Skip to content

Address Aikido security findings - #3

Merged
rockwellll merged 1 commit into
masterfrom
codex/address-aikido-security-findings
Jul 24, 2026
Merged

Address Aikido security findings#3
rockwellll merged 1 commit into
masterfrom
codex/address-aikido-security-findings

Conversation

@rockwellll

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Summary

  • Pin actions/checkout and ruby/setup-ruby to immutable release commits.
  • Disable persisted checkout credentials in the test workflow.
  • Reject parent-directory traversal in artifact output paths.
  • Replace URL-fragment jQuery selectors in the generated documentation with a native ID lookup.

Rationale

The reported findings came from mutable workflow dependencies, persisted repository credentials, an unsanitized output path, and treating URL fragments as jQuery selectors. These changes narrow each boundary while preserving normal artifact destinations and documentation anchor navigation.

@rockwellll
rockwellll merged commit a1f1ada into master Jul 24, 2026
2 checks passed
@rockwellll
rockwellll deleted the codex/address-aikido-security-findings branch July 24, 2026 21:03

@chatgpt-codex-connector chatgpt-codex-connector Bot left a comment

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

💡 Codex Review

Here are some automated review suggestions for this pull request.

Reviewed commit: c43f9185f8

ℹ️ About Codex in GitHub

Your team has set up Codex to review pull requests in this repo. Reviews are triggered when you

  • Open a pull request for review
  • Mark a draft as ready
  • Comment "@codex review".

If Codex has suggestions, it will comment; otherwise it will react with 👍.

Codex can also answer questions or update the PR. Try commenting "@codex address that feedback".

Comment thread lib/kleya/artifact.rb
# @param path [String] the path to save the artifact
# @return [String] the full path where the file was saved
def save(path = nil)
raise ArgumentError, 'path cannot contain parent directory traversal' if path.to_s.split(/[\\\/]/).include?('..')

Copy link
Copy Markdown

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

P2 Badge Reject drive-relative parent traversal

On Windows, drive-relative paths can put the parent segment in the drive component, e.g. C:..\escaped or C:../escaped. This split sees that first component as C:.. rather than .., so the new guard allows the path and the following File.write still traverses upward when the CLI/API receives such an output path. If the intent is to block parent-directory traversal, normalize/expand against an allowed base path or strip the drive prefix before checking segments.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

1 participant