fix: add missing logging_config.py to backend Dockerfile#4
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vybe merged 1 commit intoJan 7, 2026
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The backend Dockerfile was missing COPY instruction for logging_config.py, causing ModuleNotFoundError when running in production mode (docker-compose.prod.yml). Development mode works because it uses volume mounts that include all files, but production builds only the explicitly copied files.
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- Add Phase 13-14 requirements for scalability & process orchestration - Document simplified role model (Executor/Monitor/Informed) - Add human approval steps concept for business processes - Enhance demo-analyst and demo-researcher templates - Improve create-demo-agent-fleet command - Fix replay mode activity & context simulation in network.js - Merge conflict resolution for PR #3 and #4 changelog entries 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Test Results:
- T2.1: Exclusive gateway (XOR) routing ✅
- T2.2: Gateway with default route fallback ✅
- T2.3: Parallel execution (fork/join) ✅
- T2.4: Step-level conditional skip ✅
Key Findings:
- Gateway routes use 'target' field (not 'next')
- Default route via 'default_route' at step level
- Step conditions use path syntax (steps.x.output.y)
not template syntax ({{steps.x.output.y}})
Fixes Applied:
- Fixed all T2 YAMLs with correct gateway syntax
- Added depends_on and conditions for path steps
- Documented Issue #4 in test results
Running Total: 8/22 tests passing (36%)
Refs: PROCESS_ENGINE_ROADMAP.md Phase 1
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Test Results:
- T2.1: Exclusive gateway (XOR) routing ✅
- T2.2: Gateway with default route fallback ✅
- T2.3: Parallel execution (fork/join) ✅
- T2.4: Step-level conditional skip ✅
Key Findings:
- Gateway routes use 'target' field (not 'next')
- Default route via 'default_route' at step level
- Step conditions use path syntax (steps.x.output.y)
not template syntax ({{steps.x.output.y}})
Fixes Applied:
- Fixed all T2 YAMLs with correct gateway syntax
- Added depends_on and conditions for path steps
- Documented Issue #4 in test results
Running Total: 8/22 tests passing (36%)
Refs: PROCESS_ENGINE_ROADMAP.md Phase 1
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- requirements.md: Added SLACK-FILES requirement (§15.1b-iii) - feature-flows/slack-file-sharing.md: Full flow document - feature-flows.md: Index updated with new flow - task_execution_service.py: Move start_time before try block (review item #3) - message_router.py: Sanitize session_id in upload path (review item #4) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…container (#222) * feat: Bidirectional file sharing — Slack to agent (inbound) (#222) Enable Slack users to upload files that agents can process. Images are embedded as base64 data URIs for Claude vision. Text files (CSV, JSON, TXT, etc.) are copied into per-session container directories via Docker put_archive API. Security: - Filename sanitization (path traversal prevention, hidden file rejection) - Per-user file upload rate limiting (5 files/min) - Size caps: 5MB per image, 10MB per file, 10MB total inline images - Max 10 files per message - Unsupported formats rejected with user message (PDF, archives, video, audio) - Per-session upload dirs cleaned up after execution (all exit paths) Architecture: - FileAttachment model + files field on NormalizedMessage (channel-agnostic) - adapter.download_file() — each channel implements its own download auth - files:read OAuth scope added for Slack workspace installs - container_put_archive() async wrapper in docker_utils - Task execution logging: timeout, HTTP status, elapsed time Tests: 36 unit tests covering sanitization, type routing, size limits, extraction, rate limiting, session directories Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: Add requirements, feature flow for Slack file sharing (#222) - requirements.md: Added SLACK-FILES requirement (§15.1b-iii) - feature-flows/slack-file-sharing.md: Full flow document - feature-flows.md: Index updated with new flow - task_execution_service.py: Move start_time before try block (review item #3) - message_router.py: Sanitize session_id in upload path (review item #4) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Pavlo <pash@pashs-MBP.home> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: vybe <me@evyborov.com>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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* docs(planning): add Session tab design — --resume-default chat surface
Adds docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md, the comprehensive plan for a
new "Session" tab living alongside Chat. Sessions reattach to their own
Claude Code JSONL via --resume, preserving tool memory, mid-skill state,
and reasoning state across turns.
Plan covers:
- UI design (tab placement, multi-session model, +New Session, Reset memory)
- Data model (agent_sessions / agent_session_messages — parallel to chat)
- Backend architecture (separate router, single shared change to
task_execution_service for persist_session plumbing)
- Phased rollout (foundation → backend → frontend → hardening → GA)
- Edge cases & failure-mode lessons baked in from a prior local spike
(parser bug, --no-session-persistence dependency, cold-turn detection,
port allocation)
- Test plan including the cross-session contamination test for
Anthropic claude-code#26964
- Retention/cleanup policy, observability, security checklist
- Local-first workflow: implementation runs entirely on this branch
until validation passes; only then does the standard SDLC engage
(issue, push, PR)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(db): add agent_sessions + agent_session_messages tables
Phase 1.1 of the Session tab plan (docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md).
Schema definitions go in db/schema.py for fresh installs; the matching
idempotent migration agent_sessions_tables in db/migrations.py upgrades
existing databases.
The schema mirrors chat_sessions / chat_messages but is strictly parallel
— no foreign keys, no shared columns, separate index namespace. Three
fields are unique to the session model:
- agent_sessions.cached_claude_session_id — the Claude Code session UUID
the next turn will pass to ``--resume``
- agent_sessions.consecutive_resume_failures — drives the resume-failure
fallback (Phase 2.2)
- agent_session_messages.cache_read_tokens — observability for whether
Anthropic's prompt cache engaged
CASCADE on session delete cleans up message rows automatically.
Verified locally: backend restart applies the migration cleanly, tables
have 15 columns each with correct types/defaults/PKs, all four indexes
created, second restart confirms idempotency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(db): add SessionOperations for Session tab persistence
Phase 1.2 of the Session tab plan (docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md).
- Adds AgentSession and AgentSessionMessage Pydantic models in db_models.py
with the new fields the Session tab needs beyond ChatSession/ChatMessage:
cached_claude_session_id, last_resume_at, consecutive_resume_failures on
the session row, and cache_read_tokens + claude_session_id on each message.
- Creates db/sessions.py with a SessionOperations class mirroring the
ChatOperations shape: create_session, get_session, list_sessions,
delete_session, add_session_message, get_session_messages, plus the
Claude UUID cache helpers (get/update/clear_cached_claude_session_id)
and resume health helpers (mark_resume_failure, mark_resume_success).
- Wires the new ops into the DatabaseManager facade alongside the
existing _chat_ops, with one delegating method per public operation.
No router, no agent-server change, no frontend yet — those land in later
phases. Tables agent_sessions and agent_session_messages already exist
from the prior schema commit.
* feat(session-tab): backend foundation for --resume-default Session surface
Phases 1.3 through 1.7 of the Session tab plan
(docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md). Pure backend / agent-server work
behind a flag — no UI surface yet, no behavior change to Chat or any
existing /task caller.
Agent server (base image):
- Stream-json parser fix (Appendix B). Both parse_stream_json_output and
process_stream_line now recognize {"type":"system","subtype":"init"}
for session_id capture, with the result event as a fallback when init
was missed (truncated streams). The legacy bare-init shape is
intentionally rejected. This is the same bug that would have made
Session caching corrupt on every cold turn.
- Same bug in execute_headless_task's permission-mode validation site:
the check matched the wrong shape, so permission_mode_validated never
flipped to True and the protective kill-on-misconfigured-permission
path silently failed open. Now uses type=system + subtype=init.
- New persist_session flag threaded through ParallelTaskRequest →
routers/chat.py → AgentRuntime ABC → ClaudeCodeRuntime.execute_headless
→ execute_headless_task. When True, --no-session-persistence is
omitted so the JSONL is written and the next turn's --resume can find
it. --session-id is still passed for unique cold-turn namespace.
Default False keeps every existing caller stateless.
- gemini_runtime accepts the parameter for ABC parity and ignores it
(Gemini CLI has no resume).
Backend:
- task_execution_service.execute_task now accepts persist_session: bool
= False and threads it into the agent payload. All existing callers
(Chat, schedules, MCP, fan-out, webhooks) keep today's behavior; only
the future routers/sessions.py (Phase 2) opts in.
- settings_service.is_session_tab_enabled() — feature flag resolving
system_settings.session_tab_enabled → SESSION_TAB_ENABLED env →
False. Module-level convenience function exposed.
Tests (run inside trinity-backend container — Python 3.11):
- tests/unit/test_session_operations.py — 9 tests against an isolated
SQLite DB exercising the full SessionOperations CRUD plus the cached
claude session UUID lifecycle and resume failure / success counters.
- tests/unit/test_claude_code_session_id_parser.py — 8 tests covering
both parsers (batch + streaming): system/init recognition, result
fallback, init-wins-over-result, legacy bare-init rejection, and a
source-level regression guard for the permission-mode validation
fix.
- tests/unit/test_session_persistence_flag.py — 8 tests pinning the
contract: signatures across the runtime ABC, ParallelTaskRequest,
agent chat router, execute_headless_task, and
task_execution_service.execute_task. Includes the gating regex check
on --no-session-persistence and a live signature import to catch
drift AST parsing alone would miss.
Total: 25 passing tests covering every touchpoint of Phase 1.
Base image (trinity-agent-base) rebuilt to embed the agent-server
changes; existing agent containers will pick them up on next recreate.
* feat(session-tab): backend turn endpoint for --resume-default Session surface
Phase 2 of docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md. Six endpoints under
/api/agents/{name}/session{s,...} that mirror routers/chat.py's auth
model and TaskExecutionService usage but persist to the parallel
agent_sessions / agent_session_messages tables and request
persist_session=True on every turn so each call reattaches via
`claude --print --resume <uuid>`.
Surface gated on is_session_tab_enabled() — flag-off default returns
404 from every endpoint.
POST /api/agents/{name}/session create row
GET /api/agents/{name}/sessions list (per-user)
GET /api/agents/{name}/sessions/{id} session + messages
POST /api/agents/{name}/sessions/{id}/message THE turn
POST /api/agents/{name}/sessions/{id}/reset clear cached uuid
DELETE /api/agents/{name}/sessions/{id} delete row + msgs
Spike-pitfall defenses baked into the turn endpoint:
- L3 (first-turn-has-no-session-id): the agent_sessions row is created
server-side via POST /session BEFORE the turn endpoint ever calls
execute_task. No frontend-first model.
- L2 (cold turn writes empty JSONL): persist_session=True is passed
unconditionally — Phase 1.4 already wired the flag through the agent
stack; Phase 2 just promises to set it on every turn.
- L1 (parser misses system/init): trust result.session_id directly —
Phase 1.3 fixed the parser. Scenario A confirms the captured UUID is
the real Claude UUID end-to-end.
Phase 2.2 resume-failure fallback: when execute_task returns "no
conversation found" on a turn that had a cached UUID, clear the cache,
mark_resume_failure, and retry once with resume_session_id=None. Logs
event=session_resume_fallback with the stale UUID and consecutive
failure count. Anthropic #39667 (cleanupPeriodDays) and #53417 (CLI
upgrade) both produce this signal.
Phase 2.3 Redis lock: SET NX EX per (agent, claude_uuid) with 5-min TTL
and Lua-script release. Async poll loop (250ms tick) so the event loop
stays free during contention. Cold turns skip the lock (no JSONL to
corrupt). Hard 30s wait ceiling — beyond that the contender gets HTTP
429 with retry hint. Mitigation for Anthropic #20992 (concurrent
--resume JSONL writes corrupt the file).
Per-user ownership at the row layer: even agent owners cannot read or
send into another user's session (E6 isolation in the design doc).
Returns 404 for ownership failures so we don't leak session-id existence.
Tests (tests/integration/test_session_turns.py, run inside
trinity-backend container with docker.sock mounted for testfix
recreation + JSONL surgery in Scenario C):
Scenario A: 3-turn happy path — same Claude UUID across turns
Scenario B: turn 2 recalls a secret from turn 1, no text-replay
Scenario C: JSONL deletion mid-session triggers fallback + recovery
Scenario D: concurrent POSTs serialise via Redis lock
(asserts finish_gap ≈ winner_work_time, NOT total wall)
Scenario E: switching sessions A → B → A preserves A's UUID
5 passed in 54.5s against the live agent-testfix container (recreated
onto the rebuilt base image first per L4 in the plan). Phase 1's 25
unit tests still pass — no regressions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(session-tab): frontend Session surface
Phase 3 of docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md. Adds the new "Session"
tab in AgentDetail, gated on the is_session_tab_enabled() platform flag
so it stays invisible until explicit opt-in (default off).
Backend prerequisite — routers/settings.py:
- GET /api/settings/feature-flags exposes a curated allowlist of UI-
relevant flags to any authed user. The existing /api/settings/{key}
endpoint is admin-only and would block non-admin frontends from even
knowing whether to render the Session tab. The new endpoint reads
through services.settings_service.is_session_tab_enabled() so the
resolution order (DB → env → False) stays in one place.
Frontend:
- src/frontend/src/stores/sessions.js — Pinia store wrapping the six
/api/agents/{name}/sessions* endpoints with per-agent state isolation
and the feature-flag cache. Optimistic user-message insert with
rollback on send failure.
- src/frontend/src/components/SessionPanel.vue — structural copy of
ChatPanel reusing ChatMessages + ChatInput + ModelSelector. Differs
from Chat in three places per the design doc:
* Sends bare user_message to POST .../sessions/{id}/message — no
buildContextPrompt text-replay (the agent already has working
memory via --resume).
* "Reset memory" button + confirm modal that clears the cached
Claude UUID without deleting the message log (Phase 3.4).
* Per-session selector subtitle: turn count, context % used,
cached-memory dot (emerald/gray), and consecutive_resume_failures
indicator (Phase 3.5).
Lean cut for first-visible-surface: voice mic, file upload, and SSE
dynamic status labels are deferred — those need backend extensions
(file payload on the turn endpoint, async_mode + SSE on the same).
- src/frontend/src/views/AgentDetail.vue — new Session tab inserted
between Chat and Dashboard/Schedules, gated on
sessionsStore.sessionTabEnabled. Layout sites that previously
branched on activeTab === 'chat' now use a shared isFullscreenTab
computed so Chat and Session both get the input-pinned-to-bottom flex
layout. ?tab=session deep-link allowlist updated.
- src/frontend/e2e/session-tab.spec.js — Phase 3.6 Playwright spec.
Marked @Interactive (not @smoke) because each run makes one real
Claude API call (~10–60s). Snapshots the prior flag value in
beforeAll, force-enables for the run, restores in afterAll so a
failed run doesn't leave the platform with the flag dirty. Three
cases:
* tab is hidden when flag is off
* tab appears, "+ New Session" → send turn → reply visible →
Reset memory modal opens + closes
* Chat tab still works after Session interaction; switching back
preserves Session state
Visually verified in the live dev server: tab renders in correct
position, header layout matches Chat's structure, empty state and
placeholder copy match the design doc, "Reset memory" only shown when
an active session exists, full-viewport flex layout pins input to
bottom.
Phase 1 + Phase 2 work behind this change is unchanged: 25 unit tests
+ 5 integration tests still green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(session-tab): hardening + observability — cleanup service, contamination gate, docs
Phase 4 of docs/planning/SESSION_TAB_2026-04.md. Closes the JSONL
disk-growth loop, validates the GA-blocking cross-session contamination
hypothesis empirically, and lands architecture.md / feature-flows
documentation so the surface is discoverable.
Phase 4.3 — cross-session contamination GA gate (the load-bearing one):
- tests/integration/test_session_cross_contamination.py exercises the
Anthropic #26964 hypothesis end-to-end. Plants a randomly-generated
secret token in session A with explicit "do not echo" framing, asks
session B (different UUID, same agent, same cwd) to recall the token.
Hard-fails if the exact token leaks; soft-fails on partial-prefix
recall (PURPLE-DRAGON without the random suffix would only be
knowable from A's JSONL, not from training).
- PASSED in 9.5s on the current Claude Code version → shared-cwd model
is safe → Phase 5 rollout unblocked. Test stays in the suite as the
per-version regression guard.
Phase 4.2 — JSONL cleanup service:
- services/session_cleanup_service.py runs a 6h periodic sweep that
diffs every running agent's
~/.claude/projects/-home-developer/<uuid>.jsonl set against
db.list_active_claude_session_ids(agent) and reaps orphans whose
mtime is older than the 1h race guard. Race guard prevents the
cold-turn-vs-cleanup window where a brand-new JSONL exists on disk
before the backend has updated cached_claude_session_id.
- Same service exposes a synchronous reap_jsonl(agent, uuid) helper
called best-effort from routers/sessions.py reset/delete handlers so
the user-perceived disk-reclaim latency is sub-second. Never raises;
failures are logged and the periodic sweep is the safety net.
- Implementation uses execute_command_in_container — the same primitive
git_service / ssh_service / scheduler pre-check / agent terminal use.
No new agent-server endpoint, no base-image rebuild.
- New db.list_active_claude_session_ids(agent) facade method backed by
SessionOperations.list_active_claude_session_ids querying every
agent_sessions row whose cached_claude_session_id is non-null for the
agent.
- main.py wires startup (staggered +7.5s after cleanup_service to
offset Docker hits) and clean shutdown.
- tests/integration/test_session_cleanup.py: reset reaps synchronously,
delete reaps synchronously, periodic sweep keeps the active JSONL,
reaps an aged orphan, respects the 1h race guard for fresh orphans.
Phase 4.4 — architecture.md updates:
- Background Services table gets a Session Cleanup row.
- New "Session Tab" subsection in API Endpoints documenting all six
/api/agents/{name}/sessions* routes including the per-user ownership
rule (404 not 403) and the resume-failure fallback / Redis lock.
- New /api/settings/feature-flags row.
- New agent_sessions / agent_session_messages DDL block in Database
Schema, with the three Session-specific fields called out
(cached_claude_session_id, consecutive_resume_failures,
cache_read_tokens, claude_session_id audit).
Phase 4.5 — feature-flows/session-tab.md vertical slice:
- Full path from UI → API → DB → Side Effects with the JSONL lifecycle
table, the spike-pitfall defense map (L1/L2/L3/#20992/#26964), the
error-handling matrix, and the complete test catalog with the docker
run command for the integration suite.
- feature-flows.md index updated (Recent Updates row + Chat & Sessions
section entry).
Test totals: 25 unit + 9 integration = 34 tests, all green. Phase 4.3
serves as both the GA gate and the per-Claude-version regression guard.
Phase 4.1 (cache_read_tokens UI surfacing) deferred — the column is
already populated by the Phase 2 turn endpoint; surfacing is a minor
observability follow-up that doesn't block Phase 5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(session-tab): tag Session-tab turns with triggered_by="session" and a gold badge
Previously Session-tab turns went into schedule_executions with
triggered_by="chat", so the Tasks tab couldn't tell them apart from
the Chat tab. The user-visible signal was that every Session turn
showed up under the sky-blue "chat" badge.
Backend (routers/sessions.py): both call sites that invoke
task_execution_service.execute_task — the cold/resume turn and the
resume-failure fallback retry — now pass triggered_by="session".
Existing rows are unchanged; the cutover is per-write.
Frontend (TasksPanel.vue): adds a "Session" option between "Chat" and
"Manual" in the trigger filter dropdown, plus an amber/gold badge
branch (bg-amber-100 dark:bg-amber-900/30 text-amber-700
dark:text-amber-300) — visually distinct from "paid" (bright yellow)
and from the sky-blue "chat" badge.
triggered_by is a free-form TEXT column (no enum constraint at the DB
or service layer), so adding "session" as a new value doesn't require
any migration or downstream consumer updates. Filter, badge, audit
log, activity stream, and dashboards all just see another value and
display it; nothing has to know about it explicitly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(session-tab): correct context-window accounting + raise frontend turn timeout
Five interrelated fixes from manual testing — all about the per-turn
"context %" metric being misleading and the browser timing out before
long-running session turns finished.
1) Agent server (docker/base-image/agent_server/services/claude_code.py)
process_stream_line's `result` event handler used to overwrite
metadata.input_tokens, cache_read_tokens, and cache_creation_tokens
with the values from result.usage. Those values are CUMULATIVE
across every internal API call the turn made (Claude Code packs
tool-use loops into a single user turn that maps to N internal API
calls). For an 18-iteration turn each reading the same 70K cached
prefix, result.usage.cache_read_input_tokens = 18 * 70K = 1.26M
tokens — billing-cumulative, not the prompt size of any single call.
Overwriting per-message values with that aggregate made our
context-window-pressure metric grow far beyond the 200K limit even
when no individual API call was anywhere close to the wall.
Fix: result handler now only extracts model-level facts (cost,
duration, num_turns, session_id, error info, modelUsage.contextWindow).
Per-API-call usage stays in the per-assistant-message handler, where
the LATEST message's values represent the FINAL API call's prompt
size — exactly what determines whether the next turn will fit.
Also added a per-message usage-extraction block to the assistant
branch of process_stream_line (it previously had no usage extraction
at all, relying entirely on the result handler — which made my
first attempt at this fix produce zero values). parse_stream_json_output
already had the equivalent block (lines 211-215).
Base image rebuilt; agent-testfix recreated onto the new image
(image sha 0a1e20b40da1).
2) Backend (services/task_execution_service.py)
Replaced `context_used = metadata.input_tokens` with
`cache_read + cache_creation` (with input_tokens fallback when
caching isn't engaged). input_tokens is sometimes the disjoint
fresh value and sometimes inflated by the agent server's
modelUsage.inputTokens override on tool-call turns. cache_read
and cache_creation come straight from Anthropic's usage object
and (post agent-server fix) are reliable per-call values that
monotonically reflect the cached conversation prefix.
3) DB (db/sessions.py)
total_context_used is now a HIGH-WATERMARK (MAX of prior + new),
not the latest value. Per-turn context naturally oscillates by ~2x
between text-only and tool-call turns; the watermark gives users
a stable monotonic upper bound on session pressure that only goes
up.
Capped the watermark at total_context_max as a safety belt against
any future agent-server bug that emits cumulative-billing token
counts. Genuine per-call peaks should never exceed the model's
context window — if they do, that's an accounting error not a
real overflow, and the UI should display 100% rather than 648%.
4) Frontend (stores/sessions.js)
Bumped the Axios timeout on the session turn endpoint from 305s
(~5 min) to 7260s (= TIMEOUT-001 cap of 7200s + 60s slack). The
session turn endpoint is synchronous and may legitimately run for
the agent's full execution timeout. With the previous 305s ceiling
the browser threw a misleading "failed" toast on tool-heavy turns
that ran longer; the response still landed in the DB and the UI
recovered after a page refresh, but the user saw a phantom error.
Verified end-to-end with a 6-turn mixed sequence (text + tool-call):
per-call cache_read now reports ~11636 on text-only turns and ~18000
on tool-call turns (one extra round-trip's worth) instead of the
previous bogus 1,257,915 on tool-heavy turns. Watermark grows from
18073 to 18429 across 6 turns — monotonic, no oscillation, real
per-call peaks.
Existing inflated session rows (the bogus 648% / 100% sessions from
before this fix) stay as-is — the watermark cap stops them growing
further but the historical max is permanently stored. New sessions
created after this commit are accurate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(session-tab): Phase 5.1 — context warnings, stdout-race recovery, limitations doc
Bundles the round-of-decisions outcomes from the Phase 5 open-questions
discussion. Three code changes, three deferrals documented, one item
gated on a manual test before shipping.
Frontend (SessionPanel.vue) — context-window pressure warnings.
Buckets driven by the active session row's watermark divided by
total_context_max:
< 75% : nothing
75–89% : subtle gray "Session context: X% — heavy" hint
90–99% : amber banner with "Reset memory" suggestion
≥ 100% : red banner warning the next turn may fail or trigger
memory-loss fallback
No hard send-block at 100% — fallback path stays as the safety net.
Computed values gracefully handle a brand-new session (no row yet).
Agent server (claude_code.py) — stdout pipe race soft recovery. When
a child subprocess inherits Claude Code's stdout, the final result
event line can be lost ("I/O operation on closed file" + "Reader
thread(s) stuck after process exit"). Previously surfaced as 502 with
the misleading "infrastructure failure; retry the task" message even
though the assistant had completed its work and accumulated text into
response_parts. The reply was sitting in the JSONL on disk untouched;
only the closing-stats line was lost in the pipe.
Fix: at the empty-result classification site, if response_parts has
accumulated assistant text, log a warning and fall through to the
success path instead of raising. cost_usd / duration_ms stay None
for these recovered turns (we don't know what they were); the backend
records the execution as success with null cost rather than a
misleading FAILED. Hard failure path stays for the truly empty case
(no response_parts content).
Base image rebuilt; agent-testfix recreated onto image
305731fc34e0. The user's last "comprehensive report" turn that
produced 67KB of content but threw a phantom error in the UI would
now succeed cleanly.
Docs (feature-flows/session-tab.md) — Known limitations section. Five
entries that need to make it into the user-facing docs at Phase 5.3:
1. Voice mic not wired into Session (deferred — Chat tab for voice)
2. Per-message file upload not yet supported on Session (Phase 5.2)
3. Agent restore from backup may require fresh sessions (separate
platform-level issue — workspace volumes not in backup script)
4. Long Session turns may surface phantom errors in browsers (Axios
7260s ceiling vs. browser/OS sleep — refresh recovers)
5. Stdout pipe race recovery is best-effort (recovered turns will
show null cost / duration in Tasks tab)
Round-of-decisions outcomes:
✅ #1 — UI thresholds shipped here, stdout race fixed here
⏳ #2 — subscription-change cache clear (E7) — gated on manual
§5.5 test before shipping the proactive clear
⏭ #3 — backup/restore (E9) — separate platform-level issue
later; documented in §Known limitations
⏭ #4 — admin JSONL UI access — deferred follow-up
📋 #5 — file upload parity — Phase 5.2
⏭ #6 — voice on Session — deferred + documented limitation
The §5.5 E7 verification test was added to tests/manual/session-tab/README.md
which is tracked locally only (per the testing-kit precedent). Decision
on the proactive cache-clear hinges on its outcome.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(session-tab): Phase 5.2 — file-upload parity with Chat
The Session tab's input had drag-drop and the paperclip button (inherited
from ChatInput), but the second arg from ChatInput's submit event
(the files array) was being parameter-discarded in SessionPanel.vue
and never reached the backend. Result: users uploaded a file, sent
their message, and the agent reported "I can't see any attached file
in this conversation" — the upload silently dropped.
Closes the parity gap by mirroring routers/chat.py's exact upload
handling. No new behavior — same limits (3 files, 5 MB each, 5 MB per
image, 20 MB total image budget per WEB_MAX_*), same image-vs-non-image
split, same prompt-line append.
Backend (routers/sessions.py)
- SessionMessageRequest: new optional `files` list (same shape as
ParallelTaskRequest.files / WebFileUpload — name, mimetype, size,
data_base64).
- Turn endpoint: when body.files is set, decode each via
services.upload_service.decode_web_file, then run the same
process_file_uploads() helper Chat uses. Non-images get written
into the agent workspace via Docker put_archive; images come back
as already-decoded vision-block dicts in image_data.
- Append the file_descs lines to a new `effective_message` so the
agent prompt contains "[File uploaded by X]: name (size) saved to
path" references inline. Persisted user message stays as the
original body.message — visible chat log reads naturally; the
agent sees the file references.
- Pass image_data to execute_task as `images=` so vision blocks land
on the next API call. Both the resume call and the cold-retry
fallback receive the same effective_message + images (files were
already written to the workspace before the first attempt; cold
retry just re-references them).
- 502 from process_file_uploads' all_writes_failed bubbles up
cleanly; agent-not-found pre-check returns 503.
Frontend (stores/sessions.js)
- sendMessage() accepts a `files` array in opts; included in the
POST body when non-empty. Optimistic user-message insert stays
text-only (the chat log preview doesn't need to render
file chips).
Frontend (SessionPanel.vue)
- onSubmit() now takes both args from ChatInput's submit event.
Allow-empty-text-with-files is permitted (matches Chat's UX).
- Forwards files into sessionsStore.sendMessage's opts.
Verified end-to-end on a fresh session: uploaded a 66-byte text file
with a unique sentinel embedded; agent read the file out of the
workspace and recalled the sentinel verbatim. No fallback fired.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(session-tab): drop watermark, store last-cache reading directly
agent_sessions.total_context_used was a high-water mark (MAX of all
per-turn cache readings, capped at total_context_max). Claude Code's
auto-compact (~85% of the model window) silently resets the cache
mid-turn, so the watermark asymptoted near the compact threshold and
stopped conveying useful information — every heavy session ended up
visually stuck around 67-69% regardless of actual recent activity.
Switch to direct assignment of the most recent assistant turn's cache
size. The total_context_max cap (cc5c37b) stays as defence-in-depth
against agent-server accounting bugs reporting impossible token
counts. Existing inflated rows on agent-testfix self-heal on next
turn — no migration, no backfill.
Two new unit tests pin the contract: a lower new value overwrites a
higher prior value, and a None reading preserves the prior value
(stdout-pipe-race recovered turns).
* fix(session-tab): rename "% context" to "% last cache" and remove pressure banners
The 75/90/100% banners never fired empirically — Claude Code auto-
compacts mid-turn at ~85% of the model window, which prevents the
underlying metric from ever crossing 75%. A pressure warning that
silently never warns is worse than none.
The subtitle label "% context" reads as session memory pressure when
it's actually the most recent assistant turn's cache size. Relabel to
"% last cache" so the meaning matches what the column actually stores
(after the prior commit dropped the watermark semantics).
Reset modal copy: drop the "context-window pressure" framing for the
same reason, replace with "start a clean line of thought."
Removes orphaned contextPct / contextPctBucket / currentSession
script helpers — no remaining users after the banner deletion.
* docs(user-docs): add Session tab user guide
Covers what the Session tab is, when to use it vs Chat, and the three
limits/behaviours users will hit on a long heavy session:
- The "last cache" metric — explicitly per-turn cache size, NOT
session memory pressure. Bounces because of auto-compact.
- Auto-compact at ~85% of the model window — what users see (sudden
drop in % last cache, ~2 min added latency), what survives (working
memory in compressed form), what doesn't (verbatim history).
- The 50-turn agentic-loop cap (max_turns_task) — per-turn iteration
budget, NOT session message count. Heavy 12-step tasks routinely
hit it. Includes a curl recipe for raising the cap per agent via
PUT /api/agents/{name}/guardrails.
Also documents Reset memory, file attachments, the Session API
endpoint surface, and the four known limitations carried over from
docs/memory/feature-flows/session-tab.md (voice not wired, DR
backup forces fresh sessions, suspended-browser phantom errors,
stdout-pipe-race best-effort recovery).
Modeled after docs/user-docs/agents/agent-chat.md for tone and
structure.
* feat(db): persist auto-compact events on session messages and executions
Claude Code's auto-compact (~85% of the model window) silently summarizes
~170k tokens of conversation into a ~10k summary mid-turn, takes ~2 min,
and previously left no trail in our data — users saw only an unexplained
long execution and a sudden % drop on the next turn.
This change adds three additive nullable columns plus the persistence
plumbing across the standard Trinity router → service → db pipeline:
- agent_session_messages.compact_metadata (TEXT, JSON list of events)
- agent_sessions.compact_count (INTEGER, running tally)
- schedule_executions.compact_metadata (TEXT, denormalized for Tasks)
The session-level compact_count drives a future inline "consider starting
fresh" hint without scanning per-message rows. The denormalized copy on
schedule_executions lets the Tasks tab render the badge without joining
session messages — Trinity invariant 1 (router → service → db) preserved
on both the Session router and the task_execution_service.
Migration is idempotent via the existing _safe_add_column helper. Empty
columns on existing rows; populates from the next turn forward once the
agent server is rebuilt with the parser branch (separate commit).
One new unit test pins compact_metadata persistence + compact_count
accumulation across turns; the existing test_session_operations DDL
fixture mirrors the new columns.
* feat(agent-server): parse compact_boundary events and emit structured log
Claude Code emits {"type":"system","subtype":"compact_boundary","compactMetadata":{trigger,preTokens,postTokens,durationMs}}
on its stream-json output when it auto-compacts mid-turn. Both parsers
(parse_stream_json_output for batch, process_stream_line for live) now
recognise the event, append a CompactEvent to metadata.compact_events,
and emit a structured INFO log line per event:
event=session_auto_compact claude_session_id=... trigger=auto
pre_tokens=170325 post_tokens=12691 duration_ms=110361
Vector picks the line up via Docker stdout — no infrastructure change.
The compact_events list rides through ExecutionMetadata.model_dump()
into the agent server HTTP response, where the backend extracts and
persists it (separate commit).
Five new unit tests exercise: single-event capture in batch parser,
multi-event ordering within one turn, empty-events on a normal turn,
streaming-parser capture, and model_dump round-trip for the wire shape.
Live behaviour requires rebuilding trinity-agent-base:latest and
recreating each agent container — already done locally at the new SHA.
* feat(session-tab): surface auto-compact events in Session + Tasks UI
Two surfaces, one signal:
TasksPanel — adds a small violet "compacted" badge next to the trigger
badge for any execution that fired one or more compact_boundary events.
Multi-compact turns show `compacted ×N`. Hover tooltip lists each event
with pre→post tokens and duration so latency anomalies become legible
at a glance. Reads task.compact_metadata (denormalized JSON column)
without needing to follow the relation back to agent_session_messages.
SessionPanel — adds an inline italic hint adjacent to the Reset memory
button when the active session has compacted more than 5 times. Reads
session.compact_count (running tally maintained by the DB layer). Quiet
under normal use; visible only when stacked compacts have meaningfully
degraded summary fidelity. Threshold lives as a script-local constant
(COMPACT_HINT_THRESHOLD) for easy tuning from telemetry later.
The currentSession computed (deleted in Bundle A when the pressure
banners went away) is reinstated here since the inline hint needs it.
Pinia store sessions.js needs no change — compact_count and
compact_metadata ride through on the existing API responses without
new state slots.
* fix(db): propagate compact_metadata through DatabaseManager facade
b12307c extended ScheduleOperations.update_execution_status with the
new compact_metadata kwarg but missed the thin facade wrapper in
database.py. The session turn endpoint hit:
TypeError: DatabaseManager.update_execution_status() got an
unexpected keyword argument 'compact_metadata'
Trivial fix — the facade just forwards. Caught at runtime on the first
Session turn after Bundle B landed.
* fix(db): propagate compact_metadata through DatabaseManager.add_session_message
Same facade gap as the prior fix for update_execution_status — the thin
wrapper in database.py was missed. Surfaced as:
TypeError: DatabaseManager.add_session_message() got an unexpected
keyword argument 'compact_metadata'
…on the first Session-tab turn after the previous facade fix unblocked
the schedule_executions write path.
Adds the same two pass-through kwargs (compact_metadata,
compact_event_count) so the Session router can persist auto-compact
events on session messages and bump the running compact_count tally.
* fix(agent-server): recover from stdout pipe race via JSONL fallback
When a tool subprocess (or MCP grandchild) inherits Claude Code's
stdout fd and wedges the agent server's reader thread, the stream-json
result event is lost. The Phase 5.1 soft-recovery (response_parts !=
[] → synthesize success) only fires when stdout managed to deliver at
least one assistant text block before the wedge. For races that fire
mid-tool-call (zero text emitted to stdout), response_parts is empty
and the soft-recovery falls through to a hard 502.
Symptom users saw: heavy multi-step tasks (e.g. /session-context-pressure
running `python3 -c "..."` via Bash to generate 32KB of synthetic text)
sometimes returned "Execution completed without a result message after
0 tool calls / 1 turns (raw_messages=4)" — even though the JSONL on
disk contained the fully-completed turn. Probabilistic; retry usually
worked; root cause was the kernel pipe buffer exhausting before the
reader thread could drain after grandchildren died.
Fix: when the existing soft-recovery path falls through (no
response_parts text), read the session's JSONL via a side-channel that
is INDEPENDENT of stdout (Claude Code's own session record). Walk
backward to the most recent user-input boundary (string content,
distinguished from tool_results which have list-of-dicts content),
collect every assistant.text block emitted after, and synthesize a
soft-success response. Sets metadata.recovered_from_jsonl=True for
observability. If no text was emitted between boundary and EOF, the
turn is genuinely incomplete and the original 502 surfaces.
11 unit tests cover happy path (matches the actual failure shape with
2× Bash tool_use + tool_result + final text), boundary discrimination
(tool_result must not terminate the user-input search), multi-turn
isolation (only the LAST turn's text recovers), genuine-incomplete
detection (thinking-only or tool-only turns return None and surface
the 502), and robustness (malformed/truncated tail lines, blank lines).
Bounded read at 10MB to defend against pathological JSONL sizes; uses
existing /home/developer/.claude/projects/-home-developer/ path
already known to the cleanup service.
Verified end-to-end on the rebuilt agent-base: 7 turns of
/session-context-pressure executed cleanly with 3 reader-thread races
that drained naturally (none required the new fallback). Recovery is
a safety net only; happy-path behavior unchanged.
Backend reload not required. Agent-base rebuild + container recreate
required to deploy. Backward compat: old images returning no
recovered_from_jsonl field default to False.
* fix(agent-server): pull compact event detail from JSONL after the turn
Bundle B's stdout-side parser detected compact_boundary events but
captured them with all-None pre/post/duration/trigger fields — Claude
Code's --output-format stream-json strips the compactMetadata envelope
on the way out (the JSONL on disk has it, stdout doesn't). Confirmed
on the live agent: stored compact_metadata blobs were
[{"trigger":null,"pre_tokens":null,"post_tokens":null,...}] while the
JSONL contained the canonical shape with real numbers.
Add _extract_compact_events_from_jsonl(session_id, since_iso=None) — a
short helper modeled after the recovery extractor — that scans the
session JSONL post-turn and returns CompactEvent records with the
real detail fields. Called in execute_headless_task right before
returning, scoped via since_iso to records emitted from a turn-start
anchor onward (the JSONL accumulates across the resumed session, so
unfiltered would include compacts from prior turns).
Detection-only stdout branch is retained as a safety net (count
preserved if JSONL read fails) but its log line is removed — the
authoritative log line now fires from the JSONL extract with full
fields.
Effect on existing data: stored compact_metadata blobs from before
this commit keep their nulls (no backfill); new turns from now on
land with full pre_tokens / post_tokens / duration_ms / trigger /
timestamp. Tasks-tab tooltip on the violet "compacted" badge now
shows real numbers.
9 new unit tests (20 total in the suite): canonical JSONL shape,
since_iso scoping with exclusive and inclusive boundaries, multi-
compact ordering, missing/null compactMetadata defensive handling,
malformed-line robustness, empty-result paths.
Live smoke verified: rebuilt base image, recreated testfix, turn
endpoint returns compact_events:[] for non-compacting turns; the
existing session a2trktlTnXA9KD- already shows compact_count=1
unchanged.
Requires agent-base rebuild + container recreate to deploy.
* fix(credentials): strip auto-injected mcpServers.trinity before validating
Commit b474520 (sec(mcp): structure-validate .mcp.json content) added
RESERVED_SERVER_NAMES = {"trinity"} as a defense against attacker-
controlled redefinition of the auto-injected Trinity MCP server entry.
But the agent server's inject_trinity_mcp_if_configured() writes
mcpServers.trinity into .mcp.json on every agent start where
TRINITY_MCP_API_KEY is set — so the file the user loads in the
credentials editor always contains it, and every save trips the
validator with "MCP server name 'trinity' is reserved by Trinity".
Effect on the user: the credentials Save button silently failed for
every agent that had been started at least once. Confirmed regression
introduced by b474520 — pre-this-branch, .mcp.json went through the
inject endpoint with no content validation and the same auto-injected
trinity entry was accepted.
Fix at the backend: strip mcpServers.trinity from the submitted JSON
before it reaches validate_mcp_config. The agent re-injects the
canonical trinity entry from env vars on next startup, so the user
can't lose it by leaving it out of the saved file. The defense-in-
depth value of the reserved-name rule is preserved — an attacker still
can't substitute a different shape under the trinity name, because
their substitution is dropped before validation rather than rejected.
Side benefit: this self-heals corrupted bearer values in the existing
trinity entry (e.g. the historical "Bearer sqlite3.IntegrityError: ..."
strings written by some long-removed prior code path). The agent
overwrites the entry on next start with a fresh value from env.
11 unit tests cover happy path, mixed user+trinity entries, the exact
historical corruption shape, no-op cases (no trinity / no servers /
no mcpServers), robustness on malformed input (passes through to the
validator's own JSON error), and output-shape preservation.
Verified end-to-end on testfix: POST /api/agents/testfix/credentials/inject
with the corrupted-bearer trinity entry + a context7 entry returns
HTTP 200, backend logs the strip, on-disk .mcp.json contains only
context7 with the corrupted bearer cleanly removed.
Backend reload only — no agent rebuild required.
* fix(credentials): allow canonical trinity entry through validator instead of stripping
Replaces the strip approach from 705de47 (Option B) with a shape-
equivalence check in the validator (Option A) — the strip silently
dropped the user's edits to the trinity entry, which broke the
legitimate "rotate my MCP API key" flow on agents that don't have the
auto-inject env var set to recover the entry on next start.
Symptom 705de47 introduced: opening .mcp.json, editing one digit in
the trinity Bearer token, clicking Save → backend stripped the entry
before validation → on-disk file became {"mcpServers": {}} → user's
trinity MCP entry was lost.
Fix: keep RESERVED_SERVER_NAMES = {"trinity"} as the closed-shape
defense, but special-case it in `_validate_entry`: if the entry under
the trinity name matches the canonical Trinity-MCP shape exactly
(only `type`, `url`, `headers` keys; `type=http`; `url` matches the
configured TRINITY_MCP_URL or the documented default; `headers`
contains only `Authorization` with a `Bearer trinity_mcp_…` token),
accept it. Otherwise hit the existing reserved-name reject.
Strict allowlist on the canonical shape:
- exact key set: {type, url, headers} — no extras
- type == "http"
- url ∈ {TRINITY_MCP_URL env, "http://mcp-server:8080/mcp"}
- headers has only Authorization
- Authorization matches /^Bearer\s+trinity_mcp_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,200}$/
Attacker scenarios still rejected:
- stdio redefinition (npx + args) under trinity → reserved
- http with evil URL (https://evil.com/mcp) → reserved
- canonical url + extra header (X-Custom) → reserved
- canonical url + non-Bearer auth → reserved
- canonical url + Bearer with non-trinity_mcp_ token → reserved
Strip helper and its caller in routers/credentials.py reverted.
test_strip_reserved_trinity.py removed (its scenarios now covered by
the validator's own tests).
10 new unit tests in test_mcp_validator.py cover the canonical-shape
allowance + each rejection variant. 102 total tests in the validator
suite — all green.
Live verified end-to-end on testfix:
- POST /credentials/inject with edited bearer → 200, file updated
- POST /credentials/inject with stdio shape → 400 reserved-name
- User's original bearer restored after the test
* chore(gitignore): exclude saved-conversations/ and tests/manual/ from future stages
Both directories are local-only working artifacts (conversation
transcripts and the hand-driven testing kit) that should never be
pushed. They were already gitignored implicitly by being untracked,
but a future ``git add .`` could inadvertently stage them. Listing
them in .gitignore makes the exclusion explicit and accident-proof.
* feat(session-tab): flip feature flag default to True for GA (#651)
Phase 5.3 GA. Session tab is now exposed to users on every fresh
install without an admin opt-in step.
Resolution order is unchanged:
1. system_settings row 'session_tab_enabled' if present (admin override)
2. SESSION_TAB_ENABLED env var (only honored as opt-out: false/0/no)
3. Default: True
Admins who want to keep it hidden can set
``session_tab_enabled = false`` in system_settings or export
``SESSION_TAB_ENABLED=false``.
Closes the Phase 5.3 step in #651.
* docs: address PR #652 review feedback — requirements, GA status, security section
- Add §5.8 Session Tab entry to requirements.md (Rule 4 — new P1 capability
must be registered in the single source of truth)
- Flip three stale "default off / Phase 5 rollout pending" references in
architecture.md, feature-flows.md, and feature-flows/session-tab.md to
reflect the GA default-on flag flip from PR #651
- Add ## Security Considerations section to feature-flows/session-tab.md
covering 404-not-403 ownership isolation (E6), Redis lock for concurrent
--resume (Anthropic #20992), cross-session contamination empirical gate
(Anthropic #26964), and JSONL prompt-injection persistence with the
Reset memory mitigation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This was referenced May 12, 2026
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Replaces the #847 Phase 0 SSO mock stub with the first concrete enterprise feature: an admin-facing audit log dashboard. Backend (public repo, stays OSS): - New GET /api/audit-log/distinct/event-types - New GET /api/audit-log/distinct/actor-types - Both admin-gated (Depends(require_admin)); populate dashboard filter dropdowns without hardcoding the AuditEventType enum on the frontend. - Registered BEFORE /{event_id} catch-all (invariant #4). Frontend (public OSS bundle, entitlement-gated route): - views/enterprise/Audit.vue — paginated table + filter form + side detail panel. - stores/auditLog.js — domain store (entries, filters, distinct lists, pagination, selectedEntry). Default time window = last 24h. - router/index.js — /enterprise/audit route with meta.requiresEntitlement = 'audit'. - views/enterprise/Index.vue — audit card flipped to Available; SSO card kept as Coming soon. - Login.vue — removed the SSO provider buttons mock. - Deleted views/enterprise/SSO.vue (350-line mock). Submodule (trinity-enterprise): - register_module("audit") replaces register_module("sso"). - Deleted backend/sso/{router,providers,__init__}.py. - See trinity-enterprise#feature/941-audit-registration. Entitlement model: backend stays OSS (audit_log endpoints predate the seam via SEC-001 / #20 — retroactive gating would break OSS admins). Only the OSS-side dashboard route is enterprise-gated. Tests: - New tests/unit/test_847_audit_dashboard.py (6 cases): distinct DB ops, router ordering invariant, admin gate, no-entitlement-gate pin. - Updated test_847_entitlement_seam.py: 'sso' → 'audit' assertions, new submodule static check. - New e2e/audit-dashboard.spec.js (Playwright, 4 cases). Docs: - audit-trail.md — Phase 5 row + Frontend Layer section. - enterprise-modules.md — current-state note + audit registration code. - architecture.md — distinct endpoints added to audit-log table. PR #910 scope expands to close both #847 (seam) and #941 (dashboard). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…ldable card (#941 v3) Adds two new admin-only audit-log endpoints and a unified foldable Activity card on the dashboard. Backend (OSS — same pattern as the existing /stats and /distinct/*): - GET /api/audit-log/heatmap — sparse 7×24 dow×hour grid - GET /api/audit-log/calendar — sparse per-day list (GitHub-style) Both honor start_time / end_time / event_type / actor_type so the two views stay coherent with the table + stats under drill-down. Frontend (OSS, entitlement-gated by 'audit'): - Single foldable Activity card with Weekly | Calendar tabs - v-show keeps both heatmaps mounted — tab swap is instant - Calendar cell click → drilldownToDay(date) narrows the dashboard to one UTC day and reloads list + stats + both heatmaps together Tests: +8 unit tests covering bucketing, filter pass-through, router ordering vs /{event_id} catch-all (invariant #4), empty-window contract. Full suite: 14 pass. Docs: architecture.md endpoint table + audit-trail.md Phase 5 v3 / v3.1 rows + endpoint descriptions + test catalog. Related to #941. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…#910) * feat(enterprise): private submodule + EntitlementService seam + SSO PoC (#847 Phase 0) Issue #847 spike. Establishes the open-core split between the public Trinity backend and a private companion repo `Abilityai/trinity-enterprise` that ships compliance-gating features (SSO, SCIM, SIEM) without merging them into the public codebase. The spike research is in `docs/planning/OSS_ENTERPRISE_SPLIT_RESEARCH.md` (521 lines, six load-bearing decisions, stress-tested against eight other open issues). The condensed decision record is `docs/planning/ENTERPRISE_ARCHITECTURE.md`. What lands in this PR (Phase 0): Public-repo seam (the integration mechanism): * `src/backend/services/entitlement_service.py` — `EntitlementService` Phase 0 stub. Returns True for every `is_entitled(feature_id)` check unless `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1` env is set, in which case every check flips False. Module-level singleton + `_set_for_testing` test seam. * `src/backend/dependencies.py:requires_entitlement(feature_id)` — FastAPI dependency factory mirroring `require_role`. Raises HTTP 403 naming the missing feature so the UI can surface a "license required" toast. Lazy-imports the service so tests can swap singletons. * `src/backend/main.py` — conditional `try: from enterprise import register_enterprise except ImportError`. Loaders mounted under `/api/enterprise/*` when the submodule is present; OSS-only builds log an informational message and continue. Idempotent via `app.state.enterprise_registered`. * `src/backend/routers/settings.py` — `/api/settings/feature-flags` extended with `enterprise_features: list[str]`. Drives UI tab visibility. * `.gitmodules` + new submodule mount at `src/backend/enterprise` pointing to the private repo via SSH. * `docker-compose.yml` env pass-through for `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY`. * `.github/workflows/build-without-submodule.yml` — boots the backend without the enterprise submodule and asserts `/health` responds, `/api/settings/feature-flags` returns `enterprise_features: []`, `/api/enterprise/sso/providers` returns 404, and the OSS-only log line is emitted. Catches regressions where the conditional import becomes hard-required. Private-repo PoC content (in `Abilityai/trinity-enterprise`, mounted at `src/backend/enterprise/`): * `__init__.py` — `register_enterprise(app)` single entry point. * `sso/router.py` — `/api/enterprise/sso/{providers,login/{id}}` stubs. `GET /providers` returns the in-process registry (empty by default); `POST /login/{id}` returns 501 "PoC stub" or 404 for unknown id. Both gated by `requires_entitlement("sso")` with a lazy-import fallback so the private repo tests in isolation. * `sso/providers.py` — `SSOProvider` ABC + `StubProvider`. Tests (`tests/unit/test_847_entitlement_seam.py`, 14 cases): * EntitlementService default + TRINITY_OSS_ONLY deny path * Parametrised truthy/falsy env spellings * `requires_entitlement` allow/deny (skip-on-no-passlib for local) * `_set_for_testing` singleton swap * Static check that main.py uses conditional ImportError guard Docs: * `docs/planning/ENTERPRISE_ARCHITECTURE.md` — condensed decision * `docs/planning/OSS_ENTERPRISE_SPLIT_RESEARCH.md` — long-form research * `docs/dev/ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV.md` — 15-min clone-to-running guide * `docs/memory/requirements.md` §34.1 Live verification (local instance): * Submodule mounted at `src/backend/enterprise/` * `GET /api/enterprise/sso/providers` → `[]` * `GET /api/settings/feature-flags` → `enterprise_features: ["sso","scim","siem"]` * `POST /api/enterprise/sso/login/foo` → HTTP 404 "Unknown SSO provider 'foo'" * With `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1`: `/api/enterprise/sso/providers` returns 403 "Enterprise feature 'sso' is not licensed", `enterprise_features: []` * Restored default: re-entitled Out of scope (separate follow-up issues): * Phase 1: Ed25519-signed license token + verify path + admin License UI * Phase 2: extract `audit_log` into the submodule as first real enterprise module * Phase 3: prove "core-primitive + enterprise-knob" pattern via #834 * Phase 4: real SSO/SAML implementation (replaces PoC stubs) * MCP entitlement edge for the TypeScript MCP server * Fix repo license-of-record (currently NOASSERTION) — owner decision Related to #847 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(enterprise): dual-mount submodule + frontend SSO view (#847 Phase 0.5) Add the frontend half of the enterprise seam. The private repo `Abilityai/trinity-enterprise` was restructured into `backend/` and `frontend/` subdirs, and the public repo now mounts it as TWO submodules at different paths — same URL, different mount points — so each consumer reads only its own subdir: src/backend/enterprise/ → backend/ consumed by Python (`main.py`) src/frontend/src/enterprise/ → frontend/ consumed by Vite (`main.js`) One private codebase to version; two clean import surfaces. Disk waste is ~2× the repo size (the same code cloned twice) which is far cheaper than two private repos drifting out of sync. Changes: Backend (import path bump): * `src/backend/main.py` — `from enterprise.backend import register_enterprise` (was `from enterprise import ...`). * `tests/unit/test_847_entitlement_seam.py` — static-check asserts the new import path. Frontend (new): * `src/frontend/src/main.js` — conditional `import.meta.glob('./enterprise/frontend/index.js', { eager: false })`. Empty in OSS-only builds; calls `mod.registerEnterprise(router, app)` when present. Logs which mode it's in. * `src/frontend/src/stores/enterprise.js` — new Pinia store. Loads `/api/settings/feature-flags` after auth, caches `enterprise_features: list[str]`. Getters: `isEntitled(featureId)`, `hasAnyEnterprise`. Test seam `_setFeaturesForTest`. * `src/frontend/src/components/NavBar.vue` — new `Enterprise` link `v-if="enterpriseStore.isEntitled('sso')"` with `PRO` badge. Hidden in OSS-only mode and when `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1`. Submodule: * `.gitmodules` — second entry at `src/frontend/src/enterprise/` for the same private repo URL. CI: * `.github/workflows/build-without-submodule.yml` — asserts BOTH mount points are empty (`backend/__init__.py` AND `frontend/index.js`) and that the OSS-only log line + 404 + empty `enterprise_features` invariants hold. Docs: * `docs/planning/ENTERPRISE_ARCHITECTURE.md` — directory tree + why one repo + dual-mount config + frontend seam description. * `docs/dev/ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV.md` — three-submodule table, "working on the enterprise repo" steps for dual-mount sync. * `docs/memory/requirements.md` §34.1 — frontend integration in Key Features + private-repo layout. Private repo content (Abilityai/trinity-enterprise) restructured in a sibling commit (`refactor: split backend/ and frontend/ subdirs`): * `backend/__init__.py` + `backend/sso/` — was at repo root. * `frontend/index.js` — `registerEnterprise(router, app)`. Adds the `/enterprise/sso` route pointing at `EnterpriseSSO.vue`. * `frontend/views/EnterpriseSSO.vue` — Vue component. Fetches `/api/enterprise/sso/providers` via the public repo's shared `api.js`. Empty-state UI with the issue link. Live verification (local instance): * `/api/enterprise/sso/providers` → `[]` (backend still works after import path change). * Vite serves `/src/enterprise/frontend/index.js` (200) and `/src/enterprise/frontend/views/EnterpriseSSO.vue` (200) with the `api.js` import resolved to `/src/api.js`. * `import.meta.glob` returns a populated object → enterprise module loaded → `[enterprise] frontend module loaded` console log. Tests: 12 passed + 2 skipped (no-passlib local). No new test surface for the frontend store/component — playwright e2e would catch regressions but is out of scope for this Phase 0.5. Related to #847 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(enterprise): frontend in OSS, EntitlementService registry (#847) Reframe the open-core boundary: enterprise FRONTEND lives in the public OSS bundle and is gated server-side via the `enterprise_features` feature-flag. Only the private backend stays behind the submodule. Vue components have no algorithmic IP — the moat is the private backend logic (license verify, SAML signature checks, OAuth flows). This collapses the previous "dual-mount" complexity (same private repo at two mount points) back to a single submodule mount, and matches the existing feature-flag pattern (`session_tab_enabled`, `voice_available`). Trade-off accepted: enterprise Vue source is readable by anyone with the public repo, but the static UI files are not the load-bearing IP. The new closure mechanism is the EntitlementService **registry**: - Each enterprise backend module calls `entitlement_service.register_module(feature_id)` on boot. - `list_entitled_features()` returns the registered set (sorted). - OSS-only builds never call `register_module` → empty set → `enterprise_features: []` → OSS frontend hides every enterprise surface. - `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1` is a hard override (denies even when modules ARE registered). Closes three Phase-0 issues: 1. OSS users no longer see broken "Enterprise" nav — registry is empty without the submodule, feature-flag empty, NavBar hides. 2. Adding non-SSO features (SCIM, SIEM) is now additive: ship Vue file in OSS, add backend module, call `register_module(id)`. 3. Login-page SSO button extension point is straightforward — same pattern: OSS Login.vue reads the providers list from a backend API when entitled (out of scope for this PR, but the seam exists). Changes: Public repo: * `src/backend/services/entitlement_service.py` — replaces hardcoded `["sso","scim","siem"]` with a registry. `register_module(id)`, `is_entitled(id)`, `list_entitled_features()` all read from the set. Idempotent registration. TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1 still hard- overrides everything. * `src/frontend/src/views/enterprise/SSO.vue` (new) — Vue PoC view, moved from the private repo's `frontend/views/EnterpriseSSO.vue`. Same UI; api.js import path adjusted to the OSS location (`../../api`). * `src/frontend/src/router/index.js` — static route entry for `/enterprise/sso` with `meta.requiresEntitlement: 'sso'`. `beforeEach` guard checks the entitlement store before navigation; redirects to `/` when not entitled (defence-in-depth against direct URL visits). * `src/frontend/src/main.js` — drops the `import.meta.glob('./enterprise/frontend/...')` block. Routes are static now. * `.gitmodules` — removes the `src/frontend/src/enterprise/` submodule entry. Only `src/backend/enterprise/` remains. * `src/frontend/src/enterprise` (submodule pointer) — deleted. * CI workflow `build-without-submodule.yml` — checks only the single backend mount; OSS-only frontend Vue files still bundle. * Docs (architecture, local-dev, requirements §34.1) — updated structure diagram, rationale, mount layout. * Tests (`test_847_entitlement_seam.py`) — registry contract: empty-by-default denies, `register_module` enables, idempotent. Updated allow-path test to `register_module("sso")` before asserting. Private repo (sibling commit, not in this PR): * `frontend/` subdir removed (moved to OSS). * `backend/__init__.py` now calls `entitlement_service.register_module("sso")` after mounting the SSO router. Live verification (local): * Default mode: `GET /api/settings/feature-flags` → `enterprise_features: ["sso"]` (only registered modules). `GET /api/enterprise/sso/providers` → `[]`. Enterprise nav link visible. * `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1`: `enterprise_features: []`, `GET /api/enterprise/sso/providers` → 403, nav link hidden. * Restored default — re-entitled. Tests: 13 passed + 2 skipped (no-passlib local). Related to #847 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(enterprise): SSO admin UI mock + Login page provider buttons (#847) PoC enhancement to make the SSO surface demo-realistic. Backend seeds two mock providers (Okta + Azure AD) and exposes three new read endpoints (claim-mapping, session-policy) the OSS admin page renders. All action buttons remain disabled with tooltips pointing at issue #847 — no real OIDC/SAML implementation yet. Public repo changes (this commit): * `src/frontend/src/views/enterprise/Index.vue` (new) — Enterprise catalogue landing page. Cards layout with status badges (SSO Available; SCIM/SIEM/License/Audit "Coming soon"). Linked from NavBar's `Enterprise` link. * `src/frontend/src/views/enterprise/SSO.vue` (rewrite) — full admin UI: - Header with "+ Add provider" button (opens modal) - Configured providers list with protocol badge, enabled/disabled indicator, issuer/metadata URL, last-login timestamp, and disabled Test/Edit/⋮ actions per row - Identity → Role Mapping table (4 rules: trinity-admins→admin, trinity-developers→creator, trinity-readonly→user, fallback) - Session Policy panel (force-SSO checkbox, session lifetime, admin-reauth checkbox — all disabled) - Add provider modal: protocol radio (OIDC/SAML), display name, provider ID, issuer URL, client ID/secret, scopes, callback URL with Copy button, enabled-on-save toggle, Cancel + Save buttons (Save disabled) * `src/frontend/src/views/Login.vue` — adds an "or sign in with" section under the email form when SSO providers are reachable. Fetches /api/enterprise/sso/providers unauthenticated (endpoint is gated by entitlement, not by user auth, so the pre-login page can call it). Two stub buttons render: "Continue with Okta" / "Continue with Azure AD". Both disabled with tooltip. * `src/frontend/src/router/index.js` — landing route + per-feature routes with two gate modes: - `meta.requiresAnyEntitlement` for the catalogue landing - `meta.requiresEntitlement: '<id>'` for per-feature pages Guard bounces non-entitled feature visits to /enterprise (when any feature is entitled) or / (otherwise). * `src/frontend/src/components/NavBar.vue` — link points at the catalogue landing (`/enterprise`). `v-if` uses `hasAnyEnterprise` so the Enterprise nav entry shows whenever any enterprise feature is registered. * `src/backend/enterprise` (submodule bump) — pulls in private repo's `feat(sso): seed PoC providers + claim-mapping + session-policy endpoints` (commit 3e90ddc). Live verification: - Default (submodule mounted): * `/api/enterprise/sso/providers` → 2 providers * `/api/enterprise/sso/claim-mapping` → 4 rules * `/api/enterprise/sso/session-policy` → SessionPolicy defaults * `/enterprise` landing renders 5 cards (SSO available, others "Coming soon") * `/enterprise/sso` renders full admin UI with all buttons disabled * `/login` shows "Continue with Okta/Azure AD" buttons under email form - `TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1`: providers endpoint 403, NavBar enterprise link hidden, Login SSO buttons hidden. Related to #847 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): lint + first-time-setup wiring for build-without-submodule Two CI issues from the previous push: 1. `lint (sys.modules pollution check)` — 6 bare `del sys.modules[...]` calls in `test_847_entitlement_seam.py` exceeded baseline (`tests/lint_sys_modules.py` requires either `monkeypatch.delitem(sys.modules, ..., raising=False)` or the sanctioned `_STUBBED_MODULE_NAMES` pattern). Replaced all six with `monkeypatch.delitem` so the auto-restore on teardown also stops the test from leaking stale module imports into sibling tests. `_import_requires_entitlement_or_skip` helper now takes `monkeypatch` as a parameter so the pattern works from inside the helper too. 2. `backend boots without enterprise submodule` — `/api/token` returned 403 on a fresh DB because `is_setup_completed()` (in `routers/auth.py:212`) gates admin login behind first-time setup, which the previous workflow didn't complete. Added a new "Complete first-time setup" step that: - greps the setup token from `docker logs trinity-backend` (the token is printed to stdout at boot per `main.py:336-343`, gated on `setup_completed != true`) - POSTs to `/api/setup/admin-password` with the setup_token + password + confirm_password fields (schema in `routers/setup.py:28-32`) Replaced the hex `ADMIN_PASSWORD` with a known-strong value that meets the OWASP ASVS 2.1 complexity check the setup endpoint enforces (length 12+, upper, lower, digit, special). Also dropped the Bearer auth from the "SSO router not mounted" assertion — the `/api/enterprise/sso/*` router is entitlement-gated, not user-gated, so the unauthenticated 404 check still proves the conditional import correctly skipped the mount. Tests: 13 passed + 2 skipped locally (no-passlib). Lint: clean against baseline. Related to #847 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): complete setup via docker exec, not API grep The print() in main.py:336-343 that emits the setup token to stdout is Python-block-buffered when stdout is a pipe (docker logs capture), so the grep on a short timing window after /health returns OK is unreliable. The previous attempt extracted an empty SETUP_TOKEN and failed. Bypass the API entirely: docker exec into the backend container and write directly to the DB using the same helpers the production endpoint uses (dependencies.hash_password + db.set_setting + db.update_user_password). The flow: - set system_settings.setup_completed = 'true' - hash ADMIN_PASSWORD via the production helper - update admin user's password_hash The password is passed via docker -e to avoid shell quoting issues with the OWASP-compliant value (contains !). Verified locally: docker exec into trinity-backend, the python snippet runs cleanly and the bcrypt warning visible in CI logs is benign (passlib version mismatch, doesn't break hashing). Related to #847 * fix: print enterprise registration status instead of logger.info The enterprise conditional-import block in main.py runs at module init, which is BEFORE `lifespan` calls `setup_logging()`. Default Python logging is at WARNING level, so `logger.info(...)` records are silently dropped — neither the registered nor the OSS-only log line appeared in docker logs, breaking the CI workflow that greps for them. Switch to `print(..., flush=True)` so the output goes to stdout regardless of logger state. docker logs captures it (operators see the boot mode), and the build-without-submodule CI workflow's grep succeeds. Verified locally: `docker logs trinity-backend | grep 'Trinity Enterprise'` now shows the registered/OSS-only line. Related to #847 * fix(tests): widen except-ImportError search window in main.py static check The latest main.py commit (print(flush=True) + rationale comment) pushed `except ImportError` past the 400-char window the test was using to verify the conditional import is guarded. Widen to 1500 to absorb future small additions without breaking the static check, which is guarding the GUARD shape (try/except), not its byte position. Related to #847 * docs: enterprise modules feature flow with code links Walk-through of how the open-core split works at runtime: - boot chain (conditional import → register_enterprise → registry) - request-time gating (feature-flags endpoint, requires_entitlement) - frontend wiring (Pinia store, NavBar, route guard, Login.vue, Vue views) - failure modes (OSS-only, TRINITY_OSS_ONLY=1) - adding a new enterprise feature recipe - test surfaces + CI All sections link to file:line in the public repo and the private trinity-enterprise repo on GitHub. Complements ENTERPRISE_ARCHITECTURE.md (the 'why') and ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV.md (15-min onboarding) with the 'how' at the code level. Related to #847 * feat(audit): enterprise audit log dashboard (#941) + remove SSO PoC Replaces the #847 Phase 0 SSO mock stub with the first concrete enterprise feature: an admin-facing audit log dashboard. Backend (public repo, stays OSS): - New GET /api/audit-log/distinct/event-types - New GET /api/audit-log/distinct/actor-types - Both admin-gated (Depends(require_admin)); populate dashboard filter dropdowns without hardcoding the AuditEventType enum on the frontend. - Registered BEFORE /{event_id} catch-all (invariant #4). Frontend (public OSS bundle, entitlement-gated route): - views/enterprise/Audit.vue — paginated table + filter form + side detail panel. - stores/auditLog.js — domain store (entries, filters, distinct lists, pagination, selectedEntry). Default time window = last 24h. - router/index.js — /enterprise/audit route with meta.requiresEntitlement = 'audit'. - views/enterprise/Index.vue — audit card flipped to Available; SSO card kept as Coming soon. - Login.vue — removed the SSO provider buttons mock. - Deleted views/enterprise/SSO.vue (350-line mock). Submodule (trinity-enterprise): - register_module("audit") replaces register_module("sso"). - Deleted backend/sso/{router,providers,__init__}.py. - See trinity-enterprise#feature/941-audit-registration. Entitlement model: backend stays OSS (audit_log endpoints predate the seam via SEC-001 / #20 — retroactive gating would break OSS admins). Only the OSS-side dashboard route is enterprise-gated. Tests: - New tests/unit/test_847_audit_dashboard.py (6 cases): distinct DB ops, router ordering invariant, admin gate, no-entitlement-gate pin. - Updated test_847_entitlement_seam.py: 'sso' → 'audit' assertions, new submodule static check. - New e2e/audit-dashboard.spec.js (Playwright, 4 cases). Docs: - audit-trail.md — Phase 5 row + Frontend Layer section. - enterprise-modules.md — current-state note + audit registration code. - architecture.md — distinct endpoints added to audit-log table. PR #910 scope expands to close both #847 (seam) and #941 (dashboard). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(security): CSO --diff report for #941 audit dashboard No critical or high findings. 3 low-severity stale-doc items, already deferred during /review (I3). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(audit): sync feature-flows index + add Phase 5 tests section (#941) audit-trail.md: document the new test_847_audit_dashboard.py cases + Playwright audit-dashboard.spec.js coverage. feature-flows.md index: bump audit-trail row to Phase 5 (dashboard), update Phases 1–4 row to "Merged" rather than "to follow". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(audit-dashboard): stats tiles, time presets, drill-down, verify, export (#941 v2) Expands the v1 dashboard from "viewer" to "review tool" using only existing backend endpoints — zero backend changes. Added: - Stats tiles header (Total / Top event_type / Top actor_type / Time window). Backed by GET /api/audit-log/stats; same time-window semantics as the table. Top-event/Top-actor tiles are clickable drill-downs. - Time preset chips (Last 1h / 24h / 7d / 30d / All time). Manual edits to the time fields flip the active chip to "Custom". - Inline cell drill-down: clicking an event_type cell sets that filter; clicking the actor cell filters by actor_id (or actor_type fallback). Stops row-click propagation so the side panel still opens elsewhere on the row. - Hash-chain verify badge in header. Manual button to verify the visible id range via POST /api/audit-log/verify; pill turns green ✓ on success or red ✗ with the first-invalid id on failure. - Export buttons (CSV / JSON) in the filter footer. Uses fetch + Blob + object URL so we can attach the JWT (a plain <a href> can't). Filename: audit-log-{iso-timestamp}.{ext}. Store additions: - stats / statsLoading + loadStats() - verifyState / verifyResult + verifyChain() - exporting + downloadExport(format) - activePreset + applyTimePreset(key) - drilldownFilter(key, value) helper Tests: - 2 new Playwright @smoke cases (preset chip click, event_type drill-down). Existing 4 cases unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(audit-dashboard): dow×hour + GitHub-style calendar heatmaps + foldable card (#941 v3) Adds two new admin-only audit-log endpoints and a unified foldable Activity card on the dashboard. Backend (OSS — same pattern as the existing /stats and /distinct/*): - GET /api/audit-log/heatmap — sparse 7×24 dow×hour grid - GET /api/audit-log/calendar — sparse per-day list (GitHub-style) Both honor start_time / end_time / event_type / actor_type so the two views stay coherent with the table + stats under drill-down. Frontend (OSS, entitlement-gated by 'audit'): - Single foldable Activity card with Weekly | Calendar tabs - v-show keeps both heatmaps mounted — tab swap is instant - Calendar cell click → drilldownToDay(date) narrows the dashboard to one UTC day and reloads list + stats + both heatmaps together Tests: +8 unit tests covering bucketing, filter pass-through, router ordering vs /{event_id} catch-all (invariant #4), empty-window contract. Full suite: 14 pass. Docs: architecture.md endpoint table + audit-trail.md Phase 5 v3 / v3.1 rows + endpoint descriptions + test catalog. Related to #941. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): sys-modules lint + OSS-only skip for audit dashboard e2e (#941) Two CI fixes on PR #910: 1. Lint (sys.modules pollution): the audit-dashboard fixture had three bare sys.modules writes that exceeded the per-file baseline. Routed them through monkeypatch.setitem / monkeypatch.delitem so the baseline diff goes from +3 → 0. 2. Audit dashboard e2e suite was hard-coded to fail when the private enterprise submodule isn't checked out (the default on PR-time CI without a deploy-key secret). Added a per-test skip that probes for the Enterprise nav and skips the suite cleanly when absent. The route-guard / nav-hiding behavior in OSS-only mode is already covered by the unit tests in tests/unit/test_847_audit_dashboard.py. The api-keys-copy.spec.js failures in the same e2e run are a pre-existing modal-overlay flake unrelated to #941 — touched outside this PR. Related to #941. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(deploy): enterprise overlay so dev VM ships audit dashboard (#847) The Deploy-to-Dev workflow currently bypasses the enterprise submodule entirely: it doesn't init it, and the Dockerfile doesn't COPY it. The dev VM has been silently OSS-only since the seam landed. This adds an enterprise-overlay pattern that keeps the public prod image bit-identical to OSS while making enterprise features available on dev: - docker-compose.prod.enterprise.yml — single-service overlay that bind-mounts ./src/backend/enterprise into /app/enterprise (ro). The conditional `from enterprise.backend import register_enterprise` in main.py resolves the bind-mounted path on container start. - .github/workflows/deploy-dev.yml — init the submodule after pull (soft-fail with a clear marker so a missing deploy key doesn't brick the deploy), then layer the overlay onto build + up. Compose merges the volumes additively; no override of existing prod.yml mounts. - docs/dev/ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV.md — new "Dev VM deploy" section with the one-time deploy-key setup (deploy key on trinity-enterprise + ~/.ssh/config alias on the VM) and the post-deploy verification step. Verified locally: `docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -f docker-compose.prod.enterprise.yml config` merges cleanly; the import path resolves in the existing local container (which already bind-mounts the wider src/backend tree); /api/settings/feature-flags returns `enterprise_features: ["audit"]`. OSS path unchanged. The base Dockerfile and docker-compose.prod.yml are untouched, so build-without-submodule.yml CI guards stay green. Related to #847. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(api-keys-copy): swap UI cleanup for API DELETE — fits 30s budget (#677) The two @smoke tests in `api-keys-copy.spec.js` were timing out at the final cleanup step on slow GH-Actions runners. The pattern: Create modal → fill → Create → success modal → Copy → readClipboard → close → cleanup (revoke modal → confirm → delete modal → confirm) is ~9 sequential UI ops. On a constrained runner each takes 1-3s, so the per-test 30s budget would drain right around cleanup, and `page.waitForTimeout(200)` would resolve into "Target page closed". Replace the UI cleanup walk with `page.request.delete('/api/mcp/keys/{id}')` using the JWT from `localStorage['token']` (`stores/auth.js:201`). The backend DELETE handler hard-removes the row regardless of active / revoked state, so the UI-enforced revoke-then-delete sequence isn't needed for cleanup. The clipboard assertions earlier in the test still cover the actual #677 / #859 regression — UI cleanup was never under test. Reduces cleanup time from ~6s of UI clicks to one HTTP DELETE. Related to #677, #859. Unblocks PR #910 CI. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…ped (#1143) (#1145) `stores/notifications.js:fetchPendingCount()` read `count` off `GET /api/notifications?status=pending&limit=1`, where `count` is `len(returned page)` — so the polled NavBar badge clamped to 1 every 60s regardless of how many pending notifications existed. - Add `GET /api/notifications/count?status=pending` — returns the true total scoped to the caller's accessible agents (mirrors the per-agent `/api/agents/{name}/notifications/count`). Registered before the `/{notification_id}` catch-all (Invariant #4). - `db.count_pending_notifications` gains an `agent_names` list filter (fleet count over accessible agents); empty list → 0, not "all" (avoids invalid `IN ()`). - Point `fetchPendingCount()` at the new endpoint. Verified live: a fleet with 32 pending now reports 32 (old limit=1 query still returns 1); `/{id}` route unshadowed (404 on unknown id); invalid/unsupported status → 400; unauth → 401. Related to #1143 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
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Jun 19, 2026
…#1149) Surface per-schedule performance on the Overview tab and the Schedules tab, both from a SINGLE compact aggregate (no N per-schedule round-trips) — extends #1107 (Overview) and generalises #868 (per-schedule deep analytics). Backend: - db `get_agent_schedules_summary(agent, hours)` — one rollup row per non-deleted schedule (zero-run schedules included): terminal success_rate (success / (success + failed[incl. error]); None when zero terminal), NULL-skipping avg_duration_ms, cost_total, context_avg, tool_call_total (parsed over newest 5,000 rows agent-wide, tool_calls_sampled flag), and last-run outcome. Cheap grouped SQL; iso_cutoff window (Invariant #16). - GET /api/agents/{name}/schedules/analytics-summary?window=7d|14d|30d (AuthorizedAgent). Declared BEFORE /{schedule_id} in routers/schedules.py so the literal segment isn't captured as a schedule_id (Invariant #4) — putting it in analytics.py would be shadowed (schedules_router mounts first). - models: ScheduleSummaryRow + AgentSchedulesSummaryResponse (Invariant #14). Frontend (single fetch, two consumers — Invariant #7): - executions.js fetchSchedulesSummary, cached per ${name}:${window} like fetchAgentAnalytics. - OverviewPanel: "Schedules performance" section, honors the existing 7/14/30d window selector, each row deep-links to the Schedules tab; hidden at zero. - SchedulesPanel: inline mini-stats per row (success rate, avg duration, runs, last-run dot) — badge style, no new chart/modal — from the same call. Tests: tests/unit/test_1115_schedules_summary.py (6) — terminal success rate, NULL-skip avg, tool-call total, zero-run-still-appears, soft-delete excluded, out-of-window excluded. Full analytics suites green (30 passed). Frontend prod build clean; endpoint verified live across 7/14/30d windows. Related to #1115 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <1073874+vybe@users.noreply.github.com>
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…review) Security review of the widening surfaced one HIGH regression + hardening items; all fixed here. #1 (HIGH, RCE): the #598 .mcp.json content-validation guard was bypassable via the new files_b64 (binary) channel — validate_mcp_config only checked `files`, so `files_b64={".mcp.json": base64(<stdio-command MCP server>)}` skipped it and configured an RCE MCP server on the target agent. Fix: .mcp.json may only arrive as TEXT (files), where it is validated; rejected in files_b64 at the backend inject router AND the agent-server write helper. #2 (defense-in-depth): import/auto-import wrote decrypted archives via the agent-server /inject layer only. Added validate_credential_set() (curated path policy + .mcp.json content + no-binary-.mcp.json) on the backend import boundary so enforcement is dual-layer as the issue mandates. (Archives are AES-GCM with the server key, so a forged archive wasn't practical — but the layer belongs.) #3: .ssh/ is now locked to id_* only — a stray *.key/*.pem under .ssh is no longer accepted (policy was previously broader than the "SSH keys = id_*" intent). #4 (noted): .config/gcloud/** can hold a google-auth executable credential_source; only honored under non-default GOOGLE_EXTERNAL_ACCOUNT_ALLOW_EXECUTABLES=1. Documented in credential_paths.py. +6 regression tests (169 pass). CSO report: docs/security-reports/cso-2026-06-22-11-diff.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Jun 23, 2026
…erts, SSH, binary) (#1305) * feat(credentials): curated credential file-type injection — SA keys, certs, SSH, binary (enterprise#11) Widens CRED-002 injection from the fixed 3-path exact allowlist (.env/.credentials.enc/.mcp.json) to a curated set of credential file *types*, without reopening the arbitrary-path RCE surface (#183/#590/#598). - New services/credential_paths.py — single-source policy: ALLOW (.config/gcloud/**, .kube/config, *.pem/*.key/*.crt/*.cert/*.p12/*.pfx, .ssh/id_*, + existing exact set) with deny-precedence over anything executed/sourced at startup (shell rc, CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md/.claude/**, .mcp.json.template, .ssh/authorized_keys/config, .git*, bin/**) and `..`/absolute traversal. Vendored byte-identically into the agent image (Invariant #5) with a parity test. - Agent-server hardening: the inject + update file loops now enforce the policy AND a resolve-under-home traversal guard the original write path lacked; parent-dir creation + chmod 0o600 preserved. New GET /api/credentials/list for export discovery. - Binary-safe: inject carries files_b64 (base64); agent writes via write_bytes. .credentials.enc gains a v2 {files, files_b64} envelope (legacy flat archives still decrypt); encrypt/decrypt stay flat for the single-secret callers (SIEM/2FA/SSO). - Export now captures the FULL injected set (via /list) + binary, not just the 2 defaults. - Three surfaces in sync (Invariant #13): MCP inject_credentials gains files_b64; frontend CredentialsPanel gains a file-upload affordance (text vs base64 auto-detected). - Tests: allowlist test now exercises the REAL policy (newly-allowed + still-blocked), + credential_paths parity test + binary archive round-trip test. 61 pass. - docs/memory/architecture.md: credential-path policy documented. Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#11. Loosens a deliberately-tight boundary — run /cso on the diff before merge. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(credentials): close /cso findings on the injection widening (#11 review) Security review of the widening surfaced one HIGH regression + hardening items; all fixed here. #1 (HIGH, RCE): the #598 .mcp.json content-validation guard was bypassable via the new files_b64 (binary) channel — validate_mcp_config only checked `files`, so `files_b64={".mcp.json": base64(<stdio-command MCP server>)}` skipped it and configured an RCE MCP server on the target agent. Fix: .mcp.json may only arrive as TEXT (files), where it is validated; rejected in files_b64 at the backend inject router AND the agent-server write helper. #2 (defense-in-depth): import/auto-import wrote decrypted archives via the agent-server /inject layer only. Added validate_credential_set() (curated path policy + .mcp.json content + no-binary-.mcp.json) on the backend import boundary so enforcement is dual-layer as the issue mandates. (Archives are AES-GCM with the server key, so a forged archive wasn't practical — but the layer belongs.) #3: .ssh/ is now locked to id_* only — a stray *.key/*.pem under .ssh is no longer accepted (policy was previously broader than the "SSH keys = id_*" intent). #4 (noted): .config/gcloud/** can hold a google-auth executable credential_source; only honored under non-default GOOGLE_EXTERNAL_ACCOUNT_ALLOW_EXECUTABLES=1. Documented in credential_paths.py. +6 regression tests (169 pass). CSO report: docs/security-reports/cso-2026-06-22-11-diff.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(credentials): exclude vendor dirs from cert globs + accurate export count (#11 live test) Found while testing PR #1305 against a real local instance: 1. Over-capture: the broad *.pem/*.key/*.crt globs matched bundled CA files (e.g. .local/.../site-packages/certifi/cacert.pem), so export's /list walk swept vendored cert material into .credentials.enc. Added node_modules, site-packages, .local, .venv/venv, .cache, go/pkg to the deny-list (both root and nested forms) so cert globs only catch real credential files. 2. export's files_exported count re-read just the 2 default files (reported 1 while the archive actually held 5). export_to_agent now returns the true captured count; dropped the redundant stale read. Verified end-to-end on a live agent: allowed types inject (text+binary, 0600, parent dirs), blocked paths 400 (incl. .ssh non-id_*, .mcp.json-via-files_b64, weaponized .mcp.json text), and binary round-trips through export→import with matching sha256. +5 regression tests (72 pass). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Verifying against real repo history surfaced a false positive: the migration-runner refactor #1263 (_atomic_rebuild table rebuilds) re-emits CREATE TABLE / CREATE INDEX for *existing* tables in a rename-swap but adds no actual schema and no new MIGRATIONS entry — yet the original "any added DDL keyword" heuristic flagged it, violating AC #4 (non-schema edits must not trip). Tighten the signal to two conjuncts: a schema change must (1) register a net-new ("name", _migrate_fn) entry in the MIGRATIONS list AND (2) carry a DDL keyword. Runner refactors / table rebuilds add no entry → exempt; data-only new migrations carry no DDL → exempt; real column/table adds do both → caught. Validated against real commits: • #740 agent_loops, #526 agent_ownership column → FAIL (correctly blocked) • #668 compat, voice_name (both shipped an Alembic revision) → PASS • #1263 runner refactor → PASS (false positive fixed) A full post-Alembic history scan finds 0 outstanding missing revisions, so no backfill is owed; the pre-Alembic columns are already in 0001_baseline. 28 tests pass (added MIGRATIONS-entry detection + the #1263 rebuild case). Related to #1342 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…1345) * fix(ci): guard the Alembic (Postgres) track in schema-parity (#1342) The schema-parity required check validated only the SQLite track (migrations.py ↔ schema.py). A schema change that ships the SQLite migration but omits the Alembic revision under src/backend/migrations/versions/ passed every required check green yet broke PostgreSQL — init_database() runs alembic_runner.upgrade_to_head(), which applies revision files only and does not autogenerate from tables.py. Two PRs reached "green CI but PG-broken" and had to be held by hand. Add a cross-track guard, folded into the existing required schema-parity job (no new required-check to manage): - scripts/ci/check_alembic_parity.py — fails a PR that ADDS schema DDL to db/{migrations,schema,tables}.py without a net-new revision file under src/backend/migrations/versions/. Pure stdlib, PR-only (diffs base...head). - Heuristic / false-positive guard: the signal is a DDL keyword on an *added, non-comment* line (SQL: CREATE/ALTER/ADD COLUMN/…; SQLAlchemy: Column(/Table(/Index(/…). Comment edits, data-only and down migrations carry no DDL keyword, so they don't trip it. Documented in the script docstring and the workflow header. - tests/unit/test_alembic_parity_guard.py — 20 tests incl. the acceptance fixtures (SQLite-only change fails; dual-tracked passes; comment/data-only pass). Wired into the parity pytest run. Also notes the enforcement in architecture.md Invariant #3. Verified locally: 24 tests pass; end-to-end smoke across clean / SQLite-only (exit 1) / paired-revision (exit 0) scenarios behaves correctly. Related to #1342 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): tighten Alembic guard to require a new MIGRATIONS entry (#1342) Verifying against real repo history surfaced a false positive: the migration-runner refactor #1263 (_atomic_rebuild table rebuilds) re-emits CREATE TABLE / CREATE INDEX for *existing* tables in a rename-swap but adds no actual schema and no new MIGRATIONS entry — yet the original "any added DDL keyword" heuristic flagged it, violating AC #4 (non-schema edits must not trip). Tighten the signal to two conjuncts: a schema change must (1) register a net-new ("name", _migrate_fn) entry in the MIGRATIONS list AND (2) carry a DDL keyword. Runner refactors / table rebuilds add no entry → exempt; data-only new migrations carry no DDL → exempt; real column/table adds do both → caught. Validated against real commits: • #740 agent_loops, #526 agent_ownership column → FAIL (correctly blocked) • #668 compat, voice_name (both shipped an Alembic revision) → PASS • #1263 runner refactor → PASS (false positive fixed) A full post-Alembic history scan finds 0 outstanding missing revisions, so no backfill is owed; the pre-Alembic columns are already in 0001_baseline. 28 tests pass (added MIGRATIONS-entry detection + the #1263 rebuild case). Related to #1342 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
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…+ confirm-re-read (#1450) (#1495) * test(canary): unblock canary_invariants fixture broken by #1472 merge Two pre-existing breakages landed via #1472 (367a5e1, merged today) in root-level tests/test_canary_invariants.py — a file the CI unit job (tests/unit/ only) does not run, so they merged undetected: 1. Duplicate `CREATE TABLE agent_schedules` in the `canary_db` fixture DDL — the E-06 work added a second definition next to the pre-existing one, so `executescript` raised "table agent_schedules already exists" and every fixture-dependent canary test errored. Removed the older, unused block (its `message`/`owner_id` columns have no consumer; `_add_schedule` and the E-06/L-03 collectors use only the kept block's columns). 2. `test_run_invariants_all` expected registry set omitted "E-06" (added to the invariants registry by the same PR). Added E-06 to the expected set and asserted it is green on a clean platform. Restores a green baseline (92 passed) so the #1450 B-01 work can be verified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(canary): B-01 queue-status coherence — backend-consistent Side B + confirm-re-read (#1450) B-01 compared two reads that were neither temporally atomic nor backend-consistent (both latent while the canary is default-OFF and SQLite makes the two reads hit one file): (a) Temporal non-atomicity — a concurrent enqueue/backlog-drain landing between the two reads produced a transient count mismatch → spurious critical + green→red Slack alert. (b) Backend divergence (#300/#1093) — Side A (`db.get_queued_count`) honors `get_engine()`/DATABASE_URL; Side B read raw sqlite3 at DB_PATH. On Postgres those are two different databases, so B-01 compared Postgres truth to a stale/absent SQLite file (fatal under the Postgres direction + SQLite EOL, #1278). Production-side residue of #1446 (PR #1452), which fixed only the test-harness `sys.modules` leak and deferred these two gaps. Fix (localized to B-01): - New `_collect_queued_ids_via_engine` reads B-01's Side B through the SAME `get_engine()` seam as the accessor, on a dedicated `queued_ids_via_engine` snapshot field. Independent code path (SELECT id/literal 'queued' vs COUNT(*)/the QUEUED enum) — shares a database, not a code path, so a cache/status-filter regression still surfaces (non-tautology, AC #3). No cache / second count of the queue (AC #4). - The collector performs one confirm-re-read on a mismatch: a transient race self-heals; a persistent drift survives and fires (AC #2). An engine-read or unconfirmable confirm degrades to a B-01 skip — it never compares an engine count against the raw-sqlite id-set (the blocker the reviews surfaced). - `queued_exec_ids` (raw sqlite) stays untouched for B-02/E-02, so blast radius is B-01-only and the sibling #1077 merge stays clean. The running-side / known-agents reads remain raw-sqlite (half-migrated collector); the collector-wide migration + a dark-canary tripwire are a filed follow-up. Tests (test_canary_invariants.py): retarget the synthetic B-01 tests at `queued_ids_via_engine`; add the AC #5 regression net — a diverged-backend proxy (raw ≠ engine temp files) that false-fires pre-fix and is green post-fix, a transient-race confirm-absorb + persistent-drift-still-fires pair, and an engine-read-failure→skip test. New split fixtures (`canary_db_split` / `reload_canary_split`) model the diverged backend without a live PG. Convert the file to the sanctioned `_STUBBED_MODULE_NAMES` + `_restore_sys_modules` escape hatch so its import-time stubs no longer leak (the #1446 mechanism) and the reimport `del`s are lint-clean. Docs: architecture.md Canary B-01 row updated for the engine-backed read path + confirm-re-read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(feature-flows): add #1450 canary B-01 Recent Updates row Sync-feature-flows: canary-internal change, no dedicated flow doc (architecture.md is canonical); append one Recent Updates row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
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* fix(agent): make agent /tmp tmpfs size configurable via AGENT_TMP_SIZE (#1231) (#1233)
Agent containers mounted /tmp as a hardcoded 100 MB noexec,nosuid RAM-backed
tmpfs. It fills easily — e.g. `gh` CLI install artifacts (~38 MB) that hardcode
/tmp and bypass the #1098 TMPDIR redirect — after which every /tmp write fails
with "No space left on device", including git's commit scratch, so autonomous
scheduled runs "complete" but silently fail to persist. The size being a
literal meant operators couldn't tune it without a code change + base-image
rebuild.
- capabilities.py: AGENT_TMPFS_MOUNT size now read from AGENT_TMP_SIZE (env on
the backend service, which builds the agent mount spec), default 512m,
validated `^\d+[mg]$` with empty/invalid → default. noexec,nosuid stay
hardcoded — only size is configurable, and it stays bounded (counts against
the agent memory cgroup). Single source of truth, so create (crud.py) and
recreate (lifecycle.py) can't drift.
- Wire AGENT_TMP_SIZE=${AGENT_TMP_SIZE:-512m} on the backend service in both
docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.prod.yml; document in .env.example.
- architecture.md Container Security: note the now-configurable size.
- tests/unit/test_1231_agent_tmp_size.py: default, valid m/g, case-fold,
invalid→default, and the security flags are never dropped.
Mount specs are creation-time: existing agents pick up a new size on recreate,
not restart. Builds on #1098 (TMPDIR redirect) — closes the gap for tools that
hardcode /tmp. The agent-side git-sync silent-persist-failure is a separate
issue in the abilities repo, per the ticket.
Related to #1231
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <1073874+vybe@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(ui): per-schedule performance scorecards on Agent Detail (#1115) (#1149)
Surface per-schedule performance on the Overview tab and the Schedules tab,
both from a SINGLE compact aggregate (no N per-schedule round-trips) — extends
#1107 (Overview) and generalises #868 (per-schedule deep analytics).
Backend:
- db `get_agent_schedules_summary(agent, hours)` — one rollup row per
non-deleted schedule (zero-run schedules included): terminal success_rate
(success / (success + failed[incl. error]); None when zero terminal),
NULL-skipping avg_duration_ms, cost_total, context_avg, tool_call_total
(parsed over newest 5,000 rows agent-wide, tool_calls_sampled flag), and
last-run outcome. Cheap grouped SQL; iso_cutoff window (Invariant #16).
- GET /api/agents/{name}/schedules/analytics-summary?window=7d|14d|30d
(AuthorizedAgent). Declared BEFORE /{schedule_id} in routers/schedules.py
so the literal segment isn't captured as a schedule_id (Invariant #4) —
putting it in analytics.py would be shadowed (schedules_router mounts first).
- models: ScheduleSummaryRow + AgentSchedulesSummaryResponse (Invariant #14).
Frontend (single fetch, two consumers — Invariant #7):
- executions.js fetchSchedulesSummary, cached per ${name}:${window} like
fetchAgentAnalytics.
- OverviewPanel: "Schedules performance" section, honors the existing 7/14/30d
window selector, each row deep-links to the Schedules tab; hidden at zero.
- SchedulesPanel: inline mini-stats per row (success rate, avg duration, runs,
last-run dot) — badge style, no new chart/modal — from the same call.
Tests: tests/unit/test_1115_schedules_summary.py (6) — terminal success rate,
NULL-skip avg, tool-call total, zero-run-still-appears, soft-delete excluded,
out-of-window excluded. Full analytics suites green (30 passed). Frontend
prod build clean; endpoint verified live across 7/14/30d windows.
Related to #1115
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <1073874+vybe@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(ui): in-app bug reporting from the floating Help widget (#1116) (#1283)
* docs(readme): document the Trinity Ops Agent and PostgreSQL backend/migration (#1290)
Adds a top-of-README callout recommending PostgreSQL for production (SQLite remains the zero-config dev default, opt-in via DATABASE_URL, #300), links the public Trinity Ops Agent (trinity-ops-public) for instance operations, and documents migrating existing SQLite instances via its /migrate-to-postgres skill. Also adds a Database section, a DATABASE_URL env row, and an ops-agent entry in the docs index.
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(reliability): unify the SUB-003 auth-class failure classifier into one shared module (#1088) (#1297)
The `is_auth_failure` + `AUTH_INDICATORS` + `NON_AUTH_KILL_MARKERS` (#904)
logic was duplicated inline in `subscription_auto_switch.py` and
`scheduler/service.py`, kept in sync by a hand-written "keep these lists in
sync" comment — exactly how the #904 kill-marker bug class re-appears.
Consolidate into one canonical module:
- New `src/backend/services/failure_classifier.py` — canonical, pure-stdlib
classifier (55 lines). `subscription_auto_switch.py` now re-exports
`is_auth_failure` unchanged, so existing importers
(`routers/chat.py`, `services/task_execution_service.py`) and their test
patch targets keep working.
- New `src/scheduler/failure_classifier.py` — byte-identical vendored mirror.
The scheduler runs in a separate container and cannot import
`backend.services`; it uses the classifier for log-labelling only (picks the
`logger.error` wording, never gates a switch). The agent-runtime classifier
in `error_classifier` is intentionally NOT merged — it diverges semantically
and stays kill-safe by `_classify_signal_exit` precedence (D4).
- Byte-identity is enforced by
`tests/unit/test_904_sigkill_no_false_auth.py::TestBackendSchedulerParity`;
the re-export is pinned by `TestBackendReExportGuard`. No hand-sync.
Pure structural refactor, no behavioral change (verified by SHA-256 equality
of the two copies and line-for-line comparison vs the deleted code). The test
rewrite also drops the prior `exec(compile(...))` source-slicing in favour of
`importlib` path-loading, removing the only injection primitive in scope.
Tests: 19/19 pass in `test_904_sigkill_no_false_auth.py`.
CSO --diff: CLEAR (docs/security-reports/cso-diff-2026-06-21.md).
Refs #1088
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(orchestration): pull-pilot routing for agent→agent MCP chat behind default-OFF flag (#946) (#1293)
* feat(orchestration): pull-pilot routing for agent→agent MCP chat behind default-OFF flag (#946)
Phase 2 PoC for pull/work-stealing (Epic #1045, umbrella #1081). When
MCP_AGENT_CHAT_PULL_ENABLED is ON, a sequential agent→agent (scope='agent',
non-self) chat_with_agent is routed by the MCP server through the durable async
/task path instead of the synchronous held /chat; the caller gets an immediate
{accepted|queued, execution_id} receipt and polls get_execution_result.
scope='user', self-tasks, and parallel=true are unchanged. Default OFF — flag
flip + MCP routing revert is the whole rollback.
- config.py: canonical MCP_AGENT_CHAT_PULL_ENABLED registry entry (both services
read the SAME env key, so a single-.env deploy can't drift).
- settings.py: surface mcp_agent_chat_pull_enabled in /api/settings/feature-flags
(auth-gated, observability-only — not a UI surface).
- chat.py: release the idempotency claim on the two /task dispatch-breaker-open
(CircuitOpen) deny paths, mirroring /chat and CapacityFull (T5 fix) — without
it a breaker-open reject silently blocks same-key retries for 24h.
- mcp-server: scope-based pull routing + D8 dispatch-mode idempotency token so a
flag flip can't replay a wrong-shape snapshot across endpoints; startup log of
the routing mode for the soak's control/treatment window.
- tests: chat.test.ts (routing fork + key behavior), test_946_task_idempotency_on_deny.py
(deny-path claim release), feature-flag exposure tests.
- docs: ACTOR_MODEL_POSTCARD (#945 resolved), PULL_PILOT_946_SOAK harness +
go/no-go record, CSO diff audit (CLEAR), TARGET_ARCHITECTURE/architecture updates.
Refs #946
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): document pull-pilot routing (#946) + AGENT_TMP_SIZE tmpfs (#1231)
Sync feature-flow docs with recent changes:
- agent-to-agent-collaboration.md: new Pull-Pilot Routing (#946) section —
flag-gated MCP routing fork to the durable async /task path, poll-for-result
receipt contract, D8 idempotency route token, feature-flag exposure, and the
T5 /task dispatch-breaker-open deny-path claim release.
- container-capabilities.md: refresh stale tmpfs facts — agent /tmp size is now
operator-configurable via AGENT_TMP_SIZE (default 512m, noexec,nosuid fixed),
plus the TMPDIR=/home/developer/.tmp heavy-scratch redirect (#1098).
- feature-flows.md: add Recent Updates index rows for #946 and #1231.
Refs #946
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* feat(agent): runtime data_paths with portable export/import (#1169) (#1294)
* feat(agent): runtime data_paths with portable export/import (#1169)
Declare an agent's runtime data (SQLite DBs, datasets) under data/ on the
already-durable home volume — no separate volume, no platform schema change.
- template.yaml `data_paths:` surfaced by template_service (github + local)
and materialized at creation by crud.py -> git_service.materialize_data_paths:
writes ~/.trinity/data-paths.yaml and appends data/ + entries to the agent's
own .gitignore (idempotent). Opt-in; empty list is a no-op.
- S4 persistent-state and data_paths now share one extracted heredoc/list
primitive (materialize_trinity_yaml_list / _read_trinity_yaml_list).
- New routers/agent_data.py: POST /data/export (stream | base64, 413 over cap,
manifest-only tar when data/ missing) and POST /data/import (proxies to the
agent-server restore primitive; data/** allowlist + traversal guard;
Idempotency-Key). Both serialized per agent by a cross-worker Redis op lock.
- MCP tools export_agent_data / import_agent_data (Invariant #13).
- Validation checks DP-001..DP-005 in agent-validation-spec.
- Docs: architecture, requirements, feature-flows index + agent-data-volumes
flow, agent guide; CSO diff audit report (0 critical/high).
Tests: ~30 unit + TestClient tests (export/import endpoints, allowlist,
gitignore, template surface). PR2 (scheduled snapshots + pre-snapshot
quiesce hook + retention/cascade) deferred.
Closes #1169
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(agent-data): satisfy sys.modules pollution lint in #1169 tests
The two new data_paths test files copied the baselined `patch.dict` +
bare `del sys.modules[...]` loader from test_persistent_state_allowlist.py,
which the sys.modules pollution lint flags as NEW (non-baselined) violations.
Adopt the blessed snapshot/restore exception (precedent:
test_telegram_webhook_backfill.py): declare a top-level
`_STUBBED_MODULE_NAMES` list + an autouse `_restore_sys_modules` fixture, and
install the stubs / evict the cached module directly (the fixture owns
restoration). Removes the bare `del sys.modules[...]` entirely rather than
hiding it. Drop the now-unused `patch` import from the gitignore test.
Lint passes (no new violations); both files' 16 tests still green; no
cross-file leakage.
Refs #1169
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): sync recent changes — #1231 tmpfs, #1115/#1231 index rows
Fix container-capabilities.md for the now-configurable agent /tmp tmpfs
(#1231): default 100m → 512m via AGENT_TMP_SIZE, and correct the stale
full_capabilities ternary excerpts to the shared AGENT_TMPFS_MOUNT constant
(noexec,nosuid always applied, both modes). Add Recent Updates index rows for
the per-schedule performance scorecards (#1115) and the tmpfs-size fix (#1231);
the #1169 and #1116 rows already shipped in-commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* fix(security): authenticate the in-container agent server on the shared agent network (#1159) (#1292)
* fix(security): authenticate the in-container agent server on the shared agent network (#1159)
The in-container agent server (:8000) had zero inbound auth on
trinity-agent-network: any agent could read a sibling's .env secrets or
run arbitrary Claude on it. Every backend->agent call now carries a
per-agent X-Trinity-Agent-Token = HMAC-SHA256(AGENT_AUTH_SECRET,
"trinity-agent-auth:v1:"+name), verified by a pure-ASGI middleware on all
HTTP and WebSocket routes (constant-time compare; only /health exempt).
- Derive-don't-store: the master AGENT_AUTH_SECRET lives only in the
backend env (auto-generated by start.sh like SECRET_KEY); each container
receives only its own token, so a compromised agent cannot compute a
sibling's. Fail-closed -- derive raises on an empty secret.
- Callers route through services/agent_auth.py (agent_httpx_client /
build_agent_auth_headers / merge_auth_headers); a static guard test
fails any new raw agent-{name}:8000 caller that bypasses them.
- Removed the dead, unauthenticated /ws/chat route (ran arbitrary Claude)
and the agent server's wildcard CORS (internal-only).
- Grace path for old images: empty TRINITY_AGENT_AUTH_TOKEN -> allow;
check_agent_auth_token_env_matches forces a one-pass recreate to inject.
- Retired the unused src/scheduler/agent_client.py.
Tests: unit (matcher, middleware, header guard, derivation) + security
isolation test. CSO diff audit in docs/security-reports/cso-diff-2026-06-20.md.
Closes #1159
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): document agent-server authentication (#1159) + sync recent flows
Add a feature-flow doc for the in-container agent-server inbound auth shipped
in this PR, and sync the index with two recent merged changes.
- New feature-flows/agent-server-authentication.md: end-to-end trace of the
derived X-Trinity-Agent-Token (HMAC over AGENT_AUTH_SECRET), the pure-ASGI
middleware enforcing it on every HTTP/WS route, fail-closed vs grace path,
recreate reconciliation, and the migrated callers + static guard. Added to
the Authentication & Security catalog in the index.
- container-capabilities.md: refresh the stale /tmp tmpfs size (was a hardcoded
100m) to the configurable AGENT_TMP_SIZE (default 512m, #1231).
- Recent Updates rows for #1159, #1231, and the previously-missing #1115.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* docs(voip): genericize moved-issue reference in feature-flow
#1039 (configurable data-retention) moved to the private enterprise
tracker; replace the now-private issue number in voip-telephony.md with a
generic description so the public doc doesn't deep-link a private issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(agents): server-side compatibility validation with auto-fix (#668)
Run ~100 best-practice checks (11 categories) against a running agent's
workspace, surfaced non-blocking in the Overview tab with one-click
auto-fix for the 10 gitignore checks, plus an MCP tool.
- services/compatibility/ package (spec/collector/static_checks/ai_checks/fixes):
ONE docker exec -> in-container python -> JSON snapshot (secret files
existence-only, size/binary caps); pure STATIC checks (HARD-only) +
category-batched AI checks (Haiku, iterate-expected, fail-open, capped at
SOFT, secret-redacted); runtime-aware (claude-only checks skipped for
Codex/Gemini).
- GET/POST endpoints (read AuthorizedAgentByName; fix OwnedAgentByName, gitignore
only, per-agent Redis lock, atomic write, uncommitted until next sync;
include_ai path rate-limited). agent_compatibility_results table (dual-track
SQLite + Alembic) persists the latest snapshot; cascade/rename via AGENT_REFS.
- CompatibilityPanel.vue (two-phase fetch, grouped checklist, per-check fix,
re-run) in OverviewPanel; get_agent_compatibility_report MCP tool.
- 35 fixture-driven unit tests; spec sync-tested against docs/agent-validation-spec.md.
Persistence departs from the issue's "no DB table" note so AI verdicts show
without re-spend + enable fleet aggregation (see requirements section 41).
Fixes #668
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(compat): remove polynomial-ReDoS in secret-assignment regex (#668)
CodeQL py/polynomial-redos (high): `_ASSIGN_RE` captured the value as
`[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*$`. The lazy `.+?` and the surrounding `[ \t]*` can both
match a tab, giving polynomial backtracking when `_redact()` runs the pattern
over up to 48 KB of agent-supplied file text.
Capture the value greedily to end-of-line (`(.*)$`) and let the callers
strip — both `_looks_placeholder()` callers already `.strip()`, so secret
detection and redaction are behaviourally identical (verified: `=`, `:`,
`export`, and indented forms still match). 35 unit tests pass.
* feat(sso): OSS gated surface for enterprise SSO (OIDC) (#32)
Companion to trinity-enterprise#36. OSS carries only the entitlement-gated
surface; all SSO logic lives in the private submodule.
- Login.vue: "Sign in with <IdP>" buttons (shown only when the `sso` feature is
entitled and a provider is enabled), plus OIDC callback-fragment handling
(`/login#sso=ok|mfa|error`) — reuses the existing 2FA challenge UI when the
IdP login still requires a local second factor.
- stores/auth.js: completeSsoLogin() (reuses _finalizeLogin / _setMfaChallenge)
+ fetchSsoProviders() (empty in OSS-only builds — endpoint 404s).
- Settings.vue: admin-gated "SSO" tab → SsoPanel.vue (provider CRUD + test +
policy). Gated by enterpriseStore.isEntitled('sso'), same as the 2FA tab.
- Bump enterprise submodule to the SSO module commit.
- docs: architecture enterprise-modules row + requirements §40 (SSO/OIDC).
No new backend dependency (python-jose + httpx already in the image) and no
OSS Python changes — the mint/whitelist/mfa seams already exist.
Stacked on feat/5-2fa-totp (reuses the OSS mfa_gate + 2FA challenge surface).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(sso): bump enterprise submodule to OIDC hardening (#32 review)
Pulls in the email_verified / issuer-pinning / login-CSRF fixes
(trinity-enterprise 87c8f97). OSS gated surface unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(planning): note incubating goal-directed direction; reword voip flow
Add an "Incubating Directions (Not Yet Decided)" section to
TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md capturing the goal-directed control-surface idea
(Objective + policies + roster + externally-measured evals), explicitly
bounded by CLAUDE.md §8 and sequenced after the pull migration + #300.
Incubating in trinity-enterprise#27.
Reword the voip-telephony flow note to drop a stale #1039 reference in
favor of describing the LOG_* data-retention no-op class directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(security): add CSO 2026-06-21 posture report
Routine /cso full-audit posture report (Phases 0–14, daily 8/10 gate).
Follows the docs/security-reports/ convention; no real secrets reproduced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(user-docs): video library + per-page links, v0.6.1 What's New, sync dev features
- Add videos.md (35 published videos, newest-first by topic) and a README Watch section
- Add 'Watch' callouts to 32 feature pages linking the most relevant, newest videos
- Add user-facing whats-new/v0.6.1.md (translated from release notes; no issue numbers)
- Document dev-only features: agent runtimes (Claude Code/Codex/Gemini CLI, #1187),
agent data paths + export/import (#1169), compatibility validation (#668),
in-app bug reporting (#1116), subscription hot-reload (#1089), pull-pilot routing (#946),
configurable AGENT_TMP_SIZE (#1231), Postgres migration-runner groundwork (#1160)
- Index agent-runtimes, agent-data, and the previously-orphaned agent-session pages
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(setup): first-run operator intake + admin email login (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#38, #82)
Capture an optional operator email/company at first-run setup with an explicit,
unchecked-by-default opt-in to "occasionally receive important security & product
updates", submitted once to a new /v1/operator-intake endpoint on #1116's
Cloudflare intake app. The same email binds as the admin's sign-in identity so
the operator can log in with email + password — no verification email is sent (a
fresh install has no Resend key; the email is bound, not code-verified). The
code-based email second factor stays Phase 2 on the existing mfa_gate seam.
- backend: operator_intake_service (fire-and-forget, at-most-once via a
system_settings marker, DO_NOT_TRACK aware, owns installation_id); setup
endpoint captures profile + binds admin email; authenticate_user resolves the
admin by username OR registered email (password guard blocks code-only users);
PUT /api/users/me/email for the existing-admin transition
- frontend: SetupPassword email/company + consent checkbox; Login "username or
email" field; Settings -> General "Admin sign-in email" card
- config: OPERATOR_INTAKE_ENABLED / OPERATOR_INTAKE_URL (+ .env.example)
- docs: requirements section 43, architecture catalog, first-time-setup feature flow
- tests: 16 unit tests (intake idempotency/guards, email-login resolution, setup)
Fixes abilityai/trinity-enterprise#38
Fixes #82
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): index row for first-run intake + admin email login (trinity-enterprise#38, #82)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(setup): de-ambiguate email regex to clear CodeQL polynomial-ReDoS (#82)
The _EMAIL_RE pattern duplicated into setup.py and users.py had two
[^@\s]+ atoms around the literal \. that both also match '.', giving the
engine many ways to place the dot and backtracking polynomially on
user-controlled email input (CodeQL alerts #211, #212).
Constrain only the final segment to [^@\s.]+ (no dot) so the trailing \.
can align with exactly one position -> linear matching. Behaviour is
unchanged: multi-subdomain addresses still validate; an 80k-char
pathological input now resolves in ~2ms.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(credentials): curated credential file-type injection (SA keys, certs, SSH, binary) (#1305)
* feat(credentials): curated credential file-type injection — SA keys, certs, SSH, binary (enterprise#11)
Widens CRED-002 injection from the fixed 3-path exact allowlist
(.env/.credentials.enc/.mcp.json) to a curated set of credential file *types*,
without reopening the arbitrary-path RCE surface (#183/#590/#598).
- New services/credential_paths.py — single-source policy: ALLOW (.config/gcloud/**,
.kube/config, *.pem/*.key/*.crt/*.cert/*.p12/*.pfx, .ssh/id_*, + existing exact set)
with deny-precedence over anything executed/sourced at startup (shell rc,
CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md/.claude/**, .mcp.json.template, .ssh/authorized_keys/config,
.git*, bin/**) and `..`/absolute traversal. Vendored byte-identically into the
agent image (Invariant #5) with a parity test.
- Agent-server hardening: the inject + update file loops now enforce the policy AND
a resolve-under-home traversal guard the original write path lacked; parent-dir
creation + chmod 0o600 preserved. New GET /api/credentials/list for export discovery.
- Binary-safe: inject carries files_b64 (base64); agent writes via write_bytes.
.credentials.enc gains a v2 {files, files_b64} envelope (legacy flat archives still
decrypt); encrypt/decrypt stay flat for the single-secret callers (SIEM/2FA/SSO).
- Export now captures the FULL injected set (via /list) + binary, not just the 2 defaults.
- Three surfaces in sync (Invariant #13): MCP inject_credentials gains files_b64;
frontend CredentialsPanel gains a file-upload affordance (text vs base64 auto-detected).
- Tests: allowlist test now exercises the REAL policy (newly-allowed + still-blocked),
+ credential_paths parity test + binary archive round-trip test. 61 pass.
- docs/memory/architecture.md: credential-path policy documented.
Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#11. Loosens a deliberately-tight boundary —
run /cso on the diff before merge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(credentials): close /cso findings on the injection widening (#11 review)
Security review of the widening surfaced one HIGH regression + hardening items;
all fixed here.
#1 (HIGH, RCE): the #598 .mcp.json content-validation guard was bypassable via
the new files_b64 (binary) channel — validate_mcp_config only checked `files`,
so `files_b64={".mcp.json": base64(<stdio-command MCP server>)}` skipped it and
configured an RCE MCP server on the target agent. Fix: .mcp.json may only arrive
as TEXT (files), where it is validated; rejected in files_b64 at the backend
inject router AND the agent-server write helper.
#2 (defense-in-depth): import/auto-import wrote decrypted archives via the
agent-server /inject layer only. Added validate_credential_set() (curated path
policy + .mcp.json content + no-binary-.mcp.json) on the backend import boundary
so enforcement is dual-layer as the issue mandates. (Archives are AES-GCM with
the server key, so a forged archive wasn't practical — but the layer belongs.)
#3: .ssh/ is now locked to id_* only — a stray *.key/*.pem under .ssh is no
longer accepted (policy was previously broader than the "SSH keys = id_*" intent).
#4 (noted): .config/gcloud/** can hold a google-auth executable credential_source;
only honored under non-default GOOGLE_EXTERNAL_ACCOUNT_ALLOW_EXECUTABLES=1.
Documented in credential_paths.py.
+6 regression tests (169 pass). CSO report: docs/security-reports/cso-2026-06-22-11-diff.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(credentials): exclude vendor dirs from cert globs + accurate export count (#11 live test)
Found while testing PR #1305 against a real local instance:
1. Over-capture: the broad *.pem/*.key/*.crt globs matched bundled CA files
(e.g. .local/.../site-packages/certifi/cacert.pem), so export's /list walk
swept vendored cert material into .credentials.enc. Added node_modules,
site-packages, .local, .venv/venv, .cache, go/pkg to the deny-list (both
root and nested forms) so cert globs only catch real credential files.
2. export's files_exported count re-read just the 2 default files (reported 1
while the archive actually held 5). export_to_agent now returns the true
captured count; dropped the redundant stale read.
Verified end-to-end on a live agent: allowed types inject (text+binary, 0600,
parent dirs), blocked paths 400 (incl. .ssh non-id_*, .mcp.json-via-files_b64,
weaponized .mcp.json text), and binary round-trips through export→import with
matching sha256. +5 regression tests (72 pass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(security): annotate CSO 2026-06-21 findings as remediated; drop stale voip hunk
Two review-driven fixes ahead of the v0.7.0 cut:
- Annotate the CSO posture report (.md + .json) with post-audit remediation
status. The report audited `main` pre-cut and listed F1/F2/F3 as open
VERIFIED findings; they are already remediated on `dev` and ship in v0.7.0:
- F1 (unauth agent-server) -> #1159 X-Trinity-Agent-Token middleware
- F2 (fastmcp -> hono/undici) -> #1255, #1289; fastmcp ^4.3.0
- F3 (form-data CRLF via axios) -> #1254
- F4/F5/F8 exploit path closed by #1159 (auth gate)
Adds a top-of-report banner, per-row status tags, per-finding notes, and a
machine-readable `remediation_status` block in the JSON. Avoids publishing a
stale "open CRITICAL + exploit" to a PUBLIC repo without its fix context.
- Drop the voip-telephony.md reword: it is superseded by already-merged #1301,
which made the identical `#1039` -> `LOG_*` change on `dev`. Restoring to
merge-base removes the redundant/conflicting hunk from this PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: set version to 0.7.0
* feat: streamline first-time setup wizard (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#49)
Drop the log-copied setup token, require an admin email, and rebuild the
first-run page as a welcoming animated welcome screen.
Backend (routers/setup.py, main.py):
- Remove the setup-token machinery entirely (ensure_setup_token /
clear_setup_token / Redis-shared token + the main.py startup emission).
Setup no longer depends on Redis — the admin write goes straight to SQLite.
- Make admin email REQUIRED (sign-in identity): missing -> 422 at the model
layer; blank/typo -> 400, validated before any write so setup never
half-completes. Password complexity (OWASP ASVS 2.1) still enforced.
- get_setup_status keeps setup_available:true for frontend back-compat.
Frontend (SetupPassword.vue):
- Full redesign: dark branded hero with an animated orbiting fleet
constellation (Trinity mark core + agent nodes on three rings), split
layout (stacks on mobile), prefers-reduced-motion aware.
- No setup-token field; email required; order email -> password (+confirm)
-> company -> updates opt-in. Removed the Redis-wait panel + polling.
Security tradeoff (chosen: accept + document): removing the token leaves the
unauthenticated first-run window with no proof-of-control. Documented as an
operator responsibility (deploy behind a tunnel/VPN until setup completes) in
docs/DEPLOYMENT.md Security Recommendations; endpoint still self-disables
after first success. See docs/security-reports/cso-diff-2026-06-23.md (F1).
Docs: DEPLOYMENT.md security note, architecture.md, requirements.md
(§15.2/§43), feature-flows/first-time-setup.md.
Tests: remove obsolete test_1165_setup_token_shared.py; update test_setup.py
(no token, email required) and test_setup_operator_profile.py (email
required, model-layer + blank/invalid rejection). 7 operator-profile unit
tests pass; new contract verified live (422/400 negative paths).
Fixes abilityai/trinity-enterprise#49
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(setup): full-bleed setup screen via normal flow, not position:fixed
The redesigned first-run page used `position:fixed; inset:0` for its root.
On wider viewports this left a band of the light `#app` (bg-gray-100)
background showing through on the right/bottom — a fixed root is clipped to
the nearest transformed/contained ancestor instead of the viewport, so its
coverage isn't guaranteed.
Switch the root to the original component's proven normal-flow approach
(`position:relative; width:100%; min-height:100vh`), which fills the
full-width `#app`, and make the decorative aurora/grid `position:absolute`
within it. Verified covering the full viewport at 2560x1440 (light mode, the
repro case) and stacking correctly at 430px.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): defer routers.setup import so unit collection can't be corrupted
The CI backend-unit regression gate runs `cd tests && pytest unit/` (the whole
unit suite). test_setup_operator_profile.py imported `routers.setup` at module
(collection) time; that import — pulling in database/dependencies/services and
their many `utils.*` leaves — failed/perturbed sys.modules during collection and
INTERRUPTED the entire `unit/` collection (head collected ~2 of 2734 → the diff
gate flagged it as a new failure).
Defer the `import routers.setup` to a cached `_get_setup()` accessor used inside
the tests, so module collection imports only stdlib/pytest/fastapi/pydantic and
can never corrupt the suite. `_get_setup()` also spec-preloads the backend
`utils.*` leaves (helpers/errors/credential_sanitizer/password_validation/
url_validation/image_optimize) the same way conftest preloads `utils.helpers`,
without touching `sys.modules["utils"]`, so the import resolves cleanly at run
time regardless of harness utils state.
Verified with the exact CI command (`cd tests && pytest unit/ --co`): the full
suite now collects 2734 items with no interruption, and the 7 setup tests pass.
No conftest changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): drop sys.modules preload — plain lazy import (passes #762 lint)
The previous commit's `_get_setup()` spec-preloaded backend utils leaves via
`sys.modules[...] = …` / `.pop`, which tests/lint_sys_modules.py (#762) bans
outside conftest. It's also unnecessary: in the backend-unit gate
(`cd tests && pytest unit/`), tests/unit/conftest.py already installs
src/backend/utils as the canonical `utils` package, so a plain lazy
`import routers.setup` resolves the backend `utils.*` leaves natively.
Simplify `_get_setup()` to a cached plain lazy import — no sys.modules
mutation. Verified: lint clean (no new violations), `pytest unit/ --co`
collects 2734 with no interruption, and the 7 setup tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): update #858 guards for setup-token removal (#49)
Removing the setup token (trinity-enterprise#49) deleted
`routers/setup.py::ensure_setup_token` and the lifespan token emission, so two
#858 regression guards asserted gone behavior and failed in the backend-unit
gate:
- test_ensure_setup_token_logs_token_via_logger_warning
- test_lifespan_emits_setup_token_via_logger_before_event_bus
The #858 invariant itself is intact: the lifespan still emits the first-run
notice via `logger.warning` (not print), after setup_logging() and before
event_bus.start(). Replace the token-specific guard with one that matches the
new FIRST-TIME SETUP warning by content + ordering, drop the now-obsolete
ensure_setup_token guard, and remove the unused BACKEND_SETUP constant. The
Dockerfile PYTHONUNBUFFERED parity checks and the no-print-in-lifespan guard are
unchanged. 4 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(whatsapp): deliver ChannelResponse.files as Twilio MediaUrl (#1315)
WhatsApp agents can now send files to users. send_response delivers
ChannelResponse.files as Twilio MediaUrl attachments (one message per file,
text first), reaching parity with the Slack adapter.
- New create_share_from_bytes() persists in-memory bytes through the FILES-001
pipeline (MIME-blocklist/quota/disk/DB) and mints a public ?sig= URL; both it
and create_share now share the extracted _persist_and_register helper.
- Per-agent file_sharing_enabled gate; 1h share TTL (cleanup reaper purges).
- Caps (image/audio/video ~5MB, documents ~16MB) on the detected MIME; graceful
text-link fallback when public_chat_url is unset/non-HTTPS, the MIME is
unsupported, or the file is oversized — never silently dropped.
- Per-file isolation: a rejected/failed file never aborts the text or siblings.
- 42 unit tests; requirements.md + whatsapp-integration.md updated.
Fixes #1315
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(whatsapp): webhook routes to backend, not frontend (#1281) (#1316)
The WhatsApp panel's deployment-prerequisite notice told operators to route
/api/whatsapp/webhook/* to the "frontend service". That path is a backend
FastAPI route (Twilio HMAC-verified); pointing tunnel ingress at the static
SPA silently drops inbound messages. Corrected to the backend service
(http://backend:8000), matching the cited PUBLIC_EXTERNAL_ACCESS_SETUP.md.
Related to #1281
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(ui): loading skeletons for Dashboard graph & timeline (#1266) (#1312)
The initial fleet/metrics load can take 20s+ on 10+ agent fleets (#1265);
until now the Dashboard rendered the "No agents" empty state (or blank
timeline) during that wait, so the UI looked frozen/broken.
- New reusable `SkeletonLoader.vue` (dark-mode aware, accessible
role=status/aria-busy, reserves space to avoid layout shift) with `rows`
(timeline/list) and `nodes` (collaboration graph) variants.
- `stores/network.js`: add `loading` (defaults true so the first paint is a
skeleton, not the empty state) + `loadError` (distinct failed-load state),
toggled in `fetchAgents` (finally-cleared so a failure never shows an
infinite skeleton).
- `Dashboard.vue`: graph canvas and timeline now render skeleton → error →
empty → content off those flags. Loading shows immediately on nav; error
states offer a Retry (reuses `refreshAll`).
Frontend-only; pairs with the backend perf work in #1265. `vite build` passes.
Related to #1266
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(db): set SQLite end-of-support to September 1, 2026 + Postgres migration notes (#1278) (#1314)
Records the firm SQLite end-of-support date and the SQLite → PostgreSQL
migration announcement/guidance. Documentation/decision only — SQLite code
removal stays with the migration work (#300/#1183/#746).
- docs/migrations/SQLITE_TO_POSTGRES.md (new): authoritative guide — EOL date,
what changes and when, switching a fresh deployment (DATABASE_URL + postgres
profile), migrating an existing deployment (backup-first; no turnkey data-copy
tool yet — honest cutover options), verification, and release-notes copy.
- docs/releases/v0.6.2.md (new, draft): EOL announcement section linking the
guide, seeding the next release notes.
- docs/planning/TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md + docs/memory/architecture.md (Invariant #3):
reference the EOL date so it's discoverable outside the release.
- Cross-links the in-repo reminder companion (#1279).
Related to #1278
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: stop disclosing enterprise functionality in public docs (trinity-enterprise#45) (#1311)
* docs: stop disclosing enterprise functionality in public docs (trinity-enterprise#45)
The public repo documented the full design, feature catalog, and gating
strategy of the paid enterprise tier — a free blueprint of what we monetize
and how it's built. This removes that competitive content and keeps only the
generic open-core seam public.
- Delete 4 strategy/design docs (OSS_ENTERPRISE_SPLIT_RESEARCH,
ENTERPRISE_ARCHITECTURE, feature-flows/enterprise-modules, ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV)
- architecture.md "Enterprise Modules" table -> neutral seam pointer
(no paid-feature catalog, no enterprise_* table DDL, no per-module detail)
- requirements.md §35 -> abstract EntitlementService seam (drop the enumerated
module list + dead links to the deleted strategy docs)
- audit-trail.md: neutralize the lone enterprise-pillar mention
- CLAUDE.md: standing rule — enterprise designs live only in trinity-enterprise
- CI: enterprise-docs-guard.yml fails the build if live public docs reintroduce
paid-feature / private-schema tokens
Content is preserved (relocated to the private trinity-enterprise repo, see the
companion PR). Git-history scrub of the deleted files + point-in-time historical
docs (archive/, releases/, security-reports/) tracked as a follow-up.
Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#45
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* ci(enterprise-docs-guard): add least-privilege permissions block
Clears CodeQL actions/missing-workflow-permissions (medium). The guard only
checks out and greps, so contents: read is sufficient.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(releases): add 0.7.0 release notes
* fix(#1115): port get_agent_schedules_summary to SQLAlchemy Core (Postgres-safe)
The #300 SQLAlchemy migration dropped the get_db_connection import from
db/schedules.py but left get_agent_schedules_summary (#1115) calling it,
so the /schedules/analytics-summary endpoint raised NameError at runtime.
Surfaced for the first time by the v0.7.0 release-PR full-suite run (dev
pushes only lint).
Port the method to get_engine() Core queries like its siblings, and
replace the SQLite-only bare-column-with-MAX last-run query with a
portable ROW_NUMBER() window so it works on PostgreSQL too.
Also refresh the test_login_rate_limit_split config stub, which went
stale when auth.py grew a PUBLIC_ACCESS_REQUESTS_ENABLED dependency
(trinity-enterprise#10) — 8 collection errors under HEAD.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(voip): per-agent VoIP config panel + persisted voice (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#28)
Add the missing per-agent VoIP config UI (agent Settings/Sharing tab) and a
persisted per-agent Gemini voice. Shipped as plain OSS gated on the existing
voip_available platform flag — NOT entitlement-gated (a UI gate over a
money-spending OSS backend would be cosmetic; deliberate simplification of the
issue's original "entitlement-gated" framing).
Backend:
- agent_ownership.voice_name (default Kore) via dual-track migration
(SQLite db/migrations.py + Alembic 0004 + schema.py/tables.py). db
get/set_voice_name with read-path fallback to Kore for unset/invalid values.
- GET/PUT /api/agents/{name}/voice/name (PUT owner-only, validated against
GEMINI_VOICE_NAMES). _get_voice_name and voip_service now read the persisted
voice instead of the two hardcoded "Kore" sites.
- PUT /api/agents/{name}/voip/enabled toggle (owner-only, 404 when no binding);
create_binding upsert no longer forces enabled=1 so re-saving credentials
preserves a disabled state (call path already refuses disabled bindings).
Frontend:
- VoipChannelPanel.vue (modeled on WhatsAppChannelPanel) mounted in SharingPanel
under voip_available; shared src/constants/voices.js (drift-guarded vs backend);
AgentWorkspace picker defaults to the persisted voice; sessions store surfaces
voip_available.
Tests: tests/unit/test_28_voip_voice_config.py — voice fallback/roundtrip/
invalid->default, enable toggle + re-PUT-preserves-disabled (H3), and the
frontend/backend voice-list drift guard. Schema-parity + voip-db guards green.
Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#28
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(voip): HTTP-level endpoint tests for /voice/name + /voip/enabled (#28 review I1)
Pre-landing /review flagged that the new endpoints were covered only at the DB
layer. Add FastAPI TestClient tests (mount real routers, override auth deps, stub
db/voip_service) asserting:
- PUT /voice/name: owner-gated (403), 400 on unknown voice, empty clears to
default, valid voice persists; GET returns voice_name + available_voices.
- PUT /voip/enabled: owner-gated (403), 404 when no binding / when voip flag off,
200 reflecting state with no auth_token leaked.
Also capture a durable learning (docs/memory/learnings.md): the schema-parity
test is blind to db/tables.py drift — a missing Column there passes parity but
breaks at runtime; guard it with a db-accessor unit test that executes a live
select on the new column.
Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#28
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(docs): agent-readable zero-to-value onboarding (#1280) (#1336)
* refactor(docs): agent-readable zero-to-value onboarding (#1280)
Make the repo's entry points machine-first so an autonomous agent can self-orient and reach a useful result without a human translating context.
- AGENTS.md: add a "Using this file" machine-contract header (declares it the authoritative agent entry point, states the AGENTS/CLAUDE/README boundary, explains how to traverse). Rebuild Route-by-task with an explicit "Done when" zero-to-value signal per persona.
- CLAUDE.md: cross-link to AGENTS.md and frame CLAUDE.md as the contributor working agreement (auto-loaded by Claude Code), not the agent landing page.
- Fixes from a context-free agent onboarding test (AC#5 validation): AGENTS.md deploy verify no longer assumes an undefined $TOKEN (leads with `trinity agents list`, shows token derivation); deploy section states the running-instance prerequisite; README CLI example adds the `trinity agents list` verify step; docs/CLI.md leads with `pip install trinity-cli` (PyPI) and marks `-e src/cli/` as the from-source/dev variant.
Validated by an agent performing a zero-to-value deploy task using only repo files, no human context: self-oriented in 2 hops (README -> AGENTS.md) to a correct deploy+verify answer; friction items above are its findings, folded back in.
Repo-root AGENTS.md is hand-authored; the CLAUDE.md->AGENTS.md mirror (#1187) is per-agent-container (startup.sh), so these edits are conflict-free.
Related to #1280
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(templates): machine-readable starter-template catalog (#1280)
Affordance sweep for agent self-selection. Previously an agent had to `ls`
config/agent-templates/ (24 dirs, 7 of them test fixtures) and open each
template.yaml to find a starting point.
- config/agent-templates/README.md: catalog grouping the 17 real templates
(single-purpose: scout/sage/scribe/demo-*/trinity-system; the dd-* due-
diligence suite) with one-line affordances, how-to-use, and an explicit
"not starting points" list for the test/canary fixtures
- AGENTS.md: link the catalog from the Deploy-an-agent section so the
zero-to-value path is "pick a ready-made template", not "author from scratch"
Related to #1280
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): un-quarantine and fix the 15 unmasked unit failures (#1103) (#1338)
Removes the @pytest.mark.skip quarantines added in #300 and fixes the
underlying issues. Each group fixed at root cause, not by matching assertions
to current behavior.
Environmental (git identity):
- tests/unit/conftest.py: set GIT_AUTHOR/COMMITTER_NAME/EMAIL process-wide so
in-test `git commit` works on a CI runner with no global git identity
("Author identity unknown"). Fixes test_reset_preserve_state_guardrails (3)
and the test_git_pull_branch end-to-end setups.
Test-setup bug (production code was correct):
- test_git_pull_branch.py: the repos did `git push -u origin main` but `git init`
defaults to `master` (no init.defaultBranch), so origin/main never existed and
_get_pull_branch correctly fell back to the working branch — the assertions
expecting "main" failed. Force `git init -b main` (local + bare). Fixes all 5
(TestGetPullBranch 2 + TestGitPullFromMainEndToEnd 3).
Test-isolation bug (assertions were correct):
- test_orphaned_execution_recovery.py: shared module-level mocks were reset with
plain reset_mock(), which keeps return_value/side_effect — so one test's
get_agent_container.side_effect bled into later tests under random ordering,
skewing recovery counts ("assert 3 == 2"). Reset with
reset_mock(return_value=True, side_effect=True). Stable across 5 seeds.
Real lint findings:
- docker/base-image/startup.sh: shellcheck now exits 0. Converted the 4 fragile
file-iteration loops to `find -print0 | while read` (SC2010/SC2045/SC2044),
hardened 8 `cd` with `|| exit 1` (SC2164), split the SC2155 export, and
documented-disabled SC2001 on the two regex `sed` lines that ${//} can't
express. `bash -n` clean. Un-skips test_startup_sh_shellcheck_clean.
backlog (3) and 929 (1) were already un-quarantined on dev (db_harness schema),
so no change needed there.
Verified: the 11 un-skipped tests pass across multiple random seeds; full unit
suite shows no regressions from these changes (the unrelated pre-existing
test_1115_schedules_summary / test_admin_email_login failures fail on dev too).
Related to #1103
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(deps-dev): bump happy-dom (#1326)
Bumps the patch-and-minor group in /tests/git-sync with 1 update: [happy-dom](https://github.com/capricorn86/happy-dom).
Updates `happy-dom` from 20.10.5 to 20.10.6
- [Release notes](https://github.com/capricorn86/happy-dom/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/capricorn86/happy-dom/compare/v20.10.5...v20.10.6)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: happy-dom
dependency-version: 20.10.6
dependency-type: direct:development
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(deps-dev): bump @types/node in /src/mcp-server (#1327)
Bumps [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node) from 25.9.3 to 26.0.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
dependency-version: 26.0.0
dependency-type: direct:development
update-type: version-update:semver-major
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(deps): bump fastmcp (#1325)
Bumps the patch-and-minor group in /src/mcp-server with 1 update: [fastmcp](https://github.com/punkpeye/fastmcp).
Updates `fastmcp` from 4.3.0 to 4.3.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/punkpeye/fastmcp/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/punkpeye/fastmcp/compare/v4.3.0...v4.3.2)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: fastmcp
dependency-version: 4.3.2
dependency-type: direct:production
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(deps): bump the patch-and-minor group (#1329)
Bumps the patch-and-minor group in /src/frontend with 5 updates:
| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [axios](https://github.com/axios/axios) | `1.18.0` | `1.18.1` |
| [@playwright/test](https://github.com/microsoft/playwright) | `1.61.0` | `1.61.1` |
| [autoprefixer](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer) | `10.5.0` | `10.5.1` |
| [@rollup/rollup-darwin-arm64](https://github.com/rollup/rollup) | `4.62.0` | `4.62.2` |
| [@rollup/rollup-linux-arm64-musl](https://github.com/rollup/rollup) | `4.62.0` | `4.62.2` |
Updates `axios` from 1.18.0 to 1.18.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/axios/axios/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.x/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/axios/axios/compare/v1.18.0...v1.18.1)
Updates `@playwright/test` from 1.61.0 to 1.61.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/microsoft/playwright/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/microsoft/playwright/compare/v1.61.0...v1.61.1)
Updates `autoprefixer` from 10.5.0 to 10.5.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/compare/10.5.0...10.5.1)
Updates `@rollup/rollup-darwin-arm64` from 4.62.0 to 4.62.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/compare/v4.62.0...v4.62.2)
Updates `@rollup/rollup-linux-arm64-musl` from 4.62.0 to 4.62.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/compare/v4.62.0...v4.62.2)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: axios
dependency-version: 1.18.1
dependency-type: direct:production
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
- dependency-name: "@playwright/test"
dependency-version: 1.61.1
dependency-type: direct:development
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
- dependency-name: autoprefixer
dependency-version: 10.5.1
dependency-type: direct:development
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
- dependency-name: "@rollup/rollup-darwin-arm64"
dependency-version: 4.62.2
dependency-type: direct:production
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
- dependency-name: "@rollup/rollup-linux-arm64-musl"
dependency-version: 4.62.2
dependency-type: direct:production
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(executions): propagate cancelled terminal status end-to-end (#679) (#1333)
Defense-in-depth follow-up to #671. Make the agent task-runner aware that an
operator cancel happened and surface a third terminal outcome — `cancelled` —
alongside success/failed, so a cancel is never recorded as a billable success
or an agent failure.
Agent server:
- ProcessRegistry records a `_terminated[execution_id]` marker on a successful
SIGINT send; `was_terminated()` (read-only, 300s lazy TTL, cleared on
register) lets the sync chat handler and async result callback relabel a
graceful-exit-0 / SIGKILL->504 turn as cancelled.
- `record_task_finish` accepts a neutral finish (success=None): a cancel
neither resets nor increments the dispatch-breaker failure counter (#526).
Backend:
- 3-way status map (success->SUCCESS, cancelled->CANCELLED, else->FAILED) in
the async callback (routers/agents.py) and the sync applier
(task_execution_service). An auth/rate terminal is never reclassified as a
cancellation — guarded at the backend trust boundary too (CSO finding 2).
- Consumers (message_router, chat, paid, public, validation_service) treat
cancelled as non-delivery; paid no longer settles on cancel (money bug).
- terminate writes CANCELLED only when it actually stopped a running turn; on
already-finished the agent's real terminal stands (Issue 7).
Tests: 9 new unit suites (64 cases) + execution-termination integration
additions; 85 unit tests pass locally. CSO diff audit: CLEAR.
Refs #679
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(ui): unify Chat + Session into one Chat tab with a session-mode toggle (#1112) (#1340)
Collapse the redundant Chat + Session tabs on Agent Detail into a single "Chat"
tab carrying a "Session mode" toggle (default ON), keeping the legacy stateless
surface as a first-class user-selectable mode rather than dead code.
- AgentDetail.vue: single `{ id: 'chat' }` tab (drop the separate Session entry).
New `chatMode` ref ('session'|'legacy', default 'session') persisted per-user in
localStorage['trinity.chatMode']. `sessionAvailable` = feature flag on AND
runtime has --resume (not Codex); `effectiveChatMode` forces legacy when the
Session surface is unavailable and hides the toggle. The toggle swaps
SessionPanel ↔ ChatPanel in-place (v-if). isFullscreenTab keys on the single
'chat' id; `?tab=session` aliases to 'chat' (hinting session mode).
- Execution-resume: ExecutionDetail "continue as chat" (?tab=chat&resumeSessionId)
forces legacy ChatPanel (which owns resume) via a transient, non-persisted
routeForcedMode — without rewriting the user's saved preference.
- No backend change (session_tab_enabled already exists). MobileAdmin unaffected:
its openChat is a self-contained mobile chat overlay, not an AgentDetail
deep-link, so there is nothing to repoint.
- docs: architecture Session Tab block + requirements §5.8 note.
Related to #1112
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(access): Access tab — manage Trinity operators per agent (trinity-enterprise#17) (#1317)
New Access tab on Agent Detail that manages Trinity operators (platform users)
with access to an agent, distinct from the Sharing tab's external channel
clients. Draws the operator-vs-client line on the read path.
Backend:
- db.get_agent_operator_access(): outer-joins agent_sharing × users on the
grantee email (lower-cased, engine-based → PG+SQLite). Resolved → active
operator (username/role/last_active); unresolved → pending invite.
- GET /api/agents/{name}/access (AgentOperatorAccess model). Add/remove reuse
the existing /share + /share/{email}.
Frontend:
- AccessPanel.vue: operator roster (status + role badges, last-active), add by
email, remove. Access tab wired into AgentDetail (owner-gated).
- SharingPanel.vue: Team Sharing allow-list removed (moves to Access); dead
share-management script + stale "Team Sharing below" copy cleaned/repointed.
- stores/agents.js: getAgentAccess().
Tests: active-vs-pending classification + agent scoping. vite build passes.
Note: the strict client-vs-operator split (non-user emails → a dedicated client
roster) is deferred to the Sharing-side redesign (#18/#20); removing them here
now would orphan those grants, so all allow-list entries stay visible on Access.
Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#17
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ui): slim the Overview executions-by-type bars
The "Executions by type" stacked bars rendered full-width with a 1px
gap, so a busy agent's week read as a solid wall of color. Cap each
bar at 56px and center it inside its (still full-width) hover column,
and soften the top corner. The column stays flex-1 so spacing/tooltips
are unchanged and wider windows (14d/30d) thin naturally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(voip): add Gacrux to the Gemini Live voice picker
Adds the "Gacrux — Mature" prebuilt voice to the per-agent VoIP voice
selector (and the shared AgentWorkspace per-session picker, which reads
the same list). Updated in lockstep across the three mirrored sources so
the frontend↔backend parity test stays green:
- src/frontend/src/constants/voices.js — single frontend source of truth
- src/backend/config.py GEMINI_VOICE_NAMES — write-validation allowlist +
read-path fallback
- tests/unit/test_28_voip_voice_config.py — hardcoded parity tuple
Follow-up to #1323 (per-agent VoIP config panel + persisted voice).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(ui): reframe Sharing tab to external-client sharing via channels (#1347)
Part of the Access/Sharing redesign (Epic trinity-enterprise#16). The Access
tab (#17) already owns Trinity operators; this scopes the Sharing tab to the
operator → external-client surface.
- Google-Docs-style "Share this agent" framing; operator language removed
(operators live on the Access tab).
- External access policy collapsed into one **Restricted ↔ Open** segmented
control over require_email/open_access (Restricted = approval-gated, Open =
anyone verified; identity proof always on for external sharing).
- Pending requests kept, reframed as external clients awaiting approval.
- Channels rendered as compact collapsible summary rows (new
ChannelDisclosure.vue). Detailed config stays reachable inside the expanded
row as a non-regressing interim seam — #19 replaces the body with a modal
dialog. No channel functionality removed.
- Outbound file sharing + public links nudged into a separate "Distribution"
section (distribution, not client access).
Frontend-only; no API changes. SharingPanel prop/emit contract unchanged.
Verified: both SFCs compile (vue/compiler-sfc), design-token check passes.
Related to abilityai/trinity-enterprise#18
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(architecture): trim architecture.md under the 150k-char context limit (#1344)
architecture.md had grown to ~156.7k chars (on dev), past the 150k
soft limit Claude Code warns about when auto-loading it each session
(it's `@`-imported by CLAUDE.md). Over the limit the file risks silent
truncation and eats a large slice of the context window every session.
Compressed the densest Cross-Cutting Subsystem narratives, the migration
and non-root-container invariants (#3/#17), a few catalog/endpoint rows,
and the longest frontend UI prose — preferring summary + pointer where a
dedicated `feature-flows/` doc already owns the deep detail (the doc's own
editorial rule). Result: 156.7k → 149.3k chars (~4.8% smaller).
No facts dropped: every issue tag, field name, default, and error-string
is preserved; protected SQLite DDL (tracked by /validate-schema) untouched;
heading/code-fence/table counts unchanged; all 12 added flow-doc links
resolve.
Related to the over-limit warning surfaced in Claude Code.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(deps): bump js-yaml from 4.2.0 to 5.1.0 in /src/frontend (#1330)
Bumps [js-yaml](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml) from 4.2.0 to 5.1.0.
- [Changelog](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/compare/4.2.0...5.1.0)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: js-yaml
dependency-version: 5.1.0
dependency-type: direct:production
update-type: version-update:semver-major
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ci): guard the Alembic (Postgres) track in schema-parity (#1342) (#1345)
* fix(ci): guard the Alembic (Postgres) track in schema-parity (#1342)
The schema-parity required check validated only the SQLite track
(migrations.py ↔ schema.py). A schema change that ships the SQLite
migration but omits the Alembic revision under
src/backend/migrations/versions/ passed every required check green yet
broke PostgreSQL — init_database() runs alembic_runner.upgrade_to_head(),
which applies revision files only and does not autogenerate from
tables.py. Two PRs reached "green CI but PG-broken" and had to be held by
hand.
Add a cross-track guard, folded into the existing required schema-parity
job (no new required-check to manage):
- scripts/ci/check_alembic_parity.py — fails a PR that ADDS schema DDL to
db/{migrations,schema,tables}.py without a net-new revision file under
src/backend/migrations/versions/. Pure stdlib, PR-only (diffs base...head).
- Heuristic / false-positive guard: the signal is a DDL keyword on an
*added, non-comment* line (SQL: CREATE/ALTER/ADD COLUMN/…; SQLAlchemy:
Column(/Table(/Index(/…). Comment edits, data-only and down migrations
carry no DDL keyword, so they don't trip it. Documented in the script
docstring and the workflow header.
- tests/unit/test_alembic_parity_guard.py — 20 tests incl. the acceptance
fixtures (SQLite-only change fails; dual-tracked passes; comment/data-only
pass). Wired into the parity pytest run.
Also notes the enforcement in architecture.md Invariant #3.
Verified locally: 24 tests pass; end-to-end smoke across clean / SQLite-only
(exit 1) / paired-revision (exit 0) scenarios behaves correctly.
Related to #1342
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci): tighten Alembic guard to require a new MIGRATIONS entry (#1342)
Verifying against real repo history surfaced a false positive: the
migration-runner refactor #1263 (_atomic_rebuild table rebuilds) re-emits
CREATE TABLE / CREATE INDEX for *existing* tables in a rename-swap but adds
no actual schema and no new MIGRATIONS entry — yet the original "any added
DDL keyword" heuristic flagged it, violating AC #4 (non-schema edits must
not trip).
Tighten the signal to two conjuncts: a schema change must (1) register a
net-new ("name", _migrate_fn) entry in the MIGRATIONS list AND (2) carry a
DDL keyword. Runner refactors / table rebuilds add no entry → exempt;
data-only new migrations carry no DDL → exempt; real column/table adds do
both → caught.
Validated against real commits:
• #740 agent_loops, #526 agent_ownership column → FAIL (correctly blocked)
• #668 compat, voice_name (both shipped an Alembic revision) → PASS
• #1263 runner refactor → PASS (false positive fixed)
A full post-Alembic history scan finds 0 outstanding missing revisions, so
no backfill is owed; the pre-Alembic columns are already in 0001_baseline.
28 tests pass (added MIGRATIONS-entry detection + the #1263 rebuild case).
Related to #1342
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* docs(dependab…
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…04 (Phase 4) (#1497) * test(canary): unblock canary_invariants fixture broken by #1472 merge Two pre-existing breakages landed via #1472 (367a5e1, merged today) in root-level tests/test_canary_invariants.py — a file the CI unit job (tests/unit/ only) does not run, so they merged undetected: 1. Duplicate `CREATE TABLE agent_schedules` in the `canary_db` fixture DDL — the E-06 work added a second definition next to the pre-existing one, so `executescript` raised "table agent_schedules already exists" and every fixture-dependent canary test errored. Removed the older, unused block (its `message`/`owner_id` columns have no consumer; `_add_schedule` and the E-06/L-03 collectors use only the kept block's columns). 2. `test_run_invariants_all` expected registry set omitted "E-06" (added to the invariants registry by the same PR). Added E-06 to the expected set and asserted it is green on a clean platform. Restores a green baseline (92 passed) so the #1450 B-01 work can be verified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(canary): B-01 queue-status coherence — backend-consistent Side B + confirm-re-read (#1450) B-01 compared two reads that were neither temporally atomic nor backend-consistent (both latent while the canary is default-OFF and SQLite makes the two reads hit one file): (a) Temporal non-atomicity — a concurrent enqueue/backlog-drain landing between the two reads produced a transient count mismatch → spurious critical + green→red Slack alert. (b) Backend divergence (#300/#1093) — Side A (`db.get_queued_count`) honors `get_engine()`/DATABASE_URL; Side B read raw sqlite3 at DB_PATH. On Postgres those are two different databases, so B-01 compared Postgres truth to a stale/absent SQLite file (fatal under the Postgres direction + SQLite EOL, #1278). Production-side residue of #1446 (PR #1452), which fixed only the test-harness `sys.modules` leak and deferred these two gaps. Fix (localized to B-01): - New `_collect_queued_ids_via_engine` reads B-01's Side B through the SAME `get_engine()` seam as the accessor, on a dedicated `queued_ids_via_engine` snapshot field. Independent code path (SELECT id/literal 'queued' vs COUNT(*)/the QUEUED enum) — shares a database, not a code path, so a cache/status-filter regression still surfaces (non-tautology, AC #3). No cache / second count of the queue (AC #4). - The collector performs one confirm-re-read on a mismatch: a transient race self-heals; a persistent drift survives and fires (AC #2). An engine-read or unconfirmable confirm degrades to a B-01 skip — it never compares an engine count against the raw-sqlite id-set (the blocker the reviews surfaced). - `queued_exec_ids` (raw sqlite) stays untouched for B-02/E-02, so blast radius is B-01-only and the sibling #1077 merge stays clean. The running-side / known-agents reads remain raw-sqlite (half-migrated collector); the collector-wide migration + a dark-canary tripwire are a filed follow-up. Tests (test_canary_invariants.py): retarget the synthetic B-01 tests at `queued_ids_via_engine`; add the AC #5 regression net — a diverged-backend proxy (raw ≠ engine temp files) that false-fires pre-fix and is green post-fix, a transient-race confirm-absorb + persistent-drift-still-fires pair, and an engine-read-failure→skip test. New split fixtures (`canary_db_split` / `reload_canary_split`) model the diverged backend without a live PG. Convert the file to the sanctioned `_STUBBED_MODULE_NAMES` + `_restore_sys_modules` escape hatch so its import-time stubs no longer leak (the #1446 mechanism) and the reimport `del`s are lint-clean. Docs: architecture.md Canary B-01 row updated for the engine-backed read path + confirm-re-read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(feature-flows): add #1450 canary B-01 Recent Updates row Sync-feature-flows: canary-internal change, no dedicated flow doc (architecture.md is canonical); append one Recent Updates row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(canary): fix duplicate agent_schedules DDL + reconcile E-06 in registry test The canary_db fixture had two `CREATE TABLE agent_schedules` statements in one executescript (a #1472 merge artifact), so it raised `table already exists` and reddened the whole file. Merge them into one definition carrying every column the canary reads (next_run_at/enabled/deleted_at + agent_name). Add duration_ms/queued_at/backlog_metadata to schedule_executions and extend _add_execution for the #1077 E-03/E-04 collector work. Reconcile E-06 (already registered) into test_run_invariants_all's expected key-set. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(canary): terminal-row collector for E-03/G-03 (#1077) Add _collect_terminal_rows(window_seconds) + Snapshot.terminal_rows. Windowed on started_at (not completed_at, so E-03 can see NULL-completed_at rows), scoped to success/failed/cancelled via a local _E03_TERMINAL_STATUSES subset that excludes skipped (which legitimately has no completed_at/duration_ms). PRAGMA guard skips the source entirely when completed_at/duration_ms are absent (column-absent != value-NULL) rather than false-firing. Window = max per-agent timeout + 300s; bounded ORDER BY started_at DESC LIMIT 5000 with a logged sampled flag (no (status,started_at) index over 90-day retention; tripwire, not backfill audit). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(canary): register E-03 (completed_at populated) + G-03 (clock sanity) (#1077) E-03 (A/major): terminal rows must have completed_at NOT NULL. Predicate is completed_at-only — the catalog's + duration_ms clause false-fires on healthy queue-terminated rows (cancel/fail/expire set completed_at but never duration_ms). G-03 (A/minor): started_at <= completed_at with a ~1s cross-worker clock-skew tolerance, UTC-aware parsing (E-06 _to_utc shape) so a #1474 mixed naive/Z pair compares without raising. Both are leading-edge tripwires over the shared terminal-row collector and catch all producers incl. the standalone scheduler's raw-SQL writers a unit test never exercises. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(canary): E-03/G-03 synthetic + collector + end-to-end coverage (#1077) Per-invariant synthetic tests (holds-clean, fires-on-violation), collector tests (started_at window in/out, NULL-completed_at still collected, skipped-status excluded, column-absent DDL -> unavailable, LIMIT cap + sampled flag), and end-to-end collect_snapshot tests through the real collector: the C1 cancelled-from-queue holds-clean guard (completed_at set, duration_ms NULL -> zero E-03), half-written fires E-03, bad-clock fires G-03, sub-second skew does not, and the #1474 naive-vs-Z compare-without-raising case. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(canary): document E-03/G-03 Phase 4 invariants (#1077) architecture.md canary table gains E-03/G-03 rows + Phase 4 lookup-key line; requirements/infrastructure.md §31 gains a Phase 4 bullet (and reconciles the stale 'Phase 2 deferred' note now that #882/#1472 shipped); orchestration-invariant-catalog.md annotates E-03/G-03 as shipped with explicit registry-id mapping, notes the E-03 completed_at-only predicate deviation and G-03 started_at<=completed_at reduction, and flags the catalog-id vs registry-id E-06 drift (catalog #129 != registry #1472). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(feature-flows): index row for canary Phase 4 E-03/G-03 (#1077) Canary is an internal invariant harness (no user-facing flow / dedicated flow doc); follows the #1446 precedent of a Recent Updates row pointing at architecture.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(canary): queued-row metadata collector for E-04/G-04 (#1077) Capture queued_at + backlog_metadata for status='queued' rows in the existing _collect_executions query, keyed by execution_id in a new AgentSnapshot.queued_meta map. Both columns are PRAGMA-guarded (added by BACKLOG-001): when either is absent on an older/minimal DDL the map is left empty so E-04/G-04 skip those eids (older-image fail-open). Scoped STRICTLY to queued rows — never terminal — so #1449's deferred terminal-row backlog_metadata NULL-out cannot make E-04 false-fire. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(canary): register E-04 (queued metadata) + G-04 (no creds in metadata) (#1077) E-04 (Tier A, major): every status='queued' row has queued_at NOT NULL AND a non-NULL, JSON-parseable backlog_metadata — the backlog_service.drain_next replay contract. A malformed blob raises JSONDecodeError and stalls the FIFO. Reports only the failed-predicate reason code + ids, never the raw metadata (may carry credentials; violations persist to canary_violations). G-04 (Tier A, critical): a queued row's backlog_metadata matches no known secret prefix (sk-/ghp_/gho_/ghs_/ghu_/github_pat_/xoxb-/xoxp-/ AKIA/AIza/sk_live_), word-boundary anchored so common substrings don't false-fire. Rides E-04's collected bytes. Reports only the matched pattern NAME + ids, one violation per row (stops at first match) — never the secret, surrounding bytes, or raw metadata. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(canary): E-04/G-04 synthetic + collector + end-to-end coverage (#1077) Collector test proves queued_meta is populated for queued rows only (a terminal row carrying backlog_metadata is excluded — #1449-safe). E-04: holds on valid rows; fires with the right reason code on NULL queued_at, NULL backlog_metadata, and non-JSON metadata; skips an eid absent from queued_meta (older-image fail-open); e2e over a real temp DB. G-04: holds on benign metadata (incl. "task-" substring that must not false-fire); fires on github_pat / openai / slack / aws exemplars; skips NULL metadata (E-04 owns it). Every G-04/E-04 test asserts the secret / raw metadata bytes appear NOWHERE in the persisted violation record. The runner test now expects E-04 + G-04 in the registered invariant set. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(canary): document E-04/G-04 Phase 4 invariants (#1077) architecture.md lookup-key table gains E-04 + G-04 rows and the Phase 4 line now lists all four (E-04/G-04 stacked on #1450). requirements infrastructure.md Phase 4 bullet expands to the full four-predicate set with the credential-safety note. Catalog flips E-04/G-04 from "gated on #1450" to SHIPPED, records the json.loads-vs-json_valid implementation note, the queued-only scope, older-image fail-open, and the report-reason/pattern-name-only security discipline; G-04 notes the implemented check covers the backlog half of the title (log-line scanning out of scope for #1077). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(feature-flows): index row for canary Phase 4 E-04/G-04 (#1077) Also corrects the header/separator ordering left malformed by the earlier E-03/G-03 index-row commit (a data row had slipped above the |---| separator). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
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The backend Dockerfile was missing COPY instruction for logging_config.py, causing ModuleNotFoundError when running in production mode (docker-compose.prod.yml).
Development mode works because it uses volume mounts that include all files, but production builds only the explicitly copied files.