[static-analysis] Report - 2026-07-07

[github-actions]

🔍 Static Analysis Report - 2026-07-07

Analysis Summary

• Tools Used: zizmor, poutine, actionlint, runner-guard
• Total Findings: 942 (zizmor 548 · poutine 22 · actionlint 39 · runner-guard 333)
• Workflows Scanned: 258
• Workflows Affected: 197 (zizmor) · 11 (poutine) · 30 (actionlint) · 17 (runner-guard)

Findings by Tool

Tool	Total	Critical	High	Medium	Low/Info
zizmor (security)	548	0	0	0	548
poutine (supply chain)	22	0	10 (error)	1 (warn)	11 (note)
actionlint (linting)	39	-	-	-	39
runner-guard (taint)	333	0	322	11	0

Posture is stable vs. yesterday (07-06). Every High-severity runner-guard finding is a known, already-triaged class whose per-file issues are closed. No new security regressions.

Clustered Findings by Tool and Type

Zizmor Security Findings

Issue Type	Severity	Count	Affected Workflows
template-injection	Informational/Low	262	197 files (generated .lock.yml)
adhoc-packages	Low	255	broad (apt/pip installs in setup steps)
obfuscation	Low	30	agent-performance-analyzer, agentic-token-audit/optimizer, audit-workflows, copilot-* ...
superfluous-actions	Informational	1	1 file

Poutine Supply Chain Findings

Issue Type	Severity	Count	Affected Workflows
untrusted_checkout_exec	error (High)	10	copilot-setup-steps, smoke-codex, smoke-workflow-call(-with-inputs) ... (all # poutine:ignore annotated)
github_action_from_unverified_creator_used	note	8	mixed
unverified_script_exec	note	3	mixed
pr_runs_on_self_hosted	warning	1	1 file

Actionlint Linting Issues

Issue Type	Count	Notes
SC2016 (expr won't expand in single quotes)	21	intentional literal ${{...}} in single quotes
SC2086 (missing quotes)	7	word-splitting risk
SC2038 (find/xargs)	6	prefer -print0 | xargs -0
SC2034 (unused var)	2	dead assignment
SC2188 / SC2129 / SC2005	1 each	redirect / grouped redirect / useless echo

Total 39 shellcheck errors across 30 files (all generated .lock.yml).

Runner-Guard Taint Analysis Findings

Runner-Guard score/grade: not emitted in this run's output.

Rule ID	Name	Severity	Count	Affected Workflows
RGS-004	Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check	high	305	q, dev-hawk, ai-moderator (.lock.yml)
RGS-012	Secret Exfiltration via Outbound HTTP Request	high	11	daily-model-inventory, daily-byok-ollama-test, visual-regression-checker, docs-noob-tester, daily-multi-device-docs-tester
RGS-018	Suspicious Payload Execution Pattern	high	6	smoke-codex, smoke-claude, daily-sentrux-report, daily-cli-performance, daily-byok-ollama-test, copilot-setup-steps
RGS-005	Excessive Permissions on Untrusted Trigger	medium	8	ai-moderator, q, agentic_commands
RGS-019	Step Output Interpolated in run Block	medium	2	windows-cli-integration, error-message-lint
RGS-007	Unpinned Third-Party Action	medium	1	publish-safe-outputs-node

Issues created this run: none. All Critical/High runner-guard findings map to rule+file combinations that were previously filed and closed — recreating them is the duplicate anti-pattern documented in closed policy issue #31043. Verified closed coverage this run:

Dedup verification (rule + file → closed issue)

• RGS-018: copilot-setup-steps → [static-analysis] RGS-018: Suspicious Payload Execution Pattern in copilot-setup-steps.yml #33476 (closed); daily-byok-ollama-test → [static-analysis] RGS-018: Suspicious Payload Execution Pattern in daily-byok-ollama-test.lock.yml #35653 (closed); smoke-claude / smoke-codex / daily-cli-performance / daily-sentrux-report → covered by bulk closes [static-analysis] RGS-018: Suspicious Payload Execution Pattern (34 workflows) #30532, [static-analysis] RGS-018: Suspicious Payload Execution Pattern in 36 workflows #29461, [static-analysis] RGS-018: Suspicious Payload Execution Pattern in go-logger and 36 other workflows #28154, [static-analysis] RGS-018: Suspicious Payload Execution Pattern in multiple workflows #30777, [static-analysis] RGS-018: Suspicious Payload Execution Pattern in multiple workflows #30078.
• RGS-012: daily-model-inventory → [static-analysis] RGS-012: Secret Exfiltration via Outbound HTTP Request in daily-model-inventory.lock.yml #30776; daily-byok-ollama-test → [static-analysis] RGS-012: Secret Exfiltration via Outbound HTTP Request in daily-byok-ollama-test.lock.yml #35652; daily-multi-device-docs-tester → [static-analysis] RGS-012: Secret Exfiltration via Outbound HTTP Request in daily-multi-device-docs-tester.lock.yml #33477; visual-regression-checker → [static-analysis] RGS-012: Secret Exfiltration via Outbound HTTP Request in visual-regression-checker.lock.yml #30947; docs-noob-tester → [static-analysis] RGS-012: Secret Exfiltration via Outbound HTTP Request in docs-noob-tester #28488 (all closed).
• RGS-004: [static-analysis] RGS-004: Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check in 16 workflows #28156, [static-analysis] RGS-004: Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check in scout.lock.yml #29158, [static-analysis] RGS-004: Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check in pr-nitpick-reviewer.lock.yml #30778, [static-analysis] RGS-004: Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check in brave.lock.yml #30945 (all closed).
• Only open [static-analysis] issue is the daily report ([static-analysis] Report - 2026-07-06 #43713) — no open per-finding RGS issue exists to comment on.

Top Priority Issues

1. RGS-004 — Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check

• Tool: runner-guard · Count: 305 · Severity: high
• Affected: q, dev-hawk, ai-moderator (.lock.yml)
• Impact: workflows triggered by comments/issue events that lack an explicit author-association gate can be driven by unprivileged external users.
• Status: known/triaged; per-file issues closed ([static-analysis] RGS-004: Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check in 16 workflows #28156, [static-analysis] RGS-004: Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check in scout.lock.yml #29158, [static-analysis] RGS-004: Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check in pr-nitpick-reviewer.lock.yml #30778, [static-analysis] RGS-004: Comment-Triggered Workflow Without Author Authorization Check in brave.lock.yml #30945).

2. RGS-012 — Secret Exfiltration via Outbound HTTP Request

• Tool: runner-guard · Count: 11 · Severity: high
• Impact: outbound HTTP to non-GitHub domains in secret-bearing jobs is the canonical exfil pattern; these are legitimate model/API calls, reviewed and closed.

3. Poutine untrusted_checkout_exec (10, High/error)

• Fork-checkout-then-execute in smoke/setup workflows — already suppressed with # poutine:ignore untrusted_checkout_exec after review.

Fix Suggestion for actionlint SC2086 (quote-your-variables)

Issue: 7 occurrences of unquoted shell variable expansions — the only cluster here that is a genuine, low-risk, mechanically-fixable defect (RGS/zizmor findings are triaged/generated).
Severity: shellcheck warning
Affected: 7 across generated .lock.yml (durable fix belongs in the gh-aw compiler shell templates)

Prompt to Copilot Agent:

You are fixing shellcheck SC2086 findings reported by actionlint.

Vulnerability class: word-splitting / glob-expansion on unquoted variable
expansions inside run: blocks. An unquoted $VAR splits on whitespace and
expands globs, which can break on values containing spaces/*/? and, when the
value is externally influenced, change the executed command.

Rule: SC2086 — (www.shellcheck.net/redacted)

Required fix:
1. Locate each unquoted variable expansion flagged by shellcheck ($VAR, ${VAR},
   $1, $GITHUB_OUTPUT, etc.) in a run: block.
2. Wrap the expansion in double quotes: "$VAR" / "${VAR}".
3. Leave deliberately-split cases alone only with an explicit
   `# shellcheck disable=SC2086` and a one-line justification.
4. Because the flagged files are generated .lock.yml, apply the durable fix in
   the gh-aw compiler's shell-emission templates and recompile, rather than
   editing lock files by hand.

Example —
Before:
  run: echo $GITHUB_OUTPUT && cp $SRC $DEST
After:
  run: echo "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" && cp "$SRC" "$DEST"

Verify with: actionlint on the affected .lock.yml files reports 0 SC2086.

All Findings Details

Counts by tool/rule (this scan)

• zizmor: template-injection 262, adhoc-packages 255, obfuscation 30, superfluous-actions 1 (total 548; 197 files)
• poutine: untrusted_checkout_exec 10, github_action_from_unverified_creator_used 8, unverified_script_exec 3, pr_runs_on_self_hosted 1 (total 22; 11 files)
• actionlint: SC2016 21, SC2086 7, SC2038 6, SC2034 2, SC2188 1, SC2129 1, SC2005 1 (total 39; 30 files)
• runner-guard: RGS-004 305, RGS-012 11, RGS-005 8, RGS-018 6, RGS-019 2, RGS-007 1 (total 333; 17 files)

Historical Trends

Date	zizmor	poutine	actionlint	runner-guard
2026-07-04	553	22	40	333
2026-07-05	552	22	40	333
2026-07-06	548	22	37	333
2026-07-07	548	22	39	333

• Change vs 07-06: zizmor 0 · poutine 0 · actionlint +2 · runner-guard 0.
• New issue types: none.
• Resolved issue types: none.
• actionlint ticked +2 (SC2086 6→7, SC2016 unchanged) — minor, within normal generation churn.

Recommendations

1. Immediate: nothing new — all High/Critical runner-guard classes are already triaged and closed; do not refile (policy [deep-report] Static-analysis RGS-* security issues recreated daily after closure (no dedup-by-rule) #31043).
2. Short-term: fix the 7 SC2086 + 6 SC2038 shellcheck warnings at the compiler-template level so they clear across all generated lock files at once.
3. Long-term: emit a runner-guard score/grade line in compile output so trend tracking can include the composite grade.
4. Prevention: keep zizmor template-injection and adhoc-packages addressed in the gh-aw shell-emission templates (env-var indirection, pinned installs) rather than per-workflow.

Next Steps

• Apply SC2086/SC2038 fixes in the gh-aw compiler shell templates and recompile.
• No new runner-guard issues to open (all closed) — re-evaluate only if a new rule+file combo appears.
• Consider surfacing the runner-guard composite score in compile output.

References:

• §28845053115

Generated by 📊 Static Analysis Report · 168.6 AIC · ⌖ 34.3 AIC · ⊞ 6.7K · ◷

• expires on Jul 13, 2026, 10:12 PM UTC-08:00

[pelikhan]

/q set cookie label on created issue

[github-actions]

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[github-actions]

This issue is being closed as outdated. A newer issue has been created: #44210

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