chore: implement audit maintainability recommendations

.agents/skills/catalog.json

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
   "categories": [
     {
       "name": "Everyday",
-      "skills": ["skills", "plan", "run", "test", "fix", "review", "task", "handover", "health", "audit", "export"]
+      "skills": ["skills", "plan", "run", "test", "fix", "review", "task", "handover", "health", "audit", "export", "prompt-perfector"]
     },
     {
       "name": "Clinical and app",

.agents/skills/prompt-perfector/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+---
+name: prompt-perfector
+description: Refine, structure, and optimize user prompts for LLMs while ensuring execution occurs in a isolated environment. Use when asked to polish, perfect, or evaluate prompts safely.
+---
+
+# Prompt Perfector
+
+Refines user prompts into structured, highly effective instructions and executes evaluation tasks in an isolated workspace (`Workspace: "branch"`).
+
+## Core Capabilities
+
+1. **Prompt Refinement**: Analyzes input prompts for clarity, context, constraints, output format specifications, and edge cases.
+2. **Environment Isolation**: Ensures any code execution, prompt testing, or subagent tasks spawned for prompt validation run within an isolated workspace (`Workspace: "branch"` or `"share"`).
+
+## Workflow
+
+1. **Deconstruct Intent**: Identify the goal, target model, domain constraints, and missing specifications.
+2. **Enhance Structure**: Apply structured formatting (System Instructions, Context, Input Schema, Output Constraints, Examples).
+3. **Isolated Testing**: If prompt validation requires subagent execution or file testing, invoke subagents with `Workspace: "branch"`.
+4. **Deliver Output**: Present the perfected prompt with a summary of structural enhancements and usage recommendations.

.gitattributes

@@ -7,3 +7,7 @@
 *.pdf binary
 *.png binary
 *.webp binary
+
+# Review records are append-only. Concurrent branches should retain both sets
+# of rows instead of stopping on an add/add conflict at the shared table tail.
+docs/branch-review-ledger.md merge=union

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -202,6 +202,9 @@ jobs:
       - name: Gate-manifest self-test
         run: npm run check:gate-manifest
 
+      - name: Branch review ledger integrity
+        run: npm run check:branch-review-ledger
+
       - name: Codebase index coverage
         run: npm run docs:check-index
 

.github/workflows/pr-policy.yml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: PR Policy
 
 on:
   pull_request_target:
-    branches: [main]
+    branches: [main, "release/**"]
     types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review, labeled, unlabeled]
   merge_group:
 

.npmrc

@@ -1,2 +1 @@
 engine-strict=true
-allow-scripts=true

AGENTS.md

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ Review routing:
 - `branch-cleanup`: Use only when the prompt explicitly asks for branch cleanup/hygiene or branch deletion candidates. Apply `docs/branch-cleanup-guide.md` and the review ledger before inspecting branch diffs.
 - `pr-ci-fix`: Confirmation-required for this repo. GitHub/GitLab API calls, PR comments, CI reruns, commits, and pushes require explicit user approval and must respect the upload/handoff rules. Exception: an explicit `Run PR` sweep carries this approval (see "## Run PR shortcut").
 
-When a branch or PR review completes, record the reviewed branch/ref, HEAD SHA, date, scope, outcome, and checks in `docs/branch-review-ledger.md`.
+When a branch or PR review completes, append the reviewed branch/ref, HEAD SHA, date, scope, outcome, and checks to `docs/branch-review-ledger.md`. The ledger is append-only: never edit or delete an existing record; append a correction or superseding record instead. Its `merge=union` attribute preserves concurrent appends, and `npm run check:branch-review-ledger` blocks conflict markers, exact duplicate records, or loss of that merge protection.
 
 <!-- END:codex-review-throttling -->
 
@@ -207,6 +207,21 @@ action must perform one; a page that ships must be reachable.
 
 <!-- END:page-and-button-wiring -->
 
+<!-- BEGIN:search-chrome-behaviour -->
+
+# Search chrome behaviour
+
+The shared search chrome must adapt by page ownership, not by ad-hoc padding or route-local overlays. Before changing `MasterSearchHeader`, `GlobalSearchShell`, `ClinicalDashboard`, `DocumentViewer`, phone dock reserves, or search-composer placement, read `docs/search-chrome-behaviour.md`.
+
+- **One owner.** A page either uses the shell/dashboard composer, owns an in-flow hero composer, or owns a document-viewer composer. Do not stack a second fixed search bar or a second dock-sized content pad below a page-owned composer.
+- **Phone edge-to-edge contract.** Fixed phone composers are flush to the viewport bottom and paint their own safe-area/home-indicator region while visible. They must not use a non-zero `bottom` gap in edge-to-edge dock mode.
+- **Hidden means zero reserve.** When phone search/header/footer chrome scroll-hides, the content-facing reserve is `0rem`; do not restore `0.75rem`, `env(safe-area-inset-bottom)`, or `var(--safe-area-bottom)` as hidden padding. Visible composer chrome may still consume safe-area inset.
+- **Header/footer symmetry.** Top header and bottom composer hide/reveal from the same scroll signal where they share a scroll container. If one is hidden, page content behind that edge must be fully visible rather than covered by an opaque white/surface band.
+- **Page adaptation.** Standalone mode homes keep the composer in-flow in the hero on phones; submitted/search-result views use the compact bottom dock; answer mode may use overlaid glass header behaviour with matching top reserve; document detail/source routes let `DocumentViewer` own its composer.
+- **Guards.** Update the reserve helper, CSS tokens, Playwright phone-scroll coverage, and static contract tests together. Do not silence the existing reserve/overlay tests; add a narrower guard for any new page-specific exception.
+
+<!-- END:search-chrome-behaviour -->
+
 <!-- BEGIN:supabase-project-safety -->
 
 # Supabase project safety

data/forms-catalog.json

@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
       "destination": "Examination place must be clear and align with any detention or transport authority.",
       "authorises": "Referral for examination by a psychiatrist.",
       "doesNotAuthorise": "Treatment, detention, transport, restraint, seclusion or force by itself.",
-      "before": ["2"],
-      "parallel": ["3A", "4A"],
+      "before": [],
+      "parallel": ["1A attachment"],
       "after": ["5A", "6A", "6B"],
       "copies": "Use approved form pathway; include confidential attachment only where required.",
       "documentationStem": "Assessed at [time/place]. Reasonably suspect need for involuntary treatment order because [illness features], [risk], [capacity issue] and [least restrictive reasoning]. Examination destination: [place].",

docs/audit-handover-2026-07-14.md

@@ -117,19 +117,19 @@ evals, service-role tenancy regression class, upstream OCR quality labels drivin
 
 ### 4.1 Security / privacy / API
 
-| ID  | Finding                                                     | Evidence                                                 | Remediation wave |
-| --- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------- |
-| S1  | Authed public-doc DTOs leak `storage_path` / `content_hash` | `documents/route.ts`, `documents/[id]/route.ts`          | Wave D1          |
-| S2  | Auth UI trusts `getSession()`; APIs use `getUser`           | `src/lib/supabase/client.tsx`                            | Wave D3          |
-| S3  | Public-upload quarantine pool high blast radius if enabled  | `upload/route.ts` + pool owner                           | Wave D4          |
-| S4  | Auth 401 envelope `{ error }` only                          | `supabase/auth.ts` vs `http.ts`                          | Wave H1          |
-| S5  | Many hand-rolled `{ error }` omit `code`/`message`          | upload, doc 404s, feedback, demo                         | Wave H1          |
-| S6  | Auth write/admin routes lack rate limits                    | bulk, labels, table-facts, ingestion/*, eval-cases, jobs | Wave H2          |
-| S7  | Document list offset max `1_000_000`                        | `documents/route.ts`                                     | Wave H3          |
-| S8  | Upload reserves max body when Content-Length absent         | `upload/route.ts`                                        | Wave H4          |
-| S9  | Authed stream summarize excludes public docs                | `answer/stream` → `summarizeDocument` owner-only         | Wave H5          |
-| S10 | Bulk returns raw DB `error.message`                         | `documents/bulk/route.ts`                                | Wave D5          |
-| S11 | `/api/jobs` can return demo jobs when env missing           | `jobs/route.ts`                                          | Wave H6          |
+| ID  | Finding                                                     | Evidence                                                  | Remediation wave |
+| --- | ----------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------- |
+| S1  | Authed public-doc DTOs leak `storage_path` / `content_hash` | `documents/route.ts`, `documents/[id]/route.ts`           | Wave D1          |
+| S2  | Auth UI trusts `getSession()`; APIs use `getUser`           | `src/lib/supabase/client.tsx`                             | Wave D3          |
+| S3  | Public-upload quarantine pool high blast radius if enabled  | `upload/route.ts` + pool owner                            | Wave D4          |
+| S4  | Auth 401 envelope `{ error }` only                          | `supabase/auth.ts` vs `http.ts`                           | Wave H1          |
+| S5  | Many hand-rolled `{ error }` omit `code`/`message`          | upload, doc 404s, feedback, demo                          | Wave H1          |
+| S6  | Auth write/admin routes lack rate limits                    | bulk, labels, table-facts, ingestion/\*, eval-cases, jobs | Wave H2          |
+| S7  | Document list offset max `1_000_000`                        | `documents/route.ts`                                      | Wave H3          |
+| S8  | Upload reserves max body when Content-Length absent         | `upload/route.ts`                                         | Wave H4          |
+| S9  | Authed stream summarize excludes public docs                | `answer/stream` → `summarizeDocument` owner-only          | Wave H5          |
+| S10 | Bulk returns raw DB `error.message`                         | `documents/bulk/route.ts`                                 | Wave D5          |
+| S11 | `/api/jobs` can return demo jobs when env missing           | `jobs/route.ts`                                           | Wave H6          |
 
 ### 4.2 Ingestion / indexing