diff --git a/rust/src/api/orders.rs b/rust/src/api/orders.rs
index 93a0a26c..d9ccc3bb 100644
--- a/rust/src/api/orders.rs
+++ b/rust/src/api/orders.rs
@@ -1048,7 +1048,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn subscribe_gift_wraps(trade_pubkey: nostr_sdk::PublicKey, tra
 
 /// Dispatch a Mostro `Message` recovered from a gift-wrap.
 ///
-/// Authenticates the sender against the active Mostro pubkey, runs the
+/// The caller recovers the `UnwrappedMessage` via
+/// `crate::nostr::gift_wrap::unwrap_mostro_message`, which verifies the seal
+/// signature so the `identity` field is cryptographically attributable.
+/// This function authenticates that seal signer's `identity` against the
+/// active Mostro pubkey (never the self-asserted rumor `sender`), runs the
 /// centralized `validate_response` check (catches `CantDo` responses and
 /// malformed `request_id` fields), then routes by action.
 async fn dispatch_mostro_message(
@@ -1058,29 +1062,36 @@ async fn dispatch_mostro_message(
 ) {
     use mostro_core::message::Action;
 
-    // mostro-core 0.10 adds `identity` (seal signer, long-lived) alongside
-    // `sender` (rumor author, per-trade). A Mostro node that opts out of the
-    // identity/trade split — the current daemon — reuses the same key for
-    // both, so `identity == sender`. We keep the existing sender-based
-    // authentication check below; the extra `identity` field is deliberately
-    // ignored here.
+    // mostro-core 0.10 splits the wrap into two pubkeys:
+    //
+    //   * `identity` — seal signer, proven by `seal.verify_signature()` in
+    //     `unwrap_message`. This is the only field a forger cannot spoof.
+    //   * `sender`   — rumor author. Self-asserted unless an inner
+    //     `signature` is present and verifies against the rumor pubkey.
+    //
+    // In Mostro's reputation-mode key split `sender` (per-trade key) and
+    // `identity` (long-lived seal key) are expected to differ, and protocol
+    // responses commonly omit the inner signature, so we cannot use a
+    // sender/identity equality check to gate dispatch. Authenticate against
+    // `identity` only — a forger who seals with their own key cannot make
+    // it match the configured Mostro pubkey.
     let mostro_core::nip59::UnwrappedMessage {
         message: msg,
-        sender,
-        identity: _,
+        sender: _,
+        identity,
         signature: _,
         created_at: _,
     } = unwrapped;
 
-    // Daemon authentication: the active Mostro pubkey is the only legitimate
-    // sender for protocol responses. Reject anything else loudly — previously
-    // we trusted whatever decrypted under our trade key.
+    // Daemon authentication: the seal signer must be the active Mostro
+    // pubkey. The seal signature is verified inside `unwrap_message`, so
+    // `identity` is the cryptographically authoritative origin.
     match nostr_sdk::PublicKey::from_hex(&crate::config::active_mostro_pubkey()) {
-        Ok(expected) if expected == sender => {}
+        Ok(expected) if expected == identity => {}
         Ok(expected) => {
             crate::api::logging::blog_warn("gift-wrap", format!(
-                "rejecting gift-wrap: sender={} != active mostro={} (trade={})",
-                &sender.to_hex()[..8],
+                "rejecting gift-wrap: identity={} != active mostro={} (trade={})",
+                &identity.to_hex()[..8],
                 &expected.to_hex()[..8],
                 &trade_pubkey_hex[..8],
             ));
diff --git a/rust/src/nostr/gift_wrap.rs b/rust/src/nostr/gift_wrap.rs
index 678abed0..dcc5f6aa 100644
--- a/rust/src/nostr/gift_wrap.rs
+++ b/rust/src/nostr/gift_wrap.rs
@@ -62,11 +62,13 @@ pub async fn wrap_mostro_message(
 /// differ. The returned `UnwrappedMessage` exposes both (`identity` vs.
 /// `sender`) so callers can route and authorize accordingly.
 ///
-/// Daemon authentication — verifying that `UnwrappedMessage.sender` equals
-/// the active Mostro pubkey — is NOT performed here. The seal author is
-/// proven via the inner signature but could in principle be any key; the
-/// upstream dispatcher in `api/orders.rs` enforces the Mostro-pubkey check
-/// before routing the message.
+/// Daemon authentication is NOT performed here. The seal signature is
+/// verified (so `identity` is cryptographically attributable) but the seal
+/// signer could in principle be any key, and the rumor pubkey (`sender`)
+/// is only meaningful when an inner signature accompanies it. The upstream
+/// dispatcher in `api/orders.rs` enforces the Mostro-pubkey check against
+/// `identity` — never against the unauthenticated `sender` — before
+/// routing the message.
 pub async fn unwrap_mostro_message(
     trade_keys: &Keys,
     event: &Event,