Update jackson-version [SECURITY]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind (source)	2.18.0 → 2.18.8
com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core	2.18.0 → 2.18.6

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jackson-databind has a PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass via generic type parameters that allows arbitrary class instantiation

CVE-2026-54512 / GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm

More information

Details

jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV.

If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization.

An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list.

This is the same vulnerability class responsible for the historical sequence of jackson-databind deserialization CVEs; here it manifests as a validator bypass rather than a missing deny-list entry.

Impact

• Bypass of the PTV allow-list, including the recommended BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator configured with name-prefix allow rules.
• Arbitrary class instantiation of any type assignable to the container's element/parameter position, with attacker-controlled property values (setter/field injection).
• Potential unauthenticated remote code execution when a class with exploitable side effects (JNDI lookup, JDBC/connection-pool gadgets,TemplatesImpl-style loaders, etc.) is present on the classpath.

Applications that accept untrusted JSON and rely on a configured PTV — the documented, security-conscious configuration — are affected.

Proof of Concept

Configuration restricting polymorphic deserialization to a single safe container:

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
        .allowIfSubType("java.util.ArrayList")
        .build();

ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
        .polymorphicTypeValidator(ptv)
        .build();

Malicious payload (Wrapper.value is Object with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS, include = As.WRAPPER_ARRAY)):

{"value":["java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.EvilGadget>",[{"cmd":"calc.exe"}]]}

On vulnerable versions, com.evil.EvilGadget is instantiated and its cmd property is set, despite only java.util.ArrayList being allow-listed. On 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4 the deserialization throws InvalidTypeIdException before instantiation.

Variant payloads (all bypass an ArrayList/HashMap allow-list):

Type ID	Smuggled type position
java.util.ArrayList<Evil>	list element
java.util.HashMap<Evil,String>	map key
java.util.HashMap<String,Evil>	map value
java.util.ArrayList<java.util.ArrayList<Evil>>	nested element
java.util.ArrayList<Evil[]>	array element

---

Patches

Fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4 and 3.1.4 via the changes for FasterXML/jackson-databind#5988, commit 434d6c511. The fix adds recursive validation of each non-trivial type parameter (and array element types appearing as parameters) through the full PTV chain, with documented exemptions for Object (wildcard resolution) and Enum types.

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/5988
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/434d6c511de7fdd9872f29157aafb6162d12d8d5
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j3rv-43j4-c7qm

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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jackson-databind has an array subtype allowlist bypass in BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator (allowIfSubTypeIsArray)

CVE-2026-54513 / GHSA-rmj7-2vxq-3g9f

More information

Details

Summary

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist.

Impact

Applications using BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() as a safeguard get no protection for concrete array component types; an attacker controlling JSON can instantiate non-allowlisted types via an array wrapper, re-opening the gadget-instantiation risk PTV is meant to prevent.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains)

• 2.18 line: >= 2.10.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8
• 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
• 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.

Severity / CWE

Maintainer: significant. Reporter: HIGH. CWE-184 (Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs); related CWE-502.

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5981; fix PR #​5983 (24529da), 2.18 backport PR #​5984 (01d1692). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.1 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-rmj7-2vxq-3g9f
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/5981
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/5983
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/pull/5984
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/01d1692c8d0ed03e51a0e3c4f8a9e6908e4931e5
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/24529da29fdf46ff94ca38de9ebf31cd188f5e8e
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rmj7-2vxq-3g9f

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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jackson-databind: InetSocketAddress deserialization triggers eager DNS resolution (SSRF)

CVE-2026-54514 / GHSA-hgj6-7826-r7m5

More information

Details

Summary

JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect.

Impact

An attacker controlling JSON deserialized into an InetSocketAddress-bearing type can force outbound DNS lookups for attacker-chosen hostnames at deserialization time (SSRF / DNS-based out-of-band interaction / internal-resolver probing), purely from binding.

Affected / Patched (verified via git tag --contains on 1f5a103)

• 2.18 line: >= 2.18.0, < 2.18.8 -> fixed in 2.18.8
• 2.19-2.21 line: >= 2.19.0, < 2.21.4 -> fixed in 2.21.4
• 3.x line: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.4 -> fixed in 3.1.4

Severity / CWE

Maintainer: minor. Reporter: LOW. CWE-918 (SSRF).

Upstream fix

FasterXML/jackson-databind#5951 ("Improve InetSocketAddress deserialization"). Released 2026-06-04 in 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4.

Credits

Omkhar Arasaratnam (@​omkhar) - finder.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-hgj6-7826-r7m5
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/pull/5951
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/1f5a1037b1e9e05920e755cb35f198bcd46667e4
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hgj6-7826-r7m5

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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jackson-core: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Async Parser Leads to Potential DoS Condition

GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq

More information

Details

Summary

The non-blocking (async) JSON parser in jackson-core bypasses the maxNumberLength constraint (default: 1000 characters) defined in StreamReadConstraints. This allows an attacker to send JSON with arbitrarily long numbers through the async parser API, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

The standard synchronous parser correctly enforces this limit, but the async parser fails to do so, creating an inconsistent enforcement policy.

Details

The root cause is that the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase (and related classes) does not call the methods responsible for number length validation.

• The number parsing methods (e.g., _finishNumberIntegralPart) accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length checks.
• After parsing, they call _valueComplete(), which finalizes the token but does not call resetInt() or resetFloat().
• The resetInt()/resetFloat() methods in ParserBase are where the validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() checks are performed.
• Because this validation step is skipped, the maxNumberLength constraint is never enforced in the async code path.

PoC

The following JUnit 5 test demonstrates the vulnerability. It shows that the async parser accepts a 5,000-digit number, whereas the limit should be 1,000.

package tools.jackson.core.unittest.dos;

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;

import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;

import tools.jackson.core.*;
import tools.jackson.core.exc.StreamConstraintsException;
import tools.jackson.core.json.JsonFactory;
import tools.jackson.core.json.async.NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser;

import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;

/**
 * POC: Number Length Constraint Bypass in Non-Blocking (Async) JSON Parsers
 *
 * Authors: sprabhav7, rohan-repos
 * 
 * maxNumberLength default = 1000 characters (digits).
 * A number with more than 1000 digits should be rejected by any parser.
 *
 * BUG: The async parser never calls resetInt()/resetFloat() which is where
 * validateIntegerLength()/validateFPLength() lives. Instead it calls
 * _valueComplete() which skips all number length validation.
 *
 * CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
 */
class AsyncParserNumberLengthBypassTest {

    private static final int MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH = 1000;
    private static final int TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH = 5000;

    private final JsonFactory factory = new JsonFactory();

    // CONTROL: Sync parser correctly rejects a number exceeding maxNumberLength
    @​Test
    void syncParserRejectsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);
		
		// Output to console
        System.out.println("[SYNC] Parsing " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number (limit: " + MAX_NUMBER_LENGTH + ")");
        try {
            try (JsonParser p = factory.createParser(ObjectReadContext.empty(), payload)) {
                while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                    if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                        System.out.println("[SYNC] Accepted number with " + p.getText().length() + " digits — UNEXPECTED");
                    }
                }
            }
            fail("Sync parser must reject a " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + "-digit number");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            System.out.println("[SYNC] Rejected with StreamConstraintsException: " + e.getMessage());
        }
    }

    // VULNERABILITY: Async parser accepts the SAME number that sync rejects
    @​Test
    void asyncParserAcceptsLongNumber() throws Exception {
        byte[] payload = buildPayloadWithLongInteger(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH);

        NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser p =
            (NonBlockingByteArrayJsonParser) factory.createNonBlockingByteArrayParser(ObjectReadContext.empty());
        p.feedInput(payload, 0, payload.length);
        p.endOfInput();

        boolean foundNumber = false;
        try {
            while (p.nextToken() != null) {
                if (p.currentToken() == JsonToken.VALUE_NUMBER_INT) {
                    foundNumber = true;
                    String numberText = p.getText();
                    assertEquals(TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH, numberText.length(),
                        "Async parser silently accepted all " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits");
                }
            }
            // Output to console
            System.out.println("[ASYNC INT] Accepted number with " + TEST_NUMBER_LENGTH + " digits — BUG CONFIRMED");
            assertTrue(foundNumber, "Parser should have produced a VALUE_NUMBER_INT token");
        } catch (StreamConstraintsException e) {
            fail("Bug is fixed — async parser now correctly rejects long numbers: " + e.getMessage());
        }
        p.close();
    }

    private byte[] buildPayloadWithLongInteger(int numDigits) {
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(numDigits + 10);
        sb.append("{\"v\":");
        for (int i = 0; i < numDigits; i++) {
            sb.append((char) ('1' + (i % 9)));
        }
        sb.append('}');
        return sb.toString().getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
    }
}

Impact

A malicious actor can send a JSON document with an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (e.g., in a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application). This can cause:

1. Memory Exhaustion: Unbounded allocation of memory in the TextBuffer to store the number's digits, leading to an OutOfMemoryError.
2. CPU Exhaustion: If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM can be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing operations, leading to a CPU-based DoS.

Suggested Remediation

The async parsing path should be updated to respect the maxNumberLength constraint. The simplest fix appears to ensure that _valueComplete() or a similar method in the async path calls the appropriate validation methods (resetInt() or resetFloat()) already present in ParserBase, mirroring the behavior of the synchronous parsers.

NOTE: This research was performed in collaboration with rohan-repos

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/security/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/1555
• https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/commit/b0c428e6f993e1b5ece5c1c3cb2523e887cd52cf
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Quality Gate passed

Issues
0 New issues
0 Accepted issues

Measures
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