Secure CI workflows with zizmor ahead of enforced rollout#1872
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joefernandez
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Jun 26, 2026
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Thanks for the update.
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This PR hardens the GitHub Actions workflows using zizmor by remediating all medium+ findings from zizmor ahead of the org-wide rollout.
These changes lock our CI automation to exact, verified versions and give each workflow only the minimum permissions it needs, closing common supply-chain attack paths without changing what any workflow actually does.
Result
unpinned-uses), 16 medium (excessive-permissions,template-injection)artipackedand alltemplate-injectioncode smells.Changes (3 commits)
ci: pin actions to SHAs and harden workflows with zizmor auto-fixesci: set least-privilege GITHUB_TOKEN permissions on workflowsci: move PR/issue context into env vars to prevent template injectionVerification
uvx zizmor@latest .github/workflows/→No findings to report. Good job!