🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL/HIGH] Fix 커맨드 인젝션 취약점 조치

.jules/sentinel.md

@@ -31,3 +31,7 @@
 **Vulnerability:** Initial URL validation for SSRF (e.g., checking scheme and IP address) is insufficient if the HTTP client automatically follows redirects. In `urllib.request.urlopen`, redirects are followed by default, allowing an attacker to bypass initial checks by returning a 302 redirect to an internal IP (like `169.254.169.254` or `127.0.0.1`).
 **Learning:** `urllib.request.urlopen` does not inherit the security properties of the initial URL string check. It will follow HTTP redirects unconditionally to any target URL, creating a severe SSRF risk when dealing with external API endpoints that can be manipulated by malicious responses.
 **Prevention:** Explicitly disable redirects by subclassing `urllib.request.HTTPRedirectHandler`, overriding `redirect_request` to raise an `urllib.error.HTTPError`, and using `urllib.request.build_opener(NoRedirectHandler())` instead of the default `urlopen`.
+## 2026-07-13 - Complete the Fix for Command Injection Security Theater
+**Vulnerability:** Command Injection
+**Learning:** Fixing a `shell=True` vulnerability by replacing it with `shell=False` and wrapping the command string in `["/bin/bash", "-lc", command]` is incomplete and still leaves the code vulnerable to shell injection. It acts as security theater, as it misleads linters while executing untrusted input via the bash wrapper. The vulnerability was still present in `sandboxed_web_e2e.py`.
+**Prevention:** Remove `/bin/bash` wrapper from `subprocess` calls in CI scripts. Always use `shlex.split(command)` to safely parse strings into a list of arguments and pass the list directly to `subprocess.Popen` or `subprocess.run`.

scripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 import os
 import signal
 import shutil
+import shlex
 import subprocess
 import sys
 import tempfile
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ def start_service(label: str, command: str, cwd: Path, env: dict[str, str], logs
     log_path = logs_dir / f"{label}.log"
     log_file = log_path.open("w", encoding="utf-8")
     process = subprocess.Popen(
-        ["/bin/bash", "-lc", command],
+        shlex.split(command),
         cwd=cwd,
         env=env,
         text=True,
@@ -137,7 +138,7 @@ def wait_for_url(url: str, timeout: int, service: Service) -> bool:
 def run_shell(command: str, cwd: Path, env: dict[str, str], timeout: int) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess[str]:
     """Run a shell command and capture its output."""
     return subprocess.run(
-        ["/bin/bash", "-lc", command],
+        shlex.split(command),
         cwd=cwd,
         env=env,
         text=True,

tests/test_sandboxed_web_e2e.py

@@ -180,12 +180,12 @@ def fake_run(*args, **kwargs):
     assert service.label == "backend"
     assert service.command == "npm run dev"
     assert service.log_path == tmp_path / "backend.log"
-    assert popen_calls[0][0] == (["/bin/bash", "-lc", "npm run dev"],)
+    assert popen_calls[0][0] == (["npm", "run", "dev"],)
     assert "shell" not in popen_calls[0][1]
     assert "executable" not in popen_calls[0][1]
     assert popen_calls[0][1]["start_new_session"] is True
     assert completed.returncode == 7
-    assert run_calls[0][0] == (["/bin/bash", "-lc", "npm test"],)
+    assert run_calls[0][0] == (["npm", "test"],)
     assert run_calls[0][1]["timeout"] == 5
     assert "shell" not in run_calls[0][1]
     assert "executable" not in run_calls[0][1]