feat: prod-readiness PR 3 of 5 — supply chain & bundle integrity

.dockerignore

@@ -1,9 +1,37 @@
+# Build artifacts & VCS
 .git
 target
 node_modules
+
+# Documentation (not needed in image)
 *.md
 docs/
 tests/
 .github/
 helm/
+
+# Codeiq workspace under src/codeiq/ (development scratchpad)
 src/codeiq/
+
+# Secrets — explicit defense-in-depth; .dockerignore does NOT inherit
+# .gitignore (Docker resolves COPY against the build context, which
+# includes uncommitted/working-tree files). Audit RAN-46 §3.
+.env
+.env.*
+*.pem
+*.key
+*.jks
+*.p12
+*.pfx
+*.keystore
+id_rsa
+id_ecdsa
+id_ed25519
+id_dsa
+credentials.json
+credentials.yaml
+secrets.json
+secrets.yaml
+*.serviceaccount.json
+.aws/
+.codeiq/

.github/workflows/security.yml

@@ -90,8 +90,13 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/setup-python@a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 # v6.2.0
         with:
           python-version: '3.12'
-      - name: Install semgrep
-        run: python -m pip install --quiet --upgrade pip semgrep
+      - name: Install semgrep (pinned for reproducibility)
+        # Pinned per OpenSSF Scorecard `Pinned-Dependencies` (RAN-46 §5).
+        # Bump via Dependabot pip ecosystem on a documented cadence; floating
+        # `semgrep` was previously flagged by Scorecard. pip is left unpinned
+        # — setup-python@v6 ships a current vendored pip, and the Scorecard
+        # rule fires only on user-installed packages.
+        run: python -m pip install --quiet 'semgrep==1.161.0'
       - name: Run semgrep (security-audit + owasp-top-ten + java)
         run: |
           semgrep scan \

.gitignore

@@ -28,10 +28,34 @@ Thumbs.db
 *.mv.db
 
 # Environment & secrets
+# Broad .env* glob catches .env, .env.local, .env.prod, .env.test, .env.* — all
+# variants. Pre-PR-3 we only excluded the first two and several .env.<env>
+# variants would have committed silently.
 .env
-.env.local
+.env.*
+# Java keystores & PKCS#12 archives — high-value secrets that have shown up in
+# audits; never commit, even encrypted.
+*.jks
+*.p12
+*.pfx
+*.keystore
+# Generic credential / private-key patterns
 *.pem
 *.key
+# SSH private keys (public *.pub keys are fine).
+id_rsa
+id_ecdsa
+id_ed25519
+id_dsa
+# AWS / cloud credentials
+.aws/credentials
+credentials.json
+credentials.yaml
+secrets.json
+secrets.yaml
+# Service-account JSON (GCP / Firebase) — typically named *.serviceaccount.json.
+*-serviceaccount.json
+*.serviceaccount.json
 
 # Logs
 *.log

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -365,6 +365,54 @@ for that specific tag for the per-commit details.
   topology tool as a targeted Cypher query so the snapshot isn't needed.
   The cache is the bridge; the rewrite reduces peak memory.
 
+- **Production-readiness PR 3 of 5 — supply chain & bundle integrity.**
+  Closes the air-gap drift, missing bundle integrity, and unpinned
+  scanner versions audit findings.
+  - **`codeiq bundle` SHA-256 manifest.** Every entry in `bundle.zip`
+    (manifest, scripts, graph DB files, H2 cache, source tree, flow.html,
+    optional CLI JAR) is now hashed as it streams through the
+    `ZipOutputStream`, and a `checksums.sha256` entry is written last in
+    standard GNU coreutils format. Receivers verify with
+    `sha256sum -c checksums.sha256`. The hash is computed by feeding each
+    chunk to both the SHA-256 digest and the ZIP stream — no double-read
+    even for multi-hundred-MB graph databases. Order is deterministic
+    (sorted dir walks + sorted git ls-files), so the resulting
+    `checksums.sha256` is byte-stable.
+  - **No public-internet calls in launcher scripts.** `serve.sh` and
+    `serve.bat` previously fell back to `curl -fL https://repo1.maven.org/...`
+    when the CLI JAR wasn't bundled — incompatible with the air-gapped
+    deploy model documented in `~/.claude/rules/build.md`. The Maven
+    Central download is removed; if the JAR is missing, the launcher
+    fails fast and tells the operator to either `--include-jar` when
+    bundling or stage from an internal artifact mirror. `serve.sh` also
+    runs `sha256sum -c --quiet checksums.sha256` automatically before
+    launching (skip with `CODEIQ_SKIP_VERIFY=1`).
+  - **Pinned Semgrep version.** `.github/workflows/security.yml` was
+    `pip install semgrep` (floating) — Scorecard's
+    `Pinned-Dependencies` flagged it. Now pinned to `semgrep==1.161.0`
+    (latest stable as of 2026-04-28). Bumps go through Dependabot's pip
+    ecosystem on a documented cadence.
+  - **Tightened secret-pattern exclusions.** `.gitignore` previously
+    only matched `.env` / `.env.local` — gaps for `.env.prod`,
+    `.env.test`, JKS / P12 keystores, SSH private keys, and
+    cloud-credential JSON. Broadened to `.env.*` plus explicit globs
+    for `*.jks`, `*.p12`, `*.pfx`, `*.keystore`, `id_{rsa,ecdsa,ed25519,dsa}`,
+    `credentials.{json,yaml}`, `secrets.{json,yaml}`,
+    `*.serviceaccount.json`. `.dockerignore` mirrors the same rules
+    (Docker resolves COPY against the build context, which includes
+    untracked working-tree files; .dockerignore does not inherit
+    .gitignore).
+  - **Bundle verification runbook.** `shared/runbooks/release.md` §4a
+    documents consumer-side `sha256sum -c` workflow, including the
+    deliberate exclusion of `checksums.sha256` from itself (would be
+    circular) and the Sigstore/GPG out-of-band signing that backs
+    `checksums.sha256` against tampering.
+  - **Tests:** `BundleCommandTest#bundleCreatesZipWithCorrectStructure`
+    extended with 4 new asserts: serve.sh contains no `curl`/`maven.org`
+    references (defense against re-introduction), `checksums.sha256`
+    exists, format-conforms to `<64-hex>  <path>`, and excludes itself.
+    Full suite: 3672 tests / 0 failures / 0 errors.
+
 ## [0.1.0] - 2026-03-28
 
 First general-availability cut. See the

CLAUDE.md

@@ -447,6 +447,11 @@ bean for code paths that haven't been ported yet.
 - **`Files.probeContentType` is best-effort** — JDK 25 on Linux uses `/etc/mime.types` + magic-byte fallback. It returns `null` if the type can't be determined; treat that as "let it through" (the byte cap in `SafeFileReader` still bounds size). The allowlist for `/api/file` is `text/*` + `application/{json,xml,x-yaml,javascript}` — extending requires adding to the explicit list in `GraphController.readFile`.
 - **Sanitize user-controlled values before logging.** `BearerAuthFilter.sanitizeForLog(String)` strips `\p{Cntrl}` and truncates at 256 chars. Use it on anything tainted by `request.getRequestURI()`, `request.getMethod()`, headers, etc. before passing to a logger. CodeQL `java/log-injection` will flag direct `log.warn("... {} ...", request.getRequestURI())` as a vuln.
 - **`mcp.limits.max_depth` is a NEW field on `McpLimitsConfig`** (default 10). Audit #10 / C3 — the original audit assumed it existed but it didn't. When adding new MCP traversal tools, cap depth via `Math.min(callerSupplied, maxDepth)` before passing to Cypher. The REST endpoint already had this guard via `config.getMaxDepth()` from `CodeIqConfig`; the MCP path now mirrors it via `McpLimitsConfig.maxDepth()`.
+- **`codeiq bundle` writes `checksums.sha256` LAST and excludes itself.** `BundleCommand#writeChecksumsManifest` runs after every other entry has been written, then the digests collected in `LinkedHashMap<String,String> checksums` are emitted as `<sha256>  <path>\n` per line — exactly GNU coreutils `sha256sum` format, so receivers verify with `sha256sum -c checksums.sha256`. The manifest itself is intentionally NOT in the digest list (would be circular); to verify `checksums.sha256` against tampering, sign the bundle.zip out-of-band (Sigstore, GPG, or compare to the GitHub Release SHA-256). Don't try to "fix" the circular omission by hashing checksums.sha256 into the manifest — that turns into a cat-and-mouse loop.
+- **`writeFileHashed` reads each file once, feeding both the SHA-256 and the ZIP stream.** Hundreds-of-MB graph DBs / CLI JARs can't be double-read for a separate hash pass. The 8KB chunk size in `BundleCommand` is small enough to keep memory flat regardless of file size; do NOT collect bytes into a `byte[]` and then split for "convenience".
+- **`serve.sh` and `serve.bat` MUST NOT contain network calls.** Audit RAN-46 §3 — air-gapped deploy model. Pre-PR-3 these scripts had `curl -fL https://repo1.maven.org/...` to download the CLI JAR on first run; that's gone. Receivers must `--include-jar` when bundling or stage the JAR from an internal mirror. There's a regression test in `BundleCommandTest#bundleCreatesZipWithCorrectStructure` that asserts `serve.sh` contains neither `curl` nor `maven.org` — keep that test green.
+- **`.dockerignore` does NOT inherit `.gitignore`.** Docker resolves COPY against the build context, which includes uncommitted/untracked working-tree files. `.gitignore` only stops things being staged; it has no effect on what `docker build` sees. Mirror the secret-pattern globs explicitly in `.dockerignore` (`.env*`, `*.jks`, `id_rsa`, `credentials.{json,yaml}`, etc.). Pre-PR-3 the `.dockerignore` was 9 lines and would have shipped a `.env.prod` straight into a published image.
+- **Semgrep is pinned to `semgrep==1.161.0`** in `.github/workflows/security.yml`. Bumps go through Dependabot's pip ecosystem on a documented cadence — `pip install --upgrade semgrep` (floating) was previously flagged by Scorecard `Pinned-Dependencies`. Don't unpin to "always get latest"; a CI-time auto-bump on a security-scanner can break the build silently when the new release adds rules.
 
 ## Supply-chain observability (OpenSSF)
 

shared/runbooks/release.md

@@ -80,6 +80,42 @@ Within 30 minutes of the release workflow finishing:
 
 If any of (1)–(4) fails, [`rollback.md`](rollback.md) applies.
 
+### 4a. Consumer-side bundle integrity (`codeiq bundle` artifacts)
+
+When operators receive a `*-bundle.zip` produced by `codeiq bundle`, they
+**must** verify integrity before launching the bundled `serve.sh` /
+`serve.bat`. The bundle ships a `checksums.sha256` entry in standard GNU
+coreutils format, generated as the last step of bundling
+(`BundleCommand#writeChecksumsManifest`).
+
+```bash
+# 1. Unzip into a clean directory.
+unzip myrepo-v1.0-bundle.zip -d myrepo-bundle/
+cd myrepo-bundle
+
+# 2. Verify every file. Exits non-zero if any entry is missing or modified;
+#    `checksums.sha256` itself is intentionally not listed (would be circular).
+sha256sum -c --quiet checksums.sha256
+
+# 3. (Optional) Skip via env var only when the bundle is trusted source-internal:
+#    CODEIQ_SKIP_VERIFY=1 ./serve.sh
+./serve.sh
+```
+
+`serve.sh` runs the same `sha256sum -c` automatically when the binary is
+on `PATH`. **Do not set `CODEIQ_SKIP_VERIFY=1` in production**: it
+disables the only consumer-side integrity gate when the bundle was
+delivered out-of-band (USB, internal mirror, AKS sidecar artifact). For
+verifying `checksums.sha256` itself against tampering, sign the
+bundle.zip out-of-band (Sigstore, GPG, or compare to the GitHub Release
+SHA-256 if the bundle was published to a release).
+
+If the consumer environment does not provide `sha256sum` (Windows without
+WSL, locked-down build agents), distribute the bundle via Sigstore-signed
+release and rely on the Sigstore client for integrity. `serve.bat`
+intentionally does **not** include a Windows-native verification step
+yet — tracked under follow-up.
+
 ---
 
 ## 5. Hot-fix patch release (`X.Y.Z+1`)