fix(policy): add EBUSY fallback and TOML parse recovery (#19919) by krishdef7 · Pull Request #21541 · google-gemini/gemini-cli

krishdef7 · 2026-03-07T06:28:07Z

Follow-up to #19921 by @Sikandar1310291, which fixes #19919.
That PR addressed the core issue but two items from @mrpmohiburrahman's review were unaddressed and the branch had conflicts with main. This PR cherry-picks their work and adds:

EBUSY fallback - extends the rename error catch to handle EBUSY alongside EXDEV, covering Docker bind-mount scenarios on Linux aarch64
TOML parse recovery - if the policy file is corrupted, backs it up to .bak, emits a user-visible warning, and resets to a clean state instead of bricking the CLI

All 13 persistence tests pass. 4 pre-existing failures in workspace-policy.test.ts and config.test.ts are unrelated to this change and present on main.
Fixes #19919
Credit: @Sikandar1310291 and @awais62 for the original implementation.

gemini-code-assist · 2026-03-07T06:28:27Z

Summary of Changes

Hello, I'm Gemini Code Assist¹! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed!

This pull request refactors the input handling mechanism to explicitly differentiate between typed and pasted user input. A new isPasted flag has been introduced and propagated through the input submission pipeline, enabling the system to intelligently modify behavior for pasted content. Specifically, this change prevents automatic @ command expansion when input is pasted, enhancing user control and predictability. Note: The provided code changes do not align with the PR title and description, which mention policy fixes related to EBUSY and TOML parsing. This summary is based solely on the observed code modifications.

Highlights

Input Handling Refinement: Introduced an isPasted flag to accurately identify if user input originated from a paste event, allowing for differentiated processing.
@ Command Expansion Control: Modified the @ command processing logic to skip automatic expansion for pasted input, preventing unintended command execution and improving user experience.
API Updates for Paste Detection: Updated InputPrompt's onSubmit prop, AppContainer's handleFinalSubmit and submitQuery, and useGeminiStream's prepareQuery and submitQuery to propagate the new isPasted flag throughout the input submission flow.
Test Coverage: Adjusted existing tests for InputPrompt to correctly pass the isPasted parameter, ensuring the new functionality is properly validated.

Changelog

packages/cli/src/ui/AppContainer.tsx
- The handleFinalSubmit and submitQuery functions were updated to accept an isPasted boolean parameter.
packages/cli/src/ui/components/InputPrompt.test.tsx
- Test cases for InputPrompt were modified to include the isPasted parameter (mostly false) in onSubmit calls, with one specific test for paste events passing true.
packages/cli/src/ui/components/InputPrompt.tsx
- The onSubmit prop in InputPromptProps was updated to include an optional isPasted boolean.
- The handleSubmit function was modified to detect if input was pasted and pass this information to onSubmit.
- The recentUnsafePasteTime was added to the handleSubmit useCallback dependencies.
packages/cli/src/ui/hooks/atCommandProcessor.ts
- The HandleAtCommandParams interface was updated to include an optional isPasted boolean.
- The handleAtCommand function was modified to skip @ command expansion if the input was identified as pasted.
packages/cli/src/ui/hooks/useGeminiStream.ts
- The prepareQuery function signature was updated to include an isPasted boolean parameter.
- The submitQuery function signature was updated to include an optional isPasted property within its options object.
- The isPasted flag is now correctly propagated from submitQuery to prepareQuery and then to handleAtCommand.

Activity

No human activity has been recorded for this pull request yet.

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gemini-code-assist

Code Review

This pull request introduces a mechanism to prevent automatic @ command expansion when the input is pasted, which is a useful feature to avoid unintended behavior. However, the pull request title and description are completely unrelated to these changes, referring instead to policy file fixes. This discrepancy is critical as it makes the repository's history misleading and hard to follow. Please update the title and description to accurately reflect the changes made in this PR. The code changes themselves seem to correctly implement the paste detection for unsafe and large pastes, but I've noted one case that appears to be missed.

_{Note: Security Review did not run due to the size of the PR.}

krishdef7 · 2026-03-11T09:45:56Z

The bot summary above is stale, it describes an earlier version of this branch that accidentally included unrelated commits. The current diff is +215/-26, touching only packages/core/src/policy/. The bot summary will not update retroactively.
Hi @Abhijit-2592 @mrpmohiburrahman, you reviewed #19921 which this PR builds on. This PR cherry-picks that work and adds the two items from your review that were unaddressed: the EBUSY fallback and TOML parse recovery. Would appreciate your eyes on this when you get a chance.

samidhachari · 2026-03-13T05:58:34Z

Thanks for the fix and for clarifying the earlier bot summary. Since the bot mentioned that the previous diff included unrelated commits, just to confirm — the current changes are now limited to packages/core/src/policy/ and fully align with the PR title and description, correct?

krishdef7 · 2026-03-13T06:30:25Z

Yes, confirmed, the current diff touches only packages/core/src/policy/ (3 files: config.ts, persistence.test.ts, policy-updater.test.ts). The earlier bot summary described an accidentally included unrelated branch that has since been cleaned up.

krishdef7 · 2026-03-13T06:32:23Z

Added two missing tests to persistence.test.ts: EBUSY fallback (mirrors the EXDEV test) and TOML parse recovery (corrupted file → backup to .bak → reset to clean state). Also fixed all mocking to use vi.spyOn instead of vi.mocked, the latter doesn't work here since node:fs/promises is replaced wholesale by memfs rather than wrapped by vitest's mock system. All 13 tests passing.

krishdef7 · 2026-03-16T04:27:01Z

/gemini review

gemini-code-assist

Code Review

This pull request introduces important robustness improvements to the policy persistence logic. However, critical security vulnerabilities have been identified and highlighted in the comments: the use of fs.copyFile in these new paths follows symbolic links, which could be exploited by a malicious workspace to overwrite or disclose sensitive files. It is strongly recommended to add checks to ensure the policy file is not a symbolic link before performing copy operations, as detailed in the specific feedback. Despite this, the changes are well-implemented with solid error handling and comprehensive tests, indicating high overall quality.

krishdef7 · 2026-03-17T15:05:27Z

/gemini review

gemini-code-assist

Code Review

This pull request addresses handling file renaming failures (EXDEV/EBUSY) in the Gemini CLI policy configuration, particularly in Docker bind-mount scenarios. It introduces a fallback mechanism by copying and unlinking files to ensure policy persistence. The changes include modifications to packages/core/src/policy/config.ts and packages/core/src/policy/persistence.test.ts, along with a minor update to packages/core/src/policy/policy-updater.test.ts.

krishdef7 · 2026-03-20T18:21:43Z

@mrpmohiburrahman @Abhijit-2592, rebased onto latest main. This directly addresses the two items flagged in your review on #19921: EBUSY fallback and TOML parse recovery, both with symlink guards. All 13 tests pass. Would appreciate a review when you get a chance.

krishdef7 · 2026-03-21T06:17:57Z

Closing to focus bandwidth on higher-priority PRs. The EBUSY fallback and TOML parse recovery work stands on its own, happy to reopen if a maintainer wants to pull this forward.

cocosheng-g · 2026-04-09T23:13:39Z

please solve conflicts

…e-gemini#19919) - Include actual error cause in user-visible feedback message - Clean up orphaned tmp files when write operations fail - Abort persistence on non-ENOENT read errors (e.g. EACCES) to prevent silently overwriting existing policy files - Add EXDEV cross-device rename fallback (copy + unlink) - Fix existing tests to use proper ENOENT errors - Add 4 new tests for error diagnostics, cleanup, EACCES abort, and EXDEV fallback

* Port from google-gemini/gemini-cli#21541: back up corrupted config.yaml When config.yaml fails to parse, load_config() silently falls back to DEFAULT_CONFIG and leaves the broken file on disk. If the user then re-runs the setup wizard or hermes config set (both rewrite config.yaml), their broken-but-recoverable overrides are lost for good. Adapts the policy-file recovery from gemini-cli#21541: on the first parse warning for a given broken file, snapshot it to config.yaml.corrupt.<ts>.bak (best-effort, symlink-guarded, size-deduped) and tell the user where it landed. Unlike Gemini's version we deliberately do NOT reset config.yaml to a clean state — hermes never silently mutates user config, and leaving it means a hand-fixed file is re-read on the next load. Tests: 3 new cases (backup created + content preserved + original untouched; same-size backup dedup; symlink not copied). E2E verified with isolated HERMES_HOME and a real tab-indented broken config. * feat(dashboard): add Debug Share to the System page Surface `hermes debug share` in the dashboard. The System > Operations section gets a dedicated card that uploads a redacted report + full logs and returns the paste URLs as real, copyable links instead of a log tail. - debug.py: factor a pure build_debug_share() returning structured {urls, failures, redacted, auto_delete_seconds}; run_debug_share now calls it (CLI output unchanged). - web_server.py: POST /api/ops/debug-share runs the share core in a worker thread and returns the structured payload synchronously (the URLs are the whole point — not a backgrounded action). - api.ts: runDebugShare() + DebugShareResponse. - SystemPage.tsx: share card with a redaction toggle (on by default), per-link + copy-all buttons, and the 6h auto-delete countdown. - tests: build_debug_share core + endpoint (redact toggle, failure 502, token gate).

* Port from google-gemini/gemini-cli#21541: back up corrupted config.yaml When config.yaml fails to parse, load_config() silently falls back to DEFAULT_CONFIG and leaves the broken file on disk. If the user then re-runs the setup wizard or hermes config set (both rewrite config.yaml), their broken-but-recoverable overrides are lost for good. Adapts the policy-file recovery from gemini-cli#21541: on the first parse warning for a given broken file, snapshot it to config.yaml.corrupt.<ts>.bak (best-effort, symlink-guarded, size-deduped) and tell the user where it landed. Unlike Gemini's version we deliberately do NOT reset config.yaml to a clean state — hermes never silently mutates user config, and leaving it means a hand-fixed file is re-read on the next load. Tests: 3 new cases (backup created + content preserved + original untouched; same-size backup dedup; symlink not copied). E2E verified with isolated HERMES_HOME and a real tab-indented broken config. * fix(dashboard): explain WHY a chat WS connection was refused The embedded-chat PTY WebSocket (/api/pty) collapsed every rejection into a bare close code: 4401 for any auth failure, 4403 for three unrelated failures (host mismatch, origin mismatch, peer-IP). Neither the server log nor the browser said which gate fired or why, so a "chat won't connect" report was undiagnosable without a repro. Server (web_server.py): - _ws_auth_reason / _ws_host_origin_reason / _ws_client_reason return a short machine-parseable reason; old bool wrappers kept for callers/tests. - pty_ws splits the overloaded 4403 into 4401 (auth), 4403 (host/origin), 4408 (peer not allowed), 4404 (chat disabled), and sends the reason on the close frame (clamped to the 123-byte RFC6455 limit). - Each path logs one line: 'pty auth rejected reason=.. mode=.. cred=.. peer=..' / 'pty refused: <reason> ..'. Accepted path logs 'pty accepted peer=.. mode=.. cred=..' so an audit shows HOW a peer authed, not just that it did. tui_gateway/ws.py: - 'ws send/write failed' now logs error_type=<ExcName> so an exception whose str() is empty (closed-transport sends) no longer logs 'error='. web/src/pages/ChatPage.tsx: - console.warn the real close code + server reason on every close. - Map 4404/4408 to specific banners; 4401/4403 banners echo the server reason; [session ended] prints the close code. E2E verified all five reject paths + accepted path produce matching close code, wire reason, and server log line.

* Port from google-gemini/gemini-cli#21541: back up corrupted config.yaml When config.yaml fails to parse, load_config() silently falls back to DEFAULT_CONFIG and leaves the broken file on disk. If the user then re-runs the setup wizard or hermes config set (both rewrite config.yaml), their broken-but-recoverable overrides are lost for good. Adapts the policy-file recovery from gemini-cli#21541: on the first parse warning for a given broken file, snapshot it to config.yaml.corrupt.<ts>.bak (best-effort, symlink-guarded, size-deduped) and tell the user where it landed. Unlike Gemini's version we deliberately do NOT reset config.yaml to a clean state — hermes never silently mutates user config, and leaving it means a hand-fixed file is re-read on the next load. Tests: 3 new cases (backup created + content preserved + original untouched; same-size backup dedup; symlink not copied). E2E verified with isolated HERMES_HOME and a real tab-indented broken config. * feat(dashboard): add Debug Share to the System page Surface `hermes debug share` in the dashboard. The System > Operations section gets a dedicated card that uploads a redacted report + full logs and returns the paste URLs as real, copyable links instead of a log tail. - debug.py: factor a pure build_debug_share() returning structured {urls, failures, redacted, auto_delete_seconds}; run_debug_share now calls it (CLI output unchanged). - web_server.py: POST /api/ops/debug-share runs the share core in a worker thread and returns the structured payload synchronously (the URLs are the whole point — not a backgrounded action). - api.ts: runDebugShare() + DebugShareResponse. - SystemPage.tsx: share card with a redaction toggle (on by default), per-link + copy-all buttons, and the 6h auto-delete countdown. - tests: build_debug_share core + endpoint (redact toggle, failure 502, token gate).

…earch#38743) * Port from google-gemini/gemini-cli#21541: back up corrupted config.yaml When config.yaml fails to parse, load_config() silently falls back to DEFAULT_CONFIG and leaves the broken file on disk. If the user then re-runs the setup wizard or hermes config set (both rewrite config.yaml), their broken-but-recoverable overrides are lost for good. Adapts the policy-file recovery from gemini-cli#21541: on the first parse warning for a given broken file, snapshot it to config.yaml.corrupt.<ts>.bak (best-effort, symlink-guarded, size-deduped) and tell the user where it landed. Unlike Gemini's version we deliberately do NOT reset config.yaml to a clean state — hermes never silently mutates user config, and leaving it means a hand-fixed file is re-read on the next load. Tests: 3 new cases (backup created + content preserved + original untouched; same-size backup dedup; symlink not copied). E2E verified with isolated HERMES_HOME and a real tab-indented broken config. * fix(dashboard): explain WHY a chat WS connection was refused The embedded-chat PTY WebSocket (/api/pty) collapsed every rejection into a bare close code: 4401 for any auth failure, 4403 for three unrelated failures (host mismatch, origin mismatch, peer-IP). Neither the server log nor the browser said which gate fired or why, so a "chat won't connect" report was undiagnosable without a repro. Server (web_server.py): - _ws_auth_reason / _ws_host_origin_reason / _ws_client_reason return a short machine-parseable reason; old bool wrappers kept for callers/tests. - pty_ws splits the overloaded 4403 into 4401 (auth), 4403 (host/origin), 4408 (peer not allowed), 4404 (chat disabled), and sends the reason on the close frame (clamped to the 123-byte RFC6455 limit). - Each path logs one line: 'pty auth rejected reason=.. mode=.. cred=.. peer=..' / 'pty refused: <reason> ..'. Accepted path logs 'pty accepted peer=.. mode=.. cred=..' so an audit shows HOW a peer authed, not just that it did. tui_gateway/ws.py: - 'ws send/write failed' now logs error_type=<ExcName> so an exception whose str() is empty (closed-transport sends) no longer logs 'error='. web/src/pages/ChatPage.tsx: - console.warn the real close code + server reason on every close. - Map 4404/4408 to specific banners; 4401/4403 banners echo the server reason; [session ended] prints the close code. E2E verified all five reject paths + accepted path produce matching close code, wire reason, and server log line.

* Port from google-gemini/gemini-cli#21541: back up corrupted config.yaml When config.yaml fails to parse, load_config() silently falls back to DEFAULT_CONFIG and leaves the broken file on disk. If the user then re-runs the setup wizard or hermes config set (both rewrite config.yaml), their broken-but-recoverable overrides are lost for good. Adapts the policy-file recovery from gemini-cli#21541: on the first parse warning for a given broken file, snapshot it to config.yaml.corrupt.<ts>.bak (best-effort, symlink-guarded, size-deduped) and tell the user where it landed. Unlike Gemini's version we deliberately do NOT reset config.yaml to a clean state — hermes never silently mutates user config, and leaving it means a hand-fixed file is re-read on the next load. Tests: 3 new cases (backup created + content preserved + original untouched; same-size backup dedup; symlink not copied). E2E verified with isolated HERMES_HOME and a real tab-indented broken config. * feat(dashboard): add Debug Share to the System page Surface `hermes debug share` in the dashboard. The System > Operations section gets a dedicated card that uploads a redacted report + full logs and returns the paste URLs as real, copyable links instead of a log tail. - debug.py: factor a pure build_debug_share() returning structured {urls, failures, redacted, auto_delete_seconds}; run_debug_share now calls it (CLI output unchanged). - web_server.py: POST /api/ops/debug-share runs the share core in a worker thread and returns the structured payload synchronously (the URLs are the whole point — not a backgrounded action). - api.ts: runDebugShare() + DebugShareResponse. - SystemPage.tsx: share card with a redaction toggle (on by default), per-link + copy-all buttons, and the 6h auto-delete countdown. - tests: build_debug_share core + endpoint (redact toggle, failure 502, token gate).

…earch#38743) * Port from google-gemini/gemini-cli#21541: back up corrupted config.yaml When config.yaml fails to parse, load_config() silently falls back to DEFAULT_CONFIG and leaves the broken file on disk. If the user then re-runs the setup wizard or hermes config set (both rewrite config.yaml), their broken-but-recoverable overrides are lost for good. Adapts the policy-file recovery from gemini-cli#21541: on the first parse warning for a given broken file, snapshot it to config.yaml.corrupt.<ts>.bak (best-effort, symlink-guarded, size-deduped) and tell the user where it landed. Unlike Gemini's version we deliberately do NOT reset config.yaml to a clean state — hermes never silently mutates user config, and leaving it means a hand-fixed file is re-read on the next load. Tests: 3 new cases (backup created + content preserved + original untouched; same-size backup dedup; symlink not copied). E2E verified with isolated HERMES_HOME and a real tab-indented broken config. * fix(dashboard): explain WHY a chat WS connection was refused The embedded-chat PTY WebSocket (/api/pty) collapsed every rejection into a bare close code: 4401 for any auth failure, 4403 for three unrelated failures (host mismatch, origin mismatch, peer-IP). Neither the server log nor the browser said which gate fired or why, so a "chat won't connect" report was undiagnosable without a repro. Server (web_server.py): - _ws_auth_reason / _ws_host_origin_reason / _ws_client_reason return a short machine-parseable reason; old bool wrappers kept for callers/tests. - pty_ws splits the overloaded 4403 into 4401 (auth), 4403 (host/origin), 4408 (peer not allowed), 4404 (chat disabled), and sends the reason on the close frame (clamped to the 123-byte RFC6455 limit). - Each path logs one line: 'pty auth rejected reason=.. mode=.. cred=.. peer=..' / 'pty refused: <reason> ..'. Accepted path logs 'pty accepted peer=.. mode=.. cred=..' so an audit shows HOW a peer authed, not just that it did. tui_gateway/ws.py: - 'ws send/write failed' now logs error_type=<ExcName> so an exception whose str() is empty (closed-transport sends) no longer logs 'error='. web/src/pages/ChatPage.tsx: - console.warn the real close code + server reason on every close. - Map 4404/4408 to specific banners; 4401/4403 banners echo the server reason; [session ended] prints the close code. E2E verified all five reject paths + accepted path produce matching close code, wire reason, and server log line.

* Port from google-gemini/gemini-cli#21541: back up corrupted config.yaml When config.yaml fails to parse, load_config() silently falls back to DEFAULT_CONFIG and leaves the broken file on disk. If the user then re-runs the setup wizard or hermes config set (both rewrite config.yaml), their broken-but-recoverable overrides are lost for good. Adapts the policy-file recovery from gemini-cli#21541: on the first parse warning for a given broken file, snapshot it to config.yaml.corrupt.<ts>.bak (best-effort, symlink-guarded, size-deduped) and tell the user where it landed. Unlike Gemini's version we deliberately do NOT reset config.yaml to a clean state — hermes never silently mutates user config, and leaving it means a hand-fixed file is re-read on the next load. Tests: 3 new cases (backup created + content preserved + original untouched; same-size backup dedup; symlink not copied). E2E verified with isolated HERMES_HOME and a real tab-indented broken config. * feat(dashboard): add Debug Share to the System page Surface `hermes debug share` in the dashboard. The System > Operations section gets a dedicated card that uploads a redacted report + full logs and returns the paste URLs as real, copyable links instead of a log tail. - debug.py: factor a pure build_debug_share() returning structured {urls, failures, redacted, auto_delete_seconds}; run_debug_share now calls it (CLI output unchanged). - web_server.py: POST /api/ops/debug-share runs the share core in a worker thread and returns the structured payload synchronously (the URLs are the whole point — not a backgrounded action). - api.ts: runDebugShare() + DebugShareResponse. - SystemPage.tsx: share card with a redaction toggle (on by default), per-link + copy-all buttons, and the 6h auto-delete countdown. - tests: build_debug_share core + endpoint (redact toggle, failure 502, token gate).

…earch#38743) * Port from google-gemini/gemini-cli#21541: back up corrupted config.yaml When config.yaml fails to parse, load_config() silently falls back to DEFAULT_CONFIG and leaves the broken file on disk. If the user then re-runs the setup wizard or hermes config set (both rewrite config.yaml), their broken-but-recoverable overrides are lost for good. Adapts the policy-file recovery from gemini-cli#21541: on the first parse warning for a given broken file, snapshot it to config.yaml.corrupt.<ts>.bak (best-effort, symlink-guarded, size-deduped) and tell the user where it landed. Unlike Gemini's version we deliberately do NOT reset config.yaml to a clean state — hermes never silently mutates user config, and leaving it means a hand-fixed file is re-read on the next load. Tests: 3 new cases (backup created + content preserved + original untouched; same-size backup dedup; symlink not copied). E2E verified with isolated HERMES_HOME and a real tab-indented broken config. * fix(dashboard): explain WHY a chat WS connection was refused The embedded-chat PTY WebSocket (/api/pty) collapsed every rejection into a bare close code: 4401 for any auth failure, 4403 for three unrelated failures (host mismatch, origin mismatch, peer-IP). Neither the server log nor the browser said which gate fired or why, so a "chat won't connect" report was undiagnosable without a repro. Server (web_server.py): - _ws_auth_reason / _ws_host_origin_reason / _ws_client_reason return a short machine-parseable reason; old bool wrappers kept for callers/tests. - pty_ws splits the overloaded 4403 into 4401 (auth), 4403 (host/origin), 4408 (peer not allowed), 4404 (chat disabled), and sends the reason on the close frame (clamped to the 123-byte RFC6455 limit). - Each path logs one line: 'pty auth rejected reason=.. mode=.. cred=.. peer=..' / 'pty refused: <reason> ..'. Accepted path logs 'pty accepted peer=.. mode=.. cred=..' so an audit shows HOW a peer authed, not just that it did. tui_gateway/ws.py: - 'ws send/write failed' now logs error_type=<ExcName> so an exception whose str() is empty (closed-transport sends) no longer logs 'error='. web/src/pages/ChatPage.tsx: - console.warn the real close code + server reason on every close. - Map 4404/4408 to specific banners; 4401/4403 banners echo the server reason; [session ended] prints the close code. E2E verified all five reject paths + accepted path produce matching close code, wire reason, and server log line.

…i#19919) (google-gemini#21541) Signed-off-by: krishdef7 <gargkrish06@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Sikandar <ma5161310@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Tommaso Sciortino <sciortino@gmail.com>