Summary
CodeQL "Malicious Code Scanner" alert #653 (workflow-out-of-context) flags two pre-built third-party binaries committed directly to git history in PR #48979 (commit 9e4de3594991dbd4296799587890c2f15ee4ed9a):
actionlint (8,452,012 bytes, sha256 4e6adea4de17cd3787c28f3031962f4109d6bfde66a84aa9fe6977f7e3772f5c)
gosec (69,372,088 bytes, sha256 0905b2df37caaf21faeead23a632a7d86d0e52958823c437f8ed8c347249fc98)
Threat Score: 4/10 — assessed as accidental (likely a local build artifact committed by mistake), not malicious. The gosec binary's strings output matches github.com/securego/gosec/v2@v2.27.1, consistent with the version-downgrade commit message, so provenance appears legitimate. However:
- The
Makefile expects these tools via go install (github.com/rhysd/actionlint/cmd/actionlint, github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec), not vendored binaries.
- ~78MB of opaque compiled Go ELF code is now permanently in git history for a source-only Go repository, bypassing code review for that content.
.gitignore only excludes gosec-report.json/gosec-results.sarif, not the binaries themselves.
UK AI Governance Tier & Risk Scoring
- Tier: B — Open With Conditions
- Exposure amplification: Low (no malicious intent found, hashes verifiable against upstream)
- Patchability: High (simple removal +
.gitignore addition)
- Detectability: High (already caught by scanner)
- Operational fragility: Low
- Ownership confidence: Medium
Remediation Action
- Remove
actionlint and gosec binaries from the git tree (git rm + history note, or filter if warranted).
- Add
/actionlint and /gosec to .gitignore.
- Confirm CI/Makefile targets rely on
go install rather than any committed binary.
- Optionally verify sha256 hashes against upstream releases for independent confirmation (already partially done via
strings analysis).
SLA urgency: Medium
Reference
Full governance analysis: see the linked discussion report "UK AI Open Code Risk & Resilience — Weekly Assessment (2026-08-13)" created by this workflow run (recent-changes focus, 7-day lookback).
Generated by UK AI Operational Resilience · auto · 59.8 AIC · ⌖ 2.75 AIC · ⊞ 8.7K · ◷
Summary
CodeQL "Malicious Code Scanner" alert #653 (
workflow-out-of-context) flags two pre-built third-party binaries committed directly to git history in PR #48979 (commit9e4de3594991dbd4296799587890c2f15ee4ed9a):actionlint(8,452,012 bytes, sha2564e6adea4de17cd3787c28f3031962f4109d6bfde66a84aa9fe6977f7e3772f5c)gosec(69,372,088 bytes, sha2560905b2df37caaf21faeead23a632a7d86d0e52958823c437f8ed8c347249fc98)Threat Score: 4/10 — assessed as accidental (likely a local build artifact committed by mistake), not malicious. The
gosecbinary'sstringsoutput matchesgithub.com/securego/gosec/v2@v2.27.1, consistent with the version-downgrade commit message, so provenance appears legitimate. However:Makefileexpects these tools viago install(github.com/rhysd/actionlint/cmd/actionlint,github.com/securego/gosec/v2/cmd/gosec), not vendored binaries..gitignoreonly excludesgosec-report.json/gosec-results.sarif, not the binaries themselves.UK AI Governance Tier & Risk Scoring
.gitignoreaddition)Remediation Action
actionlintandgosecbinaries from the git tree (git rm+ history note, or filter if warranted)./actionlintand/gosecto.gitignore.go installrather than any committed binary.stringsanalysis).SLA urgency: Medium
Reference
Full governance analysis: see the linked discussion report "UK AI Open Code Risk & Resilience — Weekly Assessment (2026-08-13)" created by this workflow run (recent-changes focus, 7-day lookback).