feat: add trusted-committers allowlist for security-committer-identity check

examples/config.yaml

@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ security-checks:
     - ".github/workflows/"
     - ".github/actions/"
   committer-identity-check: true
+  trusted-committers: # Additional trusted committers (GitHub App bot, web-flow, and API users are auto-included)
+    - "pre-commit-ci[bot]"
 
 repositories:
   my-repository:

webhook_server/config/schema.yaml

@@ -95,6 +95,16 @@ $defs:
           When enabled, compares the PR author (parent committer) against the last commit's
           committer. Fails the security-committer-identity check run if they differ.
         default: true
+      trusted-committers:
+        type: array
+        description: |
+          List of committer logins that are always trusted for the committer-identity check.
+          When the last committer matches an entry in this list, the check passes regardless
+          of the PR author. Useful for bots (e.g., pre-commit-ci[bot]) and org identities.
+          Note: The GitHub App bot, web-flow, and github-tokens API users are
+          automatically included — you only need to list additional external committers here.
+        items:
+          type: string
     additionalProperties: false
 type: object
 properties:

webhook_server/docs/pr-flow-api.md

@@ -243,12 +243,14 @@ The PR Flow API integrates seamlessly with the log viewer system to provide:
 ```python
 import httpx
 
+
 async def analyze_pr_workflow(hook_id: str, base_url: str = "http://192.168.10.44:5003") -> dict:
     async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
         # Example using production webhook server
         response = await client.get(f"{base_url}/logs/api/pr-flow/{hook_id}")
         return response.json()
 
+
 # Usage
 workflow_data = await analyze_pr_workflow("f4b3c2d1-a9b8-4c5d-9e8f-1a2b3c4d5e6f")
 print(f"Workflow health: {workflow_data['performance_metrics']['workflow_health']}")

webhook_server/libs/github_api.py

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
     CONFIGURABLE_LABEL_CATEGORIES,
     CONVENTIONAL_TITLE_STR,
     DEFAULT_SUSPICIOUS_PATHS,
+    GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_LOGIN,
     OTHER_MAIN_BRANCH,
     PRE_COMMIT_STR,
     PYTHON_MODULE_INSTALL_STR,
@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ async def _recheck_merge_eligibility(self, pull_request: PullRequest) -> None:
 
     async def process(self) -> Any:
         # Early exit for pull_request_review_thread events that don't need processing.
-        # Must run BEFORE add_api_users_to_auto_verified_and_merged_users() to avoid
+        # Must run BEFORE get_api_users() to avoid
         # burning rate limit on get_user() calls for skipped events.
         if self.github_event == "pull_request_review_thread":
             action = self.hook_data["action"]
@@ -526,7 +527,7 @@ async def process(self) -> Any:
 
         # Early exit for status events with pending state — only terminal states
         # (success, failure, error) need processing.
-        # Must run BEFORE add_api_users_to_auto_verified_and_merged_users() to avoid
+        # Must run BEFORE get_api_users() to avoid
         # burning rate limit on get_user() calls for skipped events.
         if self.github_event == "status":
             state = self.hook_data["state"]
@@ -542,7 +543,8 @@ async def process(self) -> Any:
                 return None
 
         # Initialize auto-verified users from API users (async operation)
-        await self.add_api_users_to_auto_verified_and_merged_users()
+        api_users = await self.get_api_users()
+        self.auto_verified_and_merged_users.extend(user for user in api_users if user is not None)
 
         # Initialize app bot login for bot-PR identification (async)
         if not self.app_bot_login:
@@ -569,6 +571,9 @@ async def process(self) -> Any:
             else:
                 self.logger.debug(f"{self.log_prefix} No GitHub App API available — app_bot_login not set")
 
+        # Build final trusted-committers list with dynamic identities
+        await self._build_trusted_committers(api_users=api_users)
+
         event_log: str = f"Event type: {self.github_event}. event ID: {self.x_github_delivery}"
 
         # Start webhook routing context step
@@ -668,7 +673,7 @@ async def process(self) -> Any:
             self.last_commit = await self._get_last_commit(pull_request=pull_request)
             self.parent_committer = pull_request.user.login
             self.last_committer = await github_api_call(
-                lambda: getattr(self.last_commit.committer, "login", "unknown"),
+                lambda: getattr(self.last_commit.committer, "login", "unknown") or "unknown",
                 logger=self.logger,
                 log_prefix=self.log_prefix,
             )
@@ -835,27 +840,18 @@ async def process(self) -> Any:
             await self._update_context_metrics()
             return None
 
-    async def add_api_users_to_auto_verified_and_merged_users(self) -> None:
+    async def get_api_users(self) -> list[str | None]:
         apis_and_tokens = get_apis_and_tokes_from_config(config=self.config)
 
         async def check_token(api: github.Github, token: str) -> str | None:
             """Check a single API token and return the user login if valid, None otherwise."""
             token_suffix = f"...{token[-4:]}" if token else "unknown"
             try:
-                rate_limit_remaining = await github_api_call(
-                    lambda: api.rate_limiting[-1], logger=self.logger, log_prefix=self.log_prefix
-                )
-            except Exception as ex:
-                self.logger.warning(
-                    f"{self.log_prefix} Failed to get API rate limit for token ending in '{token_suffix}', "
-                    f"skipping. {ex}"
-                )
-                return None
-
-            if rate_limit_remaining == 60:
-                self.logger.warning(
-                    f"{self.log_prefix} API has rate limit set to 60 which indicates an invalid token "
-                    f"(token ending in '{token_suffix}'), skipping"
+                # Pre-flight probe: verify token is functional before attempting get_user()
+                await github_api_call(lambda: api.rate_limiting[-1], logger=self.logger, log_prefix=self.log_prefix)
+            except Exception:
+                self.logger.exception(
+                    f"{self.log_prefix} Failed to get API rate limit for token ending in '{token_suffix}', skipping"
                 )
                 return None
 
@@ -871,8 +867,7 @@ async def check_token(api: github.Github, token: str) -> str | None:
 
             return _api_user
 
-        results = await asyncio.gather(*[check_token(api, token) for api, token in apis_and_tokens])
-        self.auto_verified_and_merged_users.extend(user for user in results if user is not None)
+        return await asyncio.gather(*[check_token(api, token) for api, token in apis_and_tokens])
 
     def prepare_log_prefix(self, pull_request: PullRequest | None = None) -> str:
         return prepare_log_prefix(
@@ -997,6 +992,19 @@ def _repo_data_from_config(self, repository_config: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
             _mandatory_raw = True
         self.security_mandatory: bool = _mandatory_raw
 
+        _trusted_committers = _security_config.get("trusted-committers", [])
+        if not isinstance(_trusted_committers, list):
+            self.logger.warning(
+                f"{self.log_prefix} security-checks.trusted-committers must be array, "
+                f"got {type(_trusted_committers).__name__}. Defaulting to empty list."
+            )
+            _trusted_committers = []
+        self.security_trusted_committers: list[str] = [
+            str(entry).strip().lower()
+            for entry in _trusted_committers
+            if isinstance(entry, (str, int, float)) and not isinstance(entry, bool) and str(entry).strip()
+        ]
+
         _auto_merge_prs = self.config.get_value(
             value="set-auto-merge-prs", return_on_none=[], extra_dict=repository_config
         )
@@ -1110,6 +1118,39 @@ def _sanitize_item(item: Any) -> str:
 
         self.mask_sensitive = self.config.get_value("mask-sensitive-data", return_on_none=True)
 
+    async def _build_trusted_committers(self, api_users: list[str | None] | None = None) -> None:
+        """Add dynamic entries to trusted-committers list.
+
+        Adds:
+        - GitHub App bot login (app_bot_login)
+        - GitHub's web-flow system account
+        - API user logins from github-tokens
+
+        Static config entries are already loaded in _repo_data_from_config().
+        Called once from process() after app_bot_login is initialized.
+        """
+        # GitHub App bot
+        if self.app_bot_login:
+            bot = str(self.app_bot_login).strip().lower()
+            if bot and bot not in self.security_trusted_committers:
+                self.security_trusted_committers.append(bot)
+
+        # GitHub's web-flow system account
+        web_flow = GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_LOGIN.lower()
+        if web_flow not in self.security_trusted_committers:
+            self.security_trusted_committers.append(web_flow)
+
+        # API users from github-tokens
+        if api_users is None:
+            api_users = await self.get_api_users()
+        for user in api_users:
+            if user:
+                normalized = str(user).strip().lower()
+                if normalized and normalized not in self.security_trusted_committers:
+                    self.security_trusted_committers.append(normalized)
+
+        self.logger.debug(f"{self.log_prefix} Trusted committers: {self.security_trusted_committers}")
+
     async def get_pull_request(self, number: int | None = None) -> PullRequest | None:
         if number:
             self.logger.debug(f"{self.log_prefix} Attempting to get PR by number: {number}")

webhook_server/libs/handlers/runner_handler.py

@@ -372,8 +372,8 @@ async def run_security_suspicious_paths(self) -> None:
     async def run_security_committer_identity(self) -> None:
         """Check if the last committer matches the PR author.
 
-        Fails the check run if the last commit's committer differs from the PR author
-        (parent_committer), which may indicate a commit was authored by someone unexpected.
+        Uses a unified trusted-committers list that includes static config entries,
+        the GitHub App bot login, web-flow, and API users from github-tokens.
         """
         if not self.github_webhook.security_committer_identity_check:
             self.logger.debug(f"{self.log_prefix} Committer identity check disabled, skipping")
@@ -385,15 +385,17 @@ async def run_security_committer_identity(self) -> None:
             parent_committer = self.github_webhook.parent_committer
             last_committer = self.github_webhook.last_committer
 
+            # SECURITY: "unknown" check MUST precede the trusted-committers check.
+            # An unverifiable committer identity should always fail.
             if last_committer == "unknown":
                 output: CheckRunOutput = {
-                    "title": "\u274c Security: Committer Identity Unknown",
+                    "title": "❌ Security: Committer Identity Unknown",
                     "summary": "Committer identity could not be verified",
                     "text": (
                         "## Committer Identity Check\n\n"
                         f"**PR author:** `{parent_committer}`\n"
                         "**Last commit committer:** unknown\n\n"
-                        "Committer identity could not be verified \u2014 "
+                        "Committer identity could not be verified — "
                         "last commit has no associated GitHub user.\n\n"
                         "This may indicate:\n"
                         "- A commit was made with a local Git identity not linked to a GitHub account\n"
@@ -406,68 +408,78 @@ async def run_security_committer_identity(self) -> None:
                     f"PR author={parent_committer}, last committer has no GitHub user"
                 )
                 await self.check_run_handler.set_check_failure(name=SECURITY_COMMITTER_IDENTITY_STR, output=output)
-            elif last_committer == GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_LOGIN:
-                last_committer_id = self.github_webhook.last_committer_id
-                if last_committer_id == GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_USER_ID:
-                    self.logger.debug(
-                        f"{self.log_prefix} Last committer is GitHub's web-flow "
-                        f"(user ID {last_committer_id}) — passing committer identity check"
+
+            elif last_committer.lower() != parent_committer.lower():
+                if last_committer.lower() in self.github_webhook.security_trusted_committers:
+                    # Extra guard: verify web-flow by immutable user ID to prevent impersonation
+                    if last_committer.lower() == GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_LOGIN:
+                        last_committer_id = self.github_webhook.last_committer_id
+                        if last_committer_id != GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_USER_ID:
+                            self.logger.warning(
+                                f"{self.log_prefix} Committer login is 'web-flow' but user ID "
+                                f"{last_committer_id} does not match GitHub's web-flow ID "
+                                f"{GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_USER_ID} — possible impersonation"
+                            )
+                            output = {
+                                "title": "❌ Security: Committer Identity Suspicious",
+                                "summary": (
+                                    f"Committer claims to be web-flow but has unexpected user ID {last_committer_id}"
+                                ),
+                                "text": (
+                                    f"## Committer Identity Check\n\n"
+                                    f"**PR author:** `{parent_committer}`\n"
+                                    f"**Last commit committer:** `{last_committer}` (ID: {last_committer_id})\n"
+                                    f"**Expected web-flow ID:** {GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_USER_ID}\n\n"
+                                    f"The committer login is `web-flow` but the user ID does not match "
+                                    f"GitHub's official web-flow account. This may indicate an impersonation attempt."
+                                ),
+                            }
+                            await self.check_run_handler.set_check_failure(
+                                name=SECURITY_COMMITTER_IDENTITY_STR, output=output
+                            )
+                            return
+
+                    # Trusted committer — pass
+                    self.logger.info(
+                        f"{self.log_prefix} Committer identity: '{last_committer}' is in unified trusted list"
                     )
                     output = {
                         "title": "Security: Committer Identity",
-                        "summary": "Committer identity verified (GitHub web-flow)",
+                        "summary": f"Committer '{last_committer}' is trusted",
                         "text": (
                             f"## Committer Identity Check\n\n"
                             f"**PR author:** `{parent_committer}`\n"
-                            f"**Last commit committer:** `{last_committer}` (ID: {last_committer_id})\n\n"
-                            f"The last commit was made via the GitHub web UI (rebase, merge, or edit). "
-                            f"The committer is GitHub's verified `web-flow` system account "
-                            f"(user ID {GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_USER_ID}), confirming this is a legitimate "
-                            f"GitHub web operation."
+                            f"**Last commit committer:** `{last_committer}`\n\n"
+                            f"The committer differs from the PR author but is in the trusted committers list.\n"
+                            f"This is expected for automated workflows (bots, CI tools, org identities, "
+                            f"GitHub web operations)."
                         ),
                     }
                     await self.check_run_handler.set_check_success(name=SECURITY_COMMITTER_IDENTITY_STR, output=output)
                 else:
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        f"{self.log_prefix} Committer login is 'web-flow' but user ID "
-                        f"{last_committer_id} does not match GitHub's web-flow ID "
-                        f"{GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_USER_ID} — possible impersonation"
-                    )
+                    # Untrusted mismatch — fail
                     output = {
-                        "title": "\u274c Security: Committer Identity Suspicious",
-                        "summary": f"Committer claims to be web-flow but has unexpected user ID {last_committer_id}",
+                        "title": "❌ Security: Committer Identity Mismatch",
+                        "summary": f"Last committer '{last_committer}' differs from PR author '{parent_committer}'",
                         "text": (
                             f"## Committer Identity Check\n\n"
                             f"**PR author:** `{parent_committer}`\n"
-                            f"**Last commit committer:** `{last_committer}` (ID: {last_committer_id})\n"
-                            f"**Expected web-flow ID:** {GITHUB_WEB_FLOW_USER_ID}\n\n"
-                            f"The committer login is `web-flow` but the user ID does not match "
-                            f"GitHub's official web-flow account. This may indicate an impersonation attempt."
+                            f"**Last commit committer:** `{last_committer}`\n\n"
+                            f"The last commit in this PR was made by a different user than the PR author. "
+                            f"This may indicate:\n"
+                            f"- An unauthorized commit was pushed to the PR branch\n"
+                            f"- A bot or automation tool committed with unexpected credentials\n"
+                            f"- A legitimate co-author contribution (review carefully)\n\n"
+                            f"Please verify this is expected before merging."
                         ),
                     }
+                    self.logger.warning(
+                        f"{self.log_prefix} Committer identity mismatch: "
+                        f"PR author={parent_committer}, last committer={last_committer}"
+                    )
                     await self.check_run_handler.set_check_failure(name=SECURITY_COMMITTER_IDENTITY_STR, output=output)
-            elif last_committer != parent_committer:
-                output = {
-                    "title": "\u274c Security: Committer Identity Mismatch",
-                    "summary": f"Last committer '{last_committer}' differs from PR author '{parent_committer}'",
-                    "text": (
-                        f"## Committer Identity Check\n\n"
-                        f"**PR author:** `{parent_committer}`\n"
-                        f"**Last commit committer:** `{last_committer}`\n\n"
-                        f"The last commit in this PR was made by a different user than the PR author. "
-                        f"This may indicate:\n"
-                        f"- An unauthorized commit was pushed to the PR branch\n"
-                        f"- A bot or automation tool committed with unexpected credentials\n"
-                        f"- A legitimate co-author contribution (review carefully)\n\n"
-                        f"Please verify this is expected before merging."
-                    ),
-                }
-                self.logger.warning(
-                    f"{self.log_prefix} Committer identity mismatch: "
-                    f"PR author={parent_committer}, last committer={last_committer}"
-                )
-                await self.check_run_handler.set_check_failure(name=SECURITY_COMMITTER_IDENTITY_STR, output=output)
             else:
+                # Match — pass
                 output = {
                     "title": "Security: Committer Identity",
                     "summary": "Committer identity verified",