[uk-ai-resilience] [Security] Tier C: REST API path injection in pkg/cli/outcome_eval.go (alerts #641, #642)

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Tier C — Restricted Pending Review

Source: UK AI Open Code Risk & Resilience Governance — 2026-07-23 run
Discussion report: #aw_disc_gov

Risk-Scoring Breakdown

Dimension	Score (1–5)
Exposure amplification	4
Patchability (ease of fix)	2
Detectability (exploitation visibility)	4
Operational fragility	3
Ownership confidence	2
Composite score	3.0 / 5

Finding Description

Two open code scanning alerts (Semgrep, warning severity) identify REST API path injection in pkg/cli/outcome_eval.go:

• Alert Add timeout option to the neutral tool "bash" with optional configuration. Update compiler to generate code that configures the timeout in the agent. If the agent does not support timeout, fail the compilation. https://github.com/githubnext/gh-aw/issues/623 #641 (line 231): ownerRepo and endpoint variables from user-supplied repo input are interpolated into a GitHub REST API path via fmt.Sprintf without URL-path encoding. A crafted repo string could alter the API path.
• Alert Fix patch application #642 (line 253): ownerRepo variable interpolated into a GitHub REST API array endpoint path without url.PathEscape.

Remediation Action

Apply url.PathEscape() to ownerRepo and endpoint path components before interpolation into REST API paths. This eliminates path traversal risk without requiring architectural changes.

// Before
path := fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s", ownerRepo, endpoint)

// After
parts := strings.SplitN(ownerRepo, "/", 2)
path := fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/%s", url.PathEscape(parts[0]), url.PathEscape(parts[1]), url.PathEscape(endpoint))

SLA

High — remediate within 14 days (by 2026-08-06)

References

• Code Scanning Alert #641
• Code Scanning Alert #642
• Workflow Run §30023231324

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