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chore(deps): update actions/checkout action from v6.0.0 to v6.0.1 (.github/workflows/validate_docs_build.yml)#13806

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mtesauro merged 1 commit into
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renovate/actions-checkout-6.0.x
Dec 3, 2025
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chore(deps): update actions/checkout action from v6.0.0 to v6.0.1 (.github/workflows/validate_docs_build.yml)#13806
mtesauro merged 1 commit into
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renovate/actions-checkout-6.0.x

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@renovate renovate Bot commented Dec 2, 2025

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Type Update Change
actions/checkout action patch v6.0.0 -> v6.0.1

Release Notes

actions/checkout (actions/checkout)

v6.0.1

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@renovate renovate Bot added the dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file label Dec 2, 2025
@renovate renovate Bot requested review from Maffooch and mtesauro as code owners December 2, 2025 20:41
@renovate renovate Bot added the dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file label Dec 2, 2025
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dryrunsecurity Bot commented Dec 2, 2025

DryRun Security

This pull request introduces a workflow that uses an unvalidated workflow_dispatch input (release_number) directly as the ref for actions/checkout, letting anyone with write access trigger the workflow and check out an arbitrary ref (branch/tag/commit) which could lead to arbitrary code execution in the runner and possible secret exfiltration. The issue is in .github/workflows/release-x-manual-docker-containers.yml (lines ~63–64) and should be mitigated by validating or restricting the ref input or avoiding unchecked checkout of user-supplied refs.

Untrusted Input in Checkout Action in .github/workflows/release-x-manual-docker-containers.yml
Vulnerability Untrusted Input in Checkout Action
Description The GitHub Actions workflow release-x-manual-docker-containers.yml uses an unvalidated release_number input from workflow_dispatch directly as the ref for the actions/checkout action. This allows anyone with write access to the repository to trigger the workflow and specify an arbitrary Git reference (e.g., a malicious branch, tag, or commit hash from a fork). This could lead to arbitrary code execution within the CI/CD runner, potentially exfiltrating secrets or compromising the build process.

ref: ${{ inputs.release_number }}


All finding details can be found in the DryRun Security Dashboard.

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Approved

Helm GHA currently buste

@mtesauro mtesauro merged commit c30909b into dev Dec 3, 2025
282 of 289 checks passed
@renovate renovate Bot deleted the renovate/actions-checkout-6.0.x branch January 5, 2026 17:20
Maffooch pushed a commit to valentijnscholten/django-DefectDojo that referenced this pull request Feb 16, 2026
…ithub/workflows/validate_docs_build.yml) (DefectDojo#13806)

Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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