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๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix ์ƒ์„ฑ๋œ HTML ํŒŒ์ผ ๋ณด์•ˆ ๊ณ„์ธต ๊ฐ•ํ™” (CSP ์ถ”๊ฐ€) #45

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seonghobae merged 2 commits into from
Jun 30, 2026
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๐Ÿ›ก๏ธ Sentinel: [MEDIUM] Fix ์ƒ์„ฑ๋œ HTML ํŒŒ์ผ ๋ณด์•ˆ ๊ณ„์ธต ๊ฐ•ํ™” (CSP ์ถ”๊ฐ€) #45

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๋ณด์•ˆ ํ–ฅ์ƒ: ์ƒ์„ฑ๋œ HTML์— Content-Security-Policy (CSP) ๋ฉ”ํƒ€ ํƒœ๊ทธ ์ถ”๊ฐ€
seonghobae Jun 28, 2026
5630e63
Merge master into PR 45
seonghobae Jun 30, 2026
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5 changes: 5 additions & 0 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
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Expand Up @@ -17,3 +17,8 @@
**Vulnerability:** The application could crawl symlink directories, accept a symlink as the top-level directory, and walk deeper than the requested max level before deciding not to render.
**Learning:** `File.listFiles()` returns null (not empty) on unreadable directories. Directory crawlers must reject symlink roots, skip symlink children, and avoid enqueueing paths deeper than the configured traversal limit.
**Prevention:** Use `java.nio.file.Files.isSymbolicLink(file.toPath())` for root and child directory checks, gracefully handle `null` arrays from `listFiles()` and `list()`, and only enqueue child directories when the current level is still below `maxLevel`.

## 2024-06-28 - [html4tree] Static HTML Generation Security
**Vulnerability:** Defense in Depth (CSP Missing)
**Learning:** Even when inputs are properly escaped, statically generated HTML that displays file/directory structures should implement a Content Security Policy (CSP) to provide an extra layer of defense against potential XSS bypasses.
**Prevention:** Include a strict CSP meta tag (e.g., `default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';`) in auto-generated HTML headers when external scripts or resources are not required.
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions src/main/kotlin/html4tree/main.kt
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Expand Up @@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ fun process_dir(curr_dir: File){
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
<!-- ๋ณด์•ˆ ํ–ฅ์ƒ: ์ธ๋ผ์ธ ์Šคํฌ๋ฆฝํŠธ ์‹คํ–‰ ๋ฐฉ์ง€ -->
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';">
<title>${curr_dir.getName().escapeHtml()}</title>
${css}
</head>
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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions src/test/kotlin/html4tree/MainTest.kt
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Expand Up @@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ class MainTest {
assertTrue(htmlContent.contains("subdir/"))
assertTrue(htmlContent.contains("&#128193;"))
assertFalse(htmlContent.contains("test.ignore"))
assertTrue(htmlContent.contains("Content-Security-Policy"))
assertTrue(htmlContent.contains("default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';"))
}

@Test
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