openingd: bound funding_satoshis by total bitcoin supply - #9368
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funding_satoshis values above the total bitcoin supply were not rejected during open_channel/accept_channel negotiation and would later cause libwally to fail and openingd to crash during commitment transaction construction. Reject such funding_satoshis values immediately so that the negotiation terminates gracefully. Fixes: ElementsProject#9225 Changelog-Fixed: `openingd` no longer crashes when a peer opens a channel with a `funding_satoshis` value greater than the total bitcoin supply.
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funding_satoshisvalues above the total bitcoin supply were not rejected duringopen_channel/accept_channelnegotiation and would later cause libwally to fail and openingd to crash during commitment transaction construction.Reject such
funding_satoshisvalues immediately so that the negotiation terminates gracefully.The new test covers the v1 funding flow by manually constructing and sending
open_channelmessages with excessivefunding_satoshisvalues and then completing the funding flow throughfunding_createdandfunding_signed.The dualopend sites are also fixed for consistency, though it's not clear whether the crash can even be reached via the v2 flow, and writing a test for the v2 flow would be significantly more complex than the v1 test.
Fixes: #9225