[WIP] Add AS-aware relay selection#1514
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cc @nothingmuch to approach Ack/Nack |
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nothingmuch
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approach ack
not 100% sure about relaymanager getting removed it may still have a job (keeping track of failures, arguably important enough to be in scope for reference client)
relay selection looks good, but i didn't review carefully since only seeking approach ack
| Post(MessageKind), | ||
| Poll(MessageKind), |
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is message kind for diagnostic purposes?
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| pub(crate) const WINDOW_SECS: u64 = 30; | ||
| const CLOCK_SKEW_WINDOWS: i64 = 2; | ||
| const POST_RESERVED_COUNT: usize = 3; |
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at time t_i, avoid making any real GET requests (i.e. dummy GET requests are OK) using the relays
whose hash is lexicographically smallest not just at time t_i, but at times t_{i-2}..t_{i+2} or at least
t_{i-1}..t_{i+1}
they should always use a different relay for the post and the get, avoiding the worst case leak
k=3 and skew=2 are fixed at the upper end of #919 (comment)
with 3-5 public OHTTP relays, the reservation budget (up to 15 buckets) can swallow the whole pool, so POLL falls back (286-289) to POST-reserved buckets, silently violating the spec when poll_candidates is empty (small pool)
picking k and skew based on pool size (k=2/skew=1 when small) would reduce reserved bucket to 6 and avoid the fallback for B ≥ 7, while keeping max protection when B ≥ 16. The remaining edge case (B ≤ 6) would still hit the warn!, possibly worth surfacing to the caller, maybe with a typed error
makes sense?
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Yeah, that makes sense. Fixed k=3 / skew=2 is good for larger pools but too aggressive for small relay sets since it can reserve every bucket.
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| /// The ordering is recomputed from the receiver key and current time, so no | ||
| /// relay-selection progress needs to be stored between requests. | ||
| pub(crate) fn select_relays_for_request( |
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would be good to add tests for the deterministic selection
selection_hash stability (interop), deterministic ordering per (pubkey, RequestKind, TimeWindow), POLL/POST exclusion, and round-robin fairness
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Yeah was trying to keep PR small and only keep essential so it can be easier to review and get approach ack with the smaller PR's test should be added
| bail!("No valid relays available for the selected directory {}", directory.url.as_str()); | ||
| } | ||
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| relays.shuffle(&mut thread_rng()); |
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btw, relays.shuffle seems inert as ordered_candidates reorders everything afterwards
leftover of the old shuffle?
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Yep, good catch. This looks like leftover behavior from the old random relay ordering. Since request-time selection now goes through ordered_candidates, the initial relays.shuffle does not affect POST/POLL ordering. I’ll remove it.
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| [dependencies] | ||
| anyhow = "1.0.99" | ||
| asmap = { version = "0.1.0", optional = true } |
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would be good to know what the team think about adding this dep to parse the binary, especially if we are moving to the payjoin crate
is it a good idea or would it be better to have our own parser? #1452 (comment)
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I did check out the library also saw a contibutor to asmap bitcoin core library give it a star but more eyes on the library would be nice
| pub struct AsmapConfig { | ||
| #[serde(rename = "asmap_file")] | ||
| pub asmap: LoadedAsmap, |
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a configured, per-integration asmap file is a client fingerprint two ways: (1) only some integrations load one, so the AS-aware ones stand out (uses-it-or-not), and (2) selection is deterministic from the asmap, so even those that do load one diverge unless they're on the exact same snapshot.
could the lib ship one bundled snapshot per version instead, so every integration on a given version has the same file with nothing to fetch?
it's ~1.5 MB, and asmap-data updates ~monthly (irregular, gaps up to ~2 months), but relay ASNs are stable so across versions keeping everyone consistent
https://github.com/bitcoin-core/asmap-data
wdyt?
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No answer for this yet , this might require more discussion will get back to you
| #[serde(default)] | ||
| pub user_public_ips: Vec<IpAddr>, | ||
| #[serde(default)] | ||
| pub user_asns: Vec<u32>, |
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Given a list of trusted directories and relays, these lists should be filtered to exclude servers that share an AS with the user. This is potentially tricky as it users to be able to determine their public IP(s).
requiring the user's own ASN/IP makes AS-aware mode operator-only, a NAT'd wallet can't supply it without an external lookup, which is a privacy leak of its own
#919 lists four AS-overlap risks:
sender∩receiver→ inherent: relay selection can't fix it (it's the two endpoints themselves). VPN/Tor territory. out of scope.
of the three that selection can address, two don't need your own AS:
relay∩directory→ exclude relays in the directory's AS. Needs only the directory + relay ASes.relay∩relay→ the windowed ordering derived from the receiver key. Needs only the relays' ASes.
both use IPs you resolve via DNS anyway to connect, like Bitcoin Core's asmap, which diversifies its peers by AS (anti-eclipse) and never learns its own ASN; you bucket the servers, not yourself.
- only user-AS exclusion
user∩directoryneeds your own AS, and thats the one that could be dropped to the network layer (VPN/Tor) , not the selector:- a directory's AS (datacenter) vs a user's AS (residential/mobile) almost never coincide.
- the sender uses the directory that came in the URI, so it can't pick a different one to escape its own AS. it can't be addressed in selection.
so, if we drop this and keep just:
- directory-AS exclusion
relay∩directory - windowed ordering
relay∩relay
that way both use only server ASes, zero input, so AS-aware selection can be on by default for everyone, which removes the uses-it-or-not fingerprint, default and zero-input, instead of operator-only.
makes sense?
| pub(crate) struct SystemNetwork { | ||
| #[cfg(feature = "asmap")] | ||
| asmap: Option<LoadedAsmap>, |
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with the asmap bundled and the user-AS input dropped, could this Option and the random fallback go, so AS-aware is the default instead of an opt-in?
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New to AS map stuff, but this brand new lib might help? Seems like wouldn't need to load the data from file ourselves? 0xb10c's demo: |
Thanks I looked into But relay selection needs the URL and IP here are steps: That IP → ASN lookup is what the asmap crate gives us. The CLI resolves the relay/directory hostname then checks the resolved IP against asmap. Without that step we do not know which ASN the relay is actually in. |
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Add a deterministic relay-selection module to the main crate. Applications provide prepared relay candidates. The selector groups them by privacy bucket, orders buckets and relays from the receiver key and time window, and separates POST from POLL when enough buckets are available. This keeps the reusable selection logic independent from DNS resolution, ASMap lookup, directory trust policy, and HTTP transport.
Add optional ASMap configuration for v2 relay selection. The CLI can load an ASMap file and accept user ASNs or user public IPs. Later commits use this information to avoid relays and directories that share an ASN with the user.
Expose OHTTP key fetching through a relay with known socket addresses. ASMap-aware callers resolve and classify relay IPs before making HTTP requests. Passing those addresses into reqwest prevents a second DNS lookup from using a different address than the one that was checked. Move the CLI HTTP client setup behind a builder helper so v2 code can add resolve_to_addrs before building the client. The v1 path still builds a client through http_agent.
Resolve configured v2 directories and OHTTP relays before selection. When ASMap is configured, the CLI maps resolved IPs to ASNs, rejects mixed-ASN hosts, skips directories that share the user ASN, and skips relays that share the user or selected directory ASN. The CLI then converts the remaining relays into main-crate RelayCandidate values. Without ASMap, relays are still resolved and treated as individual URL buckets.
Use the prepared relay selector for v2 OHTTP POST and POLL requests. Sender and receiver flows now derive relay order from the receiver key, request kind, and current time window. OHTTP key fetching also uses resolved relay addresses so the relay used for bootstrapping is the one that was checked. Update e2e child process invocations to pass the local test directory as a trusted directory. Sender and resume paths validate the directory embedded in the BIP21 URI, so the local test directory must be configured explicitly.
Document AS-aware v2 relay selection configuration. Describe how to configure trusted directories, OHTTP relays, ASMap input, and user ASN information so downstream implementations can understand the reference CLI behavior.
This PR addresses #919 which adds AS-aware, stateless relay selection to payjoin crate and implements in payjoin-cli Reviewers will probably want to read #919 for the full context behind the design and tradeoffs.
The implementation adds optional ASMap-based filtering for trusted directories and OHTTP relays then demonstrates relay selection that separates POST and POLL traffic without storing a selected relay or relay index. Relay ordering is derived from the receiver key, request/message type and short time windows with polling avoiding POST-reserved AS buckets for nearby windows.
The main payjoin crate now contains the reusable deterministic relay-ordering logic. payjoin-cli handles the application-specific parts: DNS resolution, ASMap lookup, trusted-directory filtering, and HTTP transport.
Relay candidates are grouped into privacy buckets:
Notes to reviwers :
Open question: non-ASMap behavior and #1696.
When ASMap is not configured, this PR treats each relay URL as its own bucket. Relay choice is pseudorandom rather than plain config order buckets are ranked by hashing the receiver key, time window, and relay URL. Different receiver keys normally produce different-looking relay choices.
The limitation is that URL buckets are weaker than ASN buckets. Without ASMap, two different relay URLs in the same ASN are treated as independent so POST/POLL separation only works at the URL level, not the ASN level.
I would like reviewer feedback on whether this URL-bucket fallback is the right default for implementations that do not use ASMap or whether the non-ASMap path should align more directly with the
SelectContextdirection in #1696.Disclosure: co-authored by Codex
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