ci(security): SHA-pin third-party actions, move dev host to secrets - #820
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ci(security): SHA-pin third-party actions, move dev host to secrets#820AndriiPasternak31 wants to merge 1 commit into
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deploy-dev.yml referenced tailscale/github-action@v2 and appleboy/ssh-action@v1 — both unpinned third-party actions handling TAILSCALE_AUTH_KEY (tailnet join) and DEV_SSH_KEY (sudo SSH on dev host). A single supply-chain hijack (account takeover, malicious forced retag) exfils both credentials on the next push to dev. SHA-pinned to mitigate. Same workflow hardcoded the dev Tailscale CGNAT IP and SSH username in a PUBLIC repo, leaking the dev host's tailnet topology. Moved both to GitHub repo secrets (DEV_HOST, DEV_USER) — must be set before merge or the next deploy fails fast. CLAUDE.md forbids internal addresses in this public tree. While here, SHA-pinned the other two workflows with third-party actions (pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish, google-github-actions/*) for defense in depth. First-party actions/* keep their major-tag pins per GitHub's documented recommendation (GitHub itself signs and re-tags those). After-state: zero unpinned third-party uses: lines across .github/workflows/.
This was referenced May 13, 2026
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Closed by branch rename. Continuation: #826. |
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Summary
deploy-dev.ymlreferencedtailscale/github-action@v2andappleboy/ssh-action@v1— both unpinned third-party actions handlingTAILSCALE_AUTH_KEY(tailnet join) andDEV_SSH_KEY(sudo SSH on dev host). A single supply-chain hijack (account takeover, malicious forced retag) exfils both credentials on the next push todev. SHA-pinned to mitigate.Same workflow hardcoded the dev Tailscale CGNAT IP and SSH username in a PUBLIC repo, leaking the dev host's tailnet topology. Moved both to GitHub repo secrets (
DEV_HOST,DEV_USER) — must be set in repo secrets before merge or the next deploy fails fast. CLAUDE.md forbids internal addresses in this public tree.While here, SHA-pinned the other two workflows with third-party actions (
pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish,google-github-actions/*) for defense in depth. First-partyactions/*keep their major-tag pins per GitHub's documented recommendation (GitHub itself signs and re-tags those).After-state: zero unpinned third-party
uses:lines across.github/workflows/.What changed
.github/workflows/deploy-dev.yml: SHA-pin tailscale + ssh-action; moveDEV_HOST/DEV_USERto secrets.github/workflows/publish-cli.yml: SHA-pin pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish.github/workflows/sync-docs-to-vertex.yml: SHA-pin google-github-actions/*Required before merge (admin)
Two new repo secrets must be set:
DEV_HOST— the dev tailnet IPDEV_USER— the SSH usernameWithout these, the next
deploy-devrun fails fast (which is the safer failure mode than silently exposing the values in workflow logs).Test plan
v2/v1tag pointers (no version drift).github/workflows/foruses: [^a-z]patterns (no remaining unpinned third-party)Out of scope
This PR was previously bundled into #798 (circuit-breaker fix) — split out for isolated security review.
Companion PR #819 adds Dependabot + CODEOWNERS to keep these SHAs current and gate future changes to
.github/.🤖 Generated with Claude Code