fix(purchaseorderline): return 404 on cross-tenant access — close tenant enumeration leak#214
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CryptoJones merged 1 commit intoMay 19, 2026
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… close tenant-enumeration leak Same class as the seven prior secure-404 fixes (#174 / #188 / #192 / #196 / #200 / #204 / #210), applied to the two-level cascade-scoped PurchaseOrderLine entity: polpoh → PurchaseOrderHeader.pohPovId → PurchaseOrderVendor.povCompId Collapse 403 "exists but not yours" into 404 "Not found." so scoped callers can't enumerate `polId` populations across the whole tenant table by status code. Pinned in `tests/api/purchaseorderline.test.js` with three controller-level unit tests using stubbed `PurchaseOrderLine.findByPk` + spied `auth.isMaster` / `auth.getCompanyId` / `auth.getCompanyIdByPohId` (the helper that internally walks the header → vendor → company chain). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…e tenant-enumeration leak (#218) Same class as the eight prior secure-404 fixes (#174 / #188 / #192 / #196 / #200 / #204 / #210 / #214), applied to the job-cascade- scoped ProductEntry: pentJobId → Job.jobCustId → Customer.custCompId Collapse 403 "exists but not yours" into 404 "Not found." so scoped callers can't enumerate `pentId` populations across the whole tenant table by status code. Pinned in `tests/api/productentry.test.js` with three controller- level unit tests, spying on `auth.getCompanyIdByJobId` (which internally walks the job → customer → company chain). Co-authored-by: Aaron K. Clark <akclark@thenetwerk.net> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…enant-enumeration leak (#238) Same class as the 13 prior secure-404 fixes, applied to TimeEntry's getById / update / remove handlers. TimeEntry is direct-company- scoped via `teCompId`. Collapse 403 "exists but not yours" into 404 "Not found." so scoped callers can't enumerate `teId` populations across the whole tenant table by status code. Pinned in `tests/api/timeentry.test.js` with three controller-level unit tests spying on `auth.isMaster` / `auth.getCompanyId`. This completes the secure-404 series for the 14 single-resource domain entities (#174 / #188 / #192 / #196 / #200 / #204 / #210 / #214 / #218 / #222 / #226 / #230 / #234). Two domain controllers remain outside the series: VersionInfo (master-gated; different auth shape) and Customer (large refactor; the `findAndRespond` helper short-circuits to 200+null on a non-existent id which is a separate bug worth its own PR). Co-authored-by: Aaron K. Clark <akclark@thenetwerk.net> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The codebase collapses "exists but not yours" into 404 across every single-row GET / PATCH / DELETE endpoint so a scoped caller can't enumerate another tenant's ID range by status code. The pattern landed across 11 entities (#174, #188, #192, #196, #200, #204, #210, #214, #218, #222, etc.) but the README never mentioned the behavior — operators reading the doc table would reasonably expect 403 on a cross-tenant probe and be surprised by 404. Add a short subsection in the HTTP-conventions block that explains the choice, links the behavior to the same getCompanyId scope check used for 403 paths on other surfaces, and notes that master keys still see all rows. Co-authored-by: Aaron K. Clark <akclark@thenetwerk.net> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Closes #213.
Summary
Same secure-404 pattern as #174 / #188 / #192 / #196 / #200 / #204 / #210, now on the two-level cascade-scoped PurchaseOrderLine (
polpoh → header.pohPovId → vendor.povCompId).Test plan
npm run lintcleannpm test— 663 → 666 (+3 controller-level tests)Proudly Made in Nebraska. Go Big Red! 🌽 https://xkcd.com/2347/