,124 @@ describe('mcpResultToExecutableOutput', () => {
     ]);
   });
 
+  test('replaces an image the provider cannot accept with a text notice (media-only)', async () => {
+    // An image search tool returning AVIF: forwarding the image_url would
+    // make every later request in the session fail. The media-only wrap is
+    // kept, with a notice standing in for the dropped image.
+    const out = await mcpResultToExecutableOutput(
+      result([{ type: 'image', data: 'QUJD', mimeType: 'image/avif' }]),
+      'mcp__search__image',
+    );
+    expect(out.isError).toBe(false);
+    const parts = out.output as ContentPart[];
+    expect(parts[0]).toEqual({ type: 'text', text: '<mcp_tool_result name="mcp__search__image">' });
+    expect(parts.some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(false);
+    const notice = parts.find(
+      (p) => p.type === 'text' && p.text.includes('image/avif'),
+    );
+    expect(notice).toBeDefined();
+    expect(parts.at(-1)).toEqual({ type: 'text', text: '</mcp_tool_result>' });
+  });
+
+  test('drops an unsupported image but keeps the accompanying text', async () => {
+    const out = await mcpResultToExecutableOutput(
+      result([
+        { type: 'text', text: 'found an image' },
+        { type: 'image', data: 'QUJD', mimeType: 'image/heic' },
+      ]),
+      'mcp__search__image',
+    );
+    const parts = out.output as ContentPart[];
+    expect(parts.some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(false);
+    expect(parts[0]).toEqual({ type: 'text', text: 'found an image' });
+    expect(parts.some((p) => p.type === 'text' && p.text.includes('image/heic'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('gates a mislabeled image on its real bytes (image search tool)', async () => {
+    // An image search tool returning AVIF bytes labeled image/png: the
+    // bytes are authoritative — the image must not reach the session
+    // history, and the notice names the real format.
+    const avif = Buffer.alloc(16);
+    avif.writeUInt32BE(16, 0);
+    avif.write('ftyp', 4, 'latin1');
+    avif.write('avif', 8, 'latin1');
+    const out = await mcpResultToExecutableOutput(
+      result([{ type: 'image', data: avif.toString('base64'), mimeType: 'image/png' }]),
+      'mcp__search__image',
+    );
+    const parts = out.output as ContentPart[];
+    expect(parts.some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(false);
+    expect(parts.some((p) => p.type === 'text' && p.text.includes('image/avif'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  test('forwards the image/jpg alias as canonical image/jpeg', async () => {
+    // Strict provider whitelists reject the raw `image/jpg` alias — the part
+    // must land in the session with the canonical MIME.
+    const out = await mcpResultToExecutableOutput(
+      result([{ type: 'image', data: 'QUJD', mimeType: 'image/jpg' }]),
+      'mcp__s__t',
+    );
+    const parts = out.output as ContentPart[];
+    const image = parts.find((p) => p.type === 'image_url');
+    expect(image).toEqual({
+      type: 'image_url',
+      imageUrl: { url: '' },
+    });
+  });
+
+  test('drops remote images by declared MIME and by URL extension, passes accepted links through', async () => {
+    // An MCP resource_link carries no bytes, so the only format signals are
+    // the declared MIME and the URL extension: an honestly-declared AVIF
+    // becomes a notice even with an extensionless (signed) URL — the
+    // extension gate alone cannot see it; a server that declares PNG but
+    // links an `.avif` URL is caught by the extension; an accepted link
+    // passes through.
+    const out = await mcpResultToExecutableOutput(
+      result([
+        assertValidMcpBlock({
+          type: 'resource_link',
+          name: 'photo',
+          uri: 'https://cdn.example.com/v2/image?id=123',
+          mimeType: 'image/avif',
+        }),
+        assertValidMcpBlock({
+          type: 'resource_link',
+          name: 'pic.avif',
+          uri: 'https://example.com/pic.avif',
+          mimeType: 'image/png',
+        }),
+        assertValidMcpBlock({
+          type: 'resource_link',
+          name: 'ok.png',
+          uri: 'https://example.com/ok.png?size=full#frame',
+          mimeType: 'image/png',
+        }),
+      ]),
+      'mcp__s__t',
+    );
+    const parts = out.output as ContentPart[];
+    expect(parts).toContainEqual({
+      type: 'image_url',
+      imageUrl: { url: 'https://example.com/ok.png?size=full#frame' },
+    });
+    // Neither AVIF link survives as an image_url.
+    expect(
+      parts.some(
+        (p) =>
+          p.type === 'image_url' &&
+          (p.imageUrl.url.includes('cdn.example.com') || p.imageUrl.url.includes('pic.avif')),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    const notices = parts
+      .filter((p) => p.type === 'text')
+      .map((p) => (p as { text: string }).text)
+      .join('\n');
+    expect(notices).toContain('image/avif');
+    // Both notices keep their URL so the model can fetch and convert.
+    expect(notices).toContain('https://cdn.example.com/v2/image?id=123');
+    expect(notices).toContain('https://example.com/pic.avif');
+  });
+
   test('does NOT wrap when a non-empty text part accompanies the media', async () => {
     const out = await mcpResultToExecutableOutput(
       result([
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/test/tools/image-compress.test.ts b/packages/agent-core/test/tools/image-compress.test.ts
index d60f3820a7..4f0cb5be33 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/test/tools/image-compress.test.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/test/tools/image-compress.test.ts
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ import {
   compressImageForModel,
   cropImageForModel,
   extractImageCompressionCaptions,
+  gateImageFormatParts,
   IMAGE_BYTE_BUDGET,
   MAX_IMAGE_EDGE_ENV,
   MAX_IMAGE_EDGE_PX,
@@ -60,6 +61,8 @@ import { ImageLimits } from '../../src/tools/support/image-limits';
 // eslint-disable-next-line import/no-unresolved
 import { sniffImageDimensions } from '../../src/tools/support/file-type';
 // eslint-disable-next-line import/no-unresolved
+import { normalizeImageMime, unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl } from '../../src/tools/support/image-format-policy';
+// eslint-disable-next-line import/no-unresolved
 import type { TelemetryClient, TelemetryProperties } from '../../src/telemetry';
 
 // ── fixtures ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -836,6 +839,278 @@ describe('compressImageContentParts', () => {
     expect(imagePart.imageUrl.id).toBe('att-1');
     expect(imagePart.imageUrl.url).not.toBe(dataUrl('image/png', big));
   });
+
+  it('drops image parts the provider cannot accept, replacing each with a notice', async () => {
+    // MCP servers can return any image/* MIME (e.g. an AVIF from an image
+    // search tool). Forwarding it would poison the session history, so the
+    // part is dropped and a text notice stands in.
+    const parts = [
+      { type: 'text' as const, text: 'search results' },
+      { type: 'image_url' as const, imageUrl: { url: dataUrl('image/avif', new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3])) } },
+      { type: 'image_url' as const, imageUrl: { url: dataUrl('image/heic', new Uint8Array([4, 5, 6])) } },
+    ];
+    const { parts: out, captions } = await compressImageContentParts(parts);
+
+    expect(out[0]).toEqual({ type: 'text', text: 'search results' });
+    expect(out.some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(false);
+    const notices = out.filter((p) => p.type === 'text').map((p) => (p as { text: string }).text);
+    expect(notices.some((t) => t.includes('image/avif'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(notices.some((t) => t.includes('image/heic'))).toBe(true);
+    // Dropping is not compression: no captions are produced.
+    expect(captions).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('passes the accepted formats through the format gate untouched', async () => {
+    for (const mime of ['image/png', 'image/jpeg', 'image/gif', 'image/webp']) {
+      const url = dataUrl(mime, new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]));
+      const parts = [{ type: 'image_url' as const, imageUrl: { url } }];
+      const { parts: out } = await compressImageContentParts(parts);
+      expect(out[0]).toEqual({ type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url } });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('forwards accepted MIME aliases in canonical form', async () => {
+    // `image/jpg` (and case/whitespace variants) pass the gate, but the raw
+    // alias must not land in the session: strict provider whitelists (e.g.
+    // Anthropic's) reject it and every later request would fail.
+    const bytes = new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]);
+    const base64 = Buffer.from(bytes).toString('base64');
+    for (const alias of ['image/jpg', 'Image/JPEG', ' image/jpeg ']) {
+      const parts = [
+        { type: 'image_url' as const, imageUrl: { url: `data:${alias};base64,${base64}` } },
+      ];
+      const { parts: out, captions } = await compressImageContentParts(parts);
+      expect(out[0]).toEqual({
+        type: 'image_url',
+        imageUrl: { url: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${base64}` },
+      });
+      // Rewriting the MIME is not compression: no caption.
+      expect(captions).toEqual([]);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('drops an unsupported image even when its data URL carries MIME parameters', async () => {
+    const parts = [
+      {
+        type: 'image_url' as const,
+        imageUrl: { url: dataUrl('image/avif;charset=utf-8', new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3])) },
+      },
+    ];
+    const { parts: out } = await compressImageContentParts(parts);
+    expect(out.some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(false);
+    expect(out[0]).toMatchObject({ type: 'text' });
+    expect((out[0] as { text: string }).text).toContain('image/avif');
+  });
+});
+
+// ── format gate (shared by every ingestion point) ────────────────────
+
+describe('gateImageFormatParts', () => {
+  function dataUrl(mime: string, bytes: Uint8Array): string {
+    return `data:${mime};base64,${Buffer.from(bytes).toString('base64')}`;
+  }
+
+  it('replaces every unsupported inline image with a notice and keeps the rest', () => {
+    const parts = [
+      { type: 'text' as const, text: 'results' },
+      { type: 'image_url' as const, imageUrl: { url: dataUrl('image/avif', new Uint8Array([1])) } },
+      { type: 'image_url' as const, imageUrl: { url: dataUrl('image/bmp', new Uint8Array([2])) } },
+      { type: 'video_url' as const, videoUrl: { url: dataUrl('video/mp4', new Uint8Array([3])) } },
+      { type: 'image_url' as const, imageUrl: { url: dataUrl('image/png', new Uint8Array([4])) } },
+    ];
+    const out = gateImageFormatParts(parts);
+
+    expect(out[0]).toEqual({ type: 'text', text: 'results' });
+    // Both unsupported images became notices naming their MIME.
+    const notices = out.filter((p) => p.type === 'text').map((p) => (p as { text: string }).text);
+    expect(notices.some((t) => t.includes('image/avif'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(notices.some((t) => t.includes('image/bmp'))).toBe(true);
+    // Video parts and the accepted image pass through untouched.
+    expect(out).toContainEqual(parts[3]);
+    expect(out).toContainEqual(parts[4]);
+    expect(
+      out.some(
+        (p) => p.type === 'image_url' && !p.imageUrl.url.startsWith('data:image/png'),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rewrites accepted MIME aliases to canonical form', () => {
+    const base64 = Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]).toString('base64');
+    const out = gateImageFormatParts([
+      { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: `data:image/jpg;base64,${base64}` } },
+    ]);
+    expect(out[0]).toEqual({
+      type: 'image_url',
+      imageUrl: { url: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${base64}` },
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('rewrites an accepted MIME carrying parameters to the bare canonical form', () => {
+    // Strict provider whitelists exact-match the full data-URL header, so
+    // `image/jpeg;charset=utf-8` would be rejected just like an alias.
+    const base64 = Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]).toString('base64');
+    const out = gateImageFormatParts([
+      { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: `data:image/jpeg;charset=utf-8;base64,${base64}` } },
+    ]);
+    expect(out[0]).toEqual({
+      type: 'image_url',
+      imageUrl: { url: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${base64}` },
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('gates on the sniffed bytes, not the declared MIME', () => {
+    const pngBytes = Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a, 1, 2, 3, 4]);
+    const ftyp = (brand: string): Buffer => {
+      const buf = Buffer.alloc(16);
+      buf.writeUInt32BE(16, 0);
+      buf.write('ftyp', 4, 'latin1');
+      buf.write(brand, 8, 'latin1');
+      return buf;
+    };
+
+    // AVIF bytes labeled image/png (a mislabeling MCP image search tool):
+    // dropped as the AVIF it is — the provider decodes bytes, not labels.
+    const mislabeled = gateImageFormatParts([
+      { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: `data:image/png;base64,${ftyp('avif').toString('base64')}` } },
+    ]);
+    expect(mislabeled.some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(false);
+    expect((mislabeled[0] as { text: string }).text).toContain('image/avif');
+
+    // A video container hiding in an image part is refused too.
+    const video = gateImageFormatParts([
+      { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: `data:image/png;base64,${ftyp('isom').toString('base64')}` } },
+    ]);
+    expect(video.some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(false);
+    expect((video[0] as { text: string }).text).toContain('video/mp4');
+
+    // PNG bytes labeled image/avif: rescued — forwarded as the PNG it is.
+    const rescued = gateImageFormatParts([
+      { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: `data:image/avif;base64,${pngBytes.toString('base64')}` } },
+    ]);
+    expect(rescued[0]).toEqual({
+      type: 'image_url',
+      imageUrl: { url: `data:image/png;base64,${pngBytes.toString('base64')}` },
+    });
+
+    // Unrecognized bytes (corrupt image): the declared MIME stands; the
+    // 400-recovery path is the backstop for this case.
+    const garbage = gateImageFormatParts([
+      { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: `data:image/png;base64,${Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]).toString('base64')}` } },
+    ]);
+    expect(garbage[0]).toMatchObject({ type: 'image_url' });
+  });
+
+  it('parses the base64 marker case-insensitively', () => {
+    // `;BASE64,` is a legal data URL (RFC 2045 encoding names are
+    // case-insensitive): an uppercase marker must not slip past the gate as
+    // if it were a remote URL, and the canonical rebuild lowercases it.
+    const base64 = Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]).toString('base64');
+
+    const accepted = gateImageFormatParts([
+      { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: `data:image/jpeg;BASE64,${base64}` } },
+    ]);
+    expect(accepted[0]).toEqual({
+      type: 'image_url',
+      imageUrl: { url: `data:image/jpeg;base64,${base64}` },
+    });
+
+    const unsupported = gateImageFormatParts([
+      { type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: `data:image/avif;BASE64,${base64}` } },
+    ]);
+    expect(unsupported.some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(false);
+    expect((unsupported[0] as { text: string }).text).toContain('image/avif');
+  });
+
+  it('drops remote image URLs whose extension is unsupported, passes others through', () => {
+    // No bytes to inspect, so the gate uses the path extension: a known-bad
+    // extension becomes a notice; extensionless / unknown / accepted
+    // extensions pass through to the provider (and the 400 recovery).
+    for (const bad of [
+      'https://example.com/pic.avif',
+      'https://example.com/pic.AVIF',
+      'https://example.com/pic.heic?size=full',
+      'https://example.com/scan.tiff#frame',
+      'https://example.com/icon.ico',
+      'https://example.com/logo.svg',
+    ]) {
+      const out = gateImageFormatParts([{ type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url: bad } }]);
+      expect(out[0]).toMatchObject({ type: 'text' });
+      // The notice keeps the URL so the model can fetch and convert the image.
+      expect((out[0] as { text: string }).text).toContain(bad);
+    }
+    for (const ok of [
+      'https://example.com/pic.png',
+      'https://example.com/pic.jpg?size=full#frame',
+      'https://example.com/avatar',
+      'https://cdn.example.com/v2/image?id=123',
+    ]) {
+      const part = { type: 'image_url' as const, imageUrl: { url: ok } };
+      expect(gateImageFormatParts([part])).toEqual([part]);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('drops a malformed data URL instead of letting it poison the session', () => {
+    // A `data:` URL parseImageDataUrl cannot parse is guaranteed to fail at
+    // the provider (Anthropic throws, OpenAI-compat 400s): dropping it at
+    // ingestion beats paying a rejected request + media strip every turn.
+    const cases = [
+      'data:image/avif',
+      'data:image/png;notbase64,QUJD',
+      'data:;base64,QUJD',
+      'data:image/png;base64',
+      'DATA:image/avif',
+    ];
+    for (const url of cases) {
+      const out = gateImageFormatParts([{ type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url } }]);
+      expect(out.some((p) => p.type === 'image_url')).toBe(false);
+      expect(out[0]).toMatchObject({ type: 'text' });
+      expect((out[0] as { text: string }).text).toContain('not a valid data URL');
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('truncates a long malformed data URL in the notice', () => {
+    const url = `data:image/png${'x'.repeat(500)}`;
+    const out = gateImageFormatParts([{ type: 'image_url', imageUrl: { url } }]);
+    const notice = (out[0] as { text: string }).text;
+    expect(notice.length).toBeLessThan(250);
+    expect(notice).not.toContain(url);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('normalizeImageMime', () => {
+  it('lowercases, strips MIME parameters, and applies the jpg alias', () => {
+    expect(normalizeImageMime('image/png')).toBe('image/png');
+    expect(normalizeImageMime('Image/JPEG')).toBe('image/jpeg');
+    expect(normalizeImageMime('image/jpg')).toBe('image/jpeg');
+    expect(normalizeImageMime(' image/webp ')).toBe('image/webp');
+    // Parameters (e.g. charset) are dropped so a declared media type stays
+    // consistent with a data-URL MIME token.
+    expect(normalizeImageMime('image/jpeg; charset=utf-8')).toBe('image/jpeg');
+    expect(normalizeImageMime('IMAGE/PNG;foo=bar')).toBe('image/png');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl', () => {
+  it('flags known-unsupported extensions and ignores query/fragment/case', () => {
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/pic.avif')).toBe('image/avif');
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/pic.AVIF?x=1')).toBe('image/avif');
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/photo.HEIC#frame')).toBe('image/heic');
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/scan.tiff')).toBe('image/tiff');
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/icon.ico')).toBe('image/x-icon');
+    // .svg is not in the shared suffix map (SVG is text for the file tools),
+    // but remote SVG images are accepted by no provider.
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/logo.svg')).toBe('image/svg+xml');
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/logo.svgz')).toBe('image/svg+xml');
+  });
+
+  it('returns null for accepted, extensionless, or unknown URLs', () => {
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/pic.png')).toBeNull();
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/pic.jpg')).toBeNull();
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/avatar')).toBeNull();
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://cdn.example.com/v2/image?id=123')).toBeNull();
+    expect(unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl('https://example.com/readme.json')).toBeNull();
+  });
 });
 
 // ── original-dimension metadata ──────────────────────────────────────
diff --git a/packages/agent-core/test/tools/read-media.test.ts b/packages/agent-core/test/tools/read-media.test.ts
index 37825ce0c6..78b61c819b 100644
--- a/packages/agent-core/test/tools/read-media.test.ts
+++ b/packages/agent-core/test/tools/read-media.test.ts
@@ -643,10 +643,11 @@ describe('ReadMediaFileTool', () => {
     );
   });
 
-  it('ships sniffed image formats to the provider without gating', async () => {
-    // A `.png` file that is actually a BMP is reported as `image/bmp`. The
-    // tool does not gate on image format — it ships the real bytes with the
-    // sniffed MIME, and the provider decides which formats it accepts.
+  it('refuses a sniffed-but-unsupported image format instead of shipping it to the provider', async () => {
+    // A `.png` file that is actually a BMP is sniffed as `image/bmp`. The tool
+    // must not ship the bytes: the provider rejects BMP, and once the
+    // image_url lands in the history every later request in the session fails.
+    // It refuses with conversion guidance instead.
     const data = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from('BM'), Buffer.from('bmpdata')]);
     const tool = makeReadMediaTool({
       stat: vi.fn<Kaos['stat']>().mockResolvedValue({ ...DEFAULT_STAT, stSize: data.length }),
@@ -660,10 +661,10 @@ describe('ReadMediaFileTool', () => {
       signal,
     });
 
-    const parts = outputParts(result);
-    expect((parts[1] as { imageUrl: { url: string } }).imageUrl.url).toBe(
-      `data:image/bmp;base64,${data.toString('base64')}`,
-    );
+    expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
+    expect(result.output).toContain('image/bmp');
+    expect(result.output).toContain('Convert it to JPEG');
+    expect(result.output).toContain('/workspace/photo.jpg');
   });
 
   it('rejects a media-extension file whose bytes are not a supported image', async () => {
@@ -1019,7 +1020,7 @@ describe('ReadMediaFileTool', () => {
     });
   });
 
-  describe('provider-unsupported formats (HEIC/HEIF)', () => {
+  describe('provider-unsupported formats', () => {
     /** Minimal ISO-BMFF header: size + 'ftyp' + the given brand. */
     function ftypHeader(brand: string): Buffer {
       const bytes = Buffer.alloc(16);
@@ -1029,8 +1030,7 @@ describe('ReadMediaFileTool', () => {
       return bytes;
     }
 
-    function heicTool(osKind: string, brand = 'heic'): ReadMediaFileTool {
-      const data = ftypHeader(brand);
+    function unsupportedTool(osKind: string, data: Buffer): ReadMediaFileTool {
       const kaos = createFakeKaos({
         stat: vi.fn<Kaos['stat']>().mockResolvedValue({ ...DEFAULT_STAT, stSize: data.length }),
         readBytes: vi.fn<Kaos['readBytes']>().mockResolvedValue(data),
@@ -1039,6 +1039,10 @@ describe('ReadMediaFileTool', () => {
       return new ReadMediaFileTool(kaos, PERMISSIVE_WORKSPACE, capabilities());
     }
 
+    function heicTool(osKind: string, brand = 'heic'): ReadMediaFileTool {
+      return unsupportedTool(osKind, ftypHeader(brand));
+    }
+
     it('refuses HEIC with sips guidance on macOS instead of sending it to the provider', async () => {
       const result = await executeTool(heicTool('macOS'), {
         turnId: 't1',
@@ -1095,6 +1099,52 @@ describe('ReadMediaFileTool', () => {
       expect(region.isError).toBe(true);
       expect(region.output).toContain('sips');
     });
+
+    it('refuses AVIF (still and animated brands) with conversion guidance', async () => {
+      for (const brand of ['avif', 'avis']) {
+        const result = await executeTool(unsupportedTool('macOS', ftypHeader(brand)), {
+          turnId: 't1',
+          toolCallId: `c_avif_${brand}`,
+          args: { path: '/workspace/photo.avif' },
+          signal,
+        });
+        expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
+        expect(result.output).toContain('image/avif');
+        expect(result.output).toContain('sips -s format jpeg');
+        expect(result.output).toContain('/workspace/photo.jpg');
+      }
+    });
+
+    it('refuses AVIF on Linux with ImageMagick guidance (no heif-convert)', async () => {
+      const result = await executeTool(unsupportedTool('Linux', ftypHeader('avif')), {
+        turnId: 't1',
+        toolCallId: 'c_avif_linux',
+        args: { path: '/workspace/photo.avif' },
+        signal,
+      });
+      expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
+      expect(result.output).toContain('magick');
+      expect(result.output).not.toContain('heif-convert');
+    });
+
+    it('refuses BMP, TIFF, and ICO with per-OS conversion guidance', async () => {
+      const cases: readonly { data: Buffer; mime: string; path: string }[] = [
+        { data: Buffer.concat([Buffer.from('BM'), Buffer.from('bmpdata')]), mime: 'image/bmp', path: '/workspace/photo.bmp' },
+        { data: Buffer.from([0x49, 0x49, 0x2a, 0x00, 0x00]), mime: 'image/tiff', path: '/workspace/scan.tiff' },
+        { data: Buffer.from([0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00]), mime: 'image/x-icon', path: '/workspace/favicon.ico' },
+      ];
+      for (const c of cases) {
+        const result = await executeTool(unsupportedTool('macOS', c.data), {
+          turnId: 't1',
+          toolCallId: `c_${c.mime.replace('/', '_')}`,
+          args: { path: c.path },
+          signal,
+        });
+        expect(result.isError).toBe(true);
+        expect(result.output).toContain(c.mime);
+        expect(result.output).toContain('sips');
+      }
+    });
   });
 
   describe('read byte budget', () => {
diff --git a/packages/kosong/src/errors.ts b/packages/kosong/src/errors.ts
index 818b903df0..770228b789 100644
--- a/packages/kosong/src/errors.ts
+++ b/packages/kosong/src/errors.ts
@@ -145,8 +145,85 @@ export function isRetryableGenerateError(error: unknown): boolean {
   // instances are deliberately excluded above: deterministic 4xx
   // (400/401/403/404/422) and the recovery-owned context-overflow /
   // request-too-large subclasses keep their dedicated handling instead of
-  // burning retries first.
-  return error instanceof ChatProviderError;
+  // burning retries first. Image-format rejections are likewise excluded:
+  // they are deterministic per history and recovered by the media-stripped
+  // resend (see isImageFormatError), so retrying the identical request first
+  // would only burn the retry budget.
+  return error instanceof ChatProviderError && !isImageFormatError(error);
+}
+
+// Client-side image rejections thrown before the request is sent (kosong's
+// own media whitelist in the Anthropic adapter).
+const IMAGE_FORMAT_PROVIDER_MESSAGE_PATTERNS = [
+  /unsupported media type for base64 image/,
+  /invalid data url for image/,
+] as const;
+
+// Server-side image rejections that are safe to recover by stripping media:
+// an unsupported/invalid media type or undecodable image data. These are
+// deliberately narrow and grounded in the documented messages of the major
+// providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, Moonshot/Kimi, Gemini) — image COUNT/SIZE
+// limits or image-input-disabled errors also mention "image", but stripping
+// media either over-recovers or hides a real configuration problem the user
+// should see; only format/data rejections are guaranteed to be fixed by
+// removing the offending image.
+//
+// Matching on provider message text is inherently best-effort: these strings
+// are not a stable contract, so a novel phrasing is missed and the error
+// propagates (the pre-recovery behavior). The entry-point format gate is the
+// structural defense; this recovery only backstops the residue.
+// Every pattern mentions "image" literally, and MEDIA_TYPE_FIELD_PATTERN is
+// separately gated on an "image" anchor — so audio/video media rejections
+// ("unsupported media type", "invalid media type") can never be classified
+// as image errors here. All documented provider image rejections mention
+// "image", so the restriction costs no known match.
+const IMAGE_FORMAT_STATUS_MESSAGE_PATTERNS = [
+  // Unsupported format — OpenAI / Moonshot "unsupported image …".
+  /unsupported image (?:url|format|type)/,
+  // Undecodable / corrupt image data.
+  /does not represent a valid image/,
+  /could not (?:process|decode) (?:the |input )?image/,
+  /unable to process (?:the |input )?image/,
+  /failed to decode (?:the )?image/,
+  /invalid image(?: data| type| format)?/,
+] as const;
+
+// Anthropic `media_type` & Gemini `mime_type` enum violations name the field
+// — recoverable only when the message is about an IMAGE. A video/audio
+// `media_type` rejection must surface instead of being blindly
+// media-stripped: unlike images there is no conversion-guidance path for
+// video today, so dropping the user's video silently would hide the real
+// error. Every documented image media_type message also mentions "image",
+// so the anchor costs nothing on the known cases.
+const MEDIA_TYPE_FIELD_PATTERN = /(?:media|mime)_?type/;
+
+/**
+ * Whether the provider rejected an IMAGE in the request because of its
+ * FORMAT or DATA — an unsupported media type or undecodable image bytes.
+ * The rejection is deterministic for a given history (the same image is
+ * re-sent on every request, so the session would fail every turn), and the
+ * only recovery is to resend once with all media stripped (see the
+ * media-stripped resend in the agent loop). Body-size (413), context
+ * overflow, image count/size limits, image-input-disabled rejections, and
+ * non-image (audio/video) media rejections are excluded — the first two
+ * have their own recoveries, and the rest are not fixed by stripping media.
+ */
+export function isImageFormatError(error: unknown): boolean {
+  if (error instanceof APIStatusError) {
+    if (error instanceof APIContextOverflowError) return false;
+    if (error instanceof APIRequestTooLargeError) return false;
+    if (error.statusCode !== 400) return false;
+    const lowerMessage = error.message.toLowerCase();
+    return (
+      IMAGE_FORMAT_STATUS_MESSAGE_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(lowerMessage)) ||
+      (MEDIA_TYPE_FIELD_PATTERN.test(lowerMessage) && lowerMessage.includes('image'))
+    );
+  }
+  if (error instanceof ChatProviderError) {
+    const lowerMessage = error.message.toLowerCase();
+    return IMAGE_FORMAT_PROVIDER_MESSAGE_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(lowerMessage));
+  }
+  return false;
 }
 
 // `terminated` is the undici signature for an SSE/HTTP body stream that is
diff --git a/packages/kosong/src/index.ts b/packages/kosong/src/index.ts
index 97909a16a3..63e07c49c8 100644
--- a/packages/kosong/src/index.ts
+++ b/packages/kosong/src/index.ts
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ export {
   APITimeoutError,
   ChatProviderError,
   isContextOverflowStatusError,
+  isImageFormatError,
   isProviderRateLimitError,
   isRecoverableRequestStructureError,
   isRequestTooLargeStatusError,
diff --git a/packages/kosong/test/errors.test.ts b/packages/kosong/test/errors.test.ts
index 5fa195f882..1eb62efdbf 100644
--- a/packages/kosong/test/errors.test.ts
+++ b/packages/kosong/test/errors.test.ts
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import {
   APIStatusError,
   APITimeoutError,
   ChatProviderError,
+  isImageFormatError,
   isProviderRateLimitError,
   isRecoverableRequestStructureError,
   isRetryableGenerateError,
@@ -545,3 +546,124 @@ describe('isProviderRateLimitError', () => {
     expect(isProviderRateLimitError(new Error('context length exceeded'))).toBe(false);
   });
 });
+
+describe('isImageFormatError', () => {
+  it('matches documented provider image format/data rejections', () => {
+    // OpenAI
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(
+        new APIStatusError(400, 'The image data you provided does not represent a valid image'),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(true);
+    // Anthropic media_type enum violation
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(
+        new APIStatusError(
+          400,
+          "messages.0.content.1.image.source.base64.media_type: Input should be 'image/jpeg'",
+        ),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(true);
+    // Anthropic decode failure
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'Could not process image'))).toBe(true);
+    // Moonshot/Kimi (from the Kimi Code error reference)
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(
+        new APIStatusError(400, 'Invalid request: unsupported image url: /tmp/photo.avif'),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(true);
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'unsupported image format'))).toBe(true);
+    // Gemini
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'Unable to process input image'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(
+        new APIStatusError(400, 'The mime_type must accurately match the actual image format'),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('matches kosong client-side image whitelist throws', () => {
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(new ChatProviderError('Unsupported media type for base64 image: image/avif')),
+    ).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(
+        new ChatProviderError('Invalid data URL for image: data:image/avif;BASE64,AAA'),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('does not match a non-image 400, an unrelated status, or overflow/413 subclasses', () => {
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'max_tokens must be positive'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(422, 'image is bad'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(401, 'invalid api key'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(new APIContextOverflowError(400, 'context length exceeded for image model')),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(new APIRequestTooLargeError(413, 'image request too large')),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new ChatProviderError('connection reset'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new Error('image is bad'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('does not match image count/size/support errors that stripping media cannot fix', () => {
+    // Stripping media to zero would let these requests "succeed" with the
+    // model blind to the user's images — hiding the real error. They must
+    // surface instead of triggering a media-stripped resend.
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'too many images in request'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'image dimension 5000 exceeds maximum 2048')),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'image input is disabled for this model')),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'image_url is not allowed'))).toBe(false);
+    // Documented provider messages that are image-shaped but not
+    // format/data errors: Anthropic's per-image size cap, Moonshot's
+    // capability code, Gemini's unsupported-inlineData rejection.
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(
+        new APIStatusError(
+          400,
+          'messages.44.content.1.image.source.base64: image exceeds 5 MB maximum: 11641928 bytes > 5242880 bytes',
+        ),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'Image Input Not Supported'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, "`inlineData` isn't supported by this model.")),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    // Video/audio media_type errors are NOT image errors: they must surface
+    // (no conversion-guidance path exists for video) instead of triggering a
+    // blind media-stripped resend.
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(
+        new APIStatusError(
+          400,
+          "messages.0.content.1.video.source.base64.media_type: Input should be 'video/mp4'",
+        ),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    // Bare "media type" phrasings for audio/video inputs likewise surface.
+    expect(
+      isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'unsupported media type for audio input')),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(isImageFormatError(new APIStatusError(400, 'invalid media type'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('is excluded from the transient-retry fallback so dedicated recovery fires first', () => {
+    // A base ChatProviderError is normally retried as an unclassified
+    // transient; image-format errors must not be, or the run would burn the
+    // retry budget on an identical request before reaching the media strip.
+    expect(isRetryableGenerateError(new ChatProviderError('transient blip'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      isRetryableGenerateError(
+        new ChatProviderError('Unsupported media type for base64 image: image/avif'),
+      ),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      isRetryableGenerateError(new APIStatusError(400, 'unsupported image format')),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/packages/node-sdk/src/index.ts b/packages/node-sdk/src/index.ts
index c6e1dc6d2c..7f5806c97e 100644
--- a/packages/node-sdk/src/index.ts
+++ b/packages/node-sdk/src/index.ts
@@ -75,8 +75,13 @@ export { installGlobalProxyDispatcher } from '@moonshot-ai/agent-core';
 // pre-compression bytes readable (ReadMediaFile + region) for detail.
 export {
   buildImageCompressionCaption,
+  buildUnsupportedImageNotice,
   compressImageForModel,
   compressBase64ForModel,
+  gateImageFormatParts,
+  isModelAcceptedImageMime,
+  normalizeImageMime,
+  parseImageDataUrl,
   persistOriginalImage,
   sessionMediaOriginalsDir,
   IMAGE_BYTE_BUDGET,
diff --git a/packages/server/src/routes/prompts.ts b/packages/server/src/routes/prompts.ts
index ac0d1cd738..5104bd8a8b 100644
--- a/packages/server/src/routes/prompts.ts
+++ b/packages/server/src/routes/prompts.ts
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import {
   promptSteerResultSchema,
   type PromptSubmission,
 } from '@moonshot-ai/protocol';
-import { IPromptService, AuthModelNotResolvedError, AuthProvisioningRequiredError, AuthTokenMissingError, AuthTokenUnauthorizedError, PromptAlreadyCompletedError, PromptNotFoundError, SessionBusyError, SessionNotFoundError, FileNotFoundError, ICoreProcessService, IEnvironmentService, IFileStore, buildImageCompressionCaption, compressImageForModel, compressBase64ForModel, persistOriginalImage, sessionMediaOriginalsDir, withTelemetryContext, type IInstantiationService, type GetResult, type ImageCompressionTelemetry, type TelemetryClient } from '@moonshot-ai/agent-core';
+import { IPromptService, AuthModelNotResolvedError, AuthProvisioningRequiredError, AuthTokenMissingError, AuthTokenUnauthorizedError, PromptAlreadyCompletedError, PromptNotFoundError, SessionBusyError, SessionNotFoundError, FileNotFoundError, ICoreProcessService, IEnvironmentService, IFileStore, buildImageCompressionCaption, buildUnsupportedImageNotice, compressImageForModel, compressBase64ForModel, decodeBase64Prefix, isModelAcceptedImageMime, normalizeImageMime, persistOriginalImage, resolveEffectiveImageMime, sessionMediaOriginalsDir, unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl, withTelemetryContext, type IInstantiationService, type GetResult, type ImageCompressionTelemetry, type TelemetryClient } from '@moonshot-ai/agent-core';
 import { z } from 'zod';
 
 
@@ -308,7 +308,22 @@ async function resolvePromptMediaFiles(
     // input-stage step as the file path below, for REST clients that submit an
     // image as `{ source: { kind: 'base64' } }` instead of uploading a file.
     if (part.type === 'image' && part.source.kind === 'base64') {
-      const compressed = await compressBase64ForModel(part.source.data, part.source.media_type, {
+      // Formats the provider cannot accept must never enter the session
+      // history — one unsupported image_url makes every later request fail.
+      // The bytes are authoritative: an image labeled image/png that is
+      // actually AVIF is gated on the sniffed format, not the label. Drop
+      // the image; a notice stands in so the model knows what happened.
+      const effectiveMime = resolveEffectiveImageMime(
+        part.source.media_type,
+        decodeBase64Prefix(part.source.data),
+      );
+      if (!isModelAcceptedImageMime(effectiveMime)) {
+        content.push({ type: 'text', text: buildUnsupportedImageNotice(effectiveMime) });
+        changed = true;
+        continue;
+      }
+      const canonicalMime = normalizeImageMime(effectiveMime);
+      const compressed = await compressBase64ForModel(part.source.data, canonicalMime, {
         maxEdge: options.maxImageEdgePx,
         telemetry: telemetryFor('prompt_inline'),
       });
@@ -346,11 +361,32 @@ async function resolvePromptMediaFiles(
           source: { kind: 'base64', media_type: compressed.mimeType, data: compressed.base64 },
         });
         changed = true;
+      } else if (canonicalMime !== part.source.media_type) {
+        // Accepted but aliased (image/jpg, case/whitespace) or mislabeled
+        // (jpeg bytes declared png): forward the canonical MIME — strict
+        // provider whitelists reject anything else.
+        content.push({ ...part, source: { ...part.source, media_type: canonicalMime } });
+        changed = true;
       } else {
         content.push(part);
       }
       continue;
     }
+    // Remote image URL: no bytes to sniff, so reject when its path extension
+    // names a format providers reject (e.g. a link ending in `.avif`) — the
+    // notice keeps the URL so the model can still fetch and convert the
+    // image. Extensionless / unknown URLs pass through to the provider and
+    // the 400 recovery. Image+URL parts that pass are re-emitted unchanged.
+    if (part.type === 'image' && part.source.kind === 'url') {
+      const extMime = unsupportedImageMimeFromUrl(part.source.url);
+      if (extMime !== null) {
+        content.push({ type: 'text', text: buildUnsupportedImageNotice(extMime, part.source.url) });
+        changed = true;
+        continue;
+      }
+      content.push(part);
+      continue;
+    }
     if ((part.type !== 'image' && part.type !== 'video') || part.source.kind !== 'file') {
       content.push(part);
       continue;
@@ -374,6 +410,18 @@ async function resolvePromptMediaFiles(
     let mediaType = file.meta.media_type;
     let bytes: Uint8Array = data;
     if (part.type === 'image') {
+      // Same format gate as the inline path above, and again the bytes are
+      // authoritative: an upload whose Content-Type lies (AVIF bytes sent
+      // as image/png) becomes a notice instead of an image part.
+      mediaType = resolveEffectiveImageMime(mediaType, data);
+      if (!isModelAcceptedImageMime(mediaType)) {
+        content.push({ type: 'text', text: buildUnsupportedImageNotice(mediaType, file.meta.name) });
+        changed = true;
+        continue;
+      }
+      // Forward the canonical MIME (image/jpg → image/jpeg, case/whitespace)
+      // — strict provider whitelists reject the raw alias.
+      mediaType = normalizeImageMime(mediaType);
       const compressed = await compressImageForModel(data, mediaType, {
         maxEdge: options.maxImageEdgePx,
         telemetry: telemetryFor('prompt_file'),
diff --git a/packages/server/test/prompt.e2e.test.ts b/packages/server/test/prompt.e2e.test.ts
index 1df6c6e480..fee7ebe22b 100644
--- a/packages/server/test/prompt.e2e.test.ts
+++ b/packages/server/test/prompt.e2e.test.ts
@@ -358,6 +358,50 @@ describe('POST /api/v1/sessions/{sid}/prompts — submit validation (W7.2 / Chai
     ]);
   });
 
+  it('replaces a remote image URL whose extension is unsupported with a notice', async () => {
+    // No bytes to sniff, so the gate uses the path extension: a `.avif`
+    // link becomes a notice (the provider would fetch it server-side and
+    // 400); an extensionless or accepted-extension URL passes through.
+    let submitted: PromptSubmission | undefined;
+    const r = await bootDaemon([
+      [
+        IPromptService,
+        createPromptServiceOverride({
+          submit: async (_sid, body) => {
+            submitted = body;
+            return {
+              prompt_id: 'prompt_from_stub',
+              user_message_id: 'msg_from_stub',
+              status: 'running',
+              content: body.content,
+              created_at: '2026-06-09T00:00:00.000Z',
+            };
+          },
+        }),
+      ],
+    ]);
+    const sid = await createSession(r);
+
+    const res = await appOf(r).inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
+      payload: {
+        content: [
+          { type: 'text', text: 'describe this' },
+          { type: 'image', source: { kind: 'url', url: 'https://example.com/pic.avif' } },
+        ],
+      },
+    });
+    expect(envelopeOf(res.json()).code).toBe(0);
+
+    expect(submitted?.content[0]).toEqual({ type: 'text', text: 'describe this' });
+    const notice = submitted?.content[1];
+    if (notice?.type !== 'text') throw new Error('expected a text notice');
+    expect(notice.text).toContain('image/avif');
+    expect(notice.text).toContain('https://example.com/pic.avif');
+    expect(submitted?.content.some((p) => p.type === 'image')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
   it('uploads a real PNG image file and resolves it before submitting the prompt', async () => {
     let submitted: PromptSubmission | undefined;
     const r = await bootDaemon([
@@ -565,6 +609,301 @@ describe('POST /api/v1/sessions/{sid}/prompts — submit validation (W7.2 / Chai
     expect(persisted.equals(Buffer.from(base64, 'base64'))).toBe(true);
   });
 
+  it('replaces an inline base64 image the provider cannot accept with a notice', async () => {
+    // An AVIF inline image must never reach the session history — the
+    // provider rejects it and every later request would fail.
+    let submitted: PromptSubmission | undefined;
+    const r = await bootDaemon([
+      [
+        IPromptService,
+        createPromptServiceOverride({
+          submit: async (_sid, body) => {
+            submitted = body;
+            return {
+              prompt_id: 'prompt_from_stub',
+              user_message_id: 'msg_from_stub',
+              status: 'running',
+              content: body.content,
+              created_at: '2026-06-09T00:00:00.000Z',
+            };
+          },
+        }),
+      ],
+    ]);
+    const sid = await createSession(r);
+
+    const res = await appOf(r).inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
+      payload: {
+        content: [
+          { type: 'text', text: 'what is this?' },
+          {
+            type: 'image',
+            source: {
+              kind: 'base64',
+              media_type: 'image/avif',
+              data: Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]).toString('base64'),
+            },
+          },
+        ],
+      },
+    });
+    expect(envelopeOf(res.json()).code).toBe(0);
+
+    expect(submitted?.content[0]).toEqual({ type: 'text', text: 'what is this?' });
+    const notice = submitted?.content[1];
+    if (notice?.type !== 'text') throw new Error('expected a text notice');
+    expect(notice.text).toContain('image/avif');
+    expect(submitted?.content.some((p) => p.type === 'image')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('gates an inline base64 image on its real bytes when the declared MIME lies', async () => {
+    // AVIF bytes declared image/png: the provider decodes bytes, not labels,
+    // so the sniffed format decides — the image must not reach the session.
+    let submitted: PromptSubmission | undefined;
+    const r = await bootDaemon([
+      [
+        IPromptService,
+        createPromptServiceOverride({
+          submit: async (_sid, body) => {
+            submitted = body;
+            return {
+              prompt_id: 'prompt_from_stub',
+              user_message_id: 'msg_from_stub',
+              status: 'running',
+              content: body.content,
+              created_at: '2026-06-09T00:00:00.000Z',
+            };
+          },
+        }),
+      ],
+    ]);
+    const sid = await createSession(r);
+
+    const avif = Buffer.alloc(16);
+    avif.writeUInt32BE(16, 0);
+    avif.write('ftyp', 4, 'latin1');
+    avif.write('avif', 8, 'latin1');
+
+    const res = await appOf(r).inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
+      payload: {
+        content: [
+          {
+            type: 'image',
+            source: { kind: 'base64', media_type: 'image/png', data: avif.toString('base64') },
+          },
+        ],
+      },
+    });
+    expect(envelopeOf(res.json()).code).toBe(0);
+
+    const notice = submitted?.content[0];
+    if (notice?.type !== 'text') throw new Error('expected a text notice');
+    expect(notice.text).toContain('image/avif');
+    expect(submitted?.content.some((p) => p.type === 'image')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('gates an uploaded file on its real bytes when the Content-Type lies', async () => {
+    let submitted: PromptSubmission | undefined;
+    const r = await bootDaemon([
+      [
+        IPromptService,
+        createPromptServiceOverride({
+          submit: async (_sid, body) => {
+            submitted = body;
+            return {
+              prompt_id: 'prompt_from_stub',
+              user_message_id: 'msg_from_stub',
+              status: 'running',
+              content: body.content,
+              created_at: '2026-06-09T00:00:00.000Z',
+            };
+          },
+        }),
+      ],
+    ]);
+    const sid = await createSession(r);
+
+    const avif = Buffer.alloc(16);
+    avif.writeUInt32BE(16, 0);
+    avif.write('ftyp', 4, 'latin1');
+    avif.write('avif', 8, 'latin1');
+
+    const upload = buildMultipart({
+      file: {
+        fieldName: 'file',
+        filename: 'photo.png',
+        contentType: 'image/png',
+        data: avif,
+      },
+    });
+    const uploadRes = await appOf(r).inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: '/api/v1/files',
+      payload: upload.body,
+      headers: { 'content-type': upload.contentType },
+    });
+    const uploadEnv = envelopeOf<{ id: string; media_type: string }>(uploadRes.json());
+    expect(uploadEnv.code).toBe(0);
+
+    const res = await appOf(r).inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
+      payload: {
+        content: [{ type: 'image', source: { kind: 'file', file_id: uploadEnv.data!.id } }],
+      },
+    });
+    expect(envelopeOf(res.json()).code).toBe(0);
+
+    const notice = submitted?.content[0];
+    if (notice?.type !== 'text') throw new Error('expected a text notice');
+    expect(notice.text).toContain('image/avif');
+    expect(submitted?.content.some((p) => p.type === 'image')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('forwards an inline base64 image with an aliased MIME in canonical form', async () => {
+    // Strict provider whitelists reject the raw `image/jpg` alias — the part
+    // must land in the session with the canonical MIME.
+    let submitted: PromptSubmission | undefined;
+    const r = await bootDaemon([
+      [
+        IPromptService,
+        createPromptServiceOverride({
+          submit: async (_sid, body) => {
+            submitted = body;
+            return {
+              prompt_id: 'prompt_from_stub',
+              user_message_id: 'msg_from_stub',
+              status: 'running',
+              content: body.content,
+              created_at: '2026-06-09T00:00:00.000Z',
+            };
+          },
+        }),
+      ],
+    ]);
+    const sid = await createSession(r);
+
+    const base64 = Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]).toString('base64');
+    const res = await appOf(r).inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
+      payload: {
+        content: [
+          { type: 'image', source: { kind: 'base64', media_type: 'image/jpg', data: base64 } },
+        ],
+      },
+    });
+    expect(envelopeOf(res.json()).code).toBe(0);
+
+    expect(submitted?.content).toEqual([
+      { type: 'image', source: { kind: 'base64', media_type: 'image/jpeg', data: base64 } },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('treats an inline base64 image with a parameterized media type like the bare form', async () => {
+    // `image/jpeg; charset=utf-8` is the same accepted image as `image/jpeg`:
+    // MIME parameters are stripped before the acceptance check, so it is
+    // forwarded (canonicalized), not dropped as if unsupported. Garbage
+    // bytes force the declared-MIME fallback path that exercises the strip.
+    let submitted: PromptSubmission | undefined;
+    const r = await bootDaemon([
+      [
+        IPromptService,
+        createPromptServiceOverride({
+          submit: async (_sid, body) => {
+            submitted = body;
+            return {
+              prompt_id: 'prompt_from_stub',
+              user_message_id: 'msg_from_stub',
+              status: 'running',
+              content: body.content,
+              created_at: '2026-06-09T00:00:00.000Z',
+            };
+          },
+        }),
+      ],
+    ]);
+    const sid = await createSession(r);
+
+    const base64 = Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]).toString('base64');
+    const res = await appOf(r).inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
+      payload: {
+        content: [
+          {
+            type: 'image',
+            source: { kind: 'base64', media_type: 'image/jpeg; charset=utf-8', data: base64 },
+          },
+        ],
+      },
+    });
+    expect(envelopeOf(res.json()).code).toBe(0);
+
+    expect(submitted?.content).toEqual([
+      { type: 'image', source: { kind: 'base64', media_type: 'image/jpeg', data: base64 } },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('replaces an uploaded image the provider cannot accept with a notice naming the file', async () => {
+    let submitted: PromptSubmission | undefined;
+    const r = await bootDaemon([
+      [
+        IPromptService,
+        createPromptServiceOverride({
+          submit: async (_sid, body) => {
+            submitted = body;
+            return {
+              prompt_id: 'prompt_from_stub',
+              user_message_id: 'msg_from_stub',
+              status: 'running',
+              content: body.content,
+              created_at: '2026-06-09T00:00:00.000Z',
+            };
+          },
+        }),
+      ],
+    ]);
+    const sid = await createSession(r);
+
+    const upload = buildMultipart({
+      file: {
+        fieldName: 'file',
+        filename: 'photo.avif',
+        contentType: 'image/avif',
+        data: Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]),
+      },
+    });
+    const uploadRes = await appOf(r).inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: '/api/v1/files',
+      payload: upload.body,
+      headers: { 'content-type': upload.contentType },
+    });
+    const uploadEnv = envelopeOf<{ id: string; media_type: string }>(uploadRes.json());
+    expect(uploadEnv.code).toBe(0);
+    expect(uploadEnv.data?.media_type).toBe('image/avif');
+
+    const res = await appOf(r).inject({
+      method: 'POST',
+      url: `/api/v1/sessions/${sid}/prompts`,
+      payload: {
+        content: [{ type: 'image', source: { kind: 'file', file_id: uploadEnv.data!.id } }],
+      },
+    });
+    expect(envelopeOf(res.json()).code).toBe(0);
+
+    const notice = submitted?.content[0];
+    if (notice?.type !== 'text') throw new Error('expected a text notice');
+    expect(notice.text).toContain('image/avif');
+    expect(notice.text).toContain('photo.avif');
+    expect(submitted?.content.some((p) => p.type === 'image')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
   it('scopes prompt image compression telemetry to the session', async () => {
     // The agent-side image_compress sources inherit the session context from
     // their per-session telemetry client; the prompt-ingestion sources must