diff --git a/packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/platform_addresses/fund_from_asset_lock.rs b/packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/platform_addresses/fund_from_asset_lock.rs
index 255c17fd01e..ee3b509db3d 100644
--- a/packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/platform_addresses/fund_from_asset_lock.rs
+++ b/packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/platform_addresses/fund_from_asset_lock.rs
@@ -293,6 +293,51 @@ impl PlatformAddressWallet {
             .reconcile_address_infos(&address_infos, "fund from asset lock")
             .await;
 
+        // ADDR-09: force the next BLAST sync to full-scan-reconcile
+        // instead of applying an incremental delta.
+        //
+        // `reconcile_address_infos` above set the provider's committed
+        // `found` seed to the proof-attested ABSOLUTE balance `X`, but the
+        // top-up is recorded on-chain as a DELTA (`AddBalanceToAddress` →
+        // `AddToCredits`) in Drive's recent-address-balance-changes tree,
+        // and we did NOT advance the incremental watermark. An incremental
+        // next pass would seed `result.found` from `current_balances()`
+        // (already `X`) and then re-apply that recent `AddToCredits(X)`
+        // delta from the stale watermark, landing at `X + X = 2X` — the
+        // ADDR-09 double-count. Zeroing the in-memory watermark makes
+        // `last_sync_timestamp()` return `None`, so the next pass full-scans
+        // (absolute seed from the tree, catch-up from the fresh checkpoint)
+        // and reconciles to the correct `X`. This is the automated
+        // equivalent of the manual Sync-tab "Clear" + "Sync Now".
+        //
+        // Unlike transfer/withdrawal (which also route through the seam),
+        // an asset-lock top-up credits its recipient with a pure additive
+        // delta and no offsetting input for that same address, so updating
+        // the `found` seed alone does not neutralize the re-applied delta —
+        // hence this path-specific watermark invalidation.
+        //
+        // DURABILITY: in-memory only. The persisted sync watermark cannot
+        // be reset to 0 through the normal changeset —
+        // `PlatformAddressChangeSet::merge` combines `sync_height` with
+        // `.max()` and the persister only fires `on_persist_sync_state_fn`
+        // when a component is `> 0` — so a durable zero would have to fight
+        // both the merge and the `> 0` gate. Instead we rely on the
+        // in-session BLAST cadence (~15s): the next pass full-scans,
+        // reconciles to `X`, and persists a correct FORWARD watermark, so
+        // durable state self-corrects within ~15s. The only residual gap is
+        // an app kill inside that ~15s window; a restart then resumes
+        // incremental sync from the stale persisted watermark and the
+        // double-count could briefly reappear until the next full rescan
+        // (or a manual Clear). That narrow window is accepted here rather
+        // than over-engineering a durable invalidation against the
+        // `.max()` merge / `> 0` gate.
+        {
+            let mut guard = self.provider.write().await;
+            if let Some(provider) = guard.as_mut() {
+                provider.invalidate_sync_watermark();
+            }
+        }
+
         if let Some(out_point) = tracked_out_point {
             // Platform DID accept the top-up — propagating an Err
             // here would misreport the protocol outcome, since the
diff --git a/packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/platform_addresses/provider.rs b/packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/platform_addresses/provider.rs
index 7c29ac6883d..fa43b7fcf3d 100644
--- a/packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/platform_addresses/provider.rs
+++ b/packages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/platform_addresses/provider.rs
@@ -520,6 +520,46 @@ impl PlatformPaymentAddressProvider {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Zero the incremental-sync watermark ONLY, so the next
+    /// `sync_balances` takes the full-scan branch — WITHOUT dropping the
+    /// cached `found` seed (unlike [`reset_sync_state`](Self::reset_sync_state),
+    /// which is the "Clear" flow).
+    ///
+    /// WHY (ADDR-09): the asset-lock top-up path reconciles the
+    /// proof-attested ABSOLUTE balance `X` into both the managed account
+    /// and the provider's committed `found` seed, but the on-chain credit
+    /// is recorded as a DELTA (`AddBalanceToAddress` → `AddToCredits`) in
+    /// Drive's recent-address-balance-changes tree. If the next pass ran
+    /// INCREMENTALLY it would seed `result.found` from `current_balances()`
+    /// (already `X`) and then re-apply that recent `AddToCredits(X)` delta
+    /// from the stale watermark, landing at `X + X = 2X` — the ADDR-09
+    /// double-count. An optimistic absolute write is fundamentally
+    /// inconsistent with incremental delta re-application, so we force the
+    /// very next pass to full-scan-reconcile.
+    ///
+    /// With `sync_timestamp == 0`, [`last_sync_timestamp`](Self::last_sync_timestamp)
+    /// returns `None`, which makes `sync_address_balances` choose the
+    /// full-scan branch: `result.found` is re-seeded ABSOLUTELY from the
+    /// tree (the `found` seed is only consulted on the incremental branch,
+    /// which is skipped), and incremental catch-up runs from the fresh
+    /// full-scan checkpoint rather than the stale height, so no recent
+    /// delta is re-applied. `last_known_recent_block` is zeroed too since
+    /// catch-up reads it as its recent-tree boundary.
+    ///
+    /// The `found` seed is deliberately KEPT (not cleared): a full scan
+    /// ignores it as a seed, and preserving it means display and
+    /// `auto_select_inputs` budgeting keep the just-applied balance `X`
+    /// visible during the ~15s until the reconciling scan completes,
+    /// instead of the momentary zero `reset_sync_state` would show.
+    ///
+    /// This is the in-memory equivalent of the manual Sync-tab
+    /// "Clear" + "Sync Now" that also fixes the double-count.
+    pub(crate) fn invalidate_sync_watermark(&mut self) {
+        self.sync_height = 0;
+        self.sync_timestamp = 0;
+        self.last_known_recent_block = 0;
+    }
+
     /// Diagnostic snapshot counts used by the read-only memory
     /// explorer surface on
     /// [`crate::manager::PlatformWalletManager::platform_address_provider_state_blocking`].
@@ -1822,4 +1862,49 @@ mod tests {
             "reset must drop the cached `found` seed"
         );
     }
+
+    /// ADDR-09: after an asset-lock top-up reconciles an absolute balance,
+    /// the fund path calls `invalidate_sync_watermark` to force the next
+    /// BLAST pass into full-scan mode. Unlike `reset_sync_state`, it must
+    /// zero all three watermark scalars (so `last_sync_timestamp()` returns
+    /// `None`, the full-scan trigger) WITHOUT dropping the freshly
+    /// reconciled `found` seed — display and input budgeting rely on the
+    /// balance staying visible until the reconciling scan completes.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn invalidate_sync_watermark_forces_full_scan_keeps_seed() {
+        let addr = p2pkh(1);
+        let mut provider = provider_with_one_funded_address(addr, funds(294_627_247_940, 5));
+
+        // Simulate a wallet mid-incremental-sync: non-zero watermark and a
+        // populated balance seed (the just-reconciled top-up balance `X`).
+        provider.set_stored_sync_state(10, 20, 30);
+        assert_eq!(provider.last_sync_height(), 10);
+        assert_eq!(provider.last_sync_timestamp(), Some(20));
+        assert_eq!(provider.last_known_recent_block(), 30);
+        assert_eq!(provider.current_balances().count(), 1);
+
+        provider.invalidate_sync_watermark();
+
+        // Watermark fully zeroed → SDK drops back to full-scan mode.
+        assert_eq!(provider.last_sync_height(), 0);
+        assert_eq!(
+            provider.last_sync_timestamp(),
+            None,
+            "invalidated watermark must report no last-sync timestamp so the \
+             next pass takes the full-scan branch (the ADDR-09 fix)"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(provider.last_known_recent_block(), 0);
+
+        // The reconciled `found` seed SURVIVES — a full scan ignores it as
+        // a seed, but keeping it means the balance `X` stays visible for
+        // display / input budgeting during the ~15s until the scan runs.
+        let seed: Vec<_> = provider.current_balances().collect();
+        assert_eq!(
+            seed.len(),
+            1,
+            "invalidate_sync_watermark must NOT drop the cached `found` seed"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(seed[0].1, addr);
+        assert_eq!(seed[0].2, funds(294_627_247_940, 5));
+    }
 }
diff --git a/packages/swift-sdk/SwiftExampleApp/TEST_PLAN.md b/packages/swift-sdk/SwiftExampleApp/TEST_PLAN.md
index 17cb18895a7..2df756b88d8 100644
--- a/packages/swift-sdk/SwiftExampleApp/TEST_PLAN.md
+++ b/packages/swift-sdk/SwiftExampleApp/TEST_PLAN.md
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ The app is a full multi-wallet client: `PlatformWalletManager` holds N wallets c
 | ADDR-03 | Top up address from asset lock | Cross | Thorough | ✅ | `FundFromAssetLockPlatformAddressView` → `dash_sdk_address_top_up_from_asset_lock`. |
 | ADDR-04 | Withdraw address credits → Core L1 | Cross | Thorough | ✅ | `WalletDetailView` → Platform Balance row **⋯ menu → Withdraw to Core** (sheet, `WithdrawPlatformAddressView`) → `ManagedPlatformAddressWallet.withdraw` → `platform_address_wallet_withdraw_to_address` (keychain-signed). Source = DIP-17 platform-payment account picker; the **full** account balance is withdrawn (no per-address amount, no change). Core L1 destination = own wallet (`core_wallet_next_receive_address`) or pasted external address, network-checked Rust-side. `coreFeePerByte` defaults to 1. Gated on the Core (SPV) wallet being initialized — shows a "Core not ready" state otherwise. Identity/address credit balance drops; L1 payout is pooled and processed asynchronously (no immediate txid). On success a DIP-17 resync runs. (Also reachable via the 🧪 debug builder *Settings → Platform State Transitions → Address → Withdraw Address Funds (raw)* → `dash_sdk_address_withdraw_funds`, which pastes a raw 64-char private key.) |
 | ADDR-06 | Display / share your Platform receive address | Platform | Common | ✅ | "Receive Dash" sheet → **Platform** tab (`ReceiveAddressView`, `ReceiveAddressTab.platform`, "Your Platform Address"): QR + bech32m DIP-17 address + Copy. The receive counterpart to the credit-transfer / top-up funding paths. |
+| ADDR-09 | Top-up balance reflects exactly once (no double-credit) | Cross | Thorough | ✅ | Regression guard for the top-up double-credit bug. Run `ADDR-03` ("Top Up from Core", `FundFromAssetLockPlatformAddressView`, `dash_sdk_address_top_up_from_asset_lock`) on a Core-funded wallet, then **wait through at least one automatic BLAST platform-address sync (~15s)** and re-read the `WalletDetailView` Platform Balance. **Pass:** the balance increases by the topped-up amount **exactly once** and stays there — no manual Sync-tab "Clear" + "Sync Now" needed. **Fail (the bug):** balance shows ~2× the top-up until a manual Clear+resync. Root cause was in `rs-platform-wallet`: the fund path reconciled the proof-attested *absolute* balance into the provider but left the incremental sync watermark stale, so the next *incremental* BLAST pass re-applied the on-chain `AddBalanceToAddress` (`AddToCredits`) *delta* on top → 2×. Fixed by `PlatformPaymentAddressProvider::invalidate_sync_watermark()` (called from `fund_from_asset_lock` after `reconcile_address_infos`), which forces the next pass to full-scan-reconcile — the automated equivalent of Clear+resync. Needs a **Funded Core wallet** fixture; the wallet's Core (SPV) balance must be non-zero to build the asset lock. |
 
 ### 4.4 DPNS (usernames) — `Domain=DPNS`